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BRITISH EMBASSY,

WASHINGTON

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**THE EVENTS OF 1965  
IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC  
DOCUMENTS FROM  
THE UNITED KINGDOM'S NATIONAL ARCHIVES**

(Facsimile edition)

2. At all events, I felt it essential to await the opportunity of a talk with Vaughn before replying to you.

3. I told him, with all due diffidence, briefly of such conclusions as I had drawn from my visit as set out in my letter to you on 11 August. I showed him out on the particular points which you raise in your letter.

**LOS EVENTOS DE 1965  
EN LA REPÚBLICA DOMINICANA  
DOCUMENTOS DE  
THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES DEL REINO UNIDO**

Edición facsimilar

PRESENTED TO THE ARCHIVO GENERAL DE  
LA NACIÓN BY AMBASSADOR STEVEN FISHER

As you know, we do not have a very high opinion of them and I confess that I was glad to learn from Vaughn that Ken Crockett, the present Director of Caribbean Affairs, will shortly be leaving. I hope his successor will be both more forthcoming and more effective. I did not ask Vaughn about this in terms, he had I felt already made it clear enough to what lengths the Americans remain prepared to go in the Caribbean by their action in relation to Haiti (our telegram No. 137 Saving) that they would not hesitate to intervene if necessary. I am afraid in short that I would be dishonest if I were in any way to modify the impression I have left with you that the Americans remain determined to pursue their present policies, which they regard as vital to them, in the strictest sense of the word, in terms of their national security. It is true that no catastrophic new development seems at present likely in Santo Domingo, but I feel sure the Americans privately attach importance to the deterrent effect elsewhere of continued toughness. Of course they are uncomfortable about the damage which has already been done to the fabric of O.A.S. but seem to have hope of building on the wreckage (see our telegram No. 137 Saving). They are certainly conscious of the need to be wiser to have made an effort to consult with their other friends and allies and carry them along with them, and we must hope that they will do better in this regard in future. It is not my impression that they really attach much importance to the U.N. and they would indeed dispute that what they have done has in any way made a serious inroad on the authority of the U.N. I will not go into this in greater detail here: their attitude is based



Los documentos recogidos en este libro ofrecen una muestra de la riqueza atesorada en el exterior, y aún no rescatada en su totalidad, para el mejor conocimiento de la gesta de 1965. Con el fin de ahondar en los estudios de la historia dominicana en Gran Bretaña, en particular, se requiere por lo menos la reproducción de la documentación diplomática y consular de los siglos XIX y XX. Es de agradecer al embajador Fisher el interés para que el Archivo General de la Nación esté en condiciones de realizar esta tarea en un futuro cercano.

Desde las primeras páginas, el lector podrá percatarse de la importancia que revisten estos documentos. Por una parte, se abre una perspectiva a la apreciación de actores internacionales, además de los estadounidenses. Se pone de manifiesto el entramado interior de la diplomacia británica en sus relaciones con dominicanos de variadas orientaciones, diplomáticos estadounidenses y de otros países en Santo Domingo, altos funcionarios en Washington y delegados de las Naciones Unidas.

El grueso de los despachos proviene del primer secretario Stafford Campbell, ante la ausencia del embajador designado, Ian Bell, quien tomó posesión del cargo después de concluidos los hechos con la renuncia del presidente Francisco Alberto Caamaño, el 3 de septiembre. Tienen importancia también los despachos en Washington durante esos meses de Sir P. Dean, quien daba seguimiento al tema ante el gobierno de Estados Unidos. Como lo destaca el embajador Fisher, es de especial relevancia el extenso informe de John Killick, del personal superior de la embajada británica en Estados Unidos, quien hizo una visita de tres días a Santo Domingo. Campbell, además, tuvo el cuidado de anexar documentos que consideraba debían ser consultados en Londres, los cuales se incluyen en este libro.

A primera vista resulta imposible establecer el impacto de las posturas de Campbell en Londres. En todo caso, en ningún momento el gobierno británico hizo manifestaciones hostiles a los constitucionalistas, a diferencia de los latinoamericanos, que aprobaron la creación de la FIP. Lo que sí resalta es el hecho hasta ahora no registrado del papel significativo desempeñado en el interior del país por el diplomático a cargo de la embajada británica. La disposición al compromiso y la integridad con que rodeó sus juicios lo tornaron en actor y hoy en fuente de importancia sobre la gesta de 1965.

ROBERTO CASSÁ

Director general del AGN





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**ESTA PUBLICACIÓN HA SIDO POSIBLE GRACIAS A LA COLABORACIÓN DE LA  
REFINERÍA DOMINICANA DE PETRÓLEO PDV.**

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**PRESENTED TO THE ARCHIVO GENERAL DE LA NACION  
BY AMBASSADOR STEVEN FISHER**

Santo Domingo  
2016



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## Presentación

El embajador de Gran Bretaña en República Dominicana, Steven Fisher, hizo un aporte apreciable al mejor conocimiento de la Revolución de Abril de 1965, cuando, en el contexto de la conmemoración del medio siglo del acontecimiento, donó al Archivo General de la Nación copias de despachos conservados en el Foreign Office emanados en Santo Domingo, Londres y Washington.

Los documentos recogidos en este libro ofrecen una muestra de la riqueza atesorada en el exterior, y aún no rescatada en su totalidad, para el mejor conocimiento de la gesta de 1965, para no hablar de otros temas, como es archisabido. Con el fin de ahondar en los estudios de la historia dominicana en Gran Bretaña, en particular, se requiere por lo menos la reproducción de la documentación diplomática y consular de los siglos XIX y XX. Es de agradecer al embajador Fisher el interés para que el Archivo General de la Nación esté en condiciones de realizar esta tarea en un futuro cercano.

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El grueso de los despachos proviene del primer secretario Stafford Campbell, ante la ausencia del embajador designado, Ian Bell, quien tomó posesión del cargo después de concluidos los hechos con la renuncia del presidente Francisco Alberto Caamaño, el 3 de septiembre. Tienen importancia también los despachos en Washington durante esos meses de Sir P. Dean, quien daba seguimiento al tema ante

el gobierno de Estados Unidos. Como lo destaca el embajador Fisher, es de especial relevancia el extenso informe de John Killick, del personal superior de la embajada británica en Estados Unidos, quien hizo una visita de tres días a Santo Domingo. Campbell, además, tuvo el cuidado de anexar documentos que consideraba debían ser consultados en Londres, los cuales se incluyen en este libro.

De común acuerdo con el embajador Fisher, se ha decidido que la reproducción de los documentos se haga en facsímiles. Por una parte, hoy casi todo el mundo de cierta edad lee inglés, idioma que ha experimentado cambios mínimos en medio siglo, lo que permite eludir los problemas que comporta toda traducción. Se disfruta, además, desde el ángulo de la archivística, de los componentes materiales de sellos, firmas, reenvíos y otros elementos originales.

Particular atención ha de otorgarse a las fórmulas con que Campbell enfocó los procesos. En las escasas páginas previas al 24 de abril se capta que la atención de ese diplomático sobre los asuntos del país no traspasaba planos convencionales, centrados en las pugnas que escenificaban por lo bajo sectores militares. Durante la primera semana de la contienda asumía la perspectiva propia de representante de una potencia aliada a Estados Unidos en el escenario de América Latina. Dependía en esos días de la radio y la televisión, la prensa escrita, rumores y, en buena medida, de lo que recibía de diplomáticos estadounidenses. Su perspectiva apenas divergía de lo que estos expresaban. Es sintomático, por ejemplo, que no comentara el dato transmitido al Foreign Office el 27 de abril por Dean desde Washington, acerca de que la Agencia Central de Inteligencia de Estados Unidos (CIA) estimaba que si Juan Bosch retornaba a la presidencia en ese momento tendría compromisos inevitables con los «extremistas rebeldes» y sus concepciones izquierdistas y antiestadounidenses.

No quiere decir que estos despachos iniciales no contengan aspectos interesantes, como podrá constatarse. Pero sobre todo primaba la confusión y la falta de conocimiento de lo que en verdad sucedía. En particular Campbell quedó impresionado por lo que creyó que acontecía a partir del 28 de abril, cuando se inició la intervención militar de Estados Unidos. Hasta ese momento apreciaba que se mantenía el orden. Pero el 29 de abril sumariamente caracterizó la situación como de «ausencia de gobierno, policía o unidades militares capaces de proteger a las personas y las propiedades». Justificó en lo fundamental la entrada de la Infantería de Marina sobre la base de que estaba dirigida a facilitar la evacuación de residentes extranjeros, aunque le constaba que ningún súbdito británico había sido perjudicado. No descartó que, ya con tropas en tierra, Estados Unidos procurara restaurar el orden en los días siguientes. Estuvo de acuerdo con el diagnóstico de que el núcleo dirigente moderado del Partido Revolucionario Dominicano (PRD) había perdido el control en beneficio de «extremistas» o «comunistas». Y le alarmó la tenacidad «fanática» de resistencia



de esa izquierda. La prueba palmaria era que algunas embajadas estaban sometidas a ataques armados. Dio pábulo a un sospechoso documento, que el embajador de Colombia atribuyó al Dr. José Rafael Molina Ureña después que tomó asilo el 27 de abril, en el que se admitía este rumbo alarmante. No formuló siquiera un comentario del infundio que le transmitió el embajador de Estados Unidos de que el Movimiento Popular Dominicano había propiciado una masacre de sus enemigos. Sencillamente, encerrado en su embajada y dependiente de la comunicación por teléfono, ignoraba el fondo de lo que ocurría. El 30 de abril llegó a una caracterización completamente equivocada, que lo ponía en sintonía con la impresión catastrófica que abrumaba a la derecha tradicional: «Un reino del terror prevalece en algunos sectores». Al otro día, consumada la toma de la Fortaleza Ozama por los constitucionalistas, llegó aún más lejos. «Los militantes dominan y un reino del terror ha sido impuesto durante días. Miles de terroristas jóvenes están provistos de fusiles automáticos y bazookas. El optimismo no se justifica en el presente».

El meollo de su mirada comenzó a experimentar una mutación a partir del momento en que el agregado y segundo de la embajada, P. F. Rudd, «con un riesgo personal considerable», osó ingresar el 1 de mayo a la parte sur y principal de la Zona Constitucionalista, ya cercada por tropas estadounidenses. El diplomático británico encontró a John Bartlow Martin negociando con «el líder rebelde» Caamaño. Rudd captó que, sin duda, Caamaño estaba en «completo control del movimiento rebelde en su conjunto», pautado por la vigencia de la Constitución y el retorno de Juan Bosch a la presidencia. Más aún, reportó como buena la disciplina de los rebeldes. Por tanto, la existencia de una autoridad coherente entre estos hacía factibles las negociaciones.

Al otro día el mismo Campbell entró al «territorio rebelde». Y todo el panorama cambió de golpe. Quedó impresionado por las informaciones que le transmitió Héctor Aristy acerca de la potencia militar de los constitucionalistas. Los interlocutores de ese día declararon no ser comunistas y más bien estar vinculados al PRD. Eran, en una palabra, personas que debían ser tomadas en cuenta, aun fuera preliminarmente. «Estas gentes parecen bien organizadas y dispuestas a un sitio prolongado», como en efecto sucedió hasta el 3 de septiembre. De inmediato introdujo el primer disenso respecto a la política de Estados Unidos, al considerar que constituiría un error pretender imponer a políticos tradicionales porque los «rebeldes» nunca les darían tregua.

Por su condición de potencia aliada, Gran Bretaña debía recibir explicaciones de Estados Unidos. El Foreign Office instruyó al embajador en Washington, Patrick Dean, sobre lo que debía preguntarle al secretario de Estado. Debería afirmar a Rusk que Gran Bretaña no estaba en condiciones de proporcionar informaciones a la



inteligencia estadounidense sobre la amenaza comunista, aspecto importante que pone en evidencia el escaso conocimiento de la realidad dominicana que tenía el aparato estadounidense y la manera falaz con que se pretendió justificar la intervención militar. La negativa británica a apoyar la indagación de la participación comunista en República Dominicana pone de relieve no solo una actitud discreta, sino una sutil distancia que no debía llegar a comentarios adicionales sobre las actuaciones de Estados Unidos, a no ser las relacionadas con aspectos humanitarios.

Resulta comprensible que, en una segunda visita a Caamaño, Rudd fuese reconocido por aquel como intermediario diplomático en pos de una solución razonable, como se muestra en el despacho de Campbell del 3 de mayo.

En los documentos se evidencia una información hasta ahora desconocida: Campbell se ganó la confianza personal de Caamaño, quien en adelante le confió informaciones y apreciaciones en forma privilegiada. El único equivalente pudo ser tal vez el embajador francés, quien hizo una visita formal al Gobierno Constitucionalista por instrucciones del Quai d'Orsay, aunque no implicó su reconocimiento. El diplomático galo confió a Campbell que no compartía esa posición que podía interpretarse de apoyo, y a los pocos días en París se aclaró que tal postura favorable a los dominicanos había sido malinterpretada.

En cualquier caso, lo que informa Campbell en los despachos acerca de las conversaciones con Caamaño ilustra la sensatez madura con que este joven militar asumió su función presidencial. Campbell interactuó también con ministros y otras figuras del gobierno de Caamaño, como Héctor Aristy y Jottin Cury. En consecuencia, estuvo en condiciones de captar detalles de importancia sobre lo que acontecía. No parece que entrara en contacto directo con dirigentes de los partidos de izquierda, pero se observa la atención que prestó a los documentos que emitían, y manifestó respeto por la capacidad de algunos de ellos. Por otra parte, sostuvo todo el tiempo comunicaciones con diplomáticos que llegaban a Santo Domingo, en especial del gobierno de Estados Unidos, de las Naciones Unidas y de países de la Organización de Estados Americanos (OEA). Llama la atención la claridad con que los diplomáticos estadounidenses exteriorizaban sus pareceres al británico, como se observa cuando informa de sus conversaciones con Harry Schlaudemann. En adelante, por consiguiente, estos despachos pasan a ser material ineludible de consulta para la comprensión de la política del Gobierno Constitucionalista y, en general, de lo que transcurrió hasta los primeros días de septiembre.

Sujeta a la alianza con Estados Unidos, Gran Bretaña optó por atenerse a lo que dispusiera la OEA, controlada por la potencia invasora y que, por ende, terminó pretendiendo legalizar la invasión mediante la creación de la Fuerza Interamericana de Paz (FIP). La diplomacia británica era consciente de lo que implicaba la falta de



legalidad de la intervención militar, que solo podría ser subsanada por un organismo internacional como la OEA. Ahora bien, esta postura se formuló de manera discreta y no polémica, de forma que no se inclinara la balanza en contra de un actor dominicano determinado. El paquete de información que proporcionaba Campbell bien pudo contribuir a esta cautela.

El embajador Fisher argumenta que la postura británica en ese momento debe comprenderse a la luz de la presencia de un gobierno del Partido Laborista. Por consiguiente, es posible inferir que, aunque no se cuestionara la alianza con Estados Unidos, en un asunto de tal naturaleza cabía enfatizar una posición propia aunque fuera en matices.

Lo sustantivo estriba en que Campbell no se vio precisado en momento alguno a retractarse del posicionamiento a favor de los constitucionalistas que adoptó desde cierto momento. Le fue permitido mantener el acercamiento a Caamaño, que lo llevó a asumir la validez moral de la causa constitucionalista. Para que no quede sujeto a interpretación, conviene citar en el inglés un fragmento de su despacho de 4 de mayo. «What happened here was that the patient beast of burden suddenly turned into a tiger. Beneath the evident Communist exploitation is a spontaneous explosion of rage and frustration. It is hoped that the governing classes have learnt something, but I doubt it».

De ahí en adelante, sus desacuerdos con la política de Estados Unidos fueron incrementándose, aunque nunca se desdijo de la conclusión inicial de que la intervención militar se había justificado ante un peligroso vacío de autoridad. En el centro de su criterio radicaba la constatación de que la mayor parte de los constitucionalistas no eran comunistas. Recusó directamente la impresión del nuncio Emmanuelle Clarizzio de que Caamaño estaba atrapado por sectores cuestionables. La fuerza de los comunistas, agregó, radicaba en la calidad organizativa y política, mas no en la cantidad. Por ello, le pareció cada vez más evidente que había que tomar en cuenta las reivindicaciones democráticas de los dominicanos como un acto de justicia. En tal sentido, apostaba a la conveniencia de que se contribuyera a fortalecer la opción democrática de Caamaño y de la mayoría de los constitucionalistas con el fin de aislar al sector extremista o comunista.

No es la intención dar seguimiento aquí a los contenidos de los despachos de Campbell, ni a los que desde Washington enviaba el embajador Sir P. Dean. Tiene toda la razón el embajador Fisher al argumentar que conviene dejar a los documentos que hablen por sí mismos. Pero ha de llamarse la atención sobre la importancia de uno de los documentos en el que Campbell sistematizaba sus criterios, «The April Cup and the Ensuing Civil War», fechado el 24 de mayo, que se decidió distribuir en el interior del Foreign Office. Recapitula informaciones y resume sus conclusiones personales.



Renueva, por ejemplo, el punto de vista de que hubo un peligro comunista, aunque la mayoría de los constitucionalistas eran demócratas. Todavía más importante, varió de cuajo su caracterización de los militantes como terroristas, para poner el énfasis en el idealismo de los jóvenes, explicándose que muchos de ellos abrazaran el comunismo ante el panorama de injusticia y corrupción. Captó el papel prominente de la juventud de izquierda en los hechos iniciados el 24 de abril. Sin tapujos, acentuó su admiración por Caamaño y su acuerdo con la generalidad de sus puntos de vista, aunque no fuera un «pensador sutil». Por tanto, extremó su discrepancia con las acciones de la embajada estadounidense en Santo Domingo, que reducía la causa constitucionalista al «control comunista».

Ese documento no fue el único en que sistematizó su pensamiento. Campbell procuraba cuidadosamente informar el desenvolvimiento de los hechos, al tiempo que parece que no tenía tapujos para expresar sus puntos de vista personales. Otro documento sobresaliente es el fechado el 1 de julio, en el que continuaba informando el curso de los acontecimientos a lo largo del último mes, aunque de nuevo se remontara a los orígenes del proceso y a sus cruciales primeros días. Se apoyaba incluso en apreciaciones favorables a Caamaño que le transmitiera personalmente McGeorge Bundy, consejero de Seguridad Nacional de Estados Unidos. Del otro lado, censuraba la actitud de los attachés militares estadounidenses, Fishburn y Heywood, partidarios del exterminio puro y simple de los constitucionalistas. Campbell concluyó caracterizando la política del aparato estadounidense como «una criatura con dos cabezas».

Es probable que algunas de esas posturas tan sorprendentes causaran cierta preocupación, aunque no hay señal alguna de censura hacia él en Londres. Pero se decidió que un diplomático acreditado en Washington de nivel superior, John Killick, visitara Santo Domingo para tomar contacto directo con los actores y ayudar a Campbell a disponer de una panorámica internacional. Esto sugiere que debía instruirlo de consideraciones provenientes de la embajada en Washington y del Foreign Office, pero también de altas instancias de Estados Unidos. En un despacho del 13 de julio Campbell detalla acciones desplegadas por él y Killick durante los días anteriores. Se entrevistaron con Héctor García Godoy y Ellsworth Bunker, el primero candidato a presidente provisional y el segundo jefe de la misión de la OEA para conducir las negociaciones con el Gobierno Constitucionalista.

A poco de retornar a Washington, Killick elaboró un informe, que fechó el 19 de julio, calificado por Fisher como obra maestra. El lector podrá juzgar hasta qué punto divergían o no los puntos de vista de Killick respecto a los que venía enunciando Campbell. Fisher aclaró que no se hacía ilusiones respecto a ninguna de las partes, pero que había que tomar en cuenta a los constitucionalistas. Aun así, advertía el





peligro de la persistencia de una situación revolucionaria, por lo que consideraba que debía apoyarse la opción de García Godoy, quien requeriría del apoyo de la OEA y de la FIP para reencauzar el proceso de manera adecuada. En conclusión, Killick justificó la decisión de Washington de intervenir. Adicionalmente, aprobaba la orientación desplegada por Bunker en esos días, aunque formulaba interrogantes acerca de las posibles razones que habían determinado el fracaso de la misión encabezada por McGeorge Bundy. Agregó, de todas maneras, que Estados Unidos debía tomar en cuenta las recomendaciones de Campbell acerca de la obligatoriedad de reformas para la superación de la situación presente. En otro corto despacho del mismo día, a propósito de un encuentro con Donald Reid, Killick validó críticas de Campbell al sector dirigente tradicional de República Dominicana.

No parece, por lo que arroja la documentación en su conjunto, que la breve visita de Killick tuviese efectos significativos. Campbell mantuvo su tono crítico y la política británica se atuvo en forma cuidadosa a los términos de la alianza con Estados Unidos. A primera vista resulta imposible establecer el impacto de las posturas de Campbell en Londres. En todo caso, en ningún momento el gobierno británico hizo manifestaciones hostiles a los constitucionalistas, a diferencia de los latinoamericanos, que aprobaron la creación de la FIP. Lo que sí resalta es el hecho hasta ahora no registrado del papel significativo desempeñado en el interior del país por el diplomático a cargo de la embajada británica. La disposición al compromiso y la integridad con que rodeó sus juicios lo tornaron en actor y hoy en fuente de importancia sobre la gesta de 1965.

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## Prologue I

In April 1965 the British Embassy in Santo Domingo was to be found at No. 84 Avenida Independencia in Gascue. There was a complement of four diplomats in the Embassy staff. These were the Ambassador (position vacant), the First Secretary (Mr. Stafford Frederick Campbell), the Junior Attache/Pro-Consul (Mr. P. F. Rudd) and an Archivist (Miss R. Passmore-Rowe – a name that surely brings to mind images of James Bond's Miss Money-Penny). The Ambassador's position was vacant because the previous Head of Mission, Mr. S. A. Lockhart, had already left post at the end of his mission whilst his successor, Mr. Ian Bell, had not yet arrived. Stafford Campbell therefore headed the Embassy as the Charge d'Affaires.

Stafford Campbell had turned to diplomacy relatively late in life. He was born in 1912. His military career (1935-52) spanned the Second World War in which he saw active service. He had joined the Foreign Office aged 52 in 1963 and been posted immediately to Santo Domingo as First Secretary/Consul in April of that year.

This book, comprising original documents taken from the United Kingdom's National Archives, reveals how British diplomats viewed, assessed and reported on the events that unfolded in the Dominican Republic between April and September 1965 – the revolution, the civil war and the foreign military intervention that followed. This is largely the story as told by Stafford Campbell as Charge d'Affaires. But such was the nature of the events on 1965 in the Dominican Republic that British diplomats in Washington, New York and, of course, London became heavily involved. Their views, concerns and judgements can be seen in this book. The documents reproduced here confirm that the British Embassy was actively engaged in consultations with many of the main players in the drama and provided the UK Government with a regular supply of reports and judgements on what was happening. Campbell and his colleagues write with the confidence and clarity which has always characterised the British diplomat service.



The first few reports are short and to the point. They show a sense of great urgency and focus on the basic, essential facts. Campbell's telegram No 20 of 26 April conveys the drama of the previous day: «Triumvirate was deposed at 1020 25 April by Military Group but no constitution of Santo Domingo was proclaimed [...] By midday city was relatively calm [...] About 10,000 people assembled at Duarte Bridge to oppose force of [Elias Wessin y] Wessin said to be proceeding from San Isidro... Rifle and machine gun fire continued all night [...] situation is critical and confused [...] I have no information of harm to British life and property».

Another report, from 26 April, shows that the Diplomatic Corp met at the British Embassy and issued a joint appeal to both sides to respect human rights and civilian lives. Subsequent reports informed London that Wessin's forces were unable to force their way into the city («His plan seems unimaginative and execution incompetent»). On 29 April he reported the significant development of the previous day: «US Marines force [...] was flown in yesterday with initial order to protect Americans lives and property. I imagine they will later be charged with restoration of order».

Campbell's reports take us from those tense, early days, through the weeks of fighting that followed. There are fascinating insights, such as this on 29 April: «At Nunciatura today I was shown a document signed by Molina Urena admitting that PRD insurrection to win constitutional government had fallen into complete control of communists [...] I am informed by American Ambassador that a massacre of MPD's enemies has taken place in the city». At this point, Campbell advises London that it should recommend the evacuation of British citizens. His reports give a real sense of deepening crisis and growing chaos.

The purpose of this introduction is to stimulate the interest of the reader to work through the documents themselves, and so I will resist the temptation to continue through the reports picking out the points of interest. That pleasure awaits the reader. I will, however, point to some of the broader themes which emerge.

Campbell's reporting gives candid opinions of cause and effect of the Revolution. By 4 May he is able to write a reflective piece (telegram 37) which explains not just what happened, but also why; «What happened here was that the patient beast of burden suddenly turned into a tiger. Beneath the evident Communist exploitation is a spontaneous explosion of rage and frustration. It is hoped that the governing classes have learnt something, but I doubt it».

Above all he is not afraid to give opinions on the personal qualities and motivations of the main Dominican actors.

He is clearly unimpressed by the leadership qualities or motivations of Donald Reid Cabral, Wessin y Wessin and Antonio Imbert. Francisco Alberto Camaano Deyna, on the other hand, earns his respect and praise as a brave soldier and a leader. But perhaps the most glowing tributes are paid to Hector Garcia Godoy with whose accession to the interim Presidency the end of the crisis was reached. There are also revealing comments about his diplomatic colleagues, often delivered with



dry English humour but always with a desire to convey an accurate message. Telegram 73 of 11 May is a particularly sharply worded criticism of several of his Latin American colleagues whom he describes as «niggardly and hysterical».

The US Ambassador appears frequently in reports as one would expect. Less expected is the way that Campbell increasingly questions his judgement («I am concerned about Mr Bennett»). The particular subject where Campbell disagrees most strongly is in the estimate of the extent of communist presence. He criticises the US Embassy for exaggerating this important issue. In his despatch of 1<sup>st</sup> July, drawing a comprehensive picture, Campbell writes that «My friends at the US Embassy have got themselves into such a frame of mind about this matter [number of communists] that if the facts do not fit the circumstances it is the facts that must be changed». He is nevertheless also at pains to stress the warm US-British relationship, particularly through his friendship with a Mr Schaudeman who appears to have been the Deputy Chief of Mission or Political Counsellor.

Perhaps because Campbell was representing a Left of Centre UK Government (Labour having taken power in the elections of 1964), or perhaps through personal conviction and judgement, his sympathies are clearly with the humble Dominican people whose interests he sees as being represented by the rebels. So on 22 May in his telegram 98 he writes that «the genuine social protest content of the rebel movement has very deep roots».

Whilst he is critical of American judgement of the communist threat Campbell is extremely clear about the value of the military intervention in saving lives. «On 5 May he writes, «I do not know of any foreign resident who will not agree that the United States Marines entered Santo Domingo just in time to prevent absolute disaster [...] this prompt intervention saved thousands of lives which in the foreseeable future will be in jeopardy if they leave».

Where he becomes critical of the US military is in the way they appear to favour the anti-constitutionalist cause: «Impartiality has been stretched a good deal since their arrival [...] there has been no firing on Imbert's troops. But for some mysterious reason it has always been necessary to return the fire of the rebels».

Despite burst of humour (including informing London that the morale of the British Embassy remains high as there is plenty of whisky), Campbell does not hold back from mentioning the very darkest side of events. For example, he reports rumours and evidence of human rights abuses by the anti-Constitutional forces in the National Cemetery. And he relates a very grisly incident further north in Villa Mella where the German Ambassadors out riding her horse encountered what appear to be evidence of numerous bodies of murdered rebels).

In July a new character enters the scene. From 9-12 July a senior member of the British Embassy in Washington, Mr John Killick, comes to Santo Domingo «in order to give Campbell a glimpse of the outside world» (i.e. a breather visit out of the country). Knowing how our system works, I suggest that this was not the only reason for

the visit. The Dominican Civil War had become the biggest political issue of the year. There were (briefly) over 20,000 US troops in Santo Domingo –around half of the number already in Vietnam. The issue was the second most debated at the UN that summer. Like the US Government– which sent former Ambassador Martin (1962-1963) and Special Representative George Bundy to the Republic in order to give the President an independent view, so too the British Government would have wanted Mr. Killick to assess the situation with the benefit of his greater diplomatic experience and political sensitivity.

Killick's assessment starts with characteristic British modesty: «The trouble with the twenty four hour expert is that he knows no shame and writes about it all at great length as though his views and impressions meant anything; I propose to be no exception». But his report dated 19 July is a masterpiece of political analysis some of which still holds true today. Killick was an astute judge – later to become our Ambassador to Moscow and subsequently to NATO.

Campbell and Killick both give the impression of horrified onlookers witnessing a family breaking into factions and fighting to the death. They welcome the compromises which were made in August and September – and are especially complementary of the personal commitment and integrity of interim President Garcia Godoy («if any man can do the job ahead Garcia Godoy can»). They nevertheless report to London with a profound sadness that such murderous events could occur in the first place; and they report with dismay that not all Dominican political players would sign up to the Act of Reconciliation and that long term recovery and development would be «indescribably difficult».

Campbell went on to complete his tour under Ambassador Ian Bell and was then posted to Peru. He retired from HM Diplomatic Service in the early 1970s. His brave and intelligent handling of the crisis, his good humour and leadership and above all the quality of his written reporting, earned him warm praise from the Foreign Office who thanked him for his «admirable job».

The beauty of a book like this one, which gives the reader the original documents in an unedited form, is that he or she can make his or her own judgement. These collected documents give insights into the main Dominican players and many of the foreign players who also became involved.

This introduction need go no further than this, indeed it has probably already rambled too far. The documents speak for themselves. I hope you will enjoy the candid analysis and style of this small example of classic British diplomatic reporting, made interesting to a Dominican reader because it relates to events that took place here in Santo Domingo half a century ago. I hope that many Dominicans will be able to read this book, and I particularly hope that it finds its way onto the shelves of the many Dominicans with whom I enjoyed discussing Dominican history during my very enjoyable and unforgettable period as Her Majesty's Ambassador to Santo Domingo.

STEVEN FISHER

HM Ambassador at Santo Domingo (2009 to 2015)

## Prólogo I

En abril de 1965 la Embajada británica en Santo Domingo se ubicaba en la Av. Independencia No. 84, en Gascue. Su personal estaba formado por cuatro diplomáticos: el embajador (puesto vacante); el primer secretario (Mr. Stafford Frederick Campbell); el agregado/procónsul de rango inferior (Mr. P. F. Rudd), y una archivera (Miss R. Passmore-Rowe –un nombre que seguramente trae a la memoria imágenes de la Miss Money-Penny de James Bond). La posición de embajador estaba vacante debido a que el jefe de misión anterior, Mr. S. A. Lockhart, había abandonado el puesto al concluir su misión y, su sucesor, Mr. Ian Bell, todavía no había asumido el cargo. En consecuencia, Stafford Campbell estaba al frente de la Embajada como encargado de Negocios.

Stafford Campbell se incorporó a la vida diplomática relativamente tarde. Nació en 1912. Su carrera militar (1935-1952) abarcó la Segunda Guerra Mundial, en la cual prestó servicio activo. A la edad de 52 años se incorporó al Servicio Exterior en 1963 y fue designado de inmediato como primer secretario/cónsul en Santo Domingo, en abril de ese año.

Este libro, que contiene documentos originales tomados del Archivo Nacional del Reino Unido, revela cómo los diplomáticos británicos veían, asumían y reportaban los acontecimientos que se desarrollaron en la República Dominicana entre abril y septiembre de 1965: la revolución, la guerra civil y la intervención militar extranjera que le siguió. Esta es, a vuelo de pájaro, la historia contada por Stafford Campbell como encargado de negocios. Y fue tal la naturaleza de los acontecimientos de 1965 en la República Dominicana, que los diplomáticos británicos en Washington, Nueva York y, por supuesto, en Londres se vieron profundamente involucrados. Sus enfoques, preocupaciones y análisis se pueden encontrar en esta obra.

Los documentos que aquí se reproducen confirman que la Embajada británica estaba involucrada activamente en consultas con muchos de los principales actores en el drama y que proporcionaba al gobierno del Reino Unido un suministro constante de reportes y análisis de lo que estaba ocurriendo. Campbell y sus colegas escriben con la seguridad y la claridad que siempre han caracterizado al servicio diplomático británico.

Los primeros y escasos reportes son breves y van a lo concreto. Los mismos reflejan un sentido de mucha urgencia y se enfocan en los hechos básicos y esenciales. El telegrama No. 20 de Campbell del 26 de abril transmite el drama del día anterior:

El Triunvirato fue depuesto a las 10:20 del 25 de abril por el estamento militar, pero no se proclamó ninguna constitución de Santo Domingo [...] A eso del mediodía la ciudad estaba en relativa calma [...] Unas 10,000 personas se concentraron en el Puente Duarte para enfrentar a las fuerzas de Elías Wessin y Wessin, que se creía saldrían de San Isidro [...] El fuego de rifles y ametralladoras continuó toda la noche [...] La situación es crítica y confusa [...] No tengo información sobre daños a propiedades y vidas británicas.

Otro reporte del 26 de abril señala que el cuerpo diplomático se reunió en la Embajada británica y produjo un llamado en conjunto a ambos bandos para que se respeten los derechos humanos y las vidas de los civiles. Reportes posteriores informaron a Londres que las fuerzas de Wessin fueron incapaces de forzar su entrada a la ciudad (*su plan se ve poco imaginativo y la ejecución incompetente*). El 29 de abril reportó el desarrollo significativo del día anterior: «Fuerzas de la Infantería de Marina de los Estados Unidos, aterrizaron ayer con la orden inicial de proteger propiedades y vidas norteamericanas. Me imagino que más tarde se encargarán del restablecimiento del orden».

Los reportes de Campbell nos conducen a aquellos tensos primeros días hasta las semanas de lucha que siguieron. Hay revelaciones fascinantes, como aquella del 29 de abril: «Hoy me mostraron en la Nunciatura un documento firmado por Molina Ureña que admite que la insurrección del PRD para reinstalar el gobierno constitucional ha caído bajo total control de los comunistas [...] Me informó el embajador americano que ha ocurrido una masacre en la ciudad de los enemigos del MPD». En este punto, Campbell sugiere a Londres que se debería recomendar la evacuación de los ciudadanos británicos. Su reporte refleja un sentido real de profundización de la crisis e incremento del caos.

El propósito de esta introducción consiste en estimular el interés del lector a través de los propios documentos, por lo que resistiré la tentación de continuar extrayendo los puntos de interés de los reportes.

El placer espera por el lector. Sin embargo, puntualizaré algunos de los temas más relevantes que emergen de los textos.





Los reportes de Campbell reflejan opiniones sinceras sobre las causas y efectos de la Revolución. Para mayo 4 es capaz de redactar una pieza reflexiva (telegrama 37) que explica no solo lo que sucedió, sino también por qué:

Lo que sucedió aquí fue que la paciente bestia de carga se convirtió de repente en un tigre. Bajo la evidente explotación comunista subyace la espontánea explosión de ira y frustración. La esperanza es que las clases gobernantes hayan aprendido algo, aunque lo dudo.

Por encima de todo, no teme en ofrecer opiniones sobre las cualidades personales y las motivaciones de los principales actores dominicanos.

Claramente no se deja impresionar por las cualidades de liderazgo o las motivaciones de Donald Reid Cabral, Wessin y Wessin y Antonio Imbert. Por otra parte, Francisco Alberto Caamaño Deñó se gana su respeto y admiración como un soldado valiente y líder. Pero quizás el mayor reconocimiento se tributa a Héctor García Godoy, con cuyo acceso a la presidencia interina, se logró el fin de la crisis. Hay también comentarios reveladores acerca de sus colegas diplomáticos, presentados frecuentemente con un seco humor inglés, aunque siempre con el deseo de entregar un mensaje preciso. El telegrama No. 73 del 11 de mayo refleja una aguda y mordaz crítica a varios de sus colegas latinoamericanos a quienes describe como *miserables e histéricos*.

El embajador americano aparece con frecuencia en los reportes tal como uno podría esperar. Lo menos esperado es la forma cómo Campbell cuestiona insistentemente sus juicios (*Tengo mis reservas sobre el Sr. Bennett*). El tema particular en que Campbell está principalmente en desacuerdo es la apreciación sobre el alcance de la presencia comunista. Critica a la embajada americana por exagerar este punto importante. En su despacho del 1 de julio, al presentar un panorama abarcador, Campbell escribe que «mis amigos de la embajada de EEUU se han encerrado a sí mismos en un cerco mental sobre este asunto (el número de comunistas) a tal punto que si los hechos no concuerdan con las circunstancias, son los hechos los que deben ser cambiados». No obstante, también se interesa por resaltar la cálida relación entre británicos y americanos, de un modo especial a través de su amistad con el Sr. Schaudeman quien aparece como jefe adjunto de Misión o consejero político.

Quizás porque Campbell representaba al gobierno de centro izquierda del Reino Unido (que obtuvo el poder en las elecciones de 1964), o debido a convicciones personales o por un mero asunto de enfoque, el caso es que sus simpatías se inclinan claramente por el pueblo dominicano llano, cuyos intereses él entiende que los asumen los rebeldes. Es así, que en su telegrama 98 de mayo 22, escribe que *el contenido de las genuinas manifestaciones de protestas sociales tiene raíces muy profundas*.

Mientras se presenta como crítico del enfoque americano de la amenaza comunista, Campbell es muy claro sobre la importancia de la intervención militar para salvar vida.



El 5 de mayo escribe: «no sé de ningún residente extranjero que no esté de acuerdo en que los marinos de Estados Unidos llegaron a Santo Domingo justo a tiempo para prevenir un desastre total [...] su rápida intervención salvó miles de vidas que en un futuro previsible estarían en peligro si ellos se marcharan».

Donde se muestra crítico de los militares americanos es en la forma como ellos actúan para favorecer la causa anti-constitucionalista: «La imparcialidad se ha reducido en gran medida desde que ellos llegaron [...] no ha habido fuego contrario a las tropas de Imbert. Pero por alguna razón misteriosa, siempre ha sido necesario devolver el fuego contra los rebeldes».

Aparte de las chispas de humor (incluyendo el informe a Londres de que la moral de la embajada británica se mantiene en alto porque hay un buen surtido de Whisky), Campbell no evade el mencionar el lado más oscuro de los acontecimientos. Por ejemplo, reporta rumores y evidencias de abusos contra los derechos humanos perpetrados por los anti-constitucionalistas en el Cementerio Nacional. También relata un incidente verdaderamente espeluznante, más al norte, en Villa Mella, donde la embajadora alemana montaba a caballo y encontró lo que parecía evidencia de varios cuerpos de rebeldes asesinados.

En julio entró otro personaje a escena. Del 9 al 12 de ese mes un miembro veterano de la embajada británica en Washington, el señor John Killick llega a Santo Domingo, «...con la finalidad de ofrecer a Campbell una panorámica del mundo exterior» (i. e. una visita de respiro fuera del país). Conociendo cómo funciona nuestro sistema, insinuó que esa no fue la única razón de la visita. La guerra civil dominicana se había convertido en el tema más relevante del año. Había (en corto tiempo) más de 20,000 tropas americanas en Santo Domingo, –cerca de la mitad del número que ya estaba en Vietnam.

El tema fue el segundo más debatido en la ONU ese verano. Así como el gobierno de los Estados Unidos –que había enviado a su embajador Martin (1962-1963), el representante especial George Brundy a la República a fin de que ofreciera al Presidente una visión independiente, de la misma manera al gobierno británico le interesaba que el Sr. Killick evaluara la situación con la ventaja de su más extensa experiencia diplomática y su agudeza política.

El enfoque de Killick comienza con la característica modestia británica: «El problema con el experto en veinticuatro horas es que no tiene vergüenza y escribe generalidades de tal manera que su visión e impresiones significan cualquier cosa; yo me propongo no ser la excepción». Pero su reporte fechado el 19 de julio es una pieza maestra de análisis políticos, de los cuales algunos son ciertos al día de hoy. Killick fue un juez sagaz –quien más tarde llegó a ser nuestro embajador en Moscú y posteriormente ante la OTAN.

Ambos, Campbell y Killick daban la impresión de observadores horrorizados, testigos de una familia dividida en facciones enfrentadas hasta la muerte. Dieron la bienvenida a los compromisos alcanzados en agosto y septiembre –los que son un



complemento especial del compromiso personal y de la integridad del presidente interino García Godoy (*si alguien puede llevar el trabajo a término, ese es García Godoy*). Sin embargo reportan a Londres con profunda tristeza que tales eventos de muerte pudieron haber ocurrido en los inicios, y con consternación añaden que no todos los actores políticos dominicanos firmarían el Acta de Reconciliación y que acuerdos a largo plazo y su evaluación serían *de indescriptible dificultad*.

Campbell concluyó su designación bajo el embajador Ian Bell y fue luego designado en Perú. Se retiró del servicio diplomático de su Majestad a principio de 1970. Su firme e inteligente manejo de la crisis, su buen humor y liderazgo, y sobre todo la calidad de sus reportes escritos obtuvieron cálida aceptación en el *Foreign Office*, el cual le agradeció su *trabajo admirable*.

La belleza de un trabajo como este, que ofrece al lector los documentos originales en una forma inédita, es que él o ella pueden derivar su propia evaluación. Esta colección de documentos ofrece una visión al interior de los principales actores dominicanos y de muchos actores extranjeros que también se vieron involucrados.

Esta introducción no debe pasar de aquí; es más, probablemente ha llegado demasiado lejos. Los documentos hablan por sí mismos. Espero que puedan disfrutar del análisis sincero y del estilo de esta pequeña muestra de los reportes diplomáticos británicos clásicos, de interés para el lector dominicano, puesto que se refieren a acontecimientos que ocurrieron aquí en Santo Domingo, hace ya medio siglo.

Espero que muchos dominicanos puedan leer este libro, y particularmente espero que el mismo encuentre el camino hacia los anaqueles de muchos dominicanos con quienes he disfrutado discutiendo de historia dominicana durante mi placentero e inolvidable periodo como embajador de su Majestad en Santo Domingo.

STEVEN FISHER

Embajador de su Majestad en Santo Domingo  
(2009-2015).





*Proyecto de Digitalización*  
Academia Dominicana de la Historia

## Prologue II

This book is the result of much hard work by the staff of the Dominican Republic National Archives and my Predecessor, Ambassador Steven Fisher.

I was particularly pleased to see that the main contributor in the book, my namesake Stafford Campbell, was not only sent to the Dominican Republic in the same year I was born but also had the honour, as I do today, of being the United Kingdom's representative at a time of incredible interest, not just for the Dominican Republic, but internationally.

This book can be seen as the social media account of its day, with a series of ever more detailed reports giving timely information to an external audience who were eager to receive as much information as possible, as quickly as possible. The reporting illustrated herein shows the knowledge and conviction that the authors had in giving their personal opinions and assessments of difficult times.

I am sure that this work will become essential reading for anyone coming to the Dominican Republic as it will give them a true glimpse into a key period of history which has shaped the years since.

I very much hope that the reader enjoys the book and takes away a sense of the world as it was in 1965.

CHRIS CAMPBELL

Her Majesty's Ambassador to the Dominican Republic

(2015 - )





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# DOCUMENTS FROM THE UNITED KINGDOM'S NATIONAL ARCHIVES



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Academia Dominicana de la Historia




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*12/4*

(53/1/1)



BRITISH EMBASSY,  
 SANTO DOMINGO.

7 April, 1965.

*Dear Sir,* AD1015/21

Every once in a while, these days, we hear a sudden clatter of boots in the camps of the opposition as the first regroupings in the ranks take place, in preparation for the election campaign. The election season, as you know, is scheduled to open on 1 June and continue until 1 September, but whether, in fact, an election will actually take place, or whether, if it does, any serious opponent to Donald Reid will be allowed to stand, are the most open questions in the world. An air of unreality hangs over the whole prospect of elections, and the wily Donald Reid naturally does nothing to improve it. The only certain thing that can be said at the moment is that Reid enjoys sitting in the seat, and that he is prepared to move heaven and earth to stay there.

2. We have, however, news of a somewhat unexpected kind. Ex-President Rafael Bonnelly, who for some time has given signs of being a politically spent force, has now announced that he, at least, intends to stand as a Presidential candidate. On 3 April at La Delgada, some ten miles from Santiago, Bonnelly was guest of honour at a celebration at the house of a certain Señor Otilio Paulino, at which a letter, claimed to be supported by the signatures of 3,496 persons of the Cibao region, was read to him. This letter called on Bonnelly to take the leadership of a new independent political movement dedicated to national unity, and called for free elections. It referred to Bonnelly's Presidency of the Council of State and stressed what is claimed to be the positive benefits that flowed from that Government, citing the raising of wages of public servants, improvements in the standard of living, the prosperity of industry and commerce, and the reduction of unemployment at that time. All this, said the letter, was done with only \$25 million of Aid from the Alliance for Progress: what could the Council of State not have done with the \$89 million which, it is inferred, the present régime have squandered? At the end of the public reading of this letter, Bonnelly accepted the leadership of the movement and promised to give a written answer to it in the course of the next few days. He was accompanied on this occasion by Ramón Tapia Espinal, who, you will remember, was a Triumvir with Reid and Tavares until his headlong collision with the military last spring.

3. If elections are to take place, this move of Bonnelly's could well cause difficulty for Donald Reid. I have it on good authority that Reid has been taking samples of public opinion (such as it is) as to his popularity as a Presidential candidate, and it is more than likely that he has discovered that his following is practically non-existent. At the moment he is enjoying 100 per cent support from the Americans, but he knows, better than anyone, that this support will scarcely be forthcoming when it is seen that he is a man with hardly any public

/appeal,

R. M. K. Slater, Esq., C.M.G.,  
 American Department,  
 Foreign Office,  
 LONDON, S.W.1.

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appeal, and manoeuvres to keep in power and stave off elections, however adroit, might not go down too well with them. Up to the present, the alternatives to Reid (principally Bosch and Balaguer) have been such as to operate in his favour, as far as the Americans are concerned. This would not apply to Bonnely.

4. Bonnely's association with happier times, raised living standards, booming business, higher employment figures and relative stability, might, with advantage, be deployed against Reid now; there is no argument that, looking back on it, the period of the Council of State seemed a Golden Age. Arbitrary arrest was more or less unknown and even the military seemed to have behaved themselves. Bonnely is spoken of as the man who nursed the country through its first post-Trujillo elections, at the end of which he handed over the reins of government, like a true democrat, to his bitterest enemy. With this democratic background Bonnely would be a suitable subject for American support, and the viable alternative to Reid, which so far the Americans have always said is not to be found.

5. Bonnely's flaw is an uninspiring public personality, but Tapia's appearance with Bonnely at La Delgada has importance, when public images are considered. Admittedly Tapia drinks too much, but he has a very good brain, and a reputation for having the courage to stand by his principles. The fact that Tapia was sacrificed by Reid to the military last spring now counts definitely in his favour, seeing that hardly a single Dominican has a good word for the Armed Forces to-day. Above all, he is coloured. If Bonnely chooses Tapia as his Vice-Presidential candidate, he should be able to open up prospects for his cause among the coloured masses: no other party with a sporting chance has a coloured Vice-Presidential candidate, especially one that can talk as well, and has the good radio and television personality of Tapia.

6. Reid could hardly disqualify Bonnely from standing, as he has hinted he might do with Bosch or Balaguer. I have unconfirmed reports that Reid is putting out feelers to Bosch; if this is true, it speaks for itself. Reid's tactics have always commanded my admiration; strategy, however, may not be his strong point.

7. I am copying this letter to Sutherland at Washington.

*Yours ever.*

*S. F. Campbell*  
(S. F. Campbell)



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*Slater* *Dr* *12/10* **A**

(53/1/1)

BRITISH EMBASSY,  
SANTO DOMINGO

RECEIVED IN  
ARCHIVES No. 35  
APR 1965  
AD 1015/22

5 April, 1965.

*Dear Sir,*

I have an unconfirmed report that General de Brigada Piloto Miguel Atila Luna Pérez has been appointed Air Attaché in London, but so far I have not seen the decree, nor can I get Protocol here to confirm it yet. An acquaintance of mine, who occupies a good point of observation in Government circles, tells me that he has seen the decree but up to the present it has not been made public. It is possible that Atila Luna is still struggling to avoid the appointment and that whilst this continues the decree will be held up. In case the appointment is confirmed, I take the opportunity of this bag to enclose some information about Atila Luna, and to sketch in the background, as it was told to me, to what would be the second appointment of a former Chief of Staff to the Dominican Embassy in London as Attaché.

2. I was told on 4 April by a fairly reliable source that a plot to remove Donald Reid was uncovered during last week. My information is that Atila Luna, Belisario Peguero and General de Brigada Salvador A. Montás Guerrero, the recently appointed Secretary of State for the Interior, had pacted together in a plan to remove Donald Reid by coup de main and substitute him with some other unspecified person. Having drafted a manifesto designed to be broadcast to the nation following the successful coup, these three then approached Colonel Marcos A. Jorge Moreno. This officer had recently been removed from his post as director of a profitable enterprise known as Servicios Tecnológicos de la Fuerzas Armadas, which organisation, among other things, operates both the Miami and Dominican end of the contraband chain which has done so much to raise the living standards of certain Army, Navy and Air Force officers. By inspection, Jorge Moreno would seem to have been a good choice for the purpose, having had the caviare snatched from his mouth, so to speak, by Donald Reid.

3. However, it appears that Jorge Moreno, after promising to consider the matter, took a copy of the draft manifesto to Donald Reid and told him of the plot. How Donald Reid is said to have confronted the plotters I cannot discover, but "Listin Diario" carried a news item on 2 April announcing that Atila Luna had been appointed to London as Air Attaché. The reporter added that he had seen Atila Luna waiting in the corridors at the National Palace on the previous day with, not too surprisingly, a very worried look on his face. The same news item also announced that Jorge Moreno is appointed Military Attaché in Guatemala, but my informant tells me that this is a blind, designed to protect Jorge Moreno from the attentions of the others, whose plans he so completely torpedoed.

R. M. K. Slater, Esq., C.M.G.,  
American Department,  
Foreign Office,  
LONDON, S.W.1.

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- 2 -

4. I now await news of Montás Guerrero, whose appointment as Secretary of State for the Interior will certainly be forfeit if his implication in the alleged plot is true. As for Belisario Peguero, he is still reported to be in the country. You will remember that we saw his civilian passport some time ago and that he carried visas for a large number of countries apparently intending to take a world tour. From his point of view, now would seem to be a good time to start.

5. You will see from the attached that Luna was one of the signatories to the Manifesto published on 25 September, 1963, by the Armed Forces, following the coup d'état deposing Juan Bosch. The signatures of nine generals were attached to that document: only one, Montás Guerrero, now remains in employment in this country, and his future, to say the least, is uncertain. Golpes de estado seem to devour their own children.

6. I am copying this letter to Sutherland at Washington, Morley at Kingston, Elgar at Port-au-Prince and Readman at Caracas.

Yours ever.

(S. F. Campbell)



CONFIDENTIALFROM SANTO DOMINGO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTP

DEPARTMENTAL  
DISTRIBUTION

26 APR 1965

AD1015/23

Mr. Campbell

No. 18  
25 April, 1965D. 1646 25 April, 1965  
R. 1753 25 April, 1965IMMEDIATE  
CONFIDENTIALAddressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 18 of 25 April.Repeated for information to: Washington  
Port au Prince  
Kingston  
R.N.O. Nassau

At mid-day 24 April the Chief of Staff and the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Army were made prisoner by a junior Left-wing officer faction at camp [grp. undec.] on the north west suburbs of the city. At the same time a small group forced their way at pistol point into the Santo Domingo Radio Station and broadcast proclamations that the Government had been destroyed. By 1530 Government forces had succeeded in gaining control in Santo Domingo, but the Chiefs of Staff were still held by the rebels and two Army camps held out against the Government. The Air Force and Navy appeared to remain loyal. The Government ordered civilians to be evacuated from the vicinity of the camp in preparation for an air attack anticipated at 5 a.m. Curfew was declared at 6 p.m., 24 April.

2. At 3 a.m. on 25 April fighting broke out in the east of the city. It appears that the rebels have taken the only bridge between Santo Domingo and the Air Force base at San Isidro, thus cutting off the Government from its strongest support. The projected air attack did not take place and the aircraft merely flew over without hostile action.

3. At 6 a.m. this morning the city streets were filled with mobs shouting for Bosch. Rebel troops have armed some civilians and are patrolling the city in trucks. The mob  
/in

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Santo Domingo telegram No. 18 to Foreign Office

- 2 -

in the main square have armed themselves with sticks and clubs and riot police are taking no action against them. Rifle fire can be heard from the centre of the city and law and order is clearly breaking down. All radio stations are silent. The Government may well have already fallen and an ugly situation is possible.

4. I have no reports as yet of harm to British subjects' property. My letter 53/1/1 of 23 April, A.F.P. were right for wrong reasons, but my face is red.

Foreign Office pass Washington 4, Kingston 7, Port au Prince 11, R.N.O. Nassau 1.

[Repeated as requested. Copy to Telegraph Section C.O. for repetition to R.N.O. Nassau.]

NYR

ADVANCE COPIES:

- F.O. P.S.
- P.U.S.
- Mr. Rennie
- Hd. of American Dept.
- Hd. of P.U.S.D.



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FROM WASHINGTON TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTP

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

Sir P. Dean  
No. 1106  
26 April, 1965

D. 0035 27 April, 1965  
R. 0110 27 April, 1965

IMMEDIATE  
SECRET

27 APR 1965  
AD1015/24

AD1015/23

Santo Domingo telegram 18: Dominican Republic.

According to the State Department, the situation deteriorated early this morning and confused fighting has continued throughout the day with pro-Bosch forces appearing to gain the upper hand. C.I.A. agree that it looks as if the rebels will win, but the situation is still very fluid, and they consider that the next 12 to 24 hours will be decisive. The rebels have distributed large quantities of small arms to civilian sympathizers.

2. Bosch is still in Puerto Rico. C.I.A. comment that if he returns now, he will be heavily indebted to the rebel extremists and may be more receptive to their Leftist and anti-United States views if they succeed.

3. Some United States citizens have asked to be evacuated, but phase I only of United States' plans has been put into operation - i.e., nationals have been alerted to be ready to move. No (repeat no) decision on evacuation has yet been taken.

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Consular Dept.  
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Sir G. Harrison  
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27 APR 1965  
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FROM SANTO DOMINGO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTP

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Mr. Campbell  
No. 20  
26 April, 1965

D. 1027 26 April, 1965  
R. 2355 26 April, 1965

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27 APR 1965

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AD 1015/25

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 20 of 26 April.  
Repeated for information to Washington  
Port au Prince  
Kingston  
Nassau

Triumvirate was deposed at 1020 25 April by Military Group but no constitution of Santo Domingo was proclaimed. Bosch spoke on the radio from Puerto Rico nominating Dr. Molina Urena provisional President pending his return. Armed mob attacked various properties and party offices of fallen régime. By midday city was relatively calm. About 10,000 people assembled at Duarte Bridge to oppose force of Wessin said to be proceeding from San Isidro to seize the city.

2. At 1700 Wessin's aircraft attacked National Palace and Bridge. Attack continued until dark. Rifle and machine gun fire continued all night in various parts of city.

3. At 0500 26 April air attacks were resumed and are continuing. Fighting is going on around the Bridge but Wessin's force has not yet seized it. There have been a number of civilian casualties and radio announce that family of pilot have been seized as party hostages. The situation is critical and confused and the outcome of the fighting is impossible to forecast. I have no information of harm to British life and property.

Foreign Office pass to Washington 5, Port au Prince 8, Kingston 12, R.N.O. Nassau 2.

[Repeated as requested.]

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Private Secretary  
Sir G. Harrison  
Mr. Rennie  
Hd. American Dept.

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FROM SANTO DOMINGO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

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Mr. Campbell

No. 21

27 April, 1965

28 APR 1965

D. 0817 27 April, 1965

R. 1726 27 April, 1965

AD1015/26.

IMMEDIATE

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 21 of 27 April.  
Repeated for information to Washington.

Americans have begun evacuating dependents who wish to leave. Up to now there have been no incidents involving British lives or property. Reasonable order appears to be maintained in city. Unless situation changes for worse I would not recommend evacuation of British dependents.

ADVANCE COPIESF.O. Private Secretary

Sir G. Harrison

Mr. Rennie

Head of American Dept.

Head of Consular Department

Head of F.O.S.D.

Head of News Dept.

Resident Clerk

+++++

28 APR  
1965



FROM SANTO DOMINGO TO FOREIGN OFFICE A

Cypher/OTP

FO/CRO/WH.DISTRIBUTION

Mr. Campbell

No. 22  
27 April, 1965

39

28 APR 1965

AD10:5/27

D. 1711 27 April, 1965  
R. 1711 27 April, 1965

IMMEDIATE  
CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 22 of 27 April.

Repeated for information to: Washington  
Port au Prince Nassau  
Kingston Caracas

Wessin's tanks approached the bridge on the morning of 26 April but later retired. Air strikes continued until midday. Afternoon and evening were relatively quiet. The Corps Diplomatique met at the British Embassy in the morning and issued a joint appeal to both sides to respect human rights and civilian lives.

2. At 5.15 a.m. 27 April rocket fire attacks were made on military installations and these continue sporadically. So far it is estimated that 25 persons have been killed and about 100 injured in air attacks. Wessin's failure to take the bridge after three days may be decisive. I detect mounting confidence on the part of the pro Bosch group.

3. American evacuation of dependents at this time seems bad psychology but we all understand their special problem of anti-Americanism which does not apply to us. It is impossible to foresee events in this extremely confusing situation but I believe British subjects should stay quietly in their houses and I am advising to that end. Both sides must be reaching exhaustion point physically and administratively.

Foreign Office pass Washington 7, Port au Prince 9, Kingston 13, R.N.O. Nassau 3, Caracas 6.

[Repeated as requested and transmitted to M.O.D. for repetition via M.O.D. distribution circuit, and for repetition to R.N.O. Nassau.]

<u>ADVANCE COPIES:</u>	Hd. of Consular Dept.
P.S.	Hd. of P.U.S.D.
Sir G. Harrison	Hd. of News Dept.
Mr. Rennie	Resident Clerk
Hd. of American Dept.	

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FROM SANTO DOMINGO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTP

Mr. Campbell

No. 23  
27 April, 1965

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AD1015/28

F.O./C.R.O./WH DISTRIBUTION

D. 19.35 27 April, 1965  
R. 19.36 27 April, 1965

IMMEDIATE  
CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 23 of 27 April.  
Repeated for information to: Washington Nassau.

Units of Navy have now joined Wessin's force. Naval shelling of National Palace began at 11.45 a.m. A combined operation of shelling, bombing and rocket and cannon attack is now in progress. Civilian casualties will probably be heavy. I have associated myself with a Corps Diplomatique appeal for talks between combatants.

2. Up to now navy has been a passive spectator. Its adherence to Wessin marks an important shift in balance.

Foreign Office pass Washington No. 8 and RNO Nassau No. 4.  
[Repeated to Washington].

[Transmitted to M.O.D. for action via M.O.D. distribution circuit, and for repetition to RNO Nassau].

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F.O.  
Private Secretary  
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28 APR 1965

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FROM SANTO DOMINGO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

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Mr. Campbell

No. 21

27 April, 1965

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D. 02.12 27 April, 1965  
R. 02.50 27 April, 1965

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ARCHIVES 36  
28 APR 1965  
AD1015/29

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 21 of 27 April,  
Repeated for information to Washington, Port au Prince,  
Kingston, Nassau, Caracas

Navy's alliance with Wessin and the intense sea and air bombardment at midday, apparently overwhelmed the pre-Besch junior officer attempt to hold power. At approximately 4 p.m., 300 well equipped army troops of Wessin faction entered the city from the west and fought their way through the outskirts. A little earlier some Wessin troops had at last crossed the Ozama at the Duarte Bridge. Both forces appear to have made a northward hook penetrating [gp. undec] most favourable to Besch and enveloping the city.

2. I am informed by a fairly reliable source that Dr. Molina Urena has admitted that his cause is lost and that he and his companions have ceased resistance. Firing still goes on but is diminishing. The Latin American Ambassador's attempt to negotiate cease fire terms to-day. It was not associated with this. The resistance put up by the city should be noted since it promises future problems for Wessin. Thanks for your wishes. We are all well.

Foreign Office pass Washington No. 9, Port au Prince No. 10, Kingston No. 14, RNO Nassau No. 5 and Caracas No. 7.

[Repeated as requested. Copy passed to Telegram Section, C.O. for repetition to Nassau]

ADVANCE COPIES TO:-

- Private Secretary
- Sir G. Harrison
- Mr. Rennie
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FROM SANTO DOMINGO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

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29 APR 1965

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Mr. Campbell

No.27

28 April, 1965

AD1015/32

D. 2217 28 April, 1965

R. 2315 28 April, 1965

IMMEDIATE

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Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No.27 of 28 April,  
Repeated for information to: Washington and Nassau

As far as I can tell there are now no PRD elements leading the Santo Domingo resistance and the leadership seems to have fallen into the hands of extreme left activists. The American Ambassador clearly fears the possibility of a Castro orientated take over should Wessin be unable to subdue the city. Making allowances for American sensitivity on this point I cannot deny that this possibility should be considered now. There have been air and naval bombardments this morning but Wessin seems to be making little progress on the ground. A military junta is being sworn in at San Isidro. The fact that this is not done in Santo Domingo is significant.

Foreign Office pass Washington No.11, RNO Nassau No.7.

[Repeated as requested].



ADVANCE COPIES:

Private Secretary

Sir G. Harrison

Mr. Rennie

Head of American Department

Head of News Department

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29 APR 1965

AD1015/31

Mr. Campbell

No. 25

28 April 1965

D. 18.11 28 April 1965

R. 18.16 28 April 1965

IMMEDIATE

CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 25 of 28 April  
Repeated for information to:

Washington and Nassau.

Although pro-Besch leaders have taken asylum, area round bridge is still hotly contested by armed civilians backed by three tanks. Street fighting continues this morning and yesterday's dead are still in the main street. Wessen is not yet in control of the city and would seem to need reinforcement to do so. Wessin declared martial law and curfew last night and intends forming a military junta today. The greatest confusion prevails. We are all well.

Foreign Office pass Washington R.N.O. Nassau as my telegrams Nos. 10 and 6.

[Repeated as requested]

ADVANCE COPIES TO:

F.O.

- Private Secretary
- Sir G. Harrison
- P.U.S.
- Mr. Rennie
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No. 28  
29 April 1965

D. 1416 29 April 1965

R. 1522 29 April 1965

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30 APR 1965

AD1015/32

IMMEDIATE  
CONFIDENTIALAddressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 28 of 29 April

Repeated for information to: Washington Nassau

United States Marines force at battalion strength was flown in yesterday evening with initial order to protect American lives and property. I imagine they will later be charged with restoration order. During yesterday a meeting was held between Martinez Secretary General PRD and Wessin. Agreement was reached on elections and immediate restoration of peace. Bosch was not to be a candidate. This was immediately vetoed by Left Wing leaders of city groups who continue to resist fanatically. Fight is still going on and could continue for days. Wessin is making no progress whatever. His plan seems unimaginative and execution incompetent. His radio is attempting to make out that United States Marines are here as his allies which naturally worsens situation.

Foreign Office pass to Washington 12 and RNO Nassua 8.

[Repeated to Washington]

[Transmitted to M.O.D. for repetition via M.O.D. distribution circuit, and for repetition to RNO Nassau]

ADVANCE COPIES:

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Sir G. Harrison

Mr. Rennie

Head of American Department

Head of News Department

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Head of Personnel Department

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FROM SANTO DOMINGO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

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Mr. Campbell

No. 29

29 April 1965

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ARCHIVES 34  
30 APR 1965  
AD1015/33

D. 18.10 29 April 1965

R. 19.14 29 April 1965

IMMEDIATE  
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Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 29 of 29 April  
Repeated for information to:

Washington, Nassau, San Juan.

Situation in Santo Domingo now is that there is no Government, no police and no army units capable of protecting private persons or property. At Nunciatura today, I was shown a document signed by Molina Urena admitting that P.R.D. insurrection to win constitutional government has fallen into complete control of Communists. These appear to be adherents of minor party M.P.D. a militant Marxist organization. I am informed by American Ambassador that a massacre of M.P.D.'s enemies has taken place in city. Wessin seems to have shot his belt and has now appealed to United States to restore order in city. The Americans have been burning papers for last 24 hours. The Corps Diplomatique met today and decided that chaos prevailed. In these circumstances of a complete breakdown of law and order I am reluctantly obliged to advise all British subjects so disposed that they should now take advantage of the Americans offer to evacuate to Puerto Rico. I propose sending my family. I have no information about harm to British subjects. All have behaved magnificently.

30 APR  
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Foreign Office pass Washington No. 13, R.N.O. Nassau No. 9,  
San Juan No. 3.

[Repeated as requested]

[Transmitted to M.O.D. for repetition via M.O.D. distribution  
circuit, for repetition to R.N.O. Nassau].

ADVANCE COPIES TO:  
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P.U.S.  
Mr. Rennie  
Hd American Dept.  
Hd Consular Dept.  
Hd P.U.S. Dept.  
Hd Personal Dept.  
Hd News Dept.

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
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FROM SANTO DOMINGO TO FOREIGN OFFICE



En Clair

DEPARTMENTAL  
DISTRIBUTION

Mr. Campbell

No. 47

5 May, 1965.

D. 1645 5 May, 1965.

R. 1845 5 May, 1965.

AD1015/33

Your telegram No. 36 received 4 May.

I assume there could be up to 7,000 persons claiming B.W.I. Citizenship. In seven days Americans have evacuated 3,500 persons. Technical answer to your question therefore is no, not all at once and Americans might well refuse to shoulder such a burden. This, however, is hardly likely to arise because B.W.I.s have lived here all their lives, married Dominicans, had Dominican children and know no other home. Less than ten have shown any interest in evacuation. In their own interests this is as it should be. Practical answer to your question therefore is yes.

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Mr. Campbell

No. 59  
6 May 1965

D.0635 7 May 1965  
R.0710 7 May 1965

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= 7 MAY 1965

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AD 1015/33(8)

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 59 of 6 May.  
Repeated for information to: Washington

AD 1015/33

UKMIS New York.

AD 1015/79/e

My telegrams Nos. 29 and 43.

The document which I mentioned as being signed by Molina Urena admitting that P.R.D. insurrection had been taken over by the Communists is not to be relied on and should not be quoted. I must withdraw this from my account of events of that day.

Foreign Office pass Washington 23, and UKMIS New York 7.

[Repeated as requested]

ADVANCE COPIES:

- F.O. Private Secretary
- Sir G. Harrison
- Mr. Greenhill
- Head of American Dept.
- Head of News Dept.
- Head of P.U.S.D.

7 MAY  
1965

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AD 1015/5-

FROM WASHINGTON TO FOREIGN OFFICE

A

En Clair

FO/CRO/WH. DISTRIBUTION

Sir P. Dean

No. 1152

30 April, 1965

IMMEDIATE

D. 18.42 30 April, 1965

R. 19.08 30 April, 1965

RECEIVED IN  
ARCHIVES No.39  
-1 MAY 1965

AD1015/38

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 1152 of 30 April,Repeated for information to: Santo Domingo Kingston  
C.B.F.C.A. Ottawa

Santo Domingo.

State Department made following statement early this morning.

Pursuant to the President's directive of last evening, debarkation of marines from the naval task force off shore of the Dominican Republic has been completed. Their specific mission is to protect United States and foreign citizens whose lives are in danger. The total number marines on shore amounts to 1,700.

The situation in Santo Domingo has continued to deteriorate. Law and order have ceased to exist. Calls for cease-fire have thus far been ignored. The United States Embassy has been under fire throughout the day. Several other Embassies have also been attacked. The evacuation area itself has come under fire. The death toll among Dominicans continues to rise.

United States and other nationals who remain in the city are in the most serious danger. In view of this situation, two battalions of the United States 82nd Airborne Division have been airlifted to reinforce the marines at present on the island. These forces are landing at the San Isidro air base, the only operational airfield in the vicinity of the city.

The council of the O.A.S. is still in session this evening to devise ways and means of bringing about a cease-fire and restoration of order to the Dominican Republic. The United States is giving the O.A.S. its fullest support in these endeavours. In addition, emergency action is being taken by the United States to provide food, medical supplies and emergency hospital facilities to assist the victims of the present violence.

Foreign Office pass Santo Domingo No.4 and Kingston No. 4.  
[ Repeated as requested ]

ADVANCE COPIES TO:-

F.O. Private Secretary  
Sir B. Burrows  
Hd. of American Dept.  
Hd. of News Dept.  
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1965



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FROM WASHINGTON TO FOREIGN OFFICE

En Clair FO/CRO/WH.DISTRIBUTION

Sir P. Dean

No. 1157 D. 1957 30 April, 1965  
30 April, 1965 R. 2015 30 April, 1965

EMERGENCY

RECEIVED IN  
ARCHIVES No. 39  
- 1 MAY 1965  
AD1015/39

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 1157 of 30 April.  
Repeated for information to:- GBFCA

Following message received through American channels from British Embassy, Santo Domingo, has been passed by State Department to us for onward transmission.


Begins:- 03230. Embassy building surrounded by about 25 troops. They say they have come to protect us. They seem friendly but are probably hoping to get protection themselves under Union Jack. Conditions here appalling - dead in streets - hospitals without water - wounded lying unattended in corridors, street fighting continuous. Reign of terror prevails in some sectors. All staff now in Embassy building with good supply of Scotch and other essentials, but could do with some bagpipes. Campbell.

Ends.

ADVANCE COPIES

Private Secretary  
Sir B. Burrows  
Head of American Dept.  
Head of Personnel Dept.  
Head of News Dept.  
Head of Communications Dept.  
Resident Clerk

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MAY 1 1965



CONFIDENTIAL

FROM WASHINGTON TO FOREIGN OFFICE

RECEIVED IN  
ARCHIVES No.39  
-1 MAY 1965  
AD1015/40

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Sir P. Dean

No. 1161

30 April, 1965

D. 23.20 30 April, 1965

R. 23.40 30 April, 1965

EMERGENCY

CONFIDENTIAL

AD1015/34

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 1161 of 30 April,  
Repeated for information to C.B.F.C.A. Ottawa

My telegram No. 1147 (not to Ottawa). Santo Domingo.

United States Marines have been ordered to advance their perimeter, which has hitherto been one block East of the United States Embassy, by 15 to 20 blocks further East along Avenida Independencia. The new perimeter will encompass the British Embassy Chancery.

N/4/R

2. Your telegram No. 36 to Santo Domingo. State Department have informed us that there is sufficient accommodation on United States vessels for all who can and wish to be evacuated.

ADVANCE COPIES TO:-

Sir B. Burrows  
Hd. of American Dept.  
Hd. of Consular Dept.  
Resident Clerk

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19 MAY 1965

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FROM WASHINGTON TO FOREIGN OFFICE

A

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Sir P. Dean

No. 1169  
30 April 1965

D.0500 1 May 1965  
R.0635 1 May 1965

RECEIVED IN  
ARCHIVES No 37  
- 3 MAY 1965  
AD1015/41

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AD1015/40

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 1169 of 30 April.  
Repeated for information to: CBPCA.

My telegram No. 1161: Sante Dominge.

SITREP from State Department operations room 10 p.m. local time 30 April.

Although Ozama police station fell to Leftists this afternoon, with reported loss of over 1,000 men, United States Authorities consider that military position in capital has improved in past 12 hours as United States marines have extended perimeter to include most foreign Embassies and have established safe evacuation zone. United States airborne troops from San Isidro have moved west towards Ozama River. Forces supporting the Junta still maintain small bridgehead on right bank of the river.

2. Mora, Secretary-General of the O.A.S., has flown to Sante Dominge with mandate from the Council to seek a cease-fire, although it is not known whether he will be received by Leftist leaders - the Council will meet on 1 May as organ of consultation under Rio Treaty. Although there is continued public criticism from the majority of Latin American Governments of United States decision to send in troops on a unilateral basis, State Department comment that there is less in private and less than they expected. They expect the public clamour to increase.

VVVVV



FROM NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE

En Clair

FO/CRO/WH DISTRIBUTION

Her Majesty's Consul General

No. 51

1 May 1965

D. 1654 1 May 1965

R. 1710 1 May 1965

EMERGENCY

AD1015/42

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 51 of 1 May.

Repeated for information to: Washington  
and Saving to: Santo Domingo

Campbell spoke to Evans by telephone this morning at 1500 hours GMT and said that this was his sole remaining means of communication. He and his staff are all in good heart and he asked that the following report be sent as Santo Domingo telegram No. 33 of 1 May to Foreign Office:-

Begins:

Continuous efforts to reach cease-fire agreement have had some result but firing continues. American Embassy under sniper fire. Gun battles last night around us in international area. A very untidy picture. American airborne elements reached bridge today from East between marines on West and airborne at river. The militants rule supreme and a reign of terror has been going on there for days. Thousands of young terrorists are armed with modern automatic weapons and bazookas. Optimism is unwise at present. The rebels took the Fortaleza yesterday. Loss of life and condition of injured is really appalling.

2. Please tell our next of kin that we are all well and in high spirits.

Ends.

3. Campbell suggested that you might try to reach him by telephone if necessary.

Foreign Office please pass to Santo Domingo as my telegram No. 1 Saving.

[Repeated as requested to Santo Domingo Saving].

[Repeated to Ottawa for Department of External Affairs].

ADVANCE COPIES:

Sir B. Burrows  
Hd American Dept.  
Hd News Dept.

Hd Communications Dept.  
Hd Personnel Dept.  
Resident Clerk

1s



CONFIDENTIAL

FROM WASHINGTON TO FOREIGN OFFICE

A

Cypher/OTP

F.O./C.R.O./WH.  
DISTRIBUTION

Sir P. Dean

D. 0415 2 May 1965

R. 0446 2 May 1965

No. 1171

1 May 1965

RECEIVED  
ARCHIVES  
- 3 MAY 1965  
AD1015/43

IMMEDIATE

CONFIDENTIAL

AD1015/41

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 1171 of 1 May

Repeated for information to: CBFCA UKMIS New York  
and Saving to: Santo Domingo

My telegram No. 1169 (Not to UKMIS New York): Santo Domingo.

According to State Department at 9 p.m. local time, 1 May there had been little change in the military situation throughout the day.

2. My paragraph 2. The Q.A.S. Secretary General has reported from Santo Domingo that this morning he met with representatives of the Junta and of part of the rebel faction, together with the Papal Nuncio for whose efforts towards achieving a cease-fire he has the highest praise. Dr. Mora is hopeful of reaching agreement to end the fighting, but reports that the cease-fire was violated today in several sectors.

N/Y/R

3. UKMIS New York telegram No. 975. State Department assume that United States Mission will be instructed to take line that Security Council should not proceed to consider the situation in Dominican Republic as question is being handled by the O.A.S. meeting as organ of consultation under the Rio Treaty, O.A.S. representatives today resolved under Article 39 of their Charter to appoint special committee which will probably leave for Santo Domingo on morning of 2 May. Summary of O.A.S. resolution in my immediately following telegram. (Net to CBFCA).

Foreign Office pass Saving to Santo Domingo as my telegram No.2.

[Repeated as requested]

ADVANCE COPIES:

Sir B. Burrows  
Head of American Department  
Resident Clerk

MAY 3 1965

PPPPP

CONFIDENTIAL



FROM WASHINGTON TO FOREIGN OFFICE

En Clair

FO/CRO/WH. DISTRIBUTION

Sir P. Dean

No. 1172

1 May, 1965

D. 04.20 2 May, 1965

R. 04.46 2 May, 1965

PRIORITY

AD1015144

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 1172 of 1 May.  
 Repeated for information to: U.K.Mis. New York

and Saving to: Santo Domingo

O.A.S. and Santo Domingo.

The tenth meeting of Consultation of the O.A.S. passed resolution on 1 May to appoint a special committee of representatives of five member-states (Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Guatemala and Panama) under Article 39 of the Charter. Voting was 19-0 with one abstention (Chile).

2. The Committee is instructed to proceed immediately to Santo Domingo to do everything possible to attain the restoration of peace, and to give priority to the following two functions: -

- (a) to offer good offices to Dominican armed groups, political groups and diplomatic representatives accredited in Santo Domingo for the purpose of obtaining: -
  - (i) a cease fire
  - (ii) orderly evacuation of persons who have taken asylum in Embassies and of foreign citizens who wish to leave.
- (b) To investigate all aspects of the situation which have led to the summoning of the meeting of consultation.

3. The Committee is requested to submit a report as soon as possible, to include such conclusions and recommendations as it considers appropriate. The O.A.S. Secretary-General and member governments are requested to extend the fullest

/cooperation



Washington telegram No. 1172 to Foreign Office

- 2 -

cooperation to facilitate the work of the Committee. The Secretary-General is requested to send a report to the United Nations pursuant to article 54 of the United Nations Charter.

Foreign Office pass Saving to Santo Domingo as my telegram No. 3.

[Repeated as requested]



CONFIDENTIAL

A

FROM SANTO DOMINGO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTP

FO/CRO/WH/DISTRIBUTION

Mr. Campbell

No. 34  
1 May 1965

D.2201 1 May 1965  
R.2234 1 May 1965

- 3 MAY 1965

AD1015/45

IMMEDIATE  
CONFIDENTIAL

AD1015/42

My immediately preceding telegram [Received as No. 51 from  
Consul General New York].

My Attaché Rudd to-day penetrated rebel stronghold at considerable personal risk in search of rebel leader Caamano and found him with Martin, ex American Ambassador here. They were talking terms. There seems no doubt that Caamano is in full command of the whole rebel movement insisting on constitution of Government and return of Bosch. The prospects of Wessin being accepted in any form seem nil. The present American Ambassador is negotiating at San Isidro with the other side. Rebel discipline reported good, food short but not desperate. [gp. undec.] is evidence of coherent rebel authority making negotiations possible. Caamano is reported to be West Point graduate.

Note by Comms. Dept.  
[This telegram has been repeated  
to Washington <sup>via Air Mail from New York</sup> and Ottawa for  
External Affairs]

ADVANCE COPIES:  
Sir B. Barrows  
Head American Dept.  
Head News Dept.  
Resident Clerk

MMMM

CONFIDENTIAL

3 MAY  
1965



CONFIDENTIALFROM SANTO DOMINGO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTP

FO/CRO/WH.DISTRIBUTION

- 3 MAY 1965

Mr. Campbell

No. 35

2 May, 1965

D. 2000 2 May, 1965

R. 2228 2 May, 1965

(via New York C4 telegram No. 54)

IMMEDIATECONFIDENTIAL

This morning I was in rebel territory with Rudd and saw Caamano, military leader at his headquarters. My aim was to find out the views and assess the character of the leader. I was received politely. Dynamic force there is Ariste, Secretary of P.L.E. He said that they have 30,000 well armed men. This is exaggerated but the number must be formidable, and that the aim is return to 1963 constitution with Besch, who alone has moral authority to get men to lay down their arms: he is aware of the consequences of large number of arms at liberty after peace. He asked me to emphasize this to America. Merales seemed very good, atmosphere soldierly. He said Americans must retire from West Bridge to opposite side of the river if international zone is to be respected. All disclaimed being Communists. Also there were Manuel Berdas and Imbert Guiuere of P.R.D. I met other leaders elsewhere. All are firm about the constitutionalities and Besch, and say that Wessin must be get out of the country but his troops will be treated honourably. These people seem well organized and ready for long siege. Their tactics are well conceived. Probably a German type Warsaw operation would be needed to take the area. Americans would be mistaken to try to put old face in a new Government now, because these people will never give them peace. Whilst at Headquarters, Mera, Secretary General O.A.S. arrived.

ADVANCE COPIES

F.O. Private Secretary  
 Sir G. Harrison  
 Mr. Rennie  
 Head of American Dept.  
 Head of P.U.S.D.  
 Head of News Dept.

3 MAY  
 TELETYPE  
 1965

+++++

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIALFROM WASHINGTON TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTP

FO/CRO/WH DISTRIBUTION

Sir P. Dean

D. 2140 2 May, 1965

No. 1173

R. 2217 2 May, 1965

2 May, 1965

IMMEDIATECONFIDENTIAL

*not yet rec.*

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 1173 of 2 May  
 Repeated for information to: U.K. Mission New York  
 Ottawa  
 Consul General New York  
 and Saving to: Santo Domingo

Your telegram No. 3655: Negotiations in Santo Domingo.

Following is State Department assessment of Caamano.

2. He is an extremely intelligent and able regular army Colonel who has captured the imagination of the people around him. He has been swept along by events and has become thoroughly impassioned about the cause for which he is fighting. Inasmuch as he is trapped in a corner he is fighting fanatically, but he is not insane as some reports seem to suggest.

3. But he is also erratic. When fighting began on 25 April he took refuge in the Salvadorean Embassy, only to appear at the American Embassy on 26 April with the news that he would fight. On 27 April he again told the Americans that he would give up, but he has been fighting ever since.

4. The State Department deny that he was ever at West Point (Santo Domingo telegram No. 34) or received any military training in the United States.

Foreign Office pass Saving to Santo Domingo No. 4.

[Repeated Saving to Santo Domingo]

F.O.

ADVANCE COPIES:

Private Secretary

Sir G. Harrison


Sir B. Burrows

Head of American Department

Head of News Department

CONFIDENTIAL

: : : :



CONFIDENTIALFROM WASHINGTON TO FOREIGN OFFICERECEIVED IN  
ARCHIVES No.39  
4 MAY 1965

Cypher/OTP

DEPARTMENTAL  
DISTRIBUTION

Sir P. Dean

No. 1176

3 May 1965

D. 2120 3 May 1965

R. 2215 3 May 1965

IMMEDIATECONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 1176 of 3 May.  
Repeated for information Saving to: UKMIS New York

I have an appointment to see Mr. Rusk tomorrow at 11 a.m. Washington time mainly to ask him about the Dominican Republic. Are there any questions on this or other matters you would like me to raise?

DISTRIBUTED TO:American Department  
News Department  
U.N.D.ADVANCE COPIES:Private Secretary  
Sir G. Harrison  
Mr. Greenhill  
Head of American Department  
Head of News Department

PPPPP

CONFIDENTIAL4 MAY  
1965

CONFIDENTIAL

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO WASHINGTON

Cypher/OTP

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

No. 3702  
4 May, 1965

D. 1352 4 May, 1965

IMMEDIATE  
CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Washington telegram No. 3702 of 4 May.  
/ Repeated for information to UKMIS New York.

Your telegram No. 1176 [of 3 May: Dominican Republic].

I should like you to give Mr. Rusk the gist of Santo Domingo telegram No. 36 (being repeated to you) emphasizing the extremely confidential character of this communication and the need for discretion in making us of it.

2. Please ask him for his views on Bosch. How much importance do the Americans attach to preventing his return? How far is he committed to his supporters on the extreme left?
3. Please also ask about the prospects for O.A.S. endorsement of and participation in the United States action and the intentions of his Government in the event of these not being forthcoming.
4. You should warn Mr. Rusk that we are unlikely to be able to provide information about the Communist rôle in the revolution which is not already available to the Americans (your telegram No. 1181). We shall be telegraphing later in the day such evidence as we have. It would naturally be helpful if we could be given as much detail as possible of the American evidence on this point.

DISTRIBUTED TO:  
American Dept.

XXXXX

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

FROM SANTO DOMINGO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

A

RECEIVED IN  
ARCHIVES No.39  
- 4 MAY 1966  
AD 1015/58

Cypher/OTP

F.O./C.R.O./WH.  
DISTRIBUTION

Mr. Campbell

No. 36  
3 May 1965

D. 1830 3 May 1965  
R. 1930 3 May 1965  
[Received via New York C.G. under  
No. 55 of 3 May 1965]

IMMEDIATE  
CONFIDENTIAL

In the fighting last night the Americans drove a corridor from the International Zone to the Bridge splitting the Territory. Rudd went again to rebel headquarters this morning. Caamane and Ariste asked him to tell me following:

- (i) although they have been fighting for constitution of 1963 they would be prepared to accept a referendum supervised by O.A.S. providing Bosch agrees. They are asking him. Bosch would never agree to elections.
- (ii) they profess no enmity to United States but fear they cannot hold back their people from an all out attack on Americans for much more than 48 hours.
- (iii) they would negotiate with Wessin's Colonels but never with the General who should be get out of the way now.
- (iv) regarding danger of Communist take-over under a Bosch Government they would like to work this out themselves with American troops withdrawn but they guarantee to ask for United States help if threat materializes.

2. They asked me not to communicate this to Americans until Bosch has been consulted. My personal opinion is that if (i) and (iii) above were possible much bloodshed could be avoided. The Generals have nothing more to contribute and are clearly expendable.

ADVANCE COPIES:  
Private Secretary  
Sir G. Harrison  
Mr. Greenhill  
Head of American Department  
Head of P.U.S.D.  
Head of News Department

PPPPP

CONFIDENTIAL

1965





Registry No.

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EMERGENCY  
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 PRIORITY  
 ROUTINE  
 with — priority  
 without — priority  
 DEFERRED

\* Date and time (G.M.T.) telegram should reach addressee(s)

(Date) 4/5

Despatched

CYPHER

Draft.

Telegram to:—

SANTO DOMINGO

No. 53

(Date) 4/5

And to:—

[Security classification] CONFIDENTIAL  
—if any

[Codeword—if any]

Address to SANTO DOMINGO

telegram No. 53 (date) 4/5

RECEIVED IN  
 DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
 6 MAY 1965  
 A/D1015/58.

repeated for information to: UKMIS NEW YORK:

Saving to WASHINGTON

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

Repeat to:—

Saving to  
 UKMIS NEW YORK  
 WASHINGTON 1935  
 Scr.

Your telegram No. 36.

A/D1015/58.

We are much impressed by the initiative you have shown in making these contacts and the information obtained is extremely useful.

2. In all the circumstances we thought it unwise to withhold this information from the Americans. Your telegram under reference has been repeated to Washington and H.M. Ambassador has been authorised to communicate its contents to Mr. Rusk on a strictly confidential basis.

3. Please send the names of all rebel personalities you have identified.

Distributed to American Dept

Signature 4/18

En Clair.  
Code  
Cypher

Distribution:—

DEPARTMENTAL

American

Copies to:—



Handwritten notes: 4/16/65, 4/16/65

FROM NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE  
(United Kingdom Mission to the United Nations)

Mr Clair

A  
FO/CRO/WH  
DISTRIBUTION

Lord Caradon  
No. 987  
3 May, 1965.

RECEIVED IN  
OFFICE No. 39  
- 4 MAY 1965  
AD1015/60

D. 0337 4 May, 1965.  
R. 0445 4 May, 1965.

IMMEDIATE

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 987 of 3 May  
Repeated for information to:- Washington  
UKDEL NATO  
and Saving to:- Havana  
Santo Domingo

AD1015/60

My telegram No. 979: Dominican Republic.

The Security Council's debate began this afternoon. The representative of Cuba was invited to the table and Stevenson (United States) said he would be interested to hear from him an account of the rôle which Cuba had played in the Dominican situation. Stevenson recalled Cuba's intervention in the affairs of various Latin American states and its conspiracy with the Soviet Union to install long range missiles on its territory.

2. Fedorenko (Soviet Union) opened the proceedings with a lengthy and fierce attack on the United States action in the Dominican Republic. He described it as an act of open imperialistic aggression against a people who were trying to free themselves from a blood soaked dictatorship. The Americans argument that they intervened to protect the lives of foreign nationals was manifestly false. They could have evacuated foreign nationals the first day of their intervention, but American troops were still in the Republic and they were being reinforced even as this Council's proceedings began. Fedorenko commented that the United States regarded the Western hemisphere as its own "Bailiwick" in which it had the right to suppress national liberation movements. It had treated the Dominican Republic as if it were Alabama or Mississippi. The United States had not only violated Article 7(2) of the Charter, but had also infringed the terms of Article 17 of the Charter of the Organisation of American States. Despite this the Americans were trying to justify their intervention legally by lurking behind the O.A.S. Their real motive was to re-establish the former dictatorial régime so that American monopolies such as the United Fruit Company could eke out further profits from the Republic. The American aggression followed their previous crimes in

North Viet Nam  
1965



UKMIS New York telegram No. 987 to Foreign Office

-2-

North Viet Nam, Laos, and the Congo. Their intervention had been deplored by the leaders of several Latin American countries and it was now the duty of the Security Council to condemn it as an act incompatible with the Charter. The Council should also demand the immediate withdrawal of American troops.

3. Stevenson (United States) spoke next. He commented that, after the Soviet Union's recent polemics in other United Nations bodies, he was not surprised that Fedorenko should use the Council for further cold war attacks on American attempts to combat Communist expansion. Whenever there were difficulties in the Western Hemisphere, the Russians accused the Americans of imperialistic intervention. They did not use this term however to describe the assistance which they had given to Cuban subversion in other Latin American countries. Stevenson said that his Government had helped the Dominicans to establish a truly democratic régime, after the O.A.S. had played their part in overthrowing the Trujillo dictatorship. When the fighting broke out in the Republic the people were left without an effective Government for several days. Chaos and anarchy reigned and several Latin American Embassies were violated. His Government recognized that not all the rebels were Communists but a small group of the latter had tried to seize control of the revolution. The Dominican law enforcement authorities had informed the American Embassy that the situation was out of control and that only the landing of troops could guarantee the safety of foreign nationals. Faced with this emergency the United States had despatched security forces to the Republic. These troops had now evacuated three thousand foreign nationals from thirty different countries and had established a secure zone of refuge. His Government had reported their action to the O.A.S. and had agreed to the despatch of a Five Power Mission from the Organization to Santo Domingo. This Mission had offered its good offices to the various armed factions for the purpose of obtaining a peaceful settlement and to help in the evacuation of foreign nationals. The situation in Santo Domingo was now much improved, although Communists were in control of groups still fighting. The American intervention was prudent and had proved to be absolutely essential. In the face of the constructive steps which had been taken the Soviet Union was now trying to exploit the situation for its own ends in this Council. It was surely appropriate for the O.A.S. to continue handling what was a regional problem. Stevenson concluded by saying that the United States had no intention of dictating the political future of the Dominican Republic. This was for the Dominican people to decide by constitutional means. The United States intended to work with the O.A.S. to secure a peaceful settlement and

/it believed



UKMIS New York telegram No. 987 to Foreign Office

-3-

it believed that members of the Security Council should support the Organization in this purpose. The United States would never depart from its commitment to peoples in the Western hemisphere to choose their own political course without falling prey to Communist conspiracy.

4. The Representative of Cuba then spoke for an hour and made a vicious and repetitive attack on the United States action and on American policy in general. He also accused the members of the O.A.S. of being no more than lackeys of the United States.

5. There followed several exchanges between Fedorenko and Stevenson which ranged through the whole history of American-Soviet relations since the second world war, but added little to the subject under discussion. The proceedings were then adjourned until 3 a.m. on 4 May.

Foreign Office pass Saving to Havana 1 and Santo Domingo 1.

[Repeated as requested.]

ADVANCE COPIES:-

Private Secretary

Sir G. Harrison

× Mr. Greenhill

Head of America Dept.

Head of U.N. Dept.

Head of News Dept.

SSSSS



CONFIDENTIAL

FROM NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE  
(United Kingdom Mission to United Nations)

Cypher/CTP  
Lord Caradon  
No. 988  
3 May 1965  
PRIORITY  
CONFIDENTIAL

RECEIVED IN  
FO/CRO/WH. DISTRIBUTION  
- 4 MAY 1965  
D: 0228 4 May 1965  
R: 0321 4 May 1965  
AD 1015/60 (A)

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 988 of 3 May  
Repeated for information to: Washington UKDEL NATO  
And Saving to: Havana Santo Domingo

Dominican Republic

AD 1015/60

As you will see from my immediately preceding telegram, this afternoon's proceedings consisted of violent attacks by the Russians and Cubans on the American action and a statement by Stevenson defending this action.

2. In the event neither the Uruguayan representative nor the Bolivian spoke today. The former may have wished to avoid speaking on the same day as the Cubans and the Americans encouraged him to delay in the hope of persuading his Government to send him instructions more favourable to the United States position than his present ones. The latter has said that he will not speak before the Uruguayan.

3. In these circumstances, I decided, after consulting the Americans, to delay my own short statement (my telegram No. 979) until tomorrow when I hope to follow the two Latin American members of the Council. The meeting on this subject will be held in the afternoon.

4. While Stevenson's statement will not have persuaded a majority of the Council that the American action was justified, the polemics of the Russians and Cubans have probably made sure that the upshot will be balanced. The moderate members are beginning to talk of a consensus, appealing for an end to the fighting and support for the efforts of the O.A.S.

Foreign Office pass Saving to Santo Domingo No. 2, and Havana No. 2.

[Repeated as requested].

CONFIDENTIAL

MAY 4 1965

SECRET

FROM WASHINGTON TO FOREIGN OFFICE

A

Cypher/OTP

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

Sir P. Dean

No.1181

3 May 1965

D.0045 4 May 1965

R.0243 4 May 1965

RECEIVED  
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 - 4 MAY 1965

IMMEDIATE

SECRET

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No.1181 of 3 May.

And to: Santo Domingo.

Repeated for information to: UKMIS New York New York (C.G.)

Santo Domingo.

The State Department are under instructions from the President to produce additional material to support his statement that the revolutionary movement has been taken over by a band of Communist conspirators many of whom were trained outside the Dominican Republic. They have therefore asked the Canadians and ourselves whether we have any useful information about the Communist rôle in the revolution. In particular they would be grateful for:

- (a) information about the activities and whereabouts of known Communists in the Dominican Republic during the past ten days; and
- (b) an intelligence assessment of the Communists' rôle in the disturbances.

2. Both we and the Canadians said that we were doubtful whether we had any information not already available to the Americans, but we undertook to report this urgent request. The State Department, who are clearly under very strong pressure from the White House, have asked for our preliminary views if possible by 3 p.m. Washington time (7 p.m. G.M.T.) tomorrow, 4 May.

3. Foreign Office please pass copy to Secretary J.I.C.

Foreign Office pass Santo Domingo 5 (Immediate).

[Repeated as requested. Copies sent to J.I.C.]

DISTRIBUTED TO:

F.O. American Dept.

P.U.S.D.

I.R.D.

CRO.

Atlantic Dept.

ADVANCE COPIES:

F.O. Private Secretary

Sir G. Harrison

Mr. Greenhill

Head of American Dept.

Head of P.U.S.D.

Head of I.R.D.


The Secretary of J.I.C.

MAY 4 1965

VVVVV

SECRET

EMBAJADA  
DE LA  
REPÚBLICA DOMINICANA



Londres 3 de mayo de 1965

Excelencia:

Tengo el honor de informar a Vuestra Excelencia, con profunda preocupación y dolor, que mi país está atravesando en estos momentos la situación más crítica de su historia como nación independiente.

Conociendo y compartiendo la tradicional amistad y simpatía que siempre ha existido entre nuestros dos pueblos, respetuosamente me permito asegurar a Vuestra Excelencia que el pueblo dominicano vería con simpatía que el Gobierno de Su Majestad Británica ofreciera sus buenos oficios en interés de encontrar una solución al problema.

Aprovecho la oportunidad para expresar a Vuestra Excelencia las seguridades de mi más alta y distinguida consideración.

Antonio S. Ferrari  
Ministro Consejero  
Encargado de Negocios a.i.

Su Excelencia  
El Muy Honorable Michael Stewart, M.P.,  
Principal Secretario de Estado de Su  
Majestad para Asuntos Extranjeros,  
Londres



(Translation)

London,  
3rd May, 1965

Your Excellency,

I have the honour to inform Your Excellency, with profound concern and sorrow, that my country is at this moment passing through the most critical situation in its history as an independent nation.

Knowing and sharing the traditional friendship and understanding which has always existed between our two countries, I wish respectfully to assure Your Excellency that the Dominican people would welcome Her Majesty's Government offering her good offices in the interests of finding a solution to the problem.

I avail myself of this opportunity to express to Your Excellency the assurances of my highest consideration.

Antonio S. Ferrari  
Minister Counsellor  
Chargé d'Affaires ad interim

His Excellency,  
The Rt. Hon. Michael Stewart, M.P.,  
Her Majesty's Principal Secretary  
of State for Foreign Affairs,  
L o n d o n , S. W. 1.

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DESPATCHED IN  
DEPARTMENT

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.

4 May, 1965.

Sir,

I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your Note No. 447 of the 3rd of May.

Her Majesty's Government have been watching recent events in the Dominican Republic with deep concern and have been grieved to learn of the casualties and loss of life suffered in the fighting in Santo Domingo. We consider that the current efforts of the Organisation of American States offer the best hope of creating the conditions in which a truly democratic settlement can be achieved by the Dominican people themselves.


I have the honour to be,  
with high consideration,  
Sir,  
Your obedient Servant,  
(For the Secretary of State)

Senor Don Antonio S. Ferrari,  
Chargé d'Affaires,  
Dominican Embassy,  
4, Braemar Mansions,  
Cornwall Gardens,  
S.W. 7.



CONFIDENTIAL

Cypher/OTP and  
By Bag

7  
AFROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO CERTAIN OF HER MAJESTY'S REPRESENTATIVES

By telegraph:

U.K.Mission Geneva	Havana	Managua
Buenos Aires	Lima	Panama
Caracas	Montevideo	Port-au-Prince
Mexico City	Santiago	Quito
Rio de Janeiro	Asuncion	San José
Sao Paulo	Guatemala	San Salvador
Bogotá	La Paz	Tegucigalpa

[All Immediate]

Bonn	Amman
The Hague	Beirut
Paris	Cairo
UKDEL NATO	Bangkok
Rome	Djakarta
Holy See	Peking
Madrid	Tokyo
Moscow	

[All Priority]

No.188 GuidanceFO/CRO/WH DISTRIBUTION

3 May, 1965

D.1900 3 May, 1965

IMMEDIATECONFIDENTIALDominican Republic

The United Nations Security Council is to consider the situation in the Dominican Republic this evening, 3 May. We shall take the line that the O.A.S. should be allowed to continue to deal with the matter and the United Kingdom Representative will speak on the lines of my immediately following telegram Guidance.

2. We do not wish at present to express any view on the wider implications of the United States action, and you should limit your comments to the humanitarian aspect.

[Copies sent to Colonial Office, Commonwealth Relations Office for overseas distribution]

: : : :

CONFIDENTIAL

Clair and By Bag

RECEIVED IN  
ARCHIVE 516.45  
- 5 MAY 1965

A 8

AR 1015/651A

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO CERTAIN OF HER MAJESTY'S REPRESENTATIVES

By Telegraph: UKMIS GENEVA HAVANA MINAGUA  
BUENOS AIRES LIMA PANAMA  
CARACAS MONTEVIDEO PORT AU PRINCE  
MEXICO CITY SANTIAGO QUITO  
RIO DE JANEIRO ASUNCION SAN JOSE  
SAO PAULO GUATEMALA SAN SALVADOR  
BOGOTO LA PAZ TEGUCIGALPA

[All Immediate]

BONN ROME AMMAN DJAKARTA  
THE HAGUE HOLY SEE BEIRUT PEKING  
PARIS MADRID CAIRO TOKYO  
UNDELT NATO MOSCOW BANGKOK

[All Priority]

FO/CRO/WH. DISTRIBUTION

No. 189 Guidance

3 May 1965

D: 0042 4 May 1965

IMMEDIATE

Dominican Republic

My immediately preceding telegram Guidance.

From information available to Her Majesty's Government it is clear that an internal political struggle in the Dominican Republic has resulted in a complete breakdown of law and order in the capital Santo Domingo. In the ensuing chaos uncontrolled violence and looting threatened lives and property in the capital, including those of foreign nationals. The only Dominican forces which had any recognisable claim to be in a position to maintain order declared their inability to do so any longer.

Her Majesty's Government fully understand what has prompted the emergency action taken by the United States Government. They welcome the efforts of the Organisation of American States to bring about a complete cease-fire, are confident that the Organisation will be capable of doing so and hope that in this way the ground will be prepared for a truly democratic settlement by the Dominican people themselves.

[Copies sent to C.O., C.R.O. for overseas distribution]

N/PNN



CONFIDENTIALFROM SANTO DOMINGO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

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
Mr. Campbell

No. 37

4 May, 1965

D. 1658 4 May, 1965

R. 1658 4 May, 1965

IMMEDIATE  
CONFIDENTIAL

Situation is quiet. Our contact with rebels, who plan to announce provisional Government today, indicates that the significance of size of the American force has sunk in, but fighting could break out again at any time. Following is brief summary.

What happened here was that the patient beast of burden suddenly turned into a tiger. Beneath the evident Communist exploitation is a spontaneous explosion of rage and frustration. It is hoped that the governing classes have learnt something, but I doubt it. Short-term alternatives, all bad, appear to be:

- (i) Left-Wing government suitable to Caamaño. Probable result, Communists will quickly bury [grp. undec.] beneath it. Crisis within months.
- (ii) Right-Wing government with old faces. Probable result, political assassinations, well planned terrorism and strikes. Existing total economic collapse would continue in either case.
- (iii) Prolonged American occupation. Probable result, EOKA-type resistance and indefinite prolongation of tension. If, however, United States poured in money of unprecedented scale and given United States administration, economic recovery would be achievable.

2. No matter what solution is arrived at there are going to be some twenty thousand, modern, automatic weapons in hiding in this city.

ADVANCE COPIES:

F.O. Private Secretary  
Sir G. Harrison  
Mr. Crawford  
Hd. of American Dept.  
Hd. of News Dept.  
Resident Clerk

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1965



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Mr. Campbell

D. Untimed 5 May 1965

R. 0508 5 May 1965

No. 41

4 May 1965

- 5 MAY 1965

IMMEDIATECONFIDENTIAL

AD1015/67

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 41 of 4 May.  
Repeated for information to: Washington

Rebel provisional Government was proclaimed today in Santo Domingo with Caamano as President. A meeting was held between Samuel Conde representing rebels and a member of military junta. This evening Americans widened their corridor and extended security zone line northward. Fighting flared up in the centre of city. The American plan seems to be to keep inching in on the rebel area and rebels reacted today with some nervousness. These are probably best and most humane tactics. Some of my United States colleagues are thinking of a Government in terms of old worn faces which do not fit entirely new circumstances. United States Information Service have told Washington through my Telex that American Embassy estimates that there are 12,000 armed Communists in the city. This kind of exaggeration is a pity because it glosses over large number of non-Communists fighting for acceptable aims. Communists' strength lie in their quality not quantity.

2. Name requested in your telegram No. 53 will be sent tomorrow.

Foreign Office pass to Washington as my telegram No. 14.

[Repeated as requested]

ADVANCE COPIES:

Private Secretary

Sir G. Harrison

Mr. Greenhill

Head of American Department

Head of P.U.S.D.

Head of News Department

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FROM WASHINGTON TO FOREIGN OFFICE

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Sir P. Dean

No. 1187

4 May 1965

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- 5 MAY 1965  
AD1015/44

D. 2116 4 May 1965

R. 2205 4 May 1965

IMMEDIATE  
CONFIDENTIAL

AD1015/

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 1187 of 4 May.  
Repeated for information to: UKMIS New York

Your telegram No. 3702: Dominican Republic.

When I saw Mr. Rusk this morning I reiterated our thanks for United States help in evacuating British subjects from Santo Domingo. I then gave him the gist of Santo Domingo telegram No. 36 emphasizing its extremely confidential character. Mr. Rusk commented that it was very interesting although subsequently he added that he thought it unlikely that the Rebels would launch an all-out attack on American troops in view of the latter's overwhelming superiority.

AD1015/58

2. Mr. Rusk talked at length about Besch, emphasizing that he was personally progressive, liberal and democratic. Unfortunately he was also a poet and had no political sense and American hopes that he would survive in 1963 had quickly been dashed. In power he had been inept and indecisive and his downfall had been caused by a combination of economic disorder and his indifference to the penetration of his administration by various subversive elements. The movement against Reid Cabal appeared to have been genuinely inspired at the start by Besch's party, the P.R.D. but they had been joined immediately by the two Communist parties and the 14 June party which raised some possibility of collusion with the P.R.D. but in general the United States did not think that Besch was committed to the Communists. After three days' fighting, violent Left-wing elements had taken control of the Rebels after driving out elements of the P.R.D. Caamane was something of a thug who was prepared to work for almost anybody. He had no strong political orientation but was a not very attractive opportunist. Mr. Rusk emphasized however that the United States was not hostile to the P.R.D. If that party were

/elected  
MAY 11 1965

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIALWashington telegram No. 1187 to Foreign Office

- 2 -

elected in, say, September the United States would not oppose them. It should be possible to form a government from the spectrum of political forces stretching from the P.R.D. on the Left to elements on the Right. Mr. Rusk seemed to suggest that a Balaguer-Besch government might provide the best solution but he added that such a combination was highly unlikely. He concluded this part of our conversation by saying that Besch seemed to be out of contact with the realities in Santo Domingo, imagining that his people were in control, which they were not. Neither Besch nor Balaguer should go back to the Dominican Republic at this stage because it would be unsafe.

3. As regards the Communist role in the revolution, Mr. Rusk thought that the United States may have over-emphasized this aspect a little in public statements in the past few days. But the brittle political structure of the Dominican Republic had been shattered and a situation had arisen in which a small determined armed group could get a long way very quickly. It was the potential threat from the extreme Left (which was very active) which was particularly worrying to the United States. Mr. Rusk undertook to provide us as soon as possible with American evidence of Communist involvement in the revolution. I said that we also would be passing to him any information which we had on this, but warned him that we were unlikely to come up with anything not already available to the Americans.

4. Mr. Rusk was clearly hopeful that the O.A.S. Committee in Santo Domingo would be successful in its efforts to reach a proper cease-fire and the beginnings of a settlement and he was not disposed to consider at this stage what would happen if they came back empty-handed. He was not unduly perturbed by the critical public remarks of several members of the O.A.S. Privately they expressed their understanding of United States action. There had been no movement to censure the United States on the grounds that their action had been against Article 17 of the Charter and there seemed to be a strong similarity between O.A.S. requests and recommendations and the action taken by United States troops, such as the distribution of food and medicine. In conclusion Mr. Rusk remarked that the question "why did you do this?" was always easier to answer than "why did you not do this?"

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Private Secretary  
Sir G. Harrison  
Mr. Greenhill  
Hd American Dept.

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FROM WASHINGTON TO FOREIGN OFFICE

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Sir P. Dean

No. 1192  
4 May 1965

- 5 MAY 1965  
AD1015/75

D. 0135 5 May 1965  
R. 0324 5 May 1965

IMMEDIATE  
CONFIDENTIAL

AD1015/86  
WJA

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 1192 of 4 May.  
Repeated for information to: UKMIS New York  
UKDEL NATO

Your telegram No. 3725: Dominican Republic.

This has only just arrived and it is impossible to consult State Department properly in time to reply by your deadline. In any event, an O.A.S. meeting is now in session (State Department Legal Adviser is attending) which may result in a new legal situation (see below).

2. An Assistant Legal Adviser has given us by telephone the following outline of their views:

(a) Phase I of the American intervention (with small numbers of troops in the middle of last week) was related strictly to the need to secure evacuation of those immediately awaiting it,

(b) This expanded into phase II, when, with the outbreak of total disorder and violence, additional troops became necessary to establish "a neutral zone of refuge" in terms of the O.A.S. resolution of 1 May, to enable the O.A.S. Mission to operate. (See President Johnson's statement of 1 May). State Department would however not, repeat not, assert that at this stage United States Government were purporting to act specifically under the authority of the O.A.S. Resolution.

(c) We are now in phase III, the background to which is the President's statement of 2 May. The State Department know of no legal thesis specifically addressed to the justification of the presence of 14,000 United States troops. They seem to expect an O.A.S. resolution calling for contingents contributed by O.A.S. members. In this event, the United States forces

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/will  
MAY 11 1965

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CONFIDENTIALWashington telegram No. 1192 to Foreign Office

- 2 -

will at once be assigned to the O.A.S., and surplus numbers withdrawn as other contingents become available. In effect, the presence of United States forces will thus become legalised "ex post facto". (This would not seem inconsistent with second paragraph of your telegram No. 1424 to UKMIS New York, which would seem already to carry the implication that the purpose of the United States forces is no longer simply to protect United States lives and property).

3. We shall report further by emergency telegram tomorrow which will reach you in plenty of time for Parliamentary Questions on Thursday.

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Department of State  
Opinion of the Legal Adviser

May 7, 1965

LEGAL BASIS FOR UNITED STATES ACTIONS  
IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

I

United States action in the Dominican Republic was emergency action taken to protect lives and to give the Inter-American system a chance to deal with a situation within its competence.

The United States initially landed troops in the Dominican Republic under conditions in which immediate action was essential to preserve the lives of foreign nationals -- nationals of the United States and of many other countries. This kind of action is justified both on humanitarian and legal grounds. The United States continued its presence in the Dominican Republic for the additional purpose of preserving the capacity of the OAS to function in the manner intended by its Charter -- to achieve peace and justice by securing a cease-fire and by reestablishing orderly processes within which Dominicans can choose their own government, free from outside interference. With the adoption by the OAS Meeting of Foreign Ministers of a resolution providing for the establishment of an Inter-American Armed Force, the U.S. military elements in the Dominican Republic will be included in that Force.

The primary purposes for which the American States established the OAS, set forth in Article 1 of its Charter, are "to achieve an order of peace and justice, to promote their solidarity, to strengthen their collaboration, and to defend their sovereignty, their territorial integrity and their independence." The OAS thus exists to assist the American States to maintain their rights to defend their integrity and to provide for their preservation and prosperity. The action of the United States has given the organs of the OAS the essential time in which to consider the situation in the Dominican Republic and to determine



- 2 -

means of preserving the rights that country has under the Inter-American system. The propriety of a regional agency "dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action" is expressly recognized by Article 52 of the Charter of the United Nations.

## II

The initial landing of U.S. Marine forces during the night of April 28-29 was ordered by the President of the United States to protect the lives of U.S. nationals and those of other countries. The action was taken after the United States had been officially notified by Dominican authorities that they were no longer able to preserve order. The factual circumstances of the breakdown of order in the Dominican Republic were such that the landing could not have been delayed beyond the time it actually took place without needless sacrifice of many more lives -- both foreign nationals and Dominican citizens -- entailing serious danger to the peace and security of the Hemisphere.

After United States forces arrived in the Dominican Republic, it became apparent that the structure of government had broken down to a point where there was not only no authority capable of preserving order but also no mechanism by which the Dominican people could freely choose their own government. The same evening when U.S. forces were initially dispatched to Santo Domingo, the United States requested an urgent meeting of the Council of the OAS. A meeting of the Council was held on the morning of April 29, and organs of the OAS proceeded to meet in continuing session thereafter on the Dominican situation.

The United States refused to observe merely the form of legalistic procedures to the detriment of fundamental rights of a nation under the OAS Charter. On April 28 the Military Junta in Santo Domingo, which had proclaimed itself to be the



- 3 -

government, addressed a request to the United States to send in armed forces and crush the rebels. The United States could have recognized this group as the government of the Dominican Republic, and could have responded to their request. The United States declined to follow this course because it would have amounted to taking sides in the internal struggle and would, therefore, have resulted in actual interference with the freedom of the Dominican people to choose their own government. Such a course of action would have been inconsistent with the principles that govern the Inter-American system.

The obligations of non-intervention contained in Articles 15 and 17 of the OAS Charter did not preclude the United States' placing armed forces in the Dominican Republic for the humanitarian purpose of saving lives. Nor did those obligations require the United States to withdraw its forces in the days immediately after their landing, when it was entirely apparent that there was no local means of keeping order and providing essential public services in Santo Domingo. In fact, it would have been irresponsible for the United States to withdraw its forces when such a course would have endangered seriously the lives of foreign nationals not yet evacuated and would have led to a full-scale resumption of bloody civil war among the contending Dominican factions.

The United States, in maintaining elements of its armed forces in the Dominican Republic, acted to preserve the situation so that the organs of the Inter-American system could carry out their intended responsibilities under Inter-American treaties and assist the people of the Dominican Republic in reestablishing democratic government under conditions of public order.

The actions of the United States were designed to help give effect to the resolutions adopted by the OAS. These resolutions (1) called for a cease-fire; (2) appealed



- 4 -

for the establishment of an international neutral zone of refuge; (3) dispatched a five-member commission to the Dominican Republic; and (4) called upon member governments to supply food and medicine to the people of the Dominican Republic. Without continued action by the United States, the OAS machinery could not have become effective.

Acting upon the recommendation of the five-man commission, the Meeting of Foreign Ministers resolved on May 6 to request the establishment of an Inter-American Armed Force. This resolution recognized that the formation of the Force would "signify ipso facto the transformation of the forces presently in Dominican territory into a force which will not be that of one state or a group of states but that of the OAS, which Organization is charged with the responsibility of interpreting the democratic will of its members."

The Meeting of Foreign Ministers is now considering other reports and recommendations from the five-member commission on the preservation of public order and the formation of a new Dominican government. All of these efforts would have been frustrated if the United States had withdrawn its forces and thus invited a renewal of anarchy.

### III

There is a further consideration which supports the action taken by the United States. Available information has suggested that what began as a democratic revolution fell into the hands of a band of Communist conspirators. If a movement under such control had succeeded in establishing itself as the government of the Dominican Republic, the seizure of power by a totalitarian regime would in all likelihood have been irreversible. The OAS would have been deprived of any realistic possibility of assisting the Dominican people to determine freely their own political



- 5 -

future. Rather than let such a risk materialize, the United States acted to preserve the situation pending consideration by the OAS and the taking of such steps as the OAS might recommend.

Participation in the Inter-American system, to be meaningful, must take into account the modern day reality that an attempt by a conspiratorial group inspired from the outside to seize control by force can be an assault upon the independence and integrity of a state. The rights and obligations of all members of the OAS must be viewed in light of this reality.

The American States have formally recognized the dangers of international Communism to the Inter-American system. The Foreign Ministers of the American Republics, meeting at Punta del Este in January 1962, declared: "The principles of Communism are incompatible with the principles of the Inter-American system" and "adherence by any member of the Organization of American States to Marxism-Leninism is incompatible with the Inter-American system and the alignment of such a government with the Communist bloc breaks the unity and solidarity of the hemisphere." This meeting of Foreign Ministers therefore urged

"the member states to take those steps that they may consider appropriate for their individual or collective self-defense, and to cooperate, as may be necessary or desirable, to strengthen their capacity to counteract threats or acts of aggression, subversion, or other dangers to peace and security resulting from the continued intervention in this hemisphere of Sino-Soviet powers, in accordance with the obligations established in treaties and agreements such as the Charter of the Organization of American States and the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance."

#### IV

The United States continues to support its commitment to the preservation of the right of all free peoples in this hemisphere to choose their own course, without falling prey to international conspiracy from any quarter.



- 6 -

The United States continues to support the OAS as the institution through which this right can be realized when outside interference makes collective assistance to a sister republic necessary.

United States forces are not occupying the Dominican Republic. They are not asserting authority to govern any part of the country. They are not taking sides in the civil conflict. United States action has been taken in order to help preserve for the people of the Dominican Republic their right to choose their government free from outside interference.

Experience has shown that if a group led by Communist conspirators and inspired by an outside power is permitted to seize control of a country by force, any further consideration of the right of the people of that country to choose their own course is an empty gesture.

United States forces continue to be present in the Dominican Republic only in support of OAS efforts to organize effective measures to prevent such a denial of freedom and further loss of life. As President Johnson has stated:

"The moment that the Organization of American States can present a plan that will bring peace on the island and give us the opportunity to evacuate our people and give some hope of stability of government, we'll be the first to come back home."



SECRET

53

FROM SANTO DOMINGO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cy [redacted] /OTP

*E. Green*

FO(S)/CRO(S)/WH(S)  
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-5 MAY 1965  
AD1015/79/G

Mr. Campbell

No. 43  
5 May, 1965

D. 0922 5 May, 1965  
R. 1125 5 May, 1965

IMMEDIATE  
SECRET

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 43 of 5 May,  
Repeated for information to Washington  
UKMIS New York

Wessin's air attack began on the evening of 25 April and by 27 April PRD Cabinet gave up and took asylum in foreign Embassies, their cause being undoubtedly lost. Urena and the remainder of PRD Cabinet were relieved of their weapons by a new set of leaders before they left the National Palace. Later Urena made statement, which I was shown, that the revolt had been taken over by the Communists. Whilst this was happening an estimated number of 20,000 modern automatic weapons were being distributed indiscriminately to civilians from Army magazines.

2. The speed and force with which the revolt was reorganized from that point onwards was unprecedented. I estimate Wessin's appeal for United States to intervene to restore order i.e. his admittal of defeat, as the afternoon of 28 April. I have not the slightest doubt that this leadership was provided at least in part by persons trained for just such an opportunity. No amateur could have done it. On a personal note it was significant to me that my neighbour, a PRD leader outside the Cabinet, began surrounding his house with barbed wire at the very moment that the revolt, which his party had started, was succeeding. He also said that the Communists had got control of the revolt.

3. The tactics of the guerillas has clearly shaken the United States Marines here by clever use of element of surprise and the care with which the firing plan is always thought out. No uninstructed Dominican could achieve such a result. There is no doubt whatever in my view that the undercore of leadership which took over from Urena had received high grade instruction of the technique of armed revolt.

/4.

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54

Santo Domingo telegram No. 43 to Foreign Office

- 2 -

4. I must stress the complete anarchy into which this city had so swiftly fallen on the night of 29 April. I do not know of any foreign resident who will not agree that the United States Marines entered Santo Domingo only just in time to prevent absolute disaster. I will add that were they to leave even now that disaster would very easily take place. It should be stated again and again that this prompt intervention by the Marines saved thousands of lives which in the foreseeable future will be in jeopardy if they leave. I am sending names separately.

5. Please pass copy to Joint Intelligence Committee.

Foreign Office pass Washington 15, UKMIS New York 2.

[Repeated as requested]

[Copies passed to J.I.C.]

ADVANCE COPIES:

Private Secretary

Sir G. Harrison

Mr. Greenhill

Head of American Department

Head of P.U.S.D.

Head of News Department



A

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Cypher/OTP

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Mr. Campbell

No. 45

5 May, 1965

D: 1700 5 May, 1965

R: 1717 5 May, 1965

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AD1015/80

Personal for Watson, Shell, London.

I have heard Journalists, including some from the United States, criticize the decision to send United States troops to this country. I would point out that in my opinion their timely arrival has prevented large scale bloodshed of innocent persons including Dominicans. On the night of 29 April complete anarchy and chaos prevailed in Santo Domingo with many thousands of civilians roaming the capital with automatic weapons.

2. It is my considered opinion that if [gp undec] the United States troops were withdrawn a similar situation is almost certain to arise again. This assessment is based on personal close observation of the entire duration of the crisis all over the threatened area. In view of the mounting criticism of the United States action the opinion may be of value to the United States State Department. Deviet

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FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO WASHINGTON

64

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4 May, 1965

D. 1911 4 May, 1965

EMERGENCY  
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Addressed to Washington telegram No. 3716 of 4 May,  
Repeated for information to UKMIS New York  
UKDEL NATO

Your telegram No. 1181 [of 3 May: Dominican Republic].

We have no precise information about the role of individual Communists in the Dominican rebellion.

2. Reports from Her Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires indicate that at an early stage the Movimiento Popular Dominicano (M.P.D.), an avowed Communist organisation with considerable past experience of directing mass demonstrations in Santo Domingo, took the lead in organising and goading into violent activity the armed civilian mobs. On 28 April when the P.R.D. representatives reached a tentative agreement with General Wessin, it was apparently the M.P.D. who insisted that the struggle should be continued and their influence with the mob may well have been decisive at that point. By 29 April the P.R.D. were openly admitting that the insurrection had fallen under the complete control of the M.P.D. and thus of the Communists. This may have been an exaggeration, or at least an excuse for the abandoning of the struggle by P.R.D., because two days later, on 1 May, the Embassy reported that the non-Communist Colonel Casmano was in command of the whole rebel movement.

3. It appears that the Communist Partido Socialista Popular Dominicano (P.S.P.D.) and the Communist-penetrated 14th of June Movement have also taken a hand in the rebellion, though a less prominent one than the M.P.D. There has in the past been considerable rivalry between these three extremist groups and there is every likelihood that their leaders will have fallen out over the correct tactics to be adopted in the present tense situation.

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telegram No. 3716 (date) 4/5

repeated for information to UKMIS NEW YORK

WK Del. NATO

AD 1015/61

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(80728) Wt. 17714—35 200m 7/62 St.S. /Colonel



NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

Colonel Caamano was in command of the whole rebel movement.


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66

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

*[Handwritten signature]*  
4/5



CONFIDENTIALDOMINICAN REPUBLIC

On 24 April a military coup took place in Santo Domingo, the capital of the Dominican Republic. The coup was carried out by junior army officers and supporters of Dr. Bosch, the moderate left-wing President who was freely elected in 1962 by 62% of the electorate, but deposed by the Military and rightist groups in 1963 on the grounds that his party had become infiltrated by communists. (there is good reason to believe that it had). The rebels gained control of the National Palace and most of the city and captured Dr. Reid, the independent leader of the triumvirate which took over after the ousting of Bosch.

2. The rebels were faced with determined opposition from General Wessin (a fervent anti-communist and opponent of Bosch, who controlled the main Santo Domingo Air Force base together with some troops and tanks). Unable to win the support of the Air Force or Navy, or of the majority of the Army, they armed civilian sympathisers. The determined action of General Wessin led, after some fighting, to a decision by most of the rebel army leaders and the more moderate supporters of Bosch to surrender on 28 April, but by this time the leadership of the rebels had fallen into the hands of extreme left wing elements who seem to have regained the initiative in the centre of the town. The armed forces and the police appear to have lost control and the position in the centre of the town is chaotic, with street fighting, attacks on Embassies, looting and a breakdown of supplies and services. The United States Government have sent an aircraft carrier to evacuate their nationals and U.S. marines

/have



CONFIDENTIAL

have landed to protect the lives and property of American and other foreign citizens. Unless the Dominican Armed Forces can bring the situation quickly under control, the U.S. could become involved in more extensive operations to prevent complete chaos in the Dominican Republic and the exploitation of this by the Communists.

3. It was not considered necessary until today to evacuate British subjects, although it had been agreed that the United States would provide facilities for those who wished to leave. Evacuation has now been recommended by H.M. Chargé d'Affaires and about 40 British subjects of United Kingdom origin are proceeding to Puerto Rico where arrangements are being made for them by H.M. Consulate. There is a much larger number of Jamaicans and other West Indians in the country for whom the United States authorities are prepared also to make arrangements. The French Government have sent two naval vessels to the area, presumably in order to mark their independence of the United States. There is no case for sending British vessels unless the United States ships available are unable to cope, and this is unlikely.

4. A meeting of the Council of the Organisation of American States is to take place in Washington at about 2 a.m. G.M.T. tomorrow to consider the possibility of joint O.A.S. action in the Dominican Republic to bring about a cease fire and to establish a basis for a return to constitutional government. This will help to answer charges of United States intervention emanating from Havana, Moscow and Peking. It is possible that Cuba or some other communist country will bring the question to the Security Council as involving a threat to peace. I am

/sure



CONFIDENTIAL

sure we should give full support to the United States.  
U.N. Department and the legal advisers are being consulted  
about the line we should take.

*R.M.K. Slater*

(R.M.K. Slater)  
30 April, 1965.

Mr. Renrie

The Secretary of State may wish to see this,  
and might wish to thank the Americans  
for the assistance given in evacuating  
British subjects.

*W. Keene* 30/4

Private secretary Separate note now  
submitted to the S. of S.

*TEW*  
*7/5*

CONFIDENTIAL





8

Enter.

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

RE  
AD1015/84  
- 6 MAY 1965  
AD1015/84(A)

Please see my submission of 30 April.

2. The Americans now have some 14,000 troops in the Dominican Republic, and it seems quite clear that their object is not only to protect American lives and property but also to hold the ring between the combatants until a political solution can be found.
3. The Organisation of American States have despatched a special committee to the Dominican Republic to bring about a complete cease-fire. It is led by the Secretary General, Dr. Mora. Meanwhile, the Russians have asked that the Security Council should consider the situation as a matter of urgency. The item is likely to come up today.
4. I think our line should be that we understand the American emergency action and that it is now up to the O.A.S. special committee to do what they can. Further consideration in the Security Council should be deferred until the results of their efforts are known. I submit two draft telegrams to New York. The Legal Adviser concurs.

1423  
1424

AD 1015/51

*R.M.K. Slater*

(R.M.K. Slater)  
3 May, 1965.

*D. Greenhill*  
3/5.

Mr. Greenhill

*W. S. [unclear]*

*W/S. [has seen & approved]*

*3/5*

SECRET

FROM SANTO DOMINGO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTP

FO(S)/CRO(S)/WH(S) VE 39

DISTRIBUTION

6 MAY 1965

AD1015/91/G

Mr. Campbell  
No. 46  
5 May, 1965.

D. 1845 5 May, 1965.  
R. 1845 5 May, 1965.

IMMEDIATE  
SECRET

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 46 of 5 May.  
Repeated for information to: Washington and UKMIS New York.

My telegram No. 43. — AD1015/79/G

Since the fighting began I have had reports that the following important Communists have been identified in the rebel lines. I have not seen them myself.

- (i) Cayetano Rodriguez of M.P.D. He has visited Cuba, Russia and China and is organizer and agitator.
- (ii) Gustavo Ricart of M.P.D. military section of party. Cuban trained.
- (iii) Brothers Juan and Felix De Coudray of P.S.P. Central Committee.


2. P.R.D. neighbour mentioned in paragraph 2 of my telegram under reference told me on 29 April that the Communist take-over of the rebels had been carried out by M.P.D. I connected reports about (i) and (ii) above with this statement. In any case the whole of the P.S.P. and M.P.D. are almost certainly fighting on rebels side now together with extreme left wing of [grp. undec] party. These people are not numerous but most effective.

Foreign Office please pass Washington 16 and UKMIS New York 3.

[Repeated as requested]

ADVANCE COPIES TO:

P.S.  
Sir G. Harrison  
Mr. Greenhill  
Head of American Dept.



HHHH

SECRET

1965

27

A

FROM SANTO DOMINGO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

En Clair

Mr. Campbell

No. 49

5 May, 1965

IMMEDIATEFO/CRO/WH. DISTRIBUTION

D. 15.14 6 May, 1965

R. 15.16 6 May, 1965

RECEIVED IN  
ARCHIVES No. 39

- 7 MAY 1965

AD1015/95

A cease-fire was signed this afternoon in Santo Domingo between self proclaimed constitutional Government of Caamaño and military Junta of San Isidro in presence of Special Commission of Council of Foreign Ministers of OAS. Document mutually agrees on;

- (1) Cease-fire.
- (2) Acceptance of international zone of security limits of which are stipulated.
- (3) Adequate protection and security for all persons in security zone.
- (4) All facilities to Red Cross and other international agencies for distribution of food, medicine, free passage of doctors and health officials.
- (5) Full security for evacuation of asylees in Embassies.
- (6) Respect for diplomatic missions security to personnel security for asylees and refugees therein.
- (7) Recognition of authority of Special Commission of OAS.

2. It was signed by Caamaño and four others for Santo Domingo side and Benoit, President of Junta and two other officers for San Isidro.

ADVANCE COPIES:-F.O. Private Secretary

Sir G. Harrison

Mr. Greenhill

Hd. of American Dept.

Hd. of News Dept.



1965



CONFIDENTIAL

51

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO UNITED KINGDOM DELEGATION TO N.A.T.O. PARIS

Cypher/OTP

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTIONNo. 819  
7 May 1965

D.1545 7 May 1965

IMMEDIATE  
CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to UKDEL NATO telegram No. 819 of 7 May  
Repeated for information to: Washington  
U.K. Mission New York

Reference this morning's telephone conversation, Marsden - Hall. Political Committee.

We are repeating to you Immediate Santo Domingo telegram No. 43 [of 5 May] which gives Mr. Campbell's retrospective assessment of the course of the revolt and of the critical importance of the initial United States intervention in saving lives. Mr. Campbell has since informed us that the statement by Sr. Urena in paragraph 1 of telegram No. 43 is not to be relied on and should not be quoted in any United Kingdom statement.

2. Our own assessment of the rôle of the communists in the revolt, which accords closely with Mr. Campbell's, was given in my telegram No. 3716 of 4 May.

3. Yesterday evening we received from the Dominican Chargé d'Affaires a Note transmitting the text of a telegram from Colonel Caamano's Foreign Minister announcing Colonel Caamano's election by the National Assembly and his swearing in as Constitutional President of the Republic; listing the names of his Ministers; and asserting that his Government enjoys the absolute support of the Dominican people, maintains control over the whole of the national territory, will respect human rights and will conduct its international relations in accordance with the juridical norms of the Inter-American system and the United Nations, respecting and fulfilling undertakings contracted by the Dominican State. The telegram ends by asserting that the Popular Movement which has made possible the return to force of the 1963 Constitution answers solely to the democratic self-determination of the Dominican people (thus implicitly refuting the charge of communist involvement).

4. As you will know from Press reports, whatever the juridical claim of Colonel Caamano's Government as the constitutional successor of the Bosch Government overthrown in September 1963, the assertion that it controls the whole of Dominican national territory is patently false. The rebel-held territory is confined to a small area of Santo Domingo encircled by United States troops and we have no indication that Colonel Caamano's writ runs anywhere in the interior of the country. There is therefore no question of our according recognition to his Government at the moment, as it

CONFIDENTIAL

manifestly/



CONFIDENTIAL

Foreign Office telegram No. 819 to NATO

- 2 -

manifestly fails to meet our standard criteria of (a) being in effective control of the whole country and (b) appearing likely to remain so. We are informing the Press of the broad terms of the communication and saying that we are studying it.

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American Dept.  
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U.N. Dept.  
Western Dept.  
News Dept.

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FROM WASHINGTON TO FOREIGN OFFICE

RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES No. 39 = 7 MAY 1965
AD1015/99

Cypher/OTF

FO/CRO/WH  
DISTRIBUTION

Sir P. Dean

No. 1200

D. 2200 6 May, 1965

6 May, 1965

R. 2358 6 May, 1965

IMMEDIATE

CONFIDENTIAL

A 1015/96

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 1200 of 6 May.

Repeated for information to: U.K. Mission New York

and Saving to: U.K. Del NATO Moscow

Your telegram No. 3748.

Full text of President's T.V. address on 2 May and his remarks to the trade union audience on 3 May have been sent to the department by bag.

2. In his statement on 2 May (which is the official prepared text on which we should concentrate) the President referred to the unanimous view expressed in January 1962, against the background of Cuba, by all the American nations that "the principles of Communism are incompatible with the principles of the inter-American system". His statement that "the American nations cannot, must not, and will not permit the establishment of another Communist Government in the Western hemisphere" was in his view a natural corollary of the January 1962 declaration, and I feel sure that he would not accept that it constitutes a new doctrine. While I doubt whether President Kennedy would have spoken publicly or acted tactically in the same way as President Johnson, I have little doubt that the end result would have been the same.

3. The chief administration worries have been caused by the difficulty of securing the agreement of several American States to the establishment of an inter-American force in the Dominican Republic under O.A.S. control and the need to justify the presence of a large number of American troops in Santo Domingo after it became clear that virtually all United States and other foreign nationals who wished to leave had already done so.

4. The first of these problems seems temporarily to have been solved early this morning by the passage in the O.A.S. of a resolution establishing an inter-American force. I shall telegraph the text of this resolution later today. The Americans are however looking for ways to avoid a repetition of the last few days'

CONFIDENTIAL

/ wrangling

7 MAY  
1965

CONFIDENTIALWashington telegram No.1200 to Foreign Office

- 2 -

wrangling in the O.A.S. In the event of similar crises in the future, Mr. Rusk told me on 4 May that the United States might have some proposals to make at the second extraordinary inter-American conference in Rio later this month for the establishment of an inter-American "fire brigade" and for ways to improve the O.A.S.'s ability to take quick decisions.

5. As regards the second, whatever the merits of demerits of the argument about how far the Communists had seized control (in which connexion I am impressed by Sante Dominge telegram No.43 and draw your attention again to what Mr. Rusk told me on 4 May - my telegram No.1187, particularly the last sentence), the Americans for their part cannot prove how much worse things would have been if they had not acted as they did. The decision was and had to be theirs. Whatever tactical faults and mistakes may have been committed (and I propose to send you later considered comments on what has in effect been President Johnson's first major excursion on his own in foreign policy) a decision to do nothing or very little would have laid the President open to much more serious internal criticism here.

6. Whatever may emerge from the Rio conference in terms of the adaptation of the O.A.S. to enable it to cope better with similar crises. I am convinced that the President means what he says about preventing the establishment of Communist Governments. We must expect him in future to act similarly when the need arises. He will have learnt some lessons from the present crisis and will if possible act after consulting and in collaboration with members of the O.A.S.; but if necessary, he will act alone because the stability of this hemisphere is the first order of priority for United States security. Of course he will not lightly embark on similar operations, and no doubt attaches great importance, probably rightly, to the deterrent effect of the present one. In sum, I suggest that what we are seeing is not the adoption of a new doctrine but of new and tougher methods of putting it into effect.

Foreign Office pass Saving to U.K. Del NATO No.57 and Moscow No.31.

[Repeated as requested].

ADVANCE COPIES:

Private Secretary  
 Sir G. Harrison  
 Mr. Greenhill  
 Head of American Department  
 Head of News Department

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D1015/79/8

D1015/74



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RECEIVED IN  
ARCHIVES No 39  
- 7 MAY 1965  
AD1015/102

FROM SANTO DOMINGO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTP  
Mr. Campbell  
No. 53

FO/CRO/WH. DISTRIBUTION

6 May 1965

D: 1946 6 May 1965

R: 1946 6 May 1965

IMMEDIATE

CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 53 of 6 May  
Repeated for information to: Washington

On 3 May the National Assembly of Besch Government of 1963 met in the rebel area and claimed that a constitutional quorum was made up by the presence of 17 Senators and 41 Deputies quoting Article 105 of the 1963 Constitution. The Assembly proceeded to elect a new President as a consequence of "indefinite absence" of Molina-Urena. The result was Caamano 49 votes, Lembert Peguero 4 votes, Mainardi 3 votes. Caamano was proclaimed President as per my telegram No. 41. I await expert opinion on the legality of this move but its astuteness should be noted in connection with the O.A.S. and elsewhere. Ariste passed us a list of Cabinet appointments which are in my immediately following telegram.

AD1015/67

2. The rebels brought out a newspaper yesterday and also began broadcasting. These people move very fast indeed, and I do not think they are just going to fade away. There would seem to be advantage in America having some contact with them but there is no sign of this.

Foreign Office pass Washington No. 17.

[Repeated as requested].

ADVANCE COPIES TO:

P.S.  
Sir G. Harrison  
Mr. Greenhill  
Hd. of American Dept.  
Hd of News Dept.



1965

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FROM SANTO DOMINGO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

En Clair

FO/CRO/WH. DISTRIBUTION

Mr. Campbell

No. 54  
6 May, 1965

D. 19.40 6 May, 1965  
R. 19.40 6 May, 1965

RECEIVED IN  
ARCHIVES N. 39  
- 7 MAY 1965  
AD 1015/106

IMMEDIATE

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 54 of 6 May,  
Repeated for information to: Washington

My immediately preceding telegram: Cabinet as per Decree  
Number 1.

- Dr. Hector Aristy, Presidency.
  - Colonel Manuel R. Montes Arache, Armed Forces.
  - Colonel Rafael Fernandez Dominguez, Interior and Police.
  - Dr. Jottin Cury, Foreign Affairs.
  - Dr. Fernando A. Silie Gatón, Education.
  - Dr. Luis E. Lembert Peguero, Justice.
  - Dr. Ramon Ledesma Perez, Without Portfolio.
  - Dr. Luis Scheker, Central Bank.
  - Dr. Salvador Jorge Blanco, Procurator General
- Foreign Office pass Washington as my telegram No. 18.

[Repeated as requested]

ADVANCE COPIES

- F.O. Private Secretary
- Sir G. Harrison
- Mr. Greenhill
- Head of American Department
- Head of News Department
- Resident Clerk



1965

WWWWW



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RECEIVED IN  
S No. 39  
- 8 MAY 1965  
AD1015/106(A)

FROM SANTO DOMINGO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

En Clair

FO/CRO/WH. DISTRIBUTION

Mr. Campbell

No. 58  
6 May, 1965

D. 14.38 6 May, 1965

R. 15.40 6 May, 1965

A-1015

PRIORITY

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 58 of 6 May,  
Repeated for information to: Washington

My telegram No. 54: Cabinet.

Continued: -

Emilio Almonte Jimenez, Public Works

Dr. Marcelino Velez Santana, Public Health

Dr. Antonio Rosario, Special Delegate to OAS.

Ing. Caonabo Javier, Special Delegate in Chile

Gaston Espinal, Consul New York and Puerto Rico.

See my 53/1/8 15 March.

Foreign Office pass Washington as my telegram No. 22.

[Repeated as requested]

MAY  
11  
1965

*[Handwritten signature]*



A

FROM SANTO DOMINGO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

En Clair

FO/CRO/WH. DISTRIBUTION

Mr. Campbell

No. 65

8 May, 1965

PRIORITY

D. 17.30 8 May, 1965

R. 17.32 8 May, 1965

AD10157106

. Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 65 of 8 May,  
Repeated for information to: Washington

My telegrams Nos. 54 and 58. More Caamano appointments.

Dr. Virgilio Mainardi Reyna, Labour.

José Brea Pena, Public Property.

Noel Subvervi Espinosa, Vice Public Property.

Lic Wilfredo Nadal Lluberes, Rentas Internas.

Colonel P. A. Alvarez Helguin, Vice Armed Forces.

Diego Ramon Guerra Nouel, National Security.

Dr. José Rufael Abinader, Finance.

Dr. Rafael Cantizano Arias, Governor Santiago.

Foreign Office pass Washington as my telegram No. 28.

[ Repeated as requested ]

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10 MAY 1965  
AD1015/106(B)

CCCCC

10 MAY  
1965

*[Handwritten signature]*

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CONFIDENTIAL  
FROM SANTO DOMINGO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTP

FO/CRO/WH DISTRIBUTION

Mr. Campbell

No. 57  
6 May 1965

D. Untimed 7 May 1965

R. 0350 7 May 1965

RECEIVED IN  
ARCHIVES No. 39  
- 7 MAY 1965

IMMEDIATE  
CONFIDENTIAL

AD1015/108

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 57 of 6 May.  
Repeated for information to: Washington UKMIS New York

The French Ambassador called this morning. He is clearly disturbed by indications he told me he [gp undec.] from Paris that his Government is considering recognizing Caamane régime. He asked me for an impression of my government's attitude. I naturally told him that I could see no qualification whatever for recognition of Caamane since he by no means commanded obedience of the masses. He privately agreed with this. Later the Italian Ambassador and German Chargé d'Affaires came. We are all in agreement on this point. The French Ambassador intends telling Paris of the Italian, German and British heads of missions' attitude towards recognition so as to reinforce his own recommendation against. I need hardly add that French recognition would be very embarrassing for the United States here at this time. The United States Embassy has made many blunders in its dealings with the Press here particularly with United States newsmen. The wilder statements such as twelve thousand armed Communists here have encountered much scepticism, and errors and tactlessness have aroused hostility. The consequence is that the whole operation is now coming under heavy Press fire. This is a great pity because the facts as I see them are in my telegram No. 43.

D1015/79

2. American strength here today is: army 14,345, navy 8,314, marines 6,924, air force 626 [gp undec.] [gp undec ? these] are involved in operations.

Foreign Office pass Washington 21 and UKMIS New York 6.

[Repeated as requested].

ADVANCE COPIES:  
Private Secretary  
Sir G. Harrison  
Mr. Greenhill  
Hd American Dept.  
Hd P.U.S.D.  
Hd News Dept.

7 MAY  
RECEIVED  
1965

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CONFIDENTIALFROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO SANTO DOMINGOCypher/OTP and By Bag  
ADFO/CRO/WH.DISTRIBUTIONNo. 60

7 May, 1965

D. 1710 8 May, 1965

PRIORITYCONFIDENTIALAddressed to Santo Domingo telegram No. 60 of 7 May.

Repeated for information to: Paris

UKDEL NATO

and Saving to: Bonn No. 399

Rome No. 349

Your telegram No. 57 [of 6 May; Consultation with French and other Ambassadors].

You spoke well. I hope that your advice and that of your Italian and German colleagues will weigh with the Quai d'Orsay. Indeed, it may already have done so. A member of the French Embassy here told the Department this afternoon that the Quai d'Orsay are taking the line that President de Gaulle's remarks about recognition have been misinterpreted, and that there is no question of such a step in the immediate future. The French Ambassador in Santo Domingo has, however, been instructed to make a prise de contacte with Caamano. This is no more than you have done and carries with it no implied recognition.

2. I have received a Note from the Dominican Chargé d'Affaires transmitting the text of a telegram from "the Dominican Foreign Ministry" announcing the installation of Caamano as Constitutional President, listing his Cabinet and asserting that his Government enjoys the absolute support of the Dominican people and is in control of the whole national territory. I have also received a telegram signed by Dr. Jottin Cury formally requesting recognition. No acknowledgment will be sent for the present at least to either communication.

QQQQQ

CONFIDENTIAL

FROM WASHINGTON TO FOREIGN OFFICE

RECEIVED  
ARCHIVES 15  
A 39  
- 8 MAY 1965

AD1015/110

En Clair

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

Sir P. Dean  
No. 1203  
6 May, 1965

D. 2330 6 May, 1965  
R. 0148 7 May, 1965

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 1203 of 6 May.  
Repeated for information to UKMIS New York  
UKDEL NATO

Dominican Republic.

Following is the text of the Resolution adopted in the third plenary session of the Organisation of American States, held on 6 May:

Begins:

Whereas:

This meeting at its session of May 1, established a Committee to proceed to the Dominican Republic to seek the re-establishment of peace and normal conditions in the territory of that Republic;

The said Resolution requests the American Government's and the General Secretariat of the Organization of American States to extend their full cooperation to facilitate the work of the Committee;

The formation of an inter-American force will signify ipso facto the transformation of the forces presently in Dominican territory into another force that will not be that of one State or of a group of States but that of the Organization of American States, which organization is charged with the responsibility of interpreting the democratic will of its members;

The American States being under the obligation to provide reciprocal assistance to each other, the Organization is under greater obligation to safeguard the principles of the charter and to do everything possible so that in situations such as that prevailing in the Dominican Republic appropriate measures may be taken leading to the re-establishment of peace and normal democratic conditions;

/The Organization



Washington telegram No. 1203 to Foreign Office

- 2 -

The Organization of American States being competent to assist the member States in the preservation of peace and the re-establishment of normal democratic conditions, it is also competent to provide the means that reality and circumstances require and that prudence counsels as adequate for the accomplishment of such purposes;

And,

The Committee of the Organization of American States that preceded to the Dominican Republic, in its second report to this meeting, advises the formation of an inter-American force to achieve the objectives determined by the meeting of consultation,

The tenth meeting of consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs.

Resolves:

1. To request Governments of member States that are willing and capable of doing so to make contingents of their land, naval, air or police forces available to the Organization of American States, within their capabilities and to the extent they can do so, to form an inter-American force that will operate under the authority of this Tenth Meeting of Consultation.
2. That this force will have as its sole purpose, in a spirit of democratic impartiality, that of cooperating in the restoration of normal conditions in the Dominican Republic, in maintaining the security of its inhabitants and the inviolability of human rights, and in the establishment of an atmosphere of peace and conciliation that will permit the functioning of democratic institutions.
3. To request the commanders of the contingents of forces that make up this force to work out directly among themselves and with a committee of this meeting the technical measures necessary to establish a unified command of the Organization of American States for the co-ordinated and effective action of the inter-American armed force. In the composition of this force, an effort will be made to see that the national contingents shall be progressively equalized.
4. That at such time as the O.A.S. Unified Command shall have determined that the inter-American armed force is adequate for  
/the



Washington telegram No. 1203 to Foreign Office

- 3 -

the purposes contemplated by the Resolution adopted by this meeting on May 1, 1965, the full responsibility of meeting these purposes shall be assumed by that force.

5. That the withdrawal of the inter-American force from the Dominican Republic shall be determined by this meeting.

6. To continue in session in order to keep the situation under review, to receive the report and recommendations of the Committee, and in the light thereof to take the necessary steps to facilitate the prompt restoration of democratic order in the Dominican Republic.

7. To inform the Security Council of the United Nations of the text of this Resolution.

Ends.

2. The Resolution was adopted by 14 votes with 5 opposed (Uruguay, Mexico, Chile, Peru and Ecuador) and 1 abstention (Venezuela).

Foreign Office pass UKDEL NATO 120.

[Repeated as requested.]

DISTRIBUTED TO:

American Dept.  
United Nations Dept.  
W.O.C.D.  
News Dept.



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FROM SANTO DOMINGO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTP

FO(S)/CRO(S)/WH(S) DISTRIBUTION

Mr. Campbell

No. 61

7 May, 1965

IMMEDIATE

CONFIDENTIAL

D. 07.00 8 May, 1965

R. 09.20 8 May, 1965

RECEIVED IN  
ARCHIVES No. 39  
10 MAY 1965  
AD1015/111

AD1015/33

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 61 of 7 May,  
Repeated for information to: U.K.Mis. New York Washington

In explanation of my telegram No. 59, document referred to was shown to me on 29 April by Colombian Ambassador, in whose Embassy Molina Urena was, and still is, in asylum. It also contained his statement that Bosch should stand down from the Presidency. Wessin's attack was launched because Bosch had been named President. These attacks forced Molina Urena to give up and he signed the statement then.

2. In view of Caamane's subsequent military triumph against Wessin under the Bosch banner however, circumstances have changed greatly since 29 April. It is now by no means to Molina Urena's credit that he signed that document. He could therefore claim that he did so under duress or declare it a forgery, and might well do so. The evasive behaviour of the Colombian Ambassador, who is his friend and host, to American enquiries about the document yesterday, prompted me to send you my telegram under reference.

Foreign Office pass Washington No. 25 and U.K.Mis. New York No. 9.

[Repeated as requested]

ADVANCE COPIES TO:-

F.O. Mr. Barker  
Hd. of American Dept.  
Resident Clerk

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10 MAY  
XVII  
1965



Proyecto de Digitalización  
Academia Dominicana de la Historia

FROM SANTO DOMINGO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

A

Mr. Clair

FO/CRO/WH. DISTRIBUTION

Mr. Campbell

No. 62

7 May, 1965

IMMEDIATE

D. 11.30 7 May, 1965

R. 11.35 7 May, 1965

RECEIVED IN  
ARCHIVES No. 39  
10 MAY 1965

AD1013/112.

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 62 of 7 May.

Repeated for information to: Washington.

To-day military junta at San Isidro is being dissolved and a junta, civil-military, to sit in Santo Domingo, is being put in its place:

Brigadier General Antonio Imbert Barrera,

Carlos Grisolia Polony,

Julie Pestigo,

Ing. Alejandro Zeler,

Colonel Benoit.

Plan is free elections when OAS decides, and none of above will offer themselves as Presidential candidate or for any other office.

See my immediately following telegram.

Foreign Office pass Washington as my telegram No. 26.

[Repeated as requested]

ADVANCE COPIES TO:-F.O. Private Secretary


Mr. Barker

Hd. of American Dept.

Hd. of U.N. Dept.

Hd. of News Dept.

Resident Clerk



A

CONFIDENTIAL

FROM SANTO DOMINGO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTF

Mr. Campbell

No. 63

7 May, 1965

IMMEDIATE

CONFIDENTIAL

FO/CRO/WH. DISTRIBUTION

D. 10.40 8 May, 1965

R. 11.30 8 May, 1965

RECEIVED IN  
ARCHIVES No. 39

10 MAY 1965

AD 1015/113

AD 1015/112

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 63 of 7 May,  
Repeated for information to: Washington.

My immediately preceding telegram.

I fancy our American friends have been desperately shuffling the cards and have dealt this hand. I fear it contains few trumps. Unless the 8 discredited Generals at San Isidre can be got rid of quickly it seems too [? word omitted] for Caamano to claim that these 5 are merely a front for them.

2. I am informed that Ariste is telephoning Governments direct for recognition. He said yesterday that they intend to reinstate overseas contract[sic]. My personal feelings are that matters are chaotic enough already without that addition.

Foreign Office pass Washington No. 27.

[Repeated as requested]

ADVANCE COPIES TO:-

- Mr. Barker
- Hd. of American Dept.
- Hd. of U.N. Dept.
- Hd. of News Dept.
- Resident Clerk

CCCCC

CONFIDENTIAL

10 MAY  
XVI  
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1965

CONFIDENTIALFROM WASHINGTON TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTP

FO/CRO/WH, DISTRIBUTION

Sir F. Dean

No. 1207  
7 May, 1965

D. 0300 8 May, 1965

R. 0558 8 May, 1965

PRIORITY  
CONFIDENTIAL

RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES No. 39 10 MAY 1965 AD1015/115
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Sante Domingo.

The following information has been given to us today in conversations which I had with Mr. Thomas Mann (who is devoting almost all his time to this question) and the Minister had with Mr. Vaughn.

2. The State Department having made some progress with the O.A.S. are now trying to procure the adoption of a further resolution, (text of the operative part of which is in my immediately following telegram). If Mr. Bunker can muster sufficient support at a meeting of the O.A.S. tonight, at which a report of the Five-Man Committee who are returning from Sante Domingo will also be considered, the Americans will try to get a vote taken on the draft resolution or something like it tomorrow. The Committee of Representatives provided for in paragraph 1 of the draft resolution will, the Americans hope, consist of Venezuela (Betancourt), United States (who will nominate Munoz Marin), Costa Rica (Figueres), Colombia (Yarras Camargo) and either Argentina or Brazil. Vaughn said that the aim was that these Five should act as High Commissioners and help to work towards elections. If the present O.A.S. Committee of Five remained in being then he hoped that Betancourt, Munoz Marin, Figueres and Camargo could act in the capacity of elder statesmen.

3. Meanwhile a new Council has been nominated by the "loyalists" to replace the Junta. This consists of two military officers and three civilians. One is a Bosch supporter, another is an associate of Reid Cabral. Vaughn commented that this was a significant development, though the Americans do not at present intend to recognize the Junta. In a similar context Mann told me that the Americans would not in any foreseeable circumstances recognize Caamano.

/4. On the

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1965



CONFIDENTIALWashington telegram No. 1207 to Foreign Office

- 2 -

4. On the ground slow progress is being made but there are conflicting reports about the "rebels", some to the effect that the two extremist Communist parties have issued orders to their followers to hide their arms and others that Caamaño is himself finished and no longer in control. Vaughn said that there had been a number of desertions from the Caamaño forces.

5. The Americans are under no illusions that the real anxiety of the O.A.S. is not about the possibility that there might have been or might still be a Communist take-over in Santo Domingo, but about getting the American troops out as soon as possible. To meet this Vaughn said in strict confidence that they hoped to announce either tonight or tomorrow the withdrawal of one of the United States Marine battalions.

6. Minister asked about the reference in the President's statement to the likelihood of similar trouble elsewhere. Vaughn said this was indeed the case and mentioned specifically Colombia and Panama as the two early, if not immediate, danger spots. There was no time for discussion however about the action the United States might take if these circumstances arose.

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FROM WASHINGTON TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTP

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Sir P. Dean  
No. 1208  
7 May, 1965.

D. 0305 8 May, 1965  
R. 0515 8 May, 1965

RECEIVED IN  
ARCHIVES No. 39  
10 MAY 1965  
AD1015/115(A)

IMMEDIATE  
CONFIDENTIAL

My immediately preceding telegram. Santo Domingo.

Following is text of operative part of draft resolution.

1. Decides to establish a committee of representatives of [? grp. omitted].
2. Instructs the committee:
  - (a) To consult with outstanding democratic citizens in the Dominican Republic with a view to the establishment of a provisional government of national unity of the Dominican Republic;
  - (b) To assist and advise in the establishment of such provisional government of national unity and in the re-establishment of the administrative machinery of government;
  - (c) To cooperate with such provisional government of national unity in the establishment of a permanent representative regime through democratic processes;
  - (d) To supervise the immediate establishment and operation of a programme of public health and sanitation, emergency relief, and economic rehabilitation; and
  - (e) To exercise the authority of the tenth meeting of consultation with respect to the inter-American armed force.
3. Instructs the committee to report at regular intervals to the meeting of Foreign Ministers on its progress in carrying out its tasks.

ADVANCE COPIES TO:

P.S.  
Mr. Barker  
Head of American Dept.  
Head of News Dept.  
R.C.

HHHH

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10 MAY 1965



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Academia Dominicana de la Historia

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FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO WASHINGTON

Cypher/OTP and By Bag

FO/CRO/WH DISTRIBUTION

AD

No. 3903

11 May, 1965.

D. 0025 12 May, 1965.

PRIORITY

CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Washington telegram No. 3903 of 11 May.

Repeated for information to: UKMIS New York

UKDEL NATO

And Saving to: Paris No. 1165

Bonn No. 406

Rome No. 358

My telegram to Santo Domingo No. 61 [of 11 May] and your telegram No. 1207 [of 7 May: Dominican Republic].

I note that the Americans do not at present intend to recognise either Government: I assume that they would not recognize the Government of National Reconstruction unless the O.A.S.' efforts to work out a formula agreeable to both sides were to prove hopeless.

2. Please tell the State Department that we should find it very helpful to be kept informed of their thinking on this important matter. You should at the same time inform them of our views.

HHHH

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FROM SANTO DOMINGO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypner/OTP

FO/CRO/WH DISTRIBUTION

Mr. Campbell  
No. 60  
7 May, 1965.

D. 1945 7 May, 1965.

R. 2131 7 May, 1965.

RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES No. 39 10 MAY 1965 AD1015/117
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IMMEDIATE  
CONFIDENTIAL

Following is situation report.

1. Areas.

Eastern limit of International Zone is roughly in prolongation of Avenida Pasteur from George Washington to Euriquez Urena. United States airborne troops held all East bank of the river and bridge and approach road to roundabout on Western side. This links with a corridor to security zone. Elsewhere Caamano holds West bank, Ciudad Nueva, San Carlos, Luperon and Espailat districts.

2. Economic [grp. undec]s. City is running out of money. All banks are in rebel hands. We contacted Caamano this morning, who says he will guarantee safety of business men going into his area. He wishes banks to open. He will not allow members of the previous regime to draw large sums from their personal accounts but he wishes business to be started. I have conveyed this to bankers who have asked me to arrange a meeting with Caamano for them. I am trying to do so. Reserves of oil are probably three weeks and all installations are on East bank. A half sunken ship is burning, partially blocking the entrance to the harbour and to oil jetty. It is urgent to get this moved. Caamano offered cooperation to help clear this provided Americans inform him of method so that he can warn his troops. Americans are being told about this and banks. They say they will communicate message this morning. I hope I have your approval for acting as contact in this. Port, oil and circulation of money are essential if economic chaos is not to worsen.

ADVANCE COPIES TO:

P.S.

Mr. Barker

Head of American Dept.

Head of News Dept.

R.C.

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1965





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FROM SANTO DOMINGO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTP  
 Mr. Campbell  
No. 66  
 8 May, 1965

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RECEIVED IN  
 S No. 39  
 10 MAY 1965  
 AD1015/122

D: 2033 8 May, 1965  
 R: 2038 8 May, 1965

IMMEDIATE  
CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 66 of 8 May,  
 Repeated for information to: Washington

As this morning's contact, Caamane said that Wessin in a barrel scraping operation is moving troops from provincial towns to the capital leaving small garrisons in each. If this is true it could be in preparation for a last Wessin attack on Caamane's citadel about which there are rumours. This would of course break the cease-fire but I am hoping our American friends will continue to keep him quiet. It could be a reorganisational move following the formation yesterday of the new military/civil junta. Now seems a bad time for them to move troops away from the provinces because I am fairly reliably informed that on Monday next, 10 May, all Bosch Governors and Mayors throughout the country will proceed to offices, from which they were ousted in September 1963, to take up their duties. This will generate considerable heat. Caamane also said that in the next day or so events would [gp omitted] which would give him a much improved case for asking for recognition. He would not enlarge.

2. I have just heard from reliable source that United States Government might recognise Imbert's junta almost immediately. If true this may well be alternative (III) in my telegram No. 37 with attendant consequences. It will be a hard row for the Americans to furrow.

Foreign Office pass Washington No. 29.

[Repeated as requested]

ADVANCE COPIES:

Mr. Barker  
 Head of American Dept.  
 Head of News Dept.  
 Resident Clerk

10 MAY  
 1965

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FROM SANTO DOMINGO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTP

F.O./C.R.O./WH. DISTRIBUTION

Mr. Campbell

No. 68

10 May, 1965

D. 1753 10 May, 1965

R. 1832 10 May, 1965

IMMEDIATE

\*[Received without Security classification]

RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES No.39 11 MAY 1965
AD1015/125

My telegram No. 60.

AD1015/117

It is estimated that about twenty days' fuel supply now remains for power plant. If fresh deliveries cannot be brought in all power supplies to country will stop thereafter. The hazard presented to tanker making entry to port is considered unacceptable in view of firing still going on from both banks of river. The existence of United States-trained corps of Navy frogmen on rebel side is an additional factor. American investigations have revealed that coastline presents exceptional difficulties for running in a temporary pipeline east of Ozama. As far as I can see only alternative open to American military is to take port area by assault and secure both sides of the river for safe entry of vessels. Reaction to this would almost certainly be a general renewal of hostilities. No progress has been made over bank offices in rebel territory. Bankers considered Caamano's offer carefully, but feels that not enough security is offered for their opening. At the same time, to preserve neutrality, they have decided not to open fresh branches in security zone.

ADVANCE COPIES:

- Private Secretary
- P.U.S.
- Mr. Rennie
- Hd. American Dept.
- Hd. News Dept.
- Resident Clerk

11 MAY  
 1965  
 DEPT. OF STATE  
 WASHINGTON, D.C.

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CONFIDENTIAL

FROM WASHINGTON TO FOREIGN OFFICE

A

Cypher/OTP

FO/CRO/WH, DISTRIBUTION

Sir P. Dean

No. 1225  
10 May, 1965

D. 0040 11 May, 1965  
R. 0504 11 May, 1965

RECEIVED IN DIVISION No. 39 11 MAY 1965 AD1015/127
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PRIORITY  
CONFIDENTIAL

AD1015/15

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 1225 of 10 May.  
Repeated for information Saving to: UKMis New York  
UKDel NATO

My telegram No. 1207: Santo Domingo.

AD1015/115

The O.A.S. Council, continuing to meet as the 10th Meeting of Consultation, held a number of sessions over the week-end, and convenes again this evening. However, the draft resolution quoted in my telegram No. 1208 has not yet been tabled. According to the State Department, President Johnson is anxious to proceed as soon as possible to the appointment of the Committee of Illustrious Latin Americans referred to in my paragraph 2; but the State Department would prefer first if possible, to resolve the following objections and difficulties:

- (a) the South Americans including the Argentinians consider that the Committee is too heavily weighted in favour of the Caribbean. The United States position is that this is appropriate as Santo Domingo is a Caribbean problem;
- (b) the military governments of Latin America including Paraguay, Honduras and Ecuador are strongly opposed to the appointment of Figueres and Betancourt as Socialists and the latter is the author of the Betancourt doctrine.

The United States is, therefore, assailed within the O.A.S. from the right as well as from the left.

2. An attempt on 8 May led by Chile to challenge the credentials of the Dominican representative in the O.A.S.

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MAY 11 1965  
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
RECEIVED

1965

CONFIDENTIALWashington telegram No. 1225 to Foreign Office

- 2 -

was, however, effectively thwarted, largely through the efforts of Facio the Costa Rican and ex-President of the Council. There is a move to increase the numbers on the special committee appointed on 1 May (my telegram No. 1172 paragraph 1) to six by the addition of Facio. *WADIOTS 744*

3. According to the office of inter-American affairs at the State Department, Mr. Harriman returned to Washington on 9 May encouraged by his reception in the Latin American capitals which he visited and there are good prospects that the Governments of Brazil, the Argentine and Colombia will send forces to the Dominican Republic in accordance with the O.A.S. resolution of 6 May. The Government of Honduras has informed the Americans that they have military units ready to be moved at once. Ex-President Betanceourt is anxious that the Venezuelans should also take part but, President Leoni is said to be more inclined to make common cause with Frei and Tejera Paris, the Venezuelan Ambassador to the O.A.S., has been acting unpredictably in pursuance of his own political ambitions.

4. As the result of informal soundings the State Department conclude that about half the members of the O.A.S. are in favour of the postponement of the extraordinary conference which is due to open in Rio on 20 May. The United States Government intends to take no initiative in favour of postponement. If the conference goes on, the 10th meeting of consultation on Santo Domingo will probably transfer its seat to Rio.

Foreign Office pass Saving to UKDEL NATO 59.

[Repeated Saving to UKDel NATO.]

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FROM SANTO DOMINGO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTP

F.O./C.R.O./WH DISTRIBUTION

Mr. Campbell

No. 69  
10 May, 1965

D. 06.36 11 May, 1965  
R. 07.45 11 May, 1965

RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES No. 39 11 MAY 1965 AD1015/131
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IMMEDIATE  
CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 69 of 10 May.  
Repeated for information to: Washington.

Wessin wrote to the United States Ambassador yesterday announcing his intention to resign. He resigned today. In my immediately following telegram are names of Generals dismissed yesterday by Imbert. These figures blocked any chance of negotiation and thus we have cause for modest hopes. Ariste told a contact today that, with the disappearance of this group, the way could be opened for consultations for constitutional government of the whole country. We detect signs of a slight waning in Ariste's influence over Caamano recently.

ADVANCE COPIES:

Private Secretary  
P.U.S.  
Mr. Rennie  
Head of American Dept.

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11 MAY  
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1965

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FROM SANTO DOMINGO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

En Clair

F.O./C.R.O./WH. DISTRIBUTION

Mr. Campbell  
No. 70  
10 May, 1965

D. 0746 11 May, 1965  
R. 0746 11 May, 1965

RECEIVED IN  
ARCHIVES No. 39  
11 MAY 1965  
AD 1015/131(A)

IMMEDIATE

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 70 of 10 May.  
Repeated for information to Washington.

My immediately preceding telegram. AD101

Luna, Belisario Peguero, Hermida, Montas Guerrero,  
Rivera Guesta, Hungria Morel, Garcia Unbaez, Rib Santamira.

ADVANCE COPIES:  
Private Secretary  
P.U.S.  
Mr. Rennie  
Hd. American Dept.

11 MAY  
1965

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FROM SANTO DOMINGO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

FO/CRO/WH DISTRIBUTION

Cypher/OTP

Mr. Campbell

No. 71

11 May, 1965

D. 1823 11 May, 1965

R. 1827 11 May, 1965

RECEIVED IN
ARCHIVES No. 39
12 MAY 1965
AD1015/140

IMMEDIATE  
CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 71 of 11 May  
Repeated for information to: Washington

Schlaudemman State Department called last night. We are old friends. He told me that Wessin's removal was ordered from Washington and agreed that it would have been better to have done this a week ago. I fancy the Americans now see that Caamano is in a stronger position than they originally thought and may be moving from their unbending line. He asked me for my assessment of Caamano's popularity in the country as a whole and state on his morale. I replied that I had no way of judging popularity except that reports received indicated that he had a fair to good measure of support in provincial towns. His target for monopoly seemed good which was not surprising seeing that he still has the political initiative. In answer to specific questions I said that all props supporting the State had been swept away, that we were in entirely new circumstances and an entirely new political personality in the form of a successful man of action such as Caamano might have considerable popular appeal. Old faces would have little. The danger of Communism eventually undermining Caamano was very great and I thought it sound policy for the United States to try and drive a wedge between Caamano with his moderates and extremist minority now. This would be difficult but worth trying because a good case for strangling the Communist snake could be argued with him on patriotic grounds. Once the United States had been reassured on this question it was surely obvious to Caamano that only the Americans were in a position to revive totally collapsed economy by massive aid. Negotiations of this kind would be littered with traps but it was probably better to have some contact than none. Schlaudemman did not disagree on the general thread of this but said that the powerful anti-Communist quarters in the United States would raise a howling alarm if it

/became

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Santo Domingo telegram No.71 to Foreign Office.

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became known that the United States was treating with Caamano since they look on him as a raving communist. Also he believed that Bosch was still running Caamano's political policies and he would almost certainly [gp.undec.] deal with Communists in this way. Regarding Imbise's <sup>ent</sup> junta he said they now had little hope of its effectiveness. This was a personal statement and of course did not reflect the views of either of our governments.

[Repeated to Washington]

ADVANCE COPIES:

F.O.

Private Secretary

P.U.S.

Mr.Rennie

Head of American Department

Head of News Department





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65

FROM SANTO DOMINGO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

A

By ~~Per~~/OTP

FO/CRO/WH. DISTRIBUTION

Mr. Campbell

No. 72  
11 May, 1965

D. 1910 11 May, 1965  
R. 1915 11 May, 1965

RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES No. 39 MAY 1965
AD1015/14

AD1015/172

IMMEDIATE  
CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 72 of 11 May.  
Repeated for information to Washington

Wessin has now withdrawn his resignation. Please see my telegram No. 66 "Operation Barrel Scrape" is now a distinct possibility. The background is as follows.

Nuncio has been trying to arrange a meeting between Caamano and Imbert. Both agree on principle of talks but Caamano continues insisting on inadequacy of security for him inside American lines. Imbert saw Nuncio this morning and said that Caamano's delays were making remaining officers at San Isidro extremely nervous. He said that unless talks were held immediately he would have to break truce and start operation of clearing up Caamano's stronghold. Wessin's withdrawal of his resignation may be seen in this light. Imbert says he could defeat Caamano in four hours. This is military nonsense. Morale of troops at his disposal seems low and I doubt that they would be led into a desperate assault, and only powerful American support could bring it off. I am hoping our American friends do not intend this. There is little doubt they could sit on Wessin if they choose and I trust they will do so.

[Repeated to Washington]

ADVANCE COPIES:

- Private Secretary
- P.U.S.
- Mr. Rennie
- Head of American Department
- Head of News Department
- Resident Clerk

12 MAY  
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MAY 1965

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FROM SANTO DOMINGO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTP

Mr. Campbell

No. 73

11 May 1965

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

D. Untimed

RECEIVED May 1965

R. 19.44

11 May 1965

12 MAY 1965

AD1015/142

IMMEDIATE

CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 73 of 11 May  
 Repeated for information to: Washington

I think that I should describe the conduct of some of my Latin American colleagues here which must be at variance with some of their governments' policies. With exception San Salvador, Mexico and Brazil who are being sensible their only solution seems to be total liquidation of every man on Caamane's side in an all-out blitzkrieg and they are indignant that America did not immediately proceed to do this. None of them have ever been in rebel territories where they appear to imagine a non-stop carnage is going on. They seem to have unbound faith in martial qualities of Wessin which I cannot share. They now seriously accuse Nuncio of being a spy for Caamane and are boycotting his meetings. I would describe their behaviour as niggardly and hysterical and my European colleagues agree with me. We are not fortunate in our choice of colleagues among this group, some of whose behaviour was not exactly valiant when danger was at its peak.

[ Repeated to Washington ]

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F.O. American Dept

I.P.D.

I.R.D.

News Dept

C.R.O. Atlantic Dept

ADVANCE COPIES TO:-

F.O. Private Secretary

P.U.S.


Mr. Rennie

Hd. American Dept

Hd. News Dept

VVVVV

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1965

RESTRICTED

71



RECEIVED  
13 MAY 1965  
AD1015/145

BRITISH EMBASSY,  
SANTO DOMINGO.

23 April, 1965.

(53/1/1)

Dear Dick,

I have heard that an item put out by Agence France Presse in the past few days has stated that a golpe de estado was imminent in Santo Domingo. In case you have heard of this, I thought I should tell you what seems to me to have inspired this report. It is always possible, of course, that A.F.P. is right, but over the past week or so the chances of a golpe have not risen above the normal, and I think a fresh set of circumstances would be needed for one to be threatened in the immediate future.

2. For the past two weeks, the Government have found themselves in a very awkward dilemma over what promises to be a fatal illness of Joaquin Balaguer's mother. This lady, who lives in Santo Domingo, is at an advanced age and there appears to be little doubt that her end is near. The question, so awkward for the Government to resolve, is whether or not Balaguer should be allowed back to Santo Domingo to say farewell to her.

3. About ten days ago, the guards were doubled at the National Palace and at the residences of the Triumvirs. An extra vigilance on part of the riot police was noticeable and there was some movement of military vehicles into the city. It is my impression that these were precautions taken in the light of Señora Balaguer's condition, in anticipation of public demonstrations for the return of Balaguer by the adherents to his Partido Reformista. That Joaquin Balaguer, moreover, has a number of sympathisers in the higher ranks of the Armed Forces is no secret, and it is possible that the extra precautions were related to this fact as well. An impression that a golpe was impending could easily have been gained, in view of the troop and police movements, and this may be the origin of the A.F.P. report. There were many rumours about a golpe during this time in the city.

4. The Government are in a delicate position in this affair. On humanitarian grounds they can hardly refuse to allow Balaguer to see his dying mother. On the other hand, if Balaguer does come, his supporters will rally noisily to his side, and a critical situation could very easily arise. The Americans, of course, could partly settle the affair by hinting to Balaguer that his permit to reside in the United States would be imperilled by political activity of any kind on his part, were he to be allowed to go to Santo Domingo to see his mother. Some means could then be found to get him here and away again without his following knowing beforehand.

5. I am copying this letter to Sutherland at Washington.

*S. F. Campbell*  
(S. F. Campbell)

R. M. K. Slater, Esq., C.M.G.,  
American Department,  
Foreign Office,  
LONDON, S.W.1.

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FROM SANTO DOMINGO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

73

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Cypher/OTP

FO/CRO/WH. DISTRIBUTION

Mr. Campbell

No. 74  
12 May, 1965

D. Untimed 12 May, 1965  
R. 2024 12 May, 1965

RECEIVED IN  
ARCHIVES No. 30  
13 MAY 1965  
AD 1015/146

IMMEDIATE  
CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 74 of 12 May,  
Repeated for information to Washington

Yesterday we were told by United States Embassy that Caamano Radio had declared whole United States mission here persona non grata. This of course would be foolish and unhelpful indicating a new bellicose line towards United States heretofore absent. At this morning's Contact Ariste denied that this had been said and sent for transcript of broadcast. This said that Ambassador Bennett was unwelcome here and should be removed immediately because of his whole-hearted support of Reid regime and his subsequent espousal of reactionary forces at San Isidro, but statement that entire United States mission was persona non grata was never made according to him and was not in transcript. Ariste went on to say that when the present mess is cleared up American help would be inevitably needed and he knew it. Anyone who thought they could run a Government in South America without United States support was talking through his hat. What they wanted was for Bennett to go and for some high level person from Washington to come and talk sense. Unfortunately we have since heard American tape of the broadcast and the announcer did include the whole mission.

2. Regarding Wessin and threat of fresh fighting by Imbert he said they were not worried about what Wessin's force would do. Regarding Imbert they had much affection for him and would like him to be Inspector General of Armed Forces in a Government representing the whole country. Other members of civil military junta were also good men and would be needed in a new administration. As for talks with Imbert [gp. undec.] junta they would probably be a waste of time.

3. Foodstocks are running low in the city now.  
Foreign Office pass Washington 35.  
[Repeated as requested]

ADVANCE COPIES:

Private Secretary  
P.U.S.  
Mr. Rennie  
Head of American Department  
Head of News Department

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13 MAY  
1965

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75

FROM SANTO DOMINGO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTP

Mr. Campbell  
No. 75  
12 May, 1965FO/CRO/WH DISTRIBUTIOND. Untimed  
R. 02:45 13 May, 1965

RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES No. 35
13 MAY 1965
AD 1015/1167

IMMEDIATE  
CONFIDENTIALAddressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 75 of 12 May.  
Repeated for information to : Washington.

On 10 May Gauvin, Canadian Deputy Head of Latin American Division, called on me for briefing on arrival from Ottawa. He asked me to arrange a meeting for him with Caamano. Rudd took him to Caamano this morning. Gauvin has added that following statements be kept confidential until the Canadian Government decides what to do about them.

2. In a document addressed to the Consultative Council of O.A.S., Caamano said :-
  - (a) They want an O.A.S. Commission to investigate facts about Communists in their movement.
  - (b) They want an O.A.S. supervisory commission to watch over election due on 20 September, 1966. He told Gauvin they will accept an O.A.S. police force after their Government has been recognized. This is all rather crafty but at least not negative.
3. They regard a Communist take-over of their Government as impossible, because of the size and strength of the constitutional movement. They would fight it if it appeared. Ariste said they were well aware that he and Caamano would be the first victims of a Communist seizure of power. Their aim was a Constitutional Government which could well include members of Imbert's Junta.
4. Ariste said he told the O.A.S. Commission today that Imbert "does not exist" in that he had no political or military effectiveness, no good could come of talks with him, in other words, I assume they intend to deal only with America and not with Bennett.

/5. Schlaudeman May

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1965



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Santo Domingo telegram No.75 to Foreign Office

-2-

5. Schlandeman saw Caamano yesterday, but as the former has now left the Dominican Republic I cannot say with what result. My telegram No.71 refers. — AD10757140

6. My immediately preceding telegram Ariste told Rudd that the broadcast declaring the entire American mission here persona non grata was an "error" and that he would rectify it. Only the Ambassador Bennett, is intended.

Foreign Office please pass Washington 36.

[Repeated as requested]

ADVANCE COPY

F.O. Private Secretary

P.U.S.

Mr. Rennie

Head of American Dept.

Head of News Dept.



A 80

CONFIDENTIAL

FROM SANTO DOMINGO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

RECEIVED IN  
ARCHIVES No. 39  
14 MAY 1965  
AD1015/149

Cypher/OTF  
Mr. Campbell

FO/CRO/WH. DISTRIBUTION

No. 77  
13 May 1965

D: 1851 13 May 1965

R: 1851 13 May 1965

IMMEDIATE  
CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 77 of 13 May  
Repeated for information to: Washington.

AD1015/125-

Rudd has just telephoned from the rebel headquarters direct that American troops are advancing from the Bridge and have made a penetration of 8 city blocks. The tension at rebel headquarters is apparently at breaking point. If this is true a general resumption of hostilities is now on the cards. My telegram No. 68. Please see sentence beginning " as far as I can see".

Foreign Office pass Washington No. 37.

[Repeated as requested].

ADVANCE COPIES TO:

- F.O. P.S.
- P,U,S,
- Mr. Rennie
- Hd. of American Dept.
- Hd of News Dept.
- Resident Clerk.

CONFIDENTIAL

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CONFIDENTIAL-GUARD

FROM SANTO DOMINGO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTP

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

Mr. Campbell

D. 2150 13 May, 1965

No.79

R. 2150 13 May, 1965

13 May, 1965

RECEIVED IN  
 ARCHIVES No.39  
 14 MAY 1965  
 AD1015/151

IMMEDIATE  
CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No.79 of 13 May  
Repeated for information to: Washington

GUARD

At 2 p.m. in the middle of a rebel harangue on Radio Santo Domingo, attacking Ambassador Bennett, five aeroplanes thought to belong to Wessin group bombed the radio station which is now out of action. I saw the attack but was unable to identify national markings. However aircraft were old Mustangs which only Wessin has. I am seeking confirmation. If confirmed it naturally breaks the cease fire. It would be extraordinary if the Americans had allowed these aeroplanes to take off from San Isidro where the 82nd Airborne Division has its headquarters and Wessin in their pockets. I am hoping that no one is going round the bend on the American side. This so far has been exclusively reserved for the Dominicans.

Foreign Office pass Washington 38.

[Repeated as requested]

DISTRIBUTED TO:

F.O.

- American Department
- Information Policy Dept.,
- Information Research Dept.,
- News Department

C.R.O.

- Atlantic Dept.,

ADVANCE COPIES:

F.O.

- Private Secretary
- P.U.S.
- Mr. Rennie
- Head of American Dept.,
- Head of News Department

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CONFIDENTIAL-GUARD

14 MAY  
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CONFIDENTIAL - GUARD

A 5

FROM SANTO DOMINGO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTP

FO/CRO/WH DISTRIBUTION

RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES No. 39 14 MAY 1965 AD1015/152
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Mr. Campbell  
No. 80  
13 May, 1965

D. 08.00 14 May, 1965  
R. 08.05 14 May, 1965

IMMEDIATE  
CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 80 of 13 May.  
Repeated for information to : Washington.

GUARD

I spoke to the United States Ambassador, who said that the attack was a great surprise to him. Wessin's Airforce had promised him to keep quiet during the cease-fire, but probably they felt they had taken as much as they could [mutilated group ? stand] [six groups omitted] [mutilated group ? a] dangerous mood throughout the country and was not sorry to see it silenced. Its style, he said, was purely Peking not even Moscow. United States Embassy guards had fired at the planes and he had registered a protest about the bombing with O.A.S. Commission.

2. I am disturbed by his implied sympathy for Wessin group's deliberate breaking of the cease-fire agreement, so laboriously negotiated by the O.A.S. I have heard the broadcast and cannot believe they justify renewed bombing in the most densely populated part of the city. I am sure he speaks the truth about not knowing of this, but it will be difficult to explain how Wessin's aircraft bombed-up and took off from a base without massive American contingent stationed there knowing about it. I regret that this incident can only weaken the American case which has loyal support from us.

[Note by Communications Department. Check and repeat requested for missing groups].

[Repeated to Washington].

ADVANCE COPIES:

F.O. Private Secretary  
P.U.S.  
Mr. Rennie  
Head of American Dept.  
Head of News Dept.

14 MAY 1965

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FROM SANTO DOMINGO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

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Cypher/OTP

FO/CRO/WH DISTRIBUTION

Mr. Campbell

No. 81

15 May 1965

D. Untimed 15 May 1965

R. 0612 15 May 1965

17 MAY 1965

IMMEDIATE

CONFIDENTIAL

AD1015/122

AD1015/153

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 81 of 15 May.  
Repeated for information to: Washington

My telegram No. 66.

The Wessin attack on Caamane's citadel, which seemed possible, began in full force this morning at northern end of old airport. It is extremely difficult to discover with what success, owing to full scale battle conditions in area. He appears to be attempting a break-in to city along Avenue San Martin. At 10.30 tonight fierce fighting was still going on, where it had started, but he seems to have made some small progress. He still has to deal with a maze of narrow streets in front of him and some very nasty fighting is likely. I need hardly add that the cease-fire agreement has been completely broken. Tonight the whole of the American perimeter is also under fire from rebels. The situation for citizens is very bad indeed. If Wessin's attack fails other pre-Caamane risings in provincial towns are possible.

Foreign Office pass Washington 40.

[Repeated as requested].

ADVANCE COPIES:

- Mr. Hanceck
- Hd American Dept.
- Hd News Dept.
- Resident Clerk

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FROM SANTO DOMINGO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTP

FO/CRO/WH.DISTRIBUTION

Mr. Campbell

No. 82  
16 May, 1965

D. Untimed 17 May, 1965  
R. 0440 17 May, 1965

RECEIVED IN  
ARCHIVES No.39  
17 MAY 1965  
AD1015/154

IMMEDIATE  
CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 82 of 16 May.  
Repeated for information to Washington

Attack is still going on in the same area around the old airport. It is difficult to judge the situation but if Wessin is going to get into the city he should have made more progress.

Past 36 hours. Ariste says that a group of Wessin's troops are cut off and surrounded in the cemetery to the east of Avenue Maximo Gomez, and Wessin's fellow-up force is pinned down to the west.

2. I have a reliable report that Imbert wishes to retire and has offered the Presidency to Nicolas Picharde and Julian Perez in turn who have both refused. A less reliable report says that the State Department is considering offering post of Minister of Defence to Caamane if he will agree to Antonio Guzman as President.

Foreign Office pass to Washington No. 41.

/ Repeated as requested /

ADVANCE COPIES

Private Secretary  
P.U.S.  
Mr. Rennie  
Head of America Dept.  
Head of News Dept.

17 MAY  
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CONFIDENTIALDOMINICAN REPUBLIC

RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES 17 MAY 1965	11
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AD1015/181/G
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Since the Secretary of State's last statement to the Cabinet the cease-fire in Santo Domingo has continued to be respected in the main by both sides. A new loyalist "Government of National Reconstruction" headed by General Imbert (one of the two surviving assassins of Trujillo) has formally requested recognition by Her Majesty's Government as has the rebels' "Constitutional Government" which purports to draw its authority from the 1963 Constitution of President Bosch. Neither government meets our normal criteria for recognition though General Imbert's Government has some pretensions to control the interior of the country. The possibility that the French Government would soon recognise the "Constitutional Government" of Colonel Caamano has now receded.

2. The O.A.S. Special Mission in Santo Domingo has been charged by the Organisation with the task of setting up a unified command for the inter-American force authorised by the O.A.S. resolution of 6 May. United States troops in the Dominican Republic (now over 30,000) will form part of the force and will be reduced in number as other foreign contingents arrive. The O.A.S. Mission is also trying to set in motion the talks about steps to restore peace and normal conditions to which Dominican leaders of both sides have agreed in principle. To satisfy rebel objections General Imbert dismissed eight loyalist generals on 9 May. General Wessin's resignation on 10 May at the instigation of the Americans was withdrawn the following day and he appears to be still in command of the "loyalist" forces based on San Isidro.

3. The debate in the United Nations Security Council has continued without a vote being taken. Lord Caradon has been instructed to remind the Council at a suitable

/opportunity



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opportunity that international security is the responsibility of the United Nations and that the use of armed force is subject to the obligations of the Charter. He will promote the adoption of an anodyne Dutch resolution, failing which he may have to vote for the Uruguayan resolution tabled yesterday which invites the Secretary General to take appropriate measures to inform himself and report to the Council on all aspects of the Dominican situation. The Americans find the resolution distasteful but any disappointment they may feel at our support for it should be mitigated by the helpful terms of the statement made by the Secretary of State in the House on 11 May.



(R.M.K. Slater)  
12 May, 1965

The Secretary of State will wish to consider the final form of the last two sentences, above, in the light of any new developments.



12/5



CONFIDENTIAL

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\*AMENDED COPY (18 May 1965)FROM SANTO DOMINGO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTF

F.O./C.R.O./WH.  
DISTRIBUTION

Mr. Campbell

D. 0115 18 May 1965

R. 0220 18 May 1965

RECEIVED IN  
ARCHIVES No.39  
19 MAY 1965No. 83

17 May 1965

IMMEDIATECONFIDENTIAL

A) 1015/160

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 83 of 17 May  
Repeated for information to: Washington

The Wessin group in the cemetery have infiltrated east and are carrying out a sniping rôle some ten blocks further on. The rebels claim that the main Wessin body is still held west of Avenue Maximo Gomez but I cannot confirm. The situation is most obscure. Estimate casualties in this fighting is 1,500-2,000 with 200 dead. The Red Cross cannot penetrate the area to assist the wounded.

2. A general strike in favour of Caamaño was declared in Santo Domingo where there was firing last night. I have no information of the effect of the strike.

3. Rikhye, United Nations observer, met the rebels yesterday. His Press officer Ortiz seemed impressed by the rebels argument that only a constitutional government was possible and that another military junta would be a disaster. Mayobre, representative of the Secretary General of the United Nations will arrive tomorrow.

4. George Bundy arrive yesterday and is still believed to be here. I am informed that Vance, Deputy Secretary of Defence, Vaughan, Assistant Secretary of State \* Latin American Affairs, and Thomas Mann are here. Harriman's statement last night in a TV interview with journalists in New York that the Communists appear to have withdrawn from the Caamaño movement, is, I hope, an indication that the State Department does not entirely accept the United States Embassy's stand here that the whole Caamaño group is Communist. I heard that Caamaño has had contact with the State Department recently.\*

[Repeated to Washington]

ADVANCE COPIES:

Private Secretary

P.U.S. . .

Mr. Rennie

Head of American Department

Head of News Department

PPPPP

CONFIDENTIAL19 MAY 1965  
RECEIVED  
1965

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A 45

FROM SANTO DOMINGO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTP

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

Mr Campbell

No. 86  
18 May, 1965

D. 2120 18 May, 1965  
R. 2220 18 May, 1965

RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES No. 39 19 MAY 1965
AD 2287/8
AD 1015/169

IMMEDIATE  
CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 86 of 18 May  
Repeated for information to:- Washington

Your telegram No. 74.

AD 1015/152

United States troops did cross the Security Zone line on 13 May, but retired after coming under fire. They could not have broken the Acte de Sante Dominge negotiated by O.A.S. because they were never a party to it.

2. My telegram number 80. Cury is better placed over his argument about the air attack. I fancy somebody, not the United States Ambassador, closed their eyes. Flight clearance in an operational airfield is not usually so carelessly managed, and it is important to note that flight control organization was jointly manned by American and Dominican personnel. I have not yet heard a satisfactory explanation of this matter.

3. When Cury says that the O.A.S. Special Committee has not succeeded in restraining the United States troops, he is overlooking the fact that this body had not succeeded in restraining Caamane's snipers either. These have always operated daily inside the Security Zone. The Americans replied with much vigour, but no one can blame them for that. They do not initiate firing.

4. These however are incidental, and a rough observance of the cease fire was adhered to. Wessin's air attack on 13 May, and his offensive against the rebel positions on 15 May, still going on, are in a different class and must be considered calculated and deliberate. Imbert told Nuncio on 11 May that unless Caamane agreed to talk, he would attack and break the cease-fire. He is now claiming that the rebels attacked him, which I do not believe.

/Foreign Office

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19 MAY 1965

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FROM SANTO DOMINGO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

A

Cypher/OTF

FO/CRO/WH DISTRIBUTION

Mr. Campbell

No. 88

18 May 1965

D. Untimed 18 May 1965

R. 0801 19 May 1965

IMMEDIATE

CONFIDENTIAL

RECEIVED IN  
ARCHIVES No. 39  
19 MAY 1965  
AD1015/170

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 88 of 18 May.

Repeated for information to: Washington

GUARD

AD1015/166

Your telegram No. 77.

State Department's view of Wessin's progress tallied roughly with the rebel account given to us yesterday. They say he is strung out on a long, thin line north of the United States perimeter, firing into the rebel-held, built-up areas beyond. The rebels insist that they are along his whole flank to the Avenue Maximo Gomez. We knew that his most forward tank is on the north-east corner of the old airfield, where it has been for the last three days. This indicates the approximate advance of two thousand yards in five days. This operation seems to make less and less sense. His forward elements could be in a very nasty situation.

2. Mayebre said that Caamano intends to telegraph the United Nations and all governments accusing the United States of aiding Imbert-Wessin. This is very unwise because the Americans show signs of being disenchanted with the junta group now. Imbert is also said to be formally protesting about United States intervention.

3. The United States Embassy now seems to be undergoing a quick change of mind about the rebels, whose stated constitutional intentions are being spoken of as what was wanted all along. Last week, however, they were all card-carrying Communists.

Foreign Office pass Washington 45.

[Repeated as requested].

ADVANCE COPIES:

Private Secretary

P.U.S.

Mr. Rennie

Hd of American Dept.

Hd of News Dept.

19 MAY  
EXHIBIT

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FROM SANTO DOMINGO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

En Clair

FO/CRO/WH DISTRIBUTION

Mr Campbell

No. 91

19 May, 1965

D. 1955 19 May, 1965

R. 2000 19 May, 1965

RECEIVED IN  
20 MAY 1965  
AD1015/171

PRIORITY

As you know, American troops are manning all road blocks at entry point to security zone. There have been occasions when United States guards have attempted to search cars of diplomatic status officers of this embassy. I have given orders that such personnel in this embassy are not to permit search of their cars. American military authorities have made no formal statement announcing Martial Law. I propose to address a Note to American Embassy, drawing their attention to these irregularities quoting Vienna Convention 1961, Article 27, but before I do so I would like your guidance as to propriety of this. Americans, of course, are not receiving state in meaning of terms of Convention.

20 MAY  
VIENNA

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FROM SANTO DOMINGO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

ph/OTP

FO/CRO/WH DISTRIBUTION

Mr. Campbell  
No. 93  
 19 May, 1965.

D. 0655 20 May, 1965.  
 R. 0700 20 May, 1965.

RECEIVED IN  
 ARCHIVES No. 39  
 20 MAY 1965  
 AD1015/177

IMMEDIATE  
CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 93 of 19 May.

Repeated for information to: Washington. AD1015/170

Although I have detected a change of mind about the rebels in the United States Embassy as in my telegram No. 88, there are still signs of unrealistic thinking there. Connett, who is Counsellor, thinks that Caamano's refusal to talk to Imbert is because the Communists have him prisoner, and will not let him do so. This seems too much like a bad novel. I believe Caamano is not interested in talks with Imbert because he thinks the latter is a United States puppet, and would rather talk to the man pulling the string, than the dummy on the stage. There are possibly reasons for his not being in a hurry. Now that the United Nations is here, it is hardly feasible for the Americans to finish off the rebels militarily. Force, would not go down well in the O.A.S. either, nor in that portion of the American Press critical of American policy here. My reading of the situation is that Caamano has had his eye fixed firmly on the Americans since 30 April when he turned to political action. In the final analysis the two real contestants here are the Americans and the rebels. If a military solution is not feasible a political solution ought to be sought. Imbert is really rather irrelevant to all this. AD1015/113

2. Imbert is furious with the Americans for stepping him using his aircraft in the present fighting. He told a Press correspondent that he was prepared to fight the Americans if necessary. I have had no reason to change my view about the Junta since my telegram No. 63. Juntas of any kind have had their day here for some time hence.

Foreign Office please pass Washington 46.  
 [Repeated as requested]

ADVANCE COPIES TO:  
 P.S.  
 P.U.S.  
 Mr. Rennie  
 Head of American Dept.  
 Head of News Dept.

20 MAY 1965

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15

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CONFIDENTIAL  
FROM WASHINGTON TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTP

FO/CRO/WH DISTRIBUTION

Sir P. Dean

No. 1329

20 May 1965

D. 0030 21 May 1965

R. 0259 21 May 1965

RECEIVED IN  
ARCHIVES No.39  
21 MAY 1965  
AD1015/81

A-1015/173

IMMEDIATE  
CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 1329 of 20 May.  
Repeated for information to: UKMIS New York Santo Domingo  
Havana  
and Saving to: UKDEL NATO

My telegram No. 1304: Santo Domingo.

Director of the Santo Domingo Task Force informed us today that the State Department are very disturbed at the reports by New York Times and other correspondents in Santo Domingo, who have reported that the United States troops have assisted the forces of the junta during yesterday's fighting. They maintain that these reports are incorrect. White House spokesman stated at noon briefing that United States troops are under orders from the President to observe neutrality. Vance, who is still in Santo Domingo with Bundy, intends to make a similar public statement. Bunker, United States Ambassador to the O.A.S., told the Council this afternoon that during yesterday's fighting, attempts were made by armed bands to cross the corridor held by the Americans, who were subjected to fire and only responded in order to protect themselves.

2. Task Force also stated that responsibility for the death of Caamano's Minister of Interior, Colonel Fernandez, and the 14th of June leader Juan Miguel Roman, who were killed yesterday during attack on the National Palace, was not result of deliberate United States action. United States troops did open fire in this area, but only after they had been attacked. State Department also deny reports that the United States troops have prevented supplies of food entering Caamano held areas, and that they have moved into zones taken over by Imbert's forces.

3. Having captured Radio Santo Domingo yesterday morning, the junta forces have since continued their advance in the sector

CONFIDENTIAL

/north

21 MAY 1965

CONFIDENTIAL

Washington telegram No. 1329 to Foreign Office

- 2 -

north of the United States held corridor. The United States Government are trying to arrange for the O.A.S. to take over the radio station.

4. A heated debate has developed in the O.A.S. on the second report of the Commission, details of which are given in my immediately following telegram.

5. Minister has arranged to see Mr. Vaughn at 11 a.m. local time on 21 May to follow up my conversation with Mr. Rusk.

Foreign Office pass Sante Dominge 11, Havana 36 and Saving to UKDEL NATO 64.

[Repeated as requested].

ADVANCE COPIES:

Private Secretary

P.U.S.

Mr. Rennie

Mr. Greenhill

Hd American Dept.

Hd U.N. Dept.

Hd News Dept.

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58

FROM SANTO DOMINGO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

A

Cymer/OTF

FO/CRO/WH. DISTRIBUTION

Mr. Campbell

No. 95  
20 May, 1965

D. 0802 21 May, 1965

R. 0815 21 May, 1965

RECEIVED IN  
ARCHIVES No. 39  
21 MAY 1965

IMMEDIATE

SECRET

AD1015/173

AD1015/184

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 95 of 20 May,  
Repeated for information to Washington  
UKMIS New York

Washington telegram No. 1304 to you.

I would treat Nuncio's opinion that Caamane is in the grip of extremists with reserve. I knew Nuncio is annoyed with Aristy who gave a display of bad manners the other day in his presence. My impression is that Caamane is well enough in control and not in the grip of anyone particularly. It is a pity I think that nobody at the United States Embassy here seems to have met him although of course they have met Wessin and Imbert many times. I think that Aristy is really a light weight under the blustering. The Americans could probably buy him if they wanted to. Regarding getting rid of the brutal military leaders, the difference between Caamane and other military leaders is that he alone has a very considerable political following. The others have none. He is also a kind of hero to many of the working class and the others are certainly not that. It would be a mistake to equate him too closely with others.

2. Reference paragraph 4. May I express the hope that the change of mission for United States forces mentioned would only be undertaken as very last possible resort. It could be a very bloody affair. I am thinking of the back-lash effect in the more distant future. In their very difficult task here the Americans need to avoid playing into the hands of the real Communists to whom such an act would doubtless be welcome as being in their long term interests. I do not doubt that they are fully aware of this in Washington but I feel a little uneasy at times at signs of over-simplified thinking in the United States Embassy here.

Foreign Office pass Washington 47, UKMIS New York 11.  
[Repeated as requested]

ADVANCE COPIES:

- |                   |                             |
|-------------------|-----------------------------|
| Private Secretary | Head of American Department |
| P.U.S.            | Head of United Nations      |
| Mr. Rennie        | Department                  |
| Mr. Greenhill     | Head of News Department     |

SECRET

1965

SECRET

FROM WASHINGTON TO FOREIGN OFFICE

A

Cypher/OTP

FO/CRO/WH DISTRIBUTION

Sir P. Dean

No. 1344  
21 May 1965

D. 2215 21 May 1965  
R. 0025 22 May 1965 No.39

24 MAY 1965

IMMEDIATE  
SECRET

AD1015/173

AD1015/189

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 1344 of 21 May.  
Repeated for information to: UKMIS New York  
Sante Dominge  
Havana  
and Saving to: UKDEL NATO

My telegram No. 1304: Dominican Republic.

Mr. Vaughn informed Minister today that the objectives of United States policy described in paragraph 2 of my telegram under reference had not changed. The Americans were still trying to achieve agreement on an interim coalition Government excluding the extreme left and right. This morning's report from McGeorge Bundy, who is still in Sante Dominge, was the most optimistic so far. Vaughn shared this optimism and attributed this change in the situation to the decision of the O.A.S. meeting of consultation to enhance the role of Dr. Mera the Secretary-General, who had hitherte been waiting patiently in the wings (my telegram No. 1338). It had been unrealistic to expect the five-nation commission to produce an effective mediation formula. One man could accomplish more. Bundy was now working with Mera and was also in touch with Mayebre.

AD1015/188

AD2287/19

2. On the ground, the truce referred to in paragraph 4 of United Kingdom Mission New York telegram No. 1220 was being carried out. Imbert considered that with very little effort he could reach the Ozama River and so control the area to the north of the United States-held corridor. He wished then to go on to attack Caamane's main position to the south. However, the latest United States military assessment was that, although Imbert's forces had been considerably strengthened, they would be defeated in such an attack. Neither the O.A.S. nor the United States could tolerate an invasion into the southern sector and, in this situation, the Americans considered that

/there

24 MAY 1965

SECRET

1965



CONFIDENTIAL

66

FROM SANTO DOMINGO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTF

Mr. Campbell  
No. 98  
22 May, 1965FO/CRO/WH DISTRIBUTIOND. 21.50 22 May, 1965  
R. 22.50 22 May, 1965

RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES No. 39 24 MAY 1965 AD 1015/190
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IMMEDIATE  
CONFIDENTIALAddressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 98 of 22 May,  
Repeated for information to : Washington  
UKMIS New York

This morning Imbert claims to hold the entire north sector over which fighting has been going on for a week. If this is true I must admit he has done this contrary to my expectations when he was bogged down three days ago. Without belittling psychological effect of this success which is considerable, particularly in American quarters, it hardly touches the real military problem facing him now which is how to break into the city proper. He has two problems here. One is that he cannot cross the corridor because the Americans say they will not permit it. Second is that the Americans infer, but only infer that he will not be allowed to carry out a sea landing operation through their Naval units stationed across the approach. We are watching with interest to see whether the Americans really mean what they say in this connexion because impartiality has been stretched a good deal since their arrival. For example there has been no instance of Americans opening fire on Imbert's troops. On the other hand for some mysterious reason it has always been necessary to return the fire from the rebels. The bombing of the radio station has never been satisfactorily explained. The presence of the American Officers with Imbert's heavy units in the fighting last week was explained by them as being necessary to stop Imbert firing into the American lines. Troublesome people are asking why Imbert cannot see where the American lines are for himself and why there are no similar American observers attached to the rebels side. The issue of the reality of American impartiality is a hot one with international press here at the moment and our United States colleagues will have to watch their military carefully to avoid more trouble from that quarter. An American Officer last night said Imbert could get into the City on a "technicality" and his manner suggested that the Americans would not be over sensitive on this point. In the context of /impartiality

CONFIDENTIAL

1965



CONFIDENTIAL

67

Santo Domingo telegram No.98 to Foreign Office

-2-

AD1018/47

impartiality violations, (my telegram No.75) [? groups omitted] and I have drawn some amusement from a conversation he had with the United States Ambassador on 19 May. G. remarked that Imbert seemed to be making slow progress in the fighting. "Oh no" the Ambassador replied "It is all going according to plan".

2. Imbert radio is now saying that the O.A.S. and the United Nations are not wanted in this affair which can be settled only by the Dominicans. It also states that no Coalition Government will be tolerated. He is clearly in an exalted and intransigent mood. I do not think he could win the city properly without American connivance or assistance. There is little doubt he has had this in the past. If this resulted in an imposed Imbert Government it would be a political disaster which will have the worst possible consequences in the not too distant future.

3. Bundy and Vance are still here and have consulted many shades of opinion in search of a solution. As far as I can tell the United States Charge d'Affaires so far [? group omitted] seen any rebels to find out what is going on in their minds. I hope they will because the genuine social protest content of the rebel movement has very deep roots and military defeat would not kill this. Caamaño for whom circumstances have changed for the worse told a Press conference yesterday that if a constitutional solution could be found he was not only willing to step down from the Presidency but would if required forgo all political office. He could of course wriggle out of this when the time came but I should have thought our United States colleagues might follow this up.

Foreign Office please pass Washington 48 and UKMIS New York 12

[Repeated as requested]

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Mr.King

Head of American Dept.

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FROM SANTO DOMINGO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

A

Cypher/OTP

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Mr. Campbell

No. 101  
22 May 1965

D. 0909 23 May 1965  
R. 0909 23 May 1965  
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Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 101 of 22 May.  
Repeated for information to: Washington  
UKMIS New York

GUARD

Gauvin, with whom I am in close touch, had a talk with Mayobre special representative of Secretary-General United Nations this morning during which Mayobre stated that there was little doubt that Caamano had great support from the people to whom he was a national hero. This popularity extended to the provinces. He believed that Imbert commanded the support of Dominica conditionally, and not much more, but he was militarily powerful.

Mayobre had reported this opinion to the Secretary-General United Nations. As you know I agree with this except that I do not think Imbert so powerful militarily as that.

2. Later, political action stepped up. Gauvin and I went this afternoon to see General Rikke United Nations Military Adviser who described the morning events. United Nations group had an appointment with Imbert which he failed to keep. They then went to the United States Embassy and found Imbert there. He gave them a flat statement that he would not extend the cease-fire which has been effective during the last 24 hours. Mayobre then contacted the United Nations Secretary-General by telex to inform him, but found that he had already been told of Imbert's refusal by Mora, Secretary-General O.A.S., who had added that this was not final. Stevenson's statement in the Security Council of the strictly American article emphasizing absolute prohibition of crossing the corridor or the sea and to the city was apparently made at this time. Imbert later issued the statement in my immediately following telegram. This indicates a much softer line than I reported as coming from his radio in my immediately preceding telegram. As I have ventured to say Imbert cannot get into the city unless the Americans help him and it now appears

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24 MAY 1965  
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- 2 -

they are not going to. He is therefore stalemated militarily.

3. Questioned about Bundy's political negotiations Rikke said that a solution with Guzman as head of Government might yet be found but the pre-requisite to this was the removal of Wessin and Chiefs of Staff of Navy and Air Force. You will recollect that I have looked on Wessin as a destructive nuisance for a long time and think that no political settlement is possible without his removal. These three are not yet prepared to resign and are capable of causing trouble since they have been pressing Imbert all along for an all-out military victory, which now that American support seems to be withdrawn is beyond them. There are some 500 Wessin troops in the National Palace Garrison they could order to break and try a coup de main. Stevenson's statement suggested that this would be stopped by American troops. There are considerable dangers from these troops and they are a matter of great concern to the United Nations group. Imbert also could have trouble from them.

4. Rikke told us that Caamano and Aristy had agreed with Mayobre to stand down and leave the country if necessary if their presence impeded an acceptable settlement. Guzman would not agree to this because his position would be invidious if it were obtained at the sacrifice of a national hero.

5. Rikke visited two hospitals yesterday in the fighting area where the authorities reported treating 1100 civilians wounded in the last two days fighting and had registered 70 deaths. This is only a small part of the cost of seven days fighting.

6. My feeling is that we are squeezing through a very dangerous passage but chances for a negotiated settlement are better than I dared hope.

Foreign Office pass Washington 49, UKMIS New York 13.

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FROM SANTO DOMINGO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

En Clair

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Mr. Campbell

No. 102  
23 May 1965

D. 1645 23 May 1965  
R. 1650 23 May 1965

IMMEDIATE

AD 101

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 102 of 23 May.  
Repeated for information to: Washington  
UKMIS New York

My immediately preceding telegram.

Imbert's statement to world Press as follows:

"The Government of National Reconstruction must have its hands free to repel any military action.

Our troops will remain in the positions we now hold. We seek peace, we wish to prevent bloodshed, we do not intend to initiate any military action, but, I repeat, we wish to be free to repel in the proper fashion any military action that might be taken against us. For these reasons, the Government of National Reconstruction will abstain from reinitiating the fire unless it is provoked, while the conversations with the Secretary-General of the O.A.S. continue in order to obtain a definitive solution of the conflict".

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FROM WASHINGTON TO FOREIGN OFFICE

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Sir P. Dean

No. 1349A  
22 May, 1965

D. 1950 22 May, 1965  
R. 2008 22 May, 1965

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24 MAY 1965  
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AD1015/193

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 1349A of 22 May.  
Repeated for information to UKMIS New York  
Santo Domingo  
and Saving to Havana  
UKDEL NATO

AD1015/189

My telegram No. 1348. Dominican Republic.

State Department task force have informed us that, pursuant to this resolution, Mora saw Imbert early this morning. Mayebre and Rikhye were due to see him later. All three and the United States Embassy are hopeful of obtaining agreement to at least a 24 hour extension to the cease fire. Caamano is willing. Mora and Mayebre are closely co-ordinating action.

2. My telegram No. 1344 paragraph 3. State Department continue to be optimistic about continued efforts to find an acceptable interim government. Pena Gomez the P.R.D. leader has told the United States Ambassador that the civilian element on his side is ready for a settlement.

3. My telegram No. 1344 paragraph 5. According to the State Department majority of the O.A.S. Foreign Ministers will attend in person the meeting of consultation on 27 May. Only the Chilean has so far refused to come. The proposal for this session was made by the Brazilian Foreign Minister, subsequently supported by the United States. It has overtaken the Argentine proposal for a separate meeting of representatives of the southern Latin American countries. The Americans consider that the generally favourable response to the proposal reflects a determination on the part of the majority of the Latin Americans that the initiative should remain within the O.A.S.

Foreign Office pass Immediate to Santo Domingo 16 and Saving to Havana 4 and UKDEL NATO 70.

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P.U.S. .... Head of United Nations Department  
Mr. King Head of News Dept.  
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AD 1015/195

*Foreign Office and Whitehall Distribution***DOMINICAN REPUBLIC****24 May, 1965****Section 1**ARCHIVES COPY.  
NOT FOR CIRCULATION.**THE APRIL COUP AND THE ENSUING CIVIL WAR***Mr. Campbell to Mr. Stewart. (Received 24 May)*31 May  
3 June**SUMMARY**

1. An officers' revolt in the army suddenly set in motion a furious chain reaction of violence, resulting in civil war, the collapse of all authority and the seizure of Santo Domingo by the rebels. Reacting against this, the armed forces bombed the city with air and naval attacks, causing great destruction and loss of life. This was not followed by ground action effective enough to defeat the rebels, who opened the arsenals and distributed thousands of weapons to civilians. The armed forces were finally brought to a halt, and Santo Domingo was given over to a reign of terror which lasted two days, only checked and controlled by the arrival of the United States Marine Corps in the city. The prestige of the armed forces is broken. Dominican society fell to pieces, and the Triumvirate Government has been buried beneath the ruins. (Paragraphs 1-3.)

2. The pro-Bosch Cabinet, which followed the Triumvirate with high hopes, soon bowed down beneath the weight of bombardment, and resigned. The rebel leadership then took on a new dynamic, and the defence of the key bridge into the city was effectively organised. At the end of this stage the capital was paralysed. As American troops moved in, well-organised street-fighting bands came into action against them. (Paragraphs 4-7.)

3. In the course of 14 days five separate factions claiming Government authority rose and fell. This has now resolved into two main groups: Colonel Caamaño and his rebels, claiming constitutional Government, and Brigadier-General Imbert, heading a civil-military junta of doubtful permanence. These two factions agreed on an O.A.S.-sponsored cease-fire. The economy has collapsed. (Paragraphs 8-10.)

4. The cease-fire agreement was broken by the Imbert-Wessin faction on the 15th of May, and the battle is now in its fourth day, with heavy casualties on both sides, and to civilians. Colonel Caamaño, having turned to political action after securing his portion of the city, has had his eyes fixed on the United States throughout, and rejects all overtures for talks with Brigadier-General Imbert and others. (Paragraphs 11-12.)

5. Corruption and cynicism has played into the Communists' hands in the past 18 months. The threat from that quarter is now a real one, but the majority of Caamaño's followers are not Communists. The governing class have had their warning and will probably not get another. Hopes of an American initiative have risen with the arrival of Mr. McGeorge Bundy and other high officers from Washington. Much time has been wasted, and the prospect of nation-wide as opposed to metropolitan civil war must not be neglected. Speed in arriving at a settlement is vital. (Paragraphs 13-24.)

6. Evacuation of British subjects was carried out in a calm and orderly manner. (Paragraph 25.)

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(No. 13 S. Confidential) *Santo Domingo*,  
Sir, *18 May, 1965.*

I have the honour to submit an account of events in the Dominican Republic which began on the 24th of April at about mid-day, when a small group of officers at the army camp of 16 de Agosto, on the north-west outskirts of the city of Santo Domingo, arrested and imprisoned the Chief and Deputy Chief of Staff of the Dominican Army. This single action, at first apparently checked by the uneasily-based Triumvirate Government led by Dr. Donald J. Reid Cabral, proved to be the catalyst that finally detonated the explosive material which had been gathering below the surface of Dominican society since September 1963. The forces released by this explosion first swept away the Right-wing *de facto* Government of the Triumvirate, then the Cabinet of pro-Bosch Left-wing moderates headed by Dr. Rafael Molina Ureña which followed it, and which sat in the National Palace for 2½ days. It has crippled the prestige and omnipotence of the Dominican Armed Forces, which heretofore had been considered irresistible and all-powerful and, for that reason, the one single stable factor in the Dominican national structure.

2. The fury and speed with which one calamitous stage led to the next, and the immediate collapse of the entire Dominican establishment in the first few hours, indicates that this society had gone a long way down the road to disintegration well before the blow fell. Chronically depressed economic conditions, an unemployment rate of some 50 per cent, and cynicism and moral turpitude in most branches of public affairs, had already produced a permanent state of instability in the Triumvirate régime. Over this scene brooded the personalities of two men: Professor Juan Bosch, the stubborn, self-righteous, unrealistic but liberal-minded former constitutional President, and Brigadier-General Elias Wessin y Wessin, Commander of the Air Force base at San Isidro, a fanatical anti-Communist, whose messianic sense of mission, and readiness to put his commonplace ideas into violent action, suggest a condition approaching paranoia. Below this lay the suppressed rage of a deprived metropolitan working-class, and the frustrated idealism of the young—raw material, ready to hand for the extremist. Only the trigger to fire this assembly of explosive elements was lacking. This, in the event, was provided by the incident at the army camp of 16 de Agosto.

3. Within 48 hours of the uprising by this small group, Santo Domingo was turned into a civil war battle-field. The city was subjected to a reckless air and naval bombardment by the forces of Brigadier-General Wessin, which fell savagely upon the poorer and middle-class residential areas, and resulted in the deaths of hundreds of civilians, including women and children. At the peak of these events, whilst all authority, law and order was moving rapidly towards total collapse, some 15,000–20,000 modern automatic weapons were distributed indiscriminately to civilians by the rebels, whose unrestrained vengeance, inspired and led by extremists and agitators, was immediately wreaked upon their opponents. The reign of terror which followed and lasted two days was checked and controlled only just in time by the arrival of units of the United States Marine Corps into the city. That prompt action saved thousands of lives.

4. Between the 24th and 30th of April, the fortunes of the contestants oscillated wildly. When the Triumvirate Government of Dr. Donald J. Reid Cabral fell on the 25th of April, the pro-Bosch faction had apparently triumphed. Dr. Rafael Molina Ureña was then appointed Provisional President pending the return of Professor Bosch from Puerto Rico. On learning this, Brigadier-General Wessin immediately reacted, attacking Santo Domingo with air and naval forces, and sending his armoured group from San Isidro to take the Duarte bridge and seize the city. The bridge held and he was unable to cross. Air and naval attacks continued, and on the 27th of April, despite continued successful resistance by the rebels at the bridge, Dr. Molina Ureña admitted defeat, and the pro-Bosch cause seemed lost. A new direction and vitality then came over the rebel cause at this time. The defence of the bridge—key to the city—was greatly strengthened, that passage was denied by resolute defence, and a new and reinvigorated leadership took over command of the whole pro-Bosch faction. The Wessin assault continued, but quickly lost momentum, and by the evening of the 28th of April his forces had been brought to a halt. On the morning of the 29th he had clearly failed, and it was afterwards learned that he had appealed to the United States to restore order in Santo Domingo the day before. All semblance of law and authority then vanished before the lawless onrush of armed mobs sweeping westward through the city, and on the 30th of April

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the United States Marine Corps landed and saved Santo Domingo from total disaster. Brigadier-General Wessin then found that his San Isidro headquarters was behind the advanced screen of the United States 82nd Airborne Division, which had landed and moved between him and the rebel-held city.

5. By the 30th of April practically nothing recognisable remained of the original Dominican State. The capital, Santo Domingo, a city of approximately 400,000 people, was paralysed. There was no operative Government, no water, power or light, and all radio stations had been bombed out of action. A precarious communication with the outside world existed only through the American and British Embassies, the latter through the courage and ingenuity of my staff, and the co-operation of friends in the cable and telephone companies. In the city, the dead lay where they had fallen in the streets. The floors of the corridors of hospitals and clinics were crowded with the dying and injured, whilst doctors and nurses laboured without water and light, operating in some cases without anaesthetics. Food supplies to the city had ceased, and civic breakdown was complete.

6. Inside and outside the city the disposition of the various forces had, by this time, become very complex. A military junta of three colonels at Brigadier-General Wessin's headquarters at San Isidro claimed an authority, which their failure in the field, and the evidence of one's own eyes in Santo Domingo totally belied. Units of the United States 82nd Airborne Division were in position on the east bank of the River Ozama, whilst the United States Marine Corps, advancing from the opposite direction, occupied a large portion of the western end of the city. Between these two flanks, Colonel Francisco Caamaño Deño, who by then had emerged as the leader of the rebel movement, was organising his well-armed militia as a street-fighting garrison of formidable potential.

7. In the American occupied zone, United States troops had already been badly shaken by the expertise in techniques of armed revolt employed by guerilla bands, which sprang into action from the first moment. The American Embassy was under sniper fire, and other Embassies had been fired on and menaced in different ways. In less than six days all the props supporting Dominican society had been

swept away, an entirely new set of conditions had taken their place, and as the various troops consolidated their positions in different sectors of Santo Domingo, the first glimpse of the immense problem of a divided city, split into three armed camps, became apparent. The 30th of April, in fact, marked the end of the first phase in the catastrophe of Santo Domingo; at the moment of writing, the situation in the city bears the same general outlines that were becoming visible on that date.

8. The chief characteristic of the first phase was military. Although much violence has continued in the second phase, its true characteristic is, I believe, political. I shall have occasion in later despatches to report more fully on the work of Dr. José Mora, Secretary-General of the Organisation of American States, and on the O.A.S. Special Peace Commission, which has laboured in search of an effective cease-fire agreement, and for talks between the contending parties. A cease-fire had also been the aim of the Papal Nuncio, Monseñor Emanuele Clarizio, from the very earliest moment, and on the 30th of April he had succeeded in getting a large measure of agreement from both Dominican sides. Sporadic fighting, however, continued, and it was not until the 5th of May that Colonel Caamaño and the San Isidro group met under the auspices of the O.A.S. Special Peace Commission and actually signed the instrument called the "Acto de Santo Domingo", the provisions of which laid down a cease-fire, limits for the Security Zone, and, among other matters, immunity for diplomatic personnel and property.

9. On the 27th of April, a military junta of three colonels was formed at San Isidro. On the rebel side there was stubborn insistence on the unconditional return of Professor Juan Bosch as President, and on the 1963 Constitution which they proclaimed to be effective throughout the country as from the 1st of May. On the 2nd of May, a meeting of some members of the former Bosch Assembly was held in the rebel area, at which a legal quorum was claimed to have been present. Colonel Caamaño was then elected Provisional President as successor to Dr. Molina Ureña, and a public swearing-in ceremony was held in the main square of the city on the 4th of May. On the 7th of May, the military junta of three colonels at San Isidro was dissolved, and a civil-military junta,

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presided over by Brigadier-General Antonio Imbert Barrera, one of Trujillo's assassins, was formed in its place. When this dazzling process of replacement and reshuffle had come to an end, it was discovered that Brigadier-General Wessin and his eight generals, who had been almost forgotten, were still in position at San Isidro.

10. With a more-or-less effective cease-fire agreement, however, at least in the sense that outbreaks of violence were being kept at incident level, it was possible to make a brief assessment on the state of the economy and the city's plight in general. Santo Domingo is now a divided city and is suffering the full consequences of that distortion. The metropolitan district contains between 30,000 and 40,000 armed men, if the United States complement of about 23,000 is added to those of Caamaño and Wessin. The entire commercial and mercantile area of the city is in rebel-held territory—including all the bank head offices—and no real work or trade has been possible since the 24th of April. Reserves of oil, on which the entire Dominican power supply system depends, is estimated at 10 days to three weeks, and the fact that the River Ozama is a kind of no-man's land, across which harassing fire of all kinds is constantly exchanged, precludes the entrance of tankers. The port, also in rebel hands, is paralysed. Thus, an immense and immediate problem is posed by the stoppage of the proper flow of currency, the prospects of a complete breakdown of all power supplies, and the impossibility of importing vitally needed items. All persons who could do so have now fled the city, food supplies are dwindling, and the immediate prospects are grave.

11. Brigadier-General Wessin, under persuasion, I imagine, by the American Ambassador, wrote his resignation on the 9th of May. On the same date Brigadier-General Imbert announced the removal of all the remaining eight generals at San Isidro, and the chances for the O.A.S. Special Peace Commission's efforts for talks between Caamaño and Imbert were thereby thought to be improved. A setback occurred on the 10th of May, when Wessin changed his mind and withdrew his resignation. Reports were later received that he was assembling in the Santo Domingo area whatever troops could be found and spared from the provinces, and the risk that he was contemplating breaking the cease-fire by a planned attack sharply increased. On the 13th of May his aircraft bombed

and silenced Radio Santo Domingo television, which had been carrying out a violent programme of abuse and defamation against himself, the American Ambassador, and members of the former régime. On the 15th of May he launched an all-out assault on rebel positions in the north-western areas of the city—thus setting aside the cease-fire agreement, and once again plunging this wretched city into the horrors of civil war. This action is proceeding at the moment and has so far caused 1,500 to 2,000 fresh casualties, including 200 deaths.

12. This account of events having now come full cycle back to violence, it is appropriate to consider some of the causes which so suddenly and dramatically turned the patient Dominican beast of burden into a tiger. My views, of course, will be based on personal observations of this society over the past two years, and I am only too conscious that proximity to events of this kind tends to impair objectivity. It would be profitable, I believe, to arrange for an independent and expert analysis of the background to the Dominican revolt, because, as I see it, what has happened in Santo Domingo is of importance to the whole of this continent, and thereby to the United States and her allies in the free world. Some years ago, about the time of Punta del Este, the remark was made that it was one minute to midnight in Latin America; the indications, from what I have seen here since the 24th of April, are that there may well be less time than that. The social and political malaise at the root of the Dominican eruption is, I believe, repeated to a greater or lesser extent in some other parts of Latin America; if a Frankenstein monster can suddenly and unexpectedly arise from the midst of the supposedly docile and tractable Dominican people, it seems to me that this could happen elsewhere at the same lightning speed. It is wrong, of course, to generalise too freely about conditions in the various Latin American States and to draw overall conclusions. I can say, however, that the movement of social protest in the Dominican Republic suddenly took on a new velocity and ferocity without any warning, and that there are possible implications in this for the rest of the continent.

13. I would like to hazard the generalisation that the tragedy of the Dominican Republic stems in part from





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basic misconceptions by foreigners and Dominicans alike, about the modern ordinary Dominican and his character. Notable among these was the belief, much cherished by the ambitious and the unscrupulous, that all Dominicans are abject cowards who can be panicked by a mere show of force. Of all the astonishing facts that have come to light since the 24th of April none, I think, is more significant than the discovery that thousands of young Dominicans can hold their ground against tanks, air bombardment and naval artillery, and fight those forces to a standstill. This fact should be noted with great care by the governing class of this country, who bear a heavy responsibility for what has happened; for them the acquisition of a social conscience is now essential to their survival, because if, either under the umbrella of United States protection, or at any other time, these people attempt to revert to their previous manipulation of the Government apparatus for their own exclusive benefit, the most terrible consequences are likely to flow from their bad judgment. Political cynicism, obstruction to social reform, robbing of the Treasury, falsified budgets, contract-fixing and the securing of large fortunes by barefaced and impertinent dishonesty is, I fear, what the Triumvirate régime will be chiefly remembered for. I see, on looking through my papers, that I was writing last June describing the level of moral decrepitude to which the senior officers of the armed forces had come, and speculating on the effect that this might be having on military discipline. We now know the answer. Corruption in almost every aspect of national life had weakened the fabric of the Dominican State to such an extent that it collapsed at the first sign of real trouble in the army. The governing class, whose representatives seized power in September 1963, and ruled thereafter, can hardly have realised what they were doing. Now they have had a horrible fright; if they take the real lesson from it, the horror will not have been endured entirely in vain.

14. Another misconception, at least for this country, was that it was safe, and in the long-term interests of the governing class, to arrange with the military for the overthrow of a constitutional President when that man had been elected to office by a massive majority of working-class votes in a scrupulously clean election. I refer, of course, to the *coup d'état* of September 1963 deposing ex-President

Bosch. I am well aware that in many Latin American countries the military have traditionally taken it upon themselves to be the final arbiters of what is good or bad in the way of Presidents and Administrations, but I would suggest that this claim be treated with some reserve in the future because, in the case of the Dominican Republic, this idea was the military's worst and probably last great political blunder. Ex-President Bosch had an almost chaotic influence on the day-to-day business of government when he was in office, and his Administration was practically non-existent, even by Dominican standards. It was only a question of time before his reputation as a President was irreparably damaged by his own administrative incompetence, and I fancy he would have stood only a slight chance in a future election. But the *golpistas* of 1963 could not wait. It may have been the thought of massive American aid and large European credits, all passing through other hands than their own, that made them so restless; or they may have genuinely believed that he was a Communist, that his Administration was riddled with Communists, and that he, personally, was pocketing huge sums from the national Treasury. At all events, these were the charges made against Juan Bosch when he was overthrown after only seven months; later, no more was heard of them. But, by striking him down, the military made a myth of the man, and "*Bosch y Constitución*" was the battle-cry of the rebels in the fighting which has now fulminated the Dominican military establishment into fragments.

15. The men who made the *coup d'état* of 1963, moreover, never seemed to understand that the acute polarisation of the Left and the Right—which was its immediate product—could create a genuine, as opposed to a fancied Communist threat to this country. This I believe was the most grievous of all self-inflicted wounds resulting from the *coup d'état* of 1963, because it presented the small band of professional Communists then in this country with their golden chance. This they took with both hands, working tirelessly on the frustrated idealism of the young men who have surprised us all so much by their recent conduct under fire. Some joined the Communist movement outright; others—and I believe these to be the great majority—whilst remaining genuine Dominican patriots, mistakenly saw in the Communist programme a practical line of action for

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getting their country back to the constitutional Government from which it had been so unceremoniously thrust in September 1963. It was predictable at that time that the *coup d'état* would play directly into the hands of the Communists; this unfortunately has happened, and the menace from that quarter is now a real one for this country.

16. A great deal has been said about Communists in this affair, and my colleagues in the American Embassy and the State Department have come under very heavy fire from the hundred or so journalists here on the issue of the number of Communists fighting on the rebel side. When the American Embassy used my Telex on the 4th of May I noticed in an *en clair* telegram their estimate that 12,000 armed Communists were in the city. My telegraphed opinion at the time was that this kind of exaggeration was a pity, because it glossed over the large number of non-Communist militants who were fighting for aims which were generally acceptable to the United States, ourselves and the rest of the free world. There is no doubt whatever that Communists are in Caamaño's ranks. The Partido Socialista Popular (P.S.P.) and the Movimiento Popular Dominicano (M.P.D.), both self-admitted Communist movements, enlisted as a body into the revolt for return to constitutionality from the very beginning. These two parties enjoy a competent professional-type leadership, some members of which, in the past 18 months, have been to drink at the well of truth in Havana, Peking and Moscow, and, I do not doubt, to receive training and instruction. These, with some members of the extreme Left wing of the 14th of June Movement, provided the hard core which had managed to attain a truly commanding position among university students and other sectors of Dominican youth over the past 18 months. The rallying of the rebel ranks at the moment when defeat seemed certain, and Dr. Molina Ureña—Professor Bosch's nominee as Provisional President—had admitted that he was beaten, was, I believe, only made possible by these young men. They, as I have said, were the raw material. But the speed and efficiency with which defeat was organised into victory was unprecedented and is, next to the amazing performance of the Dominicans under fire, the second most astonishing fact in this whole affair. That the Communists played a prominent part in organising, exhorting

and fighting at this time, I do not question. In this context there is no need to think in terms of thousands, for a relatively small, competent group may well provide a greater menace.

17. This quality of organisation, which turned the scales for the rebel forces, extended later to the tactics of the guerilla bands in the city after the American landing. These—which unnerved the United States Marines from the very start—were, by their use of the element of surprise, and the flexibility of the fire plan, cleverly executed small-scale operations by persons whom I judge to have been trained in the techniques of armed revolt. The bands were ready when the first American troops arrived in the city, and they came into action without delay. To my way of thinking, this is a long way from the scattered, romantic resistance of uninstructed Dominican students, or even defected Dominican Army personnel fighting on the rebel side. The latter are not particularly well trained, and I do not believe them capable of the quick and effective improvisation which the circumstances would have demanded.

18. As can be imagined, I have given the most careful thought to Caamaño's position *vis-à-vis* the Communists in his ranks. I think I have had more contact with this man than any other Head of Mission here, since the courage of my Attaché in penetrating rebel territory and seeking him out in the first place, whilst fighting was still in progress, made it possible for me to visit Caamaño at his headquarters on the 2nd of May. Since then we have had daily contact. I have found in Caamaño some qualities that I admire, and I sympathise with many of his views, but he is not a particularly subtle thinker, and I believe he under-estimates the menace presented to his position by the Communists, whose presence in his organisation he does not deny. In my judgment, the chance of a Communist take-over in a Government headed by Caamaño would have to be reckoned with, if the United States forces were withdrawn before a wedge can be driven between him and his Communists.

19. A Communist take-over, of course, is exactly what my American colleagues most fear. I am sorry they spoiled their case with the journalists by putting the emphasis on numbers and not on quality. I have long suspected over the past two or three years that the American Service

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Attachés, the officers of M.A.A.G. and the C.I.A. here have been sending long lists of supposed Communists to their headquarters in Washington. This thought was disturbing to me because I do not think many of these well-meaning officers are very clear in their own minds about the nature of Communism, and what, in fact, constitutes a Communist. I have heard them use the word "Commie" in connection with persons who are not Communists to my certain knowledge. Thus, it is possible that a failure in definition, and the taking at their face value of long lists of names, has rebounded to the disadvantage of the American Embassy in the case they were presenting to the journalists. This, however, must not be allowed to cloud the essential issues, which are that Communists are in positions of influence in the Caamaño organisation, that they have probably rendered him important and perhaps decisive support during dangerous days, and that the chances of their undermining any Government he might inherit would be considerable, unless something is done about them.

20. In these circumstances, the attitude of the American Mission here ("We'll have nothing to do with that rabble down there") has been unrealistic. Caamaño is a military and political factor of importance and his strength in both spheres, in fact, presents the United States with its major problem here. Unless the Americans intend to bring about Caamaño's defeat by military means in some way—and at the moment there are no signs that they are thinking in terms of a *Wehrmacht*-type *blitzkrieg* on the heavily populated section of the city in Caamaño's hands—a solution of some kind will inevitably have to be sought in the political field. I need hardly add that this means contact, but so far there has been none here between the American Embassy and Caamaño, and we are now in the fourth week. If I may be permitted one criticism of my American colleagues in this affair, it is that they have behaved towards Caamaño rather like the man who went out shooting and suddenly came face-to-face with a rhinoceros. The man's first reaction was that the rhinoceros had no business to be there; his second was that he hoped it would go quietly away. With Caamaño, I fear, this has not worked.

21. His antenna, if I judge correctly, has been trained on the Americans, and only on them, since he first settled down in his

stronghold and swung over to political action. The San Isidro group, headed by Wessin and the colonels, was quickly eliminated from the political arena at that time, because the fragmentation of the Dominican Armed Forces, and their own military failure, had deprived them of real significance. The civil-military junta, presided over by Brigadier-General Imbert, which followed—thrown together, I fancy, by my American colleagues in a last-minute shoring-up effort of support for persons they think they can trust—is faring little better. As a political force Imbert seems unlikely to have much impact on the masses, to whom, I imagine, the figure of Caamaño, as a successful man of action on the side of social justice, now has attraction. It is also fairly clear that, without the Americans, Imbert's military potential would not be much. Caamaño, therefore, probably thinks he has nothing to gain and little to fear from Imbert, and that if Imbert is acting as a puppet for the Americans it is better to talk to the master who pulls the strings, and not to the dummy at the front of the stage. This is my reading of Caamaño's continued evasion and prevarication towards the O.A.S. Special Peace Commission's efforts to arrange talks between himself and Imbert.

22. The American Ambassador here, for whom I have a great respect, particularly for all that he and his Government have done in trying to help this country, has seemed to be more concerned with what he calls the "pure Peking" style of Caamaño's radio announcers than in finding out what is actually going on in Caamaño's mind. He may be trapped, of course, by those long lists of "Commies", which his Attachés have so dilligently compiled, for these could hardly be brushed aside if they had served as the basis of intelligence reports coming from his Mission for a considerable time. I certainly think he believes that to have contact with Caamaño is to have traffic with the devil. The result is that there has been a complete vacuum between the two real contestants in this unhappy affair. The American Ambassador is, of course, a much harassed and overworked man, and the size of his Mission, now for the most part drawn into the Embassy building, is vast and unwieldy. I personally find the atmosphere there overheated and confusing, and it must be very difficult for him to stand away from his many problems and view them objectively. I have come to the opinion that

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the conditions under which the American Ambassador is working, and the fatigue he is suffering, could have unhappy consequences for the United States here if the inflexibility of mind I have noticed in him were State Department policy. Fortunately, there are good indications that it is not.

23. At present, however, I am disquieted by the continued presence of Brigadier-General Wessin at San Isidro, and what this implies about American thinking. This curious person has ceased to be meaningful in a positive way and has now dropped into the category of a destructive nuisance. As a commander he is in need of much instruction, for he has apparently not yet grasped the elementary truth—familiar to every second lieutenant—which is that aeroplanes and artillery are support weapons in the type of operation he was conducting. His failure to pass the Duarte bridge with his tanks was mortal to his plan, which in any case was unimaginative and badly executed. If he had understood the principle of concentration of force in time and space, he might have carried the day: in the event, he scattered his strength and thereby lost it. I will not dwell on this officer's errors as a field commander because his political position is at the moment a good deal more to the point. If Brigadier-General Wessin ever puts a foot inside Santo Domingo again, he is certain to be murdered. He is, therefore, a political liability of the first water, because nothing can be done with the man here, and I should have thought that the Americans would have seen this, and got him out of the way. Considering the size of the American military establishment here now, and the enormous influence they have always exerted over the Dominican military, I find it hard to believe they cannot rid themselves of the Wessin incubus if they choose. My fear is that they still believe he might be of some use. If so, this kind of thinking is obscuring the main issue, which is that there are only two real contestants in the arena—Caamaño, who must at all costs be separated from his Communist retinue, and the Americans, who are the only people with the slightest chance of doing it.

24. The tragedy of Santo Domingo has not yet fully run its course, for the killing and destruction is still going on and the misery of the citizens is unabated. Yet

there are some hopeful signs. The arrival from Washington of Mr. McGeorge Bundy, Special Adviser to the President on National Security Affairs, and Mr. Vance, Mr. Thomas Mann and Mr. Vaughn, suggests that the need for quick and clear thinking about the Dominican Republic is understood. The American Embassy has badly underestimated the strength of Caamaño and has been making a *carte blanche* assumption that everyone in Caamaño's ranks is a card-carrying Communist. This has wasted time. Speed is important because the longer this affair drags on, the greater are the chances that the revolt will spread to the provincial towns. If that happens a nation-wide, as opposed to metropolitan civil war is on the cards, and the chances that this would present to mischief-makers in Havana and elsewhere needs no description from me.

25. I am happy to report that the evacuation of all the British subjects who wished to leave was carried out without mishap. On the 26th of April the Embassy warned all British subjects who might be disposed to leave to keep a suitcase packed and their papers available in preparation to move at short notice. On the 29th of April they were warned to proceed immediately to the evacuation area, and on that day the entire party of 60 left for San Juan, having provided an excellent example by their calm and orderly manner. The efficiency and kindness of the American authorities in this matter have been beyond praise. I have, of course, personally thanked the American Ambassador on behalf of this Embassy, and I have no doubt that the gratitude of Her Majesty's Government will be conveyed to the United States authorities at the proper time. I shall have occasion in later correspondence to describe the magnificent conduct of my staff here, which in trying and often dangerous conditions has been in the highest traditions of the Service.

26. I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Representatives at Washington, United Kingdom Mission to United Nations, New York, Port-au-Prince, Kingston, Caracas and Havana, Her Majesty's Consul at San Juan, and the Resident Naval Officer at Nassau.

I have, &c.

S. F. CAMPBELL  
(*Chargé d'Affaires*).

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CONFIDENTIAL AND PERSONAL110  
DESPATCHED IN  
DEPARTMENT

FOREIGN OFFICE,

S.W. 1.

3 June, 1965.

It is rather shameful that this should be my first letter to you since the storm broke. However, our telegrams will, I hope, have reflected a mood receptive to and grateful for all you have done. This is certainly the way we have felt. Bill Harding has told you in a personal letter that I took a fortnight's leave from mid-May - on the face of it a gross dereliction of duty, but I went off with an easy mind knowing that the fort would be admirably held by George and Bill. And so it was.

I am writing now to thank you for your despatch No. 13 "S" which is being hurried into print. I read it on my return from leave and found it of absorbing interest. You certainly had a story to tell and lessons to be drawn from it: both admirably done. I agree with you that if the lessons are learnt elsewhere in Latin America, good may yet come out of this wretched business. Whether a social conscience born of fear can be expected to bring about any lasting improvement is, I suppose, open to doubt; but it is presumably better than no social conscience at all.

(R.M.K. Slater)

S.F. Campbell, Esq.,  
British Embassy,  
SANTO DOMINGO.

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

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112  
Date sm.  
24/5.

(53/1/1)

RECEIVED IN  
AMERICAN EMBASSY  
25 MAY 1965  
AD1015/196

BRITISH EMBASSY,  
SANTO DOMINGO.  
20 May, 1965.

AD1015/106

Dear Bill,

In fighting last night Colonel Rafael Fernandez Dominguez, Minister of the Interior and Police in the rebel "cabinet", was killed. It was only a few days earlier that the Americans air-lifted him to San Juan to see Bosch to discuss a government led by Antonio Guzman. I am told that Lieut. Colonel Montes Arache was also wounded but I cannot confirm it yet. My telegram Nos. 54 and 56 refer.

AD1015/107

I hear that Hector Garcia-Godoy, former Ambassador to London and last Minister for Foreign Affairs in the Bosch Government, has been considered as President in a coalition government. I doubt that he would accept. He is the best suggestion so far, so it is a pity.

I hope I do not appear to be carping unduly at the American Embassy here in my telegrams. I am afraid they got off to a bad start and have never recovered. I am sorry for them because they have had a terrible time, but they certainly are not doing well.

Bundy and Vance are still here, and on them we fix our hopes. To-morrow will be the fourth week.

Yours ever

*Stefford*  
(S. F. Campbell)

G. W. Harding, Esq.,  
American Department,  
Foreign Office,  
LONDON, S.W.1.

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CONFIDENTIAL - GUARDFROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO SANTO DOMINGOCypher/OTP  
ADDEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTIONNo. 98  
24 May 1965

D.0120 25 May 1965

PRIORITY  
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Addressed to Santo Domingo telegram No. 98 of 24 May  
Repeated for information to: Washington  
U.K. Mission New York

GUARD

Your letter 53/1/1 of 20 May to Harding, paragraph 1 (not to Washington, U.K. Mission New York).

My immediately following telegram contains the text of an announcement about the incident which was monitored by the B.B.C.

2. Press reports have mentioned Roman and drawn attention to his Communist affiliations but have said nothing of the others. If it is true that Rodriguez was killed as well, it is surprising that this has not been more publicised.
3. We have the impression that the Americans are now playing down this aspect of the rebellion, but we do not know whether this is for tactical reasons or because they now think that they over-estimated the threat in the first place. There has been much speculation in the Press that the objectivity of Ambassador Bennett's reporting is being questioned in Washington and that Bundy and his colleagues were sent to Santo Domingo by President Johnson to find out what was really happening there.
4. These are much the same considerations as these put forward in your telegram No. 98. It would be useful if you could in your conversations with your United States colleagues discreetly reflect this kind of disquiet, both about the past and the future, and collect their reactions. If you get a chance to speak to Bundy or Vance, so much the better.

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FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO SANTO DOMINGO

En Clair  
AD

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

No. 99  
24 May, 1965.

D. 0720 25 May, 1965.

Addressed to Santo Domingo telegram No. 99 of 24 May.  
Repeated for information to: Washington  
UKMIS New York

My immediately preceding telegram.

Following is text of broadcast on 20 May by "National Reconstruction Government Radio":

In a desperate attempt to seize the National Palace last night, a group of Communist thugs were overwhelmingly repelled by the democratic forces. Killed were Col. Rafael Fernandez Dominguez; Juan Miguel Roman Bonelly, a member of the Communist Party; Arnulfo Soto, who at one time was deported for his Communist activities; Cayetano Rodriguez del Prado, a Communist trained in Cuba, Russia, Peking and Czechoslovakia, and a prominent Marxist-Leninist leader at the university of Santo Domingo: Idririo Capozzi, an Italian Communist who worked as an instructor for Dominican Navy frogmen. Seriously wounded was Manuel Montes Arache, whom the people remember with sadness.

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FROM WASHINGTON TO FOREIGN OFFICE

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F.O./C.R.O./WHITEHALL  
DISTRIBUTION

RECEIVED IN  
ARCHIVES No.39  
25 MAY 1965  
AD1015/198

Sir P. Dean

No. 1368

24 May 1965

D. 00.45 25 May 1965

R. 03.30 25 May 1965

PRIORITY  
CONFIDENTIAL

71349A  
AD1015/194

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 1368 of 24 May  
Repeated for information to:

U.K. Mission New York, Santo Domingo,  
and Saving to Havana, and U.K. Del NATO.

My telegram No. 1349: Dominican Republic.

Following is summary of information given to us today by  
State Department Task Force.

2. Apart from a few isolated incidents, the cease-fire has continued. State Department consider that much of the credit for persuading Imbert to agree to a de facto extension of the truce should go to Dr. Mora, who spoke to him in the strongest terms on 22 May after Mayobre had failed to secure his concurrence. He has since been trying to secure the agreement of both sides to get the area of the National Palace neutralized and included within the security zone, and to have Radio Santo Domingo in the northern sector put under the control of the O.A.S. and the inter-American force.
3. With the lull in hostilities, the State Department consider that there is a good prospect of finding a solution to the problem of an acceptable interim government within the next few days. The Americans are aware of the danger stemming from extreme elements on both sides who are in favour of holding fast. Martinez Francisco, the P.R.D. leader, confirms report in my paragraph 2 that the civilian element around Caamano is ready for a settlement. Reports by some Press correspondents that agreement has been reached on the composition of a government are however premature. Argument continues not only over the question of appointments, but on acceptability of the 1963 constitution.

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RECEIVED  
MAY 25 1965



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Academia Dominicana de la Historia

CONFIDENTIAL

Washington telegram No. 1368 to Foreign Office

- 2 -

4. The inter-American force was officially constituted on 23 May under the command of the Brazilian General Hugo Panesce Alvim. In off-the-record Press briefing on 23 May, of which transcript is being sent by bag. Bundy stated that the United States ought to be able to make very significant reduction in their troops as the force came into being and if a political solution can be found. He also spoke of the need for an inter-American force for some time to come.

5. My paragraph 3. It is still uncertain which of the Latin American Foreign Ministers will attend the meeting of consultation on 27 May. The Brazilian, Argentine, Ecuadorian and Peruvian have accepted and the Uruguayan has indicated that he is in favour of coming, but there is still no answer from the Mexicans and Venezuelans, and the Central Americans are reported to favour retaining the Nicaraguan Ambassador to the O.A.S. as chairman of the session.

Foreign Office please pass Priority Santo Domingo No. 17 and Saving to Havana No. 5 and U.K. Del NATO No. 71.

[Not repeated to Santo Domingo pending departmental decision.  
Repeated as requested to remaining posts]

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A 9

FROM SANTO DOMINGO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTF

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Mr. Campbell

No. 104

D. 0720 25 May, 1965

RECEIVED IN  
ARCHIVES No. 39  
25 MAY 1965

R. 0725 25 May, 1965

24 May, 1965

AD1015/199

IMMEDIATE

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Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 104 of 24 May  
Repeated for information to: Washington  
U.K. Mission New York

I saw Rikke this morning and we discussed the Wessin troops still in the National Palace. These are subject of concern because they pose a potential threat to operating successful cease-fire. Events have taken a turn for the worse for Wessin personally, and judging from his previous behaviour it is not impossible that he might try a pocket Getterdämmerung. Rikke said that the United Nations group had seen this danger and were actively discussing taking over the palace by O.A.S. troops specifically Brazilians. Imbert seemed amenable to this but insisted on keeping his troops there at the same time. At a contact yesterday Caamano told Rudd that he would cede the territory around the palace unconditionally. This could be workable and troops might be eased out later.

2. Rikke said that a Cabinet headed by Guzman was now being vetted in Washington. The list I saw contains neither Caamano nor Imbert. I feel a Cabinet on these lines might be workable for a month or two if followed by elections, but if it is intended to last more than a few months it will have difficulty. Caamano's followers will noisily claim they have been betrayed. On the other side the chronic fear of creeping Communism needs to be reassured by someone like Imbert in the Cabinet.

3. Unified O.A.S. force was formed here today.  
Foreign Office pass Washington No. 51, U.K. Mission  
New York No. 15.

[Repeated as requested]

ADVANCE COPIES:

Private Secretary  
P.U.S.  
Mr. Rennie  
Head of American Dept.,  
Head of News Dept.,



1965



A 23

CONFIDENTIALFROM SANTO DOMINGO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

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F.O./C.R.O./WH. DISTRIBUTION

Mr. Campbell

No. 105

25 May, 1965

D. 1921 25 May, 1965

R. 1927 25 May, 1965

RECEIVED IN  
ARCHIVES No. 39  
26 MAY 1965

AD1015/201

IMMEDIATECONFIDENTIALAddressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 105 of 25 May.

Repeated for information to Washington

UKMIS New York

I hear that proposed Guzman Government is having difficulty in Washington. Guzman is said to have refused a proposal to deport suspected Communists immediately on taking over the Government. The deportation of Dominican citizens is expressly forbidden by the 1963 Constitution, for which Guzman's party stands, hence this poses a problem. Imbert, however, seems to be running straight into trouble if what I hear is true. The following is from a good source, but unconfirmed:

- (a) Imbert refuses to agree to any provisional Government until satisfied that foreign troops, including the United States, have left the country;
- (b) Three journalists were refused re-entry into the country yesterday by his officials, including Perott of the Observer;
- (c) Two television crews were stopped entering the country yesterday. They were required to agree first to Imbert processing their film before use. They naturally refused;
- (d) Imbert has threatened to sever telephone communications with the outside world.

2. I am concerned about truth of the Perott story. If you can confirm and require me to take action, I shall be only too pleased.

Foreign Office pass Washington 52, UKMIS New York 16.

[Repeated as requested.]

26 MAY  
1965ADVANCE COPIES:F.O. Private Secretary  
P.O. Mr. Rennie  
Hd. American Dept.  
Hd. News Dept.

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FROM SANTO DOMINGO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

F.O./C.R.O./WH.  
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Cypher/OTP

D. 0800 26 May 1965  
R. 0809 26 May 1965

Mr. Campbell  
No. 107  
25 May 1965

RECEIVED IN  
ARCHIVES No.39  
27 MAY 1965  
AD1015/204

AD1015/201

IMMEDIATE  
CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 107 of 25 May  
Repeated for information to: Washington UKMIS New York

GUARD

My telegram No. 105

I asked the United States Ambassador if he had heard that Imbert officials had interfered with journalists re-entering the country yesterday. He said yes, it was feasible but it was all a mistake which was being put right. He added that it was the work of "Leftist elements" in the Imbert Immigration Department who had been trying to sow confusion. I am concerned about Mr. Bennett.

2. I am also concerned that "identical" and "impartial" and "neutrality" seem to have different meanings in Washington and Santo Domingo. Today the United States Naval Attaché had a meeting in his apartment of American military officers. Imbert was present.

3. Your telegram No. 100.

AD1015/191

Mera is being built up as a counter weight to the United Nations group whose presence here is heartily disliked by both the Americans and Imbert. They both have common cause therefore to denigrate Mayebre.

My telegram No. 101, paragraph 1 reflects his views which finds no echo amongst some of our United States colleagues. Rikke told Gauvin the following in strict confidence and he has passed it to Ottawa, Canadian eyes only. It describes the position of the United Nations group here. On the 22 May Cery, claiming encroachment, informed Mayebre that his troops were firing on United States troops because the latter were setting up a machine gun position in Avenida 30 de Marzo. Rikke asked the Americans for their side of this incident and they promised to investigate. Nothing was heard from them, afterwards despite calls to remind them. Mayebre finally last called U Thant who told him to make one last telephone call to produce to the United States Embassy. This failed to produce information

MAY 24 1965

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Academia Dominicana de la Historia

CONFIDENTIAL- GUARDSante Domingos telegram 107 to Foreign Office

- 2 -

information and U Thant contacted Stevenson. The result of this was an order from Washington to the United States Embassy here to clear up the matter.

4. At 0100 23 May Mayebre and Rikke were asked to go to the United States Embassy. There in the presence of Bundy, Vance dressed them down like school boys accusing them of irresponsibility and of trying to create an international incident by reporting to U Thant. Mayebre was so surprised that he was unable to speak in English and Rikke went on to point out that the United States Embassy had failed to furnish information they had promised. This episode closed with an undertaking by the Americans to ensure better communication between themselves and the United Nations in future. Later that morning, however, Rikke was told by the United States Embassy that he must address all enquiries through O.A.S.

5. Reference to Martinez is somewhat puzzling (see my telegram No. 28 [sic]). I fancy that he is no longer a P.R.D. leader and can hardly be considered part of the civilian element around Casiano now.

6. I detect a swing back to Imbert today on the part of the Americans and I do not like the way things are shaping here at all.

Foreign Office pass to Washington 53 and UKMIS New York 17.

[Repeated as requested]

ADVANCE COPIES:

Private Secretary

P.U.S.

Mr. Rennie

Head of American Department

News Department

PPPPP

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21/05/52



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FROM SANTO DOMINGO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

RECEIVED IN  
ARCHIVES No.39  
27 MAY 1965  
AD1015/205

Cypher/OTP

Mr. Campbell  
No.108  
26 May, 1965

FO/CRO/WH DISTRIBUTION

D. 22.27 26 May, 1965  
R. 23.45 26 May, 1965

IMMEDIATE  
CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No.108 of 26 May.  
Repeated for information to : Washington  
UKMIS New York

I send you in my immediately following telegram extracts from a memorandum which Imbert gave to the Press on 25 May. I trust this explains why I think Imbert is politically irrelevant and underlines my disquiet over the unfluence this man seems to have in some American circles here. Contrary to my hope it seems that the oligarchy, as represented by Imbert, have learned little. They have already forgotten how frightened they were by Frankenstein.

Foreign Office please pass Washington 55 and UKMIS New York 18.

[Repeated as requested]

ADVANCE COPIES:

F.O. Private Secretary  
P.U.S.  
Mr. Rennie  
Head of American Dept.  
Head of News Dept.

27 MAY  
1965

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FROM SANTO DOMINGO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

A 33

En Clair

FO/CRO/WH. DISTRIBUTION

Mr Campbell

No. 109  
26 May, 1965

D. 2340 26 May, 1965  
R. 2345 26 May, 1965

PRIORITY

A 101

RECEIVED IN  
ARCHIVES No. 39  
27 MAY 1965  
AD1015/205(n)

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 109 of 26 May.  
Repeated for information to Washington  
UKMIS New York

My immediately preceding telegram.

Free translation of memorandum issued by General Imbert on 24 May.

Begins.

It is in my opinion the Government's urgent obligation to reorganize itself in a satisfactory way in light of its political principles.

The formula which we propose has antecedents in Latin America specifically in Cuba in one of the Governments presided over by General Batista. This in Cuba brought wide popular support to the Government and satisfied democratic principles for the separation of power.

Different commissions from various institutions now in the Dominican Republic, such as the personal mission of President Johnson, headed by Mr. George Bundy, are trying out formulas on ideological lines. These all misunderstand the problem, since they insist on the formation of a new government as if the problem were one of persons and not of institutions.

All these formulas coming from outside are an open intrusion into the affairs of the Republic.

What we propose is a Dominican solution, not a solution from the outside and it is institutional. It is just and not without authority, bearing in mind the men, who, in the gravest moment of the collapse of democracy, saved the Republic and our democratic religious and cultural traditions. It is a solution which given a chance of opportunity and expression is, unlike the other formulas brought in by aeroplane, not based on the humbling of the victor before the vanquished.

/A. Creation

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1965



Santo Domingo telegram No. 109 to Foreign Office

34

- 2 -

## A. Creation of a provisional legislative council:

(a) The Government of national reconstruction will transfer to this provisional legislative council all legislative powers retaining for itself only executive;

(b) The provisional legislative council will be constituted in corporative form, that is to say its members would not be chosen by the executive or by universal suffrage, but by the institutions, associations and trade unions of this country which represent the great base of national reconstruction. Each institution, for example, industrialists, merchants, professionals, agriculturists, unions and political parties would nominate one or two members to form the provisional legislative council. This democratic form of election would give the Government of National Reconstruction the "wide popular base" spoken about and would create a truly democratic institution avoiding ever concentration of power.

(c) The plan would be, for example, to submit to the Government the names of representatives freely elected in each civil organization so that the Government could proceed to the formation of a provisional legislative council and transfer its powers to it. Also the civil organizations should designate its member and a substitute which would give elasticity to the Government's selection to the legislative chamber;

(d) The provisional legislative council must not be too numerous because of the need to deal with grave problems and to legislate urgently for national reconstruction. A large assembly would impede this.

B. The Army would make public an avowal of obedience to the civil power and also assert a policy of non interference in the legal processes which will have to be put into effect as a consequence of the revolt. This will reinforce the civil power and dispose of many fears of reprisals. I believe that this "national solution" would solve the impasse which is being worsened by national and foreign pressures on the Government. The insistence on other formulas and the personal ambitions of certain persons figuring in them is creating a suffocating atmosphere which could lead to new violence.

Ends.

Foreign Office pass Washington and UKMIS New York as my telegrams Nos. 56 and 19.

[Repeated as requested]



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A

RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES No.39
28 MAY 1965

FROM SANTO DOMINGO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

AD1015/208

Cypher/OTP

FO/CRO/WH. DISTRIBUTION

Mr. Campbell

No. 112

D. Untimed 27 May, 1965

27 May, 1965

R. 22.08 27 May, 1965

IMMEDIATECONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 112 of 27 May.  
Repeated for information to: Washington  
U.K.Mis, New York

See Reuter's despatch of 25 May.

"United States official sources outline policy to the Press."

The United States official was Bundy, who spoke before leaving for Washington. He said that the first landing of troops was to prevent a highly disciplined minority of Communists taking over control. As you will remember this was not the United States Embassy's point of view at the time and later they were still speaking of large numbers of Communists. This was when journalists were asking why the American force was so large. Bundy added that the danger of a Communist take-over was now very greatly reduced. The Americans seem to be extracting themselves with some skill from the awkward position in which their Embassy landed them when a faulty assessment of the Communist threat caused them to over-react.

2. Since this Press conference Bundy has had a four-hour conference with Caamano. This I believe is the first real approach made by Bundy to assess Caamano since he has been here and it is said to have had a decisive influence. An informant tells me that Bundy was most impressed by Caamano and believes that he has complete control over the movement he represents and is a political figure of importance. It is said that Bundy will make this clear to the President. As I have been of this opinion myself about Caamano since 2 May, I should be glad to learn that this report of Bundy's opinion is true.

28 MAY  
1965

/I feared

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Santo Domingo telegram No. 112 to Foreign Office

- 2 -

I feared that Bundy might leave without actually seeing Caamaño himself. There now appears to be a split in the American ranks between the Embassy and Thomas Mann on one side, who thinks that Imbert should still be supported, and Bundy who now it seems is thinking otherwise.

Foreign Office pass Washington 57, U.K.Mis. New York 20.

[Repeated as requested]

ADVANCE COPIES

F.O. Private Secretary  
P.U.S.  
Mr. Rennie  
Head of American Dept.  
Head of News Dept.



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FROM SANTO DOMINGO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

RECEIVED IN  
ARCHIVES No. 39  
28 MAY 1965  
AD1015/209

Cypher/OTP

FILES

Mr. Campbell

No. 113  
27 May 1965

D.0920 28 May 1965  
R.0940 28 May 1965

IMMEDIATE  
CONFIDENTIAL

AD1015/196

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 113 of 27 May  
Repeated for information to: Washington

GUARD

Your telegram No. 105.

For some time I have debated the wisdom of a discreet mention to my United States colleague on my doubts about the United States Ambassador's objectivity. I have concluded that in the circumstances it would achieve little and perhaps do harm there. This is a very sensitive area now and the resentment aroused might temporarily deprive me of useful contact needed to assess the way their minds are working from day to day. Might I suggest that someone in Washington drops the hint to a State Department colleague.

AD1015/208

2. My telegram No. 112, last sentence. Apparent division of opinion now carried to Washington with return of Bundy suggests that a hint there might have weight at this time.

[Repeated priority to Washington]

DISTRIBUTED TO:  
American Dept.

ADVANCE COPY:  
Head American Dept.

28 MAY  
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Proyecto de Digitalización  
Academia Dominicana de la Historia

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SECRETFROM WASHINGTON TO FOREIGN OFFICE

ppher/OTP

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

Mr P. Dean

p. 1410

8 May 1965

D. 0430 28 May 1965 IN

R. 0620 28 May 1965 39

31 MAY 1965

AD 1015 | 211

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PRIORITYSECRETAddressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 1410 of 28 May.

Repeated for information to: Santo Domingo  
and Saving to: UKMIS New York

Santo Domingo.

I asked McGeorge Bundy this afternoon how close he thought as a political settlement. He replied that during his ten days in Santo Domingo he had twice thought that a negotiated settlement would emerge fairly soon, but he now thought that there was no early hope of this. The American idea had been to work for a settlement which would have given the constitutionlists some two-thirds of the full authority which they would probably have got if the fighting had continued. The local political situation, however, was quite extraordinary and neither side had any idea of the give and take of politics or of accepting anything other than total victory (or defeat). This was clearly impossible and time would now be needed to allow passions to ebb. Bundy said this was perhaps no bad thing since it might lead the O.A.S. to make a real effort to exercise proper authority.

I asked about the rôle of the United Nations. Bundy said that on balance the United Nations had probably played a useful rôle if only by stirring the O.A.S. into more activity. One difficulty had been that Mayobre was politically wholly identified with the "rebels". On the other hand, Rikhye had shown great discretion and good sense. I asked about Caamaño to which Bundy said that he was a man of real substance and, contrary to what had originally been believed, was in real charge of his side. He had an air of authority and was not in any sense a covert communist. He had changed his line from time to time but that had not been due to opportunism so much as to lack of knowledge.

Finally, Bundy told me that the President was aiming to

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SECRET

Washington telegram No. 1410 to Foreign Office

- 2 -

bring the number of United States troops in the Island down to about a half of their present numbers (i.e., about 10,000) within ten days and that this should be possible if everything remained quiet. There was no reason why there should be any further outbreak of violence and everybody now seemed tired of fighting. Bundy asked that this information should be kept very close indeed, as the Americans themselves were doing, since they did not want to give "that ambitious little gunman Imbert the wrong ideas". May I ask that his confidence be respected.

Foreign Office please pass Sante Domingo 20.

[Not repeated to Sante Domingo pending departmental instructions].

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U.N. Dept.

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SECRET

FROM WASHINGTON TO FOREIGN OFFICE

A 48

Cypher/OTF

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

Sir P. Dean

No. 1415  
28 May 1965

D. 0500 29 May 1965

R. 0807 29 May 1965

RECEIVED IN  
ARCHIVES No. 39  
31 MAY 1965

PRIORITY

SECRET

AD1015/211

AD1015/212

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 1415 of 28 May.

Repeated for information to: Santo Domingo  
and Saving to: UKMIS New York      Havana  
UKDEL NATO                              Rio de Janeiro

My telegram No. 1410 (not to all): Santo Domingo.

About the same time as I saw Bundy the Minister spoke to Vaughn, who confirmed that there now appeared to be little prospect of an early political settlement. There were sufficient good people acceptable to both sides to form a team, but the following crucial questions remained open:-

(a) Who was to be in charge of the Army? This had been complicated by the death of Colonel Fernandez.

(b) What was to be done with the known Communists in the country? Were they to be rounded-up and expelled before a political settlement was reached or was the task to be left to the interim government? This problem had not yet come to the fore, but Vaughn thought it would be an increasingly important issue.

(c) It was clear that certain extremists on both sides would have to leave the country, but it had proved impossible to agree who must go. Vaughn agreed that the position of both sides had hardened. The more conservative, middle class elements had come out in favour of Imbert, but the mass of the people, who had been waiting to see who could come out on top, were in favour of radical change. Vaughn did not exclude the possibility of renewed violence but thought that major developments would await the next move in the O.A.S.

2. Vaughn confirmed that Bundy had been impressed by Caamano as a forceful and reasonable character. He had not thought much of Ariste.

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31 MAY  
13:45  
1965



Proyecto de Digitalización  
Academia Dominicana de la Historia

SECRETWashington telegram No. 1415 to Foreign Office

- 2 -

3. The United States Government were continuing to try to facilitate the O.A.S. in taking the lead. Contingents for the inter-American force were expected from two or three additional countries, including Venezuela which had promised naval units and might send up to two battalions.

4. In the O.A.S. attention was now centered on the following problems:-

(a) What continuing arrangements should be made for giving political guidance to the commander of the force. Dr. Mora had done well but could not remain in Santo Domingo indefinitely, and the United States Government intended to support a resolution to replace him by one or more political advisers. The Brazilians favoured a political committee of three.

(b) How to provide for continuing consultation. The United States delegation has informed us that they intend to sponsor a resolution transferring the responsibilities now vested in the tenth meeting of Foreign Ministers in the O.A.S. Council.

5. In the event, only the Brazilian and Paraguayan Foreign Ministers have come to Washington for the current session of the meeting of consultation, and there is a general wish to conclude the meeting as soon as possible, leaving the question of a permanent inter-American force for consideration at the Rio conference. The Brazilians have proposed that the conference should now open between 26 July and 4 August. The United States Government agrees to this date. Vaughn said that the majority of O.A.S. member-countries, with the notable exception of Chile, now supported the idea of a permanent force. But the question of its mandate remained open, and he did not think that it would be possible to agree precise terms.

Foreign Office pass Santo Domingo 21 and Saving to Havana 6, UKDEL NATO 75 and Rio de Janeiro 13.

[Not repeated Santo Domingo pending Departmental decision. Repeated as requested to remainder].

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CONFIDENTIAL  
FROM SANTO DOMINGO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTP

F.O./C.R.O./WH DISTRIBUTION

Mr. Campbell

No. 115  
28 May, 1965

D. 17.45 28 May, 1965  
R. 17.54 28 May, 1965

RECEIVED IN  
ARCHIVES No. 39  
31 MAY 1965  
AD1015/213

IMMEDIATE  
CONFIDENTIAL

AD1015/208

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 115 of 28 May.  
Repeated for information to: Washington UKMis New York.

My telegram No. 112 paragraph 2.

At this meeting Caamano is believed to have made following essential points and to have been unyielding on them:

- (a) Unconditional return to 1963 constitution
- (b) Government to be entirely composed of civilians.
- (c) Provision for really effective control of the military by civilian government.
- (d) All persons elected to the Government in 1963 to be confirmed as legal national representatives.
- (e) Removal of all foreign troops as quickly as possible.

2. I have an unconfirmed report that in Guzman negotiations for a "broad based government" Americans asked him to select three officers on rebel side for dismissal and deportation as quid pro quo for elimination of Wessin and two Chiefs of Staff. It was left to him to decide who the three officers should be. Guzman refused. He also refused to imprison Communists saying that this violates 1963 constitution.

5. In the past few days Imbert has been making changes in Monetary Board and Banco Reservas. His plan was to get Monetary Board to authorize Central Bank release to his Government's account of money needed for his army and public servants. The payment of public servants in rebel zone did not of course figure in this proposal. The Americans and the International Monetary Fund very wisely dissuaded him from this course. The Americans are now financing payment of all public servants on both sides. This flow of money however, in an economy as short of basic necessities as this, must have a sharp inflationary effect.

MAY 31 1965

/Foreign Office

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FROM SANTO DOMINGO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

A 54

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Mr. Campbell  
No. 116  
29 May, 1965.

D. 1833 30 May, 1965.  
R. 1944 30 May, 1965.

IMMEDIATE  
CONFIDENTIAL

RECEIVED IN  
ARCHIVES No. 39  
31 MAY 1965  
AD1015/213  
AD1015/214

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 116 of 29 May.  
Repeated for information to Washington and UKMIS New York

GUARD  
My telegram No. 115.

It had been intended to pay public servants of both sides through O.A.S. but Aristy told us yesterday that he would not agree to this. He said this was outright financing of Imbert and an improper intervention on the part of the O.A.S. Moreover they could not recognize the authority of O.A.S. in the role of paymaster to the independent Dominican Republic. This was later repeated at an open-air meeting in the city held in pouring rain attended by about 7,000 and was greeted with yells of approval. All the same it is hard to see what they are going to use for money. Today Caamano held a Press conference and repeated this. He attacked Mora on the grounds of lack of impartiality and said he had interrupted relations with him but not with the O.A.S.

2. In lighter vein Imbert attempted to get into Central Bank on 27 May with his troops to take out 7 million peses but was thwarted by United States troops rushed there to prevent him.

3. The general situation. We are at a stalemate. Apart from the cease fire and its prolongation all activities of the various international missions over the past two weeks have so far produced no practical advance towards a political solution. The Americans probably feel that they can hardly come to a quick settlement with Caamano even on the basis of his not too unreasonable demands given in my telegram No. 115 because it is only about twenty days ago that their Embassy was describing him as a prisoner of the former hard core of armed Communists although Bundy's mention of a disciplined minority is a considerable moderation of that statement. They are also hooked with Imbert Junta which their Embassy brought into existence and which Bundy may now realize is even less promising than Caamano as a political alternative. It would hardly be sensible to /set up Imbert

CONFIDENTIAL-GUARD

31 MAY 1965



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Santo Domingo telegram No. 116 to Foreign Office.

- 2 -

set up Imbert if, as I believe, that were to be followed by yet another explosion in a few months time. Meanwhile Imbert is playing anti-Communist line at full blast being shrewd enough to realize that this puts the Americans in an awkward spot. All the middle-of-road formulae for an interim Government so far produced have been blocked by Imbert who has now decided to keep the job of President for himself. Wessin and his troops in the National Palace constitute a permanent danger to the cease fire. The American Service Attachés here quite openly state that all-out victory [grp. undec] Imbert and Wessin are fully aware of this and it adds to the dangers. Thus although we are enjoying the cease fire I fear that we live on the edge of new disasters unless something drastic is done about Imbert and Wessin. The muzzling of the American Service Attachés would be a good starting point. From then onwards the question of tackling Caamaño's Communists could be given a fair wind, but at the moment the situation here can only be described as an awful mess viewed from any angle.

*Check requested*

Foreign Office please pass Washington 60 and UKMIS New York 22.

[Repeated as requested]

ADVANCE COPIES TO:

P.S.

P.U.S.

Mr. Rennie

Head of American Dept.

Head of News Dept.

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CONFIDENTIALFROM SANTO DOMINGO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTP

F.O./C.R.O./WHITEHALL  
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Mr. Campbell

No. 120

5 June 1965

D. 2300 5 June 1965

R. 2313 5 June 1965

RECEIVED IN
AR 100/100 No. 39
- 7 JUN 1965
AD 10 15   219

PRIORITY  
CONFIDENTIALAddressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 120 of 5 June

Repeated for information to:

Washington, U.K. Mission New York.

Shlaudeff<sup>man</sup> who left for Washington with the Bundy Group, returned here later and is now State Department representative with O.A.S. Mediation Commission, headed by Bunker which arrived here 3 June. We lunched together yesterday. He said that proposals for a Balaguer - headed Government have little chance and gave the impression that it was no longer being pursued. I think it is still being explored as an outside chance. He said that the Bunker commission had not yet really started work because of the very lengthy brief required. I asked him if it was United States policy to have free elections in the foreseeable future and he replied that it was. I said I thought the P.R.D. would easily win and he agreed that, given either Caamaño or Bosch as candidate, they would probably walk it. I then suggested that if the P.R.D were going to win by a popular vote, close bargaining over personalities in a provisional government was somewhat beside the point. He said that any proposal for a provisional government came against rock-like opposition from one side or the other. I formed the impression that the Americans really do not know what to do next.

2. At contact today, the rebels reaffirmed, as their essential condition, the restoration of the 1963 constitution. They have never wavered from this point and I fear they never will. The National Palace was taken over by O.A.S. troops on 2 June, a token force of 25 Imbert soldiers remaining. During the week Imbert dropped his corporate State idea and agreed to elections in due course without himself as a candidate. Shlaudeff<sup>man</sup> agreed that Imbert's position had weakened in the past week and mentioned ~~current~~ rumours of a

/struggle

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Santo Domingo telegram No. 120 to Foreign Office

- 2 -

struggle now going on inside the Junta about the dismissal of the Generals and I believe Imbert has written a bitter letter to President Johnson, which the United States Ambassador has refused to forward. The United States Ambassador is looking more cheerful having recently had assurances of the confidence of President Johnson.

3. The Canadians today are reopening their Embassy, which is in the heart of the rebel zone in the same building as Caamaño's military and political headquarters. This will test the rebels' constant statement that bank headquarters and others can operate in complete safety in their area, and psychological effect might be considerable among some of the business community, who are approaching a state of despair. They say they do not know what the United States is trying to achieve here, and after paying their employees wages for 6 weeks, during which time no productive work has been possible, many of them are in financial trouble.

Foreign Office pass Washington No. 61, U.K. Mission New York No. 23.

[Repeated as requested]

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RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES

10 JUN 1965

*Smler 9/6*

AD 1015/227/G

BRITISH EMBASSY,  
SANTO DOMINGO.

30 May, 1965.

GUARD  
(53/1/1G)

*3/6*  
*Mr Slater*  
*9/6*

*My dear Dick,*

*AD 1015/67*

*AD 1015/195*

*AD 1015/208*

May I refer to my telegram No. 41 of 4 May, which briefly discussed the original American estimate that there were 12,000 armed communists in this city up to that date. I touched on this in my despatch No. 13 "S" of 18 May and have referred to it since. I have now been fortunate enough to get my hands on the official American Embassy record of the Bundy press briefing on 25 May (telegram No. 112 of 27 May) and I attach a photocopy of the first page. You will see that Mr. Bundy's words - underlined by me - amount to a marked retreat from the original estimate, so much so, in fact, that they seem to alter the case entirely. To demonstrate how far the Americans have come back from their original estimate, which perhaps had some weight in the U.S. Government's decision to send as many as 23,000 troops into this island at the end of April, I also attach a photocopy of the U.S. Embassy telegram which was passed over my Telex on 4 May. Again, I have underlined the significant words. It is hardly necessary to stress the difference between "12,000 hard core armed communists" on 4 May and a "highly disciplined minority" 22 days later. As I think this miscalculation and its consequences have origins going back more than two years, I hope you will bear with me if I enlarge on the subject. In my opinion, it is related to some of the difficulties we are facing here at the present time.

2. When I came here in April, 1963, one of my first contacts was with Lt.Col. Bevan Cass, U.S.M.C., then the U.S. Naval Attaché. This officer clearly believed that there was a vast and immediate communist menace to the Dominican Republic at that time. In answer to my questions he gave me to understand that this belief was founded, in part, upon evidence supplied by a kind of intelligence network which his office operated here. I was naturally concerned at the thought of an immediate threat to the fledgling democracy on which such high hopes had been set, not least those of President Kennedy, who seemed to regard the Dominican democratic experiment as one of importance in U.S. Caribbean plans vis-à-vis fidelismo ideology. I later discovered that almost the whole of the Diplomatic Corps here more or less shared Lt.Col. Cass's opinion, but then, of course, I had to make allowances for the somewhat claustrophobic atmosphere in which we all live in Santo Domingo. Harry Shlaudeman, however, who was then the Head of the Political Department of the American Embassy, gave me a very different and much more modest estimate of the strength of the communist conspiracy. I quickly discovered that he had a profound and subtle knowledge of the Dominican political scene, and convincing ideas about the real nature of communism and the characteristics of communists (he had previously served in the U.S. Mission at Belgrade, where he was, incidentally, p.n.g.-ed by the communist government). From him I got the impression that the communist problem was hardly an immediate one and certainly not of the size described by Lt.Col. Cass.

R. M. K. Slater, Esq., C.M.G.,  
American Department,  
Foreign Office,  
LONDON, S.W.1.

/3.

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- 2 -

3. I was struck, however, by the fact that there should be two senior members of the U.S. Mission here with divergent views on this important matter. I also gave a good deal of thought to the possibility that the Pentagon - which, as we all know, occupies a very different and much more powerful position as a Department of State than our own Service departments - might be receiving quite different assessments about the communist threat here from those going to the State Department. As all the Service Attachés and the M.A.A.G. appeared to agree with Lt.Col. Cass's opinions, it seemed to me that this might be the cause of confusion and discord in Washington at some future time.

4. Sooner or later I had to decide whether I thought Lt.Col. Cass's version, as opposed to Mr. Shlaudeman's, was a sound one. In arriving at the conclusion that it was not, and that his idea of the scope and size of communist penetration here was greatly exaggerated, I took into consideration at least one of his methods of collecting evidence about the political affiliations of various persons. At this juncture, I must make it clear that Lt.Col. Cass was extremely well informed as regards facts, that is to say, his knowledge of the doings of the leading military and political figures in the Dominican scene was very great. It was over the interpretation of these facts - where, incidentally, his ideas parted company with those of Mr. Shlaudeman - that I felt uneasy.

5. The method I refer to was a system whereby his Marine Gunnery Sergeant kept a payroll for a number of Dominican contacts who, as well as reporting what was overheard in bars, etc., were furnishing evidence about the political outlook and activity of various people, using this information to deduce whether they were or were not communists. I had no reason to have much faith in this kind of system, but not, may I say, because I think that what is said in bars is of no importance in intelligence work. My mistrust of these methods arose from the need for careful sifting and analysis of such materia - more than 9/10ths of the labour of sound intelligence appreciation at this level - and it did not appear to me that Lt.Col. Cass's office in the U.S. Embassy was equipped for this sophisticated work. As I have said in my despatch under reference, the thought that raw material of this kind might be finding its way upwards to Washington was rather disturbing.

6. It was also not difficult to see that Lt.Col. Cass and the U.S. military generally bore an intense personal dislike for Juan Bosch. We all know that Bosch is probably the most irritating and maddening public figure in Latin America, and it is only fair to make allowances for a natural reaction to this fact. But Lt.Col. Cass had an immense and almost commanding influence upon the Dominican military chiefs and, knowing this, the thought that he had ideas about communist penetration in the Bosch régime which might not stand up to careful scrutiny, was not a happy one.

7. When Bosch was overthrown by the military, in a wave of public anxiety - almost amounting to hysteria - about communists in his administration, I watched with great interest, therefore, to see how many communists in positions of importance would fall into the net. You will be aware, of course, that not one case of communist affiliation or

/association

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- 3 -

association was pinned on any member of his numerous appointees to government and official positions. I also noticed at that time that President Kennedy's hard reaction to the coup d'état took the U.S. military here by complete surprise, and this led me to suppose that these officers were not particularly well informed about the politics and policies of their own country. I came to the conclusion that there were serious flaws in the general political judgment exercised by these persons, and the idea that their opinions in any political sphere might have weight was far from reassuring. Nothing has occurred since to make me change my mind.

8. The business of collecting names of supposed communists, however, has been going on ever since. This, I should add, has been happening over a period when the post-Bosch State Department staff of the Embassy proper has been far from the quality of Shlaudeman; his keen mind, I fancy, would never have allowed the figure of 12,000 (which, incidentally, absolutely infuriated the international press here) to see the light of day.

9. From little acorns, they say, do mighty oaks flourish. The miscalculation from which the United States is now extricating itself with great difficulty may well have had its origin, in part, in the office of the Marine Gunnery Sergeant, and other places of the kind. It sounds almost ridiculous to say that. Yet it would not surprise me at all to learn that 12,000 names of supposed communists had been accumulated in the U.S. Naval Attaché's office over the past two or three years. This figure of 12,000, as you will see from the attached, was given out at an Embassy joint military-political briefing, and they must have got it from somewhere. The Bundy group, which worked quite separately from their Embassy throughout their stay, cut it down to a "highly disciplined minority".

10. Opportunities for calm reflection have been hard to come by in the past month, but occasionally I speculate about whether there are other Marine Gunnery Sergeants in other posts in Latin America, and what the end product of the work of these honest and conscientious N.C.O.s might be. There are few things in this world more harmful than badly processed intelligence. If the Americans were frank about what happened here, they would have to admit, I think, that they made a bad appreciation of the communist threat to this country between 24 and 30 April, and that faulty intelligence lay at the root of it. Later, the American Embassy repeatedly described Caamaño as a prisoner of the communists. Mr. Bundy, I think, now knows that this was wrong too. In my view, much of the delay in getting to a political solution here stems from the consequences of these mistakes, one of which has landed us in the grotesque situation of Imbert in the rôle of anti-communist warrior.

11. I am copying this letter to Iaian Sutherland at Washington.

*Yours ever*  
*Stafford*  
 (S. F. Campbell)

SECRET



SECRETFROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO SANTO DOMINGO

Cypher/OTP and By Bag

DEPARTMENTAL  
DISTRIBUTIONNo.114

8 June, 1965

D. 0005 9 June, 1965

IMMEDIATESECRETAddressed to Santo Domingo telegram No.114 of 8 June.

Repeated for information to: Washington

and Saving to: U.K. Mission New York No.993

U.K. Del NATO No.1043 Havana No.100

An American summary dated 7 June cites as evidence of Communist influence at a mass rally addressed by Caamano on 5 June the presence in the crowd of armed men wearing the distinctive uniform of the 14 June Political Group and the tenor of printed propaganda handouts. The summary observes that the tone of the rally was more blatantly anti-United States than on any previous occasion when the top rebel leaders have been present and that this has been reflected in the tone of rebel-controlled broadcasts since the rally.

2. A further summary dated 8 June reports that the "Caamano Government Security Chief" told the Spanish Ambassador on 6 June that the Communists were becoming more influential. The summary quotes the Ambassador as supporting other indications that extremist elements are becoming bolder. His reported statement that tension is growing in the rebel zone is supported by paragraph 2 of your telegram No.121 [of 7 June].

3. The B.B.C. Monitoring Service reports that a number of speeches critical of the O.A.S. and United States were broadcast live from the rally by the "Constitutionalist" Radio Santo Domingo. Speakers named were: Dr. Arismendi Arista Jimenez, Deputy Miguel Seto, Antonio Jaime Peyte Mejia, Jose Francisco Pena Gomez, Senator Professor Rafael Casimiro Castro, Caamano and Aristy. A message from Juan Bosch was also read out. On 6 June the same radio station carried frequent broadcasts of an anti-United States message telephoned by Bosch (presumably from Puerto Rico).

/ 4. We are

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SECRET - GUARDFROM SANTO DOMINGO TO FOREIGN OFFICE*lyneen*

Cypher/OTP

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

Mr. Campbell

D. 20.29 9 June, 1965

No. 124

R. 21.35 9 June, 1965

9 June, 1965

IMMEDIATESECRET

RECEIVED IN AR 10 JUN 1965
AD 104/228/G (A)

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 124 of 9 June.  
 Repeated for information to: Washington and U.K. Mis. New York  
GUARD

Your telegram No. 114. —

AD 101

/c

I am in full agreement with your paragraph 4. I believe that the failure to arrive at any kind of settlement here is now playing dangerously into the hands of the extremists on both the Dominican sides. It would not be surprising if Caamane's apparent policy of non-violent negotiation with the Americans was coming in for heavy criticism inside his movement and that the extremists are extracting the maximum profit from it. It is seven weeks since this affair began and Caamane has twice publicly stated that an agreement was near. The fact that he still has none is probably being used to show that a moderate policy is useless.

2. I have had many reports of extremism on Imbert side also, specifically of the executions being carried out by his forces in the north of the City, the last on the night of 6 June in the National Cemetery. I also hear from a reliable source of the execution of over twenty persons in the Villa Mella district last week. No visible practical results have come as yet from O.A.S. Human Rights Commission and the extremist attacks against the good faith of the O.A.S. generally gaining ground. There are 2,500 persons imprisoned in La Victoria as a result of Imbert's cleaning up operations in the north of the City and their fate is a matter of concern. These arrests are continuing.

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SECRET - GUARD

SECRET - GUARDSanto Domingo telegram No. 124 to Foreign Office

-2-

3. This situation after all these weeks is calculated to play into the hands of the extremists. The Americans might reflect that in the long run the political alternative to Caamano is not the Governing class or the old Dominican Army, anymore than the alternative to Kenyatta was really the White settlers. A Dominican Oginga Odinga is probably standing behind the scenes and his chances improve with every day's delay in getting to an agreement. Mechanistic thinking about the evidence of increased Communist influence is hardly in the United States' true interests here. Attention should be paid to the cause.

Foreign Office pass Washington No. 63, U.K.Mis. New York No. 25

[Repeated as requested]

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FROM SANTO DOMINGO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

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11 JUN 1965

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DEPARTMENTAL  
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Mr. Campbell

AD 1015 / 239/G

No. 125  
10 June, 1965

D. 0016 11 June, 1965

R. 0125 11 June, 1965

IMMEDIATE

SECRET

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 125 of 10 June.

Repeated for information to: Washington

UKMis New York

GUARD

My telegram No. 124, paragraph 2.

AD 1015 / 228/G

I gave luncheon to Mayebre and Rikhye on their return from the site in the Villa Mella area named. At different spots they told me they saw the remains of human bodies which bore signs of having been devoured by animals, several skeletons and freshly filled in graves capable of taking more. On this statement my estimate of over 20 persons appears to be accurate. My information came from a German-American named Harder who lived on this estate. He told Mayebre today that the first executions began 23 May and the last was on 5 June. Harder came to Santo Domingo yesterday to make a statement about the killings to Mayebre and also to the O.A.S. Human Rights Commission. Rikhye said that the latter went to the site yesterday afternoon, but owing to heavy rain did not go to the spot where the evidence was seen by Mayebre and Rikhye today. Mayebre had heard of the executions in the National Cemetery but stated that for obvious reasons it would be hard to discover the evidence there. You will appreciate that Harder's name must not be made public as he lives in the Imbert zone.

2. The German and French Ambassadors are now aware of the Villa Mella business and the Canadian, Gauvin, was present at the luncheon. Mayebre is reporting this to U Thant immediately.

3. Rightly or wrongly it is widely believed amongst the Dominicans that Imbert could not last 24 hours without American tolerance and this affair, if made public, could give the Communists an excellent chance of playing on their favourite

/anti American

SECRET - GUARD



SECRET - GUARD

Santo Domingo telegram No. 125 to Foreign Office

- 2 -

anti American themes.

Foreign Office pass Washington 64, UKMis New York 26.

[Repeated as requested.]

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QQQQQ



SECRET - GUARD

*Green*

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FROM SANTO DOMINGO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTP

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

Mr. Campbell

No. 127

11 June, 1965

IMMEDIATE

SECRET

RECEIVED IN  
ARCHIVES No. 39  
4 JUN 1965

D. 01.30 12 June, 1965  
R. 01.32 12 June, 1965

AD1015/232 G

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 127 of 11 June,  
Repeated for information to: Washington, U.K. Mis. New York  
GUARD

My telegram No. 125.

*AD1015/230/B*

Ward Just of News Week called on me this morning. He told me that he and two friends went to the site yesterday afternoon and dug up one of the graves. At this particular spot they uncovered four corpses at about 5 - 7 days' stage of decomposition. The German Ambassador reported to Nunciatura her discovery of corpses when riding across this land some days ago. This is four miles from prison of La Victoria about which I expressed disquiet in my telegram No. 124. I understand that French have photographs of corpses on this land. Reston of Los Angeles Times later corroborated Ward Just.

*AD1015/228/G*

2. Wife of Director of Peace Corps here told me confidentially yesterday that their volunteers from the provinces had been reporting unreliable accounts of brutality by Imbert police in various places. She added that she thought that her Embassy had long ago taken up a fixed attitude and was not prepared to listen to anything running contrary to that. I would like her confidence to be respected. Her husband made an excellent impression for his objective analysis of the situation on Bundy when he was here.

SECRET-GUARD

13. 194 JUN  
1965



SECRET-GUARDSanto Domingo telegram No. 127 to Foreign Office

-2-

3. A priest reported to me to-day on 9 June a crowd which was waiting the arrival of O.A.S. Human Rights Commission at San Pedro de Macas<sup>es</sup> was fired on by police resulting in 18 injured and many arrests. The O.A.S. Human Rights Commission which was due there that day did not arrive. I have reports of similar incidents at San Francisco de Macas<sup>es</sup> and Salcedo over the past 10 days. The tenor of many reports I have received in the past week leave little room for doubt that Imbert forces in the circumstances of a precarious held in the provinces are, terrorizing the population in many places. The O.A.S. Human Rights Commission seem to be dragging its feet. The United Nations observers have taken initiative in matters concerning Human Rights and O.A.S. seem to trail behind. As things have developed in this past week this wretched country is getting a wretched deal from which I fear no one can hope to profit.

Foreign Office pass Washington No. 65, and U.K.Mis. New York No. 27.

[Repeated as requested]

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SECRET-GUARD



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FROM SANTO DOMINGO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTP

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Mr. Campbell

No. 130  
15 June 1965

D. 1933 15 June 1965  
R. 1935 15 June 1965

RECEIVED IN  
ARCHIVES No.39  
16 JUN 1965  
AD1015/234

IMMEDIATE  
CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 130 of 15 June.

Repeated for information to: Washington  
UKMIS New York

At 2 a.m. this morning fighting suddenly broke out between United States and rebel troops in Duarte area. This has been going on for several hours. Fighting has now spread to the centre of the city in el Cande. A large scale fire is burning. The rebels claim that United States troops opened mortar fire on them from the east side of Ozama and that they are now advancing into the city. The United States sources deny this and suggest that the incident is engineered to coincide with this morning's United Nations Security Council meeting. I hope to have a clearer picture later.

Foreign Office pass Washington 66 and UKMIS New York 28.

[Repeated as requested].

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16 JUN  
1965

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CONFIDENTIAL-GUARD

FROM SANTO DOMINGO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

*Green* 159

Cypher/OTP

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

Mr. Campbell

No. 131  
15 June, 1965

RECEIVED IN  
ARCHIVES  
17 JUN 1965

AD 1015/236

D. 0130 16 June, 1965  
R. 0632 16 June, 1965

IMMEDIATE  
CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 131 of 15 June,  
Repeated for information to Washington  
UKMIS New York

GUARD

AD 1015/234

My telegram No. 130.

The action which began this morning now clearly emerges as a planned operation by the United States forces on the Caamano-held sector of the city. During the morning United States troops opened fire across the river Ozama. After the first strengthening of their position on the Duarte bridge and deploying medium artillery, units of the 82nd Airborne Division moved over the bridge and thrust southwards to Isavela La Catolica thus securing both sides of the river in continuous fighting throughout the day. Firing appeared to have largely died down by 7.30 p.m. Throughout the day the United States Embassy has been denying to me all knowledge of any aggressive action by their troops and asserting that it was the rebels who were firing on the National Palace. This was contradicted by Shlaudeman tonight who told me it had been decided to carry out a limited operation to take the power station on the west bank of the Ozama. He denied that it is intended to press onwards but added that their troops would have to secure a safe line to ensure security of the territory gained. This should allow maximum latitude to press forward into Caamano's fortress if required. The present situation is that the forward area and most of the port is in United States hands. I do not expect they intend to stop there indefinitely. Casualties from this operation in closely built-up sections of the city can hardly be light. I have heard a good deal of the United States 106 millimetre recoilless weapon firing throughout the day.

2. The Imbert faction has had no part whatever, apart from rather faltering bravado about cleaning up the Communists. A claim that

/Caamano

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San Domingo telegram No. 131 to Foreign Office

- 2 -

Caamano and Aristy had fled was disproved when Aristy was located at his headquarters by telephone during the fighting. He said that the Americans were advancing but they would fight on to the very end. My telegram No. 127 last sentence. Please heavily underline the following from "as things" to "profit".

Foreign Office pass Washington No. 67 and UKMIS New York No. 29.

[Repeated as requested]

ADW15/230/G

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SECRETFROM WASHINGTON TO FOREIGN OFFICE

A

Cypher/OTP

Sir P. Dean

No. 1578

17 June 1965

RECEIVED IN  
ARCHIVES N. 37

18 JUN 1965

AD 1015/240

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

D. 2230 17 June 1965

R. 2350 17 June 1965

IMMEDIATESECRET

AD 1015/236.

Santo Domingo telegram No. 131: Dominican Republic.

Following is account of developments given in today's D.I.A. daily intelligence summary which supplements information in paragraph 2 of my telegram No. 1569. — AD 1015/237

The Dominican rebels opened up with heavy fire for a brief period again on 16 June; United States forces delayed returning the fire for more than 30 minutes. One United States soldier was killed during the exchange.

The firing the dissidents initiated on 15 June cost them heavily in men and ground. Their casualties are estimated at 77 killed, 45 wounded, and 200 detained. They also lost 30 square blocks west and south of the power plant. General Panasco Alvim approved all moves by the I.A.F. components against the rebels; the O.A.S. ad hoc committee in turn approved Panasco Alvim's actions and the expansion of the I.A.F. protected zone.

The 15 June incidents provided additional evidence that Caamano has lost control over extremists in his camp and indicate that they now make the major decisions. The outbreak followed a call by the Castroite 14 of June group for attacks on United States and other O.A.S. troops and for a country-wide struggle. Caamano admitted to United Nations representative Mayobre that he was not sure that his orders to stop shooting would be heeded.

Conditions in the insurgent-held area deteriorated on the 16th, and people living there are frightened and demoralized. Store windows on Conde street, the main shopping area, were damaged by mortar and machine gun fire, and there was a good deal of looting. Morale of the rebel military is, however, still high.

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Washington telegram No. 1578 to Foreign Office

- 2 -

There has been no response from the countryside to the insurgents' calls for violence. A general strike scheduled for Santiago on 15 June did not come off, and developments in this most important city in the rich Cibae Valley continue to favour the G.N.R. officials and prominent citizens in the city are organizing a large demonstration for 20 June in favour of Imbert.

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AD 1015/243

Cypher/OTP

Mr. Campbell

No. 133

16 June, 1965

FO(S)CRO(S)WH(S)DISTRIBUTION

D. 23.13 16 June, 1965

R. 07.10 19 June, 1965

IMMEDIATE  
CONFIDENTIALAddressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 133 of 16 June.  
Repeated for information to : Washington

UKMIS New York

GUARD

Aristy claims that the Americans tried hard to take the city yesterday but failed. He said that they had reached Isabela la Católica at one time but the rebels counter attacked at 0500 today and pushed them back to Santa Barbara. He told me that they had counted twenty United States dead left behind. He claims that the heavy weapons used by the Americans caused great destruction. Aristy finished by saying, "The Americans will never take this city. They can have the ashes but not the city itself. We will go on fighting until we are all dead!" I spoke to Caamano last night at 2300 and he said that all was well. He had been in touch with Mayebre throughout the day.

2. I saw Shlaudeman this morning at 1000 who repeated that United States action was limited in scope and only intended to neutralize rebel fields of fire covering power stations. He stated that United States troops had first occupied the Santa Barbara area. They had then pushed forward but had withdrawn later. I think Aristy is wrong in claiming that the Americans intended to take the whole city but I think it likely that they wanted to secure the west bank of the Ozama down to the port and create panic, but encountered bitter resistance and had to pull back. Shlaudeman thought that American troops suffered twenty casualties last night but was not sure. He agreed that heavy weapons were used.

3. He said there was no doubt that Caamano and Aristy had lost control of the movement which was now run entirely by the 14 June movement. I said it was a pity that the Bundy formula could not have been tried before extremist influences became so /uncontrollable.

CONFIDENTIAL - GUARD

CONFIDENTIAL - GUARDSante Domingo telegram No.133 to Foreign Office

-2-

AD1015/209  
AD1015/226/6

uncontrollable. He replied that Caamane obstinately refused to deal with the Communist threat and that made it a non-starter. I do not think it true that Caamane has lost all control. For reasons discussed in your telegram No.114 and my telegram No.124 the delay has played into extremist hands. I asked Shlaudeman what was the next step and he said it was up to the O.A.S.

AD1015/187

4. I think the Americans once again have underestimated the strength of resistance in the rebel movement and that yesterday's experience has given them much to think about. I have always advised them against getting involved in the fighting in the city proper (my telegram No.95). I do not quite follow the logic of yesterday's events, if heavy fighting was not intended to bring about panic and collapse in the rebel side. The power station issue is hardly convincing seeing that there has been no real interruption of power supplies for over a month but it may have been a constant irritation. I can hardly see much improvement arising from yesterday's events. Civilian casualties must have been great. [? group omitted] are still there and the Americans have not exactly improved their reputation.

Foreign Office please pass Washington 68, UKMIS  
New York 30.

[Repeated as requested]

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FROM SANTO DOMINGO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

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AD1015/245

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Mr. Campbell

No. 137

19 June, 1965

D: 0319 20 June, 1965

R: 0322 20 June, 1965

PRIORITY

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 137 of 19 June,  
Repeated for information to: Washington UKMIS New York

The Bunker commission outlined to the Diplomatic Corps last night its proposals for a solution. These contained the following points.

1. (1) General elections under the supervision of the OAS in a period of 6 - 9 months.
- (2) Freedom for all leaders of democratic parties in exile to return to the country under OAS guarantee.
- (3) The immediate cessation of fighting and the return of all members of the regular armed forces to their units and return of irregular fighters to their homes.
- (4) The handing over to the OAS of all arms in civilian hands.
- (5) The reopening of all commerce and industrial establishments in the country
- (6) The formation of a provisional government which will convoke General elections and prepare an institutional act which can serve as a provisional constitution until the people can freely decide their constitutional requirements by the elections.

2. Rebel headquarters say that these proposals are being carefully examined and that counterproposals will be possible in two or three days. Imbert has stated also that he was consulting with his colleagues and that he would be indicating his decision in the near future.

Foreign Office pass Washington and UKMIS New York as my telegrams Nos. 69 and 31.

[Repeated as requested]

21 JUN  
1965

GW



CONFIDENTIAL - GUARDFROM SANTO DOMINGO TO FOREIGN OFFICECypher/OTP  
Mr. CampbellDEPARTMENTAL  
DISTRIBUTION 21 JUN 1965RECEIVED IN  
ARCHIVES No. 39No. 138  
19 June, 1965

D: 0320 20 June, 1965

R: 0326 20 June, 1965

PRIORITY  
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AD1015/246

AD1015/245

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 138 of 19 June,  
Repeated for information to: Washington UKMIS New YorkGUARD

My immediately preceding telegram.

I imagine that these proposals will be the last from the United States in their present frame of mind. I am not optimistic about acceptance. The disarming of irregular forces whilst regular army remains armed and intact, is asking for a good deal from the Rebels. It involves accepting the good faith of Imbert Military, on a matter fundamental to the Rebel's survival. An acceptable proposal would seem to be disarming of both sides, with armed force functions temporarily taken over by O.A.S.

2. Bunker said he thought that only the Democratic Party would be able to register for elections. I imagine this eliminates the 14 June movement. The Americans have been repeatedly declaring that 14 June has taken over the entire Rebel movement from Caamano. By this token, therefore, the entire Rebel movement would be disfranchised. They cannot have it both ways. Only full control of the 14 June would allow Caamano to accept this condition, in which case they would be wrong about him not having control. On the other hand, if they are right and he has lost control they must anticipate rejection of this condition and a breakdown of negotiations. This contradiction is disturbing. From my talks with Shlaudeman, I have gained the impression that the United States has abandoned trying to guide the movement of Social Protest here and now intend the complete breakup of Caamano's organization. Signs of this have grown over the past three weeks. A strong Dominican Army, capable of holding the situation down for a few weeks, is included in the calculation. If this is what they think, they are in for much trouble.

/3. I have

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
Santo Domingo telegram No. 138 to Foreign Office

I have unconfirmed reports that the United States troops are already in the provinces. I have also had a hint that Imbert is engineering an incident in Santiago next week. I am expecting further details. The idea would be to involve United States troops in suppressing "Communist Lawlessness". This would be timed to coincide with a breakdown of negotiations.

Foreign Office pass Washington No. 70 and UKMIS New York No. 32.

[Repeated as requested]

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Ante. 10



21 JUN 1965

A D1015/248

4 = 14<sup>th</sup> of June Political Group 21/6

BRITISH EMBASSY,  
SANTO DOMINGO.

17 June, 1965.

(53/1/1)

My dear Bill,

--- You may be interested in this page from LJ4 dated 14 June. I spoke to Harry Shlaudeman about this because he and most other persons in the American Embassy are now convinced that LJ4 have taken over control of the Caamaño movement. I do not think this is true, but an increase in the influence of extremists is fairly evident for reasons which we have already explored. You might note the portion between the two red lines. It is this which disquiets Harry considerably, and which makes him feel that the moderate cause is lost on the Caamaño side. I personally feel that we should not take too much for granted from a political sheet of this kind, but it does show us the way we are heading unless something is done about a reasonable settlement pretty soon. There is not much more time.

Yours ever,

Stafford  
(S. F. Campbell)

G. W. Harding, Esq.,  
American Department,  
Foreign Office,  
LONDON, S.W.1.

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El 274 - 14 DE JUNIO DE 1965

## LOS CINCO PUNTOS DE LAS NEGOCIACIONES

El pasado día 8, el presidente constitucional, ciudadano Francisco Caamaño Deñó, se dirigió al pueblo dominicano y al congreso nacional desde el teatro Leonor, de esta ciudad.

En su discurso el presidente Caamaño acusó al gobierno imperialista de los Estados Unidos por su política de agresión e intervención contra nuestro pueblo, así como a la organización de Estados Americanos y su Secretario General, Dr. Jose A. Mora, por seguir los dictados de sus amos de Washington, tratando de imponer soluciones contra a los intereses del pueblo dominicano.

El presidente Caamaño señaló la posibilidad de llevar el caso dominicano a otros organismos internacionales, se mostró partidario de sostener conversaciones con estos organismos y definió la posición que mantiene el gobierno constitucional sobre las negociaciones en los cinco puntos siguientes:

- 1.- Constitución del 63
- 2.- Vigencia de las Cámaras Legislativas
- 3.- Permanencia de los combatientes Constitucionales en las Fuerzas Armadas
- 4.- Formación de un gobierno con personalidades democráticas
- 5.- Salida inmediata de las tropas norteamericanas.

En otra parte de su discurso hizo un llamado a las ciudades del interior para que se levantaran en armas en defensa de la Constitución de 1963. Dijo Caamaño: " Los que hoy no pueden defenderla

con las armas, porque se lo están impidiendo por la fuerza, terminarán mañana por coger las armas y vencer a sus enemigos". Dijo que los enemigos del pueblo no habían sido definitivamente derrotados "porque el gobierno de los Estados Unidos, violando todos los principios, abusando de su fuerza militar, invadió con sus tropas nuestro suelo y de momento momentaneamente el triunfo del movimiento constitucional".

Con estas palabras del presidente Caamaño se ha dado un rotundo mentís a las maniobras de los imperialistas yanquis que utilizaron la estratagema de "Proteger las vidas de sus nacionales" para intervenir descaradamente en nuestra patria, a la vez los imperialistas yanquis han puesto al desnudo su naturaleza agresora y se han mostrado abiertamente como son: Enemigos de los pueblos del mundo, La Paz y La Democracia.

La posición del 14 de Junio en la actual situación ha sido confirmada en la practica. Dijimos que la lucha armada era inevitable para consolidar la victoria popular. Otros entendieron que conversando con el imperialismo se lograría el triunfo. Ahora nos dan la razón y se habla de incorporar a todo el país a la lucha armada. Dijimos que el imperialismo no estaba interesado en negociaciones sino al contrario: liquidar el foco constitucionalista, la justa rebelión del pueblo. Ahora se ve claro que es así.

Dijimos y reafirmamos que la movilización de las masas con la consigna de Desocupación Inmediata de las Tropas Yan-

quis y Reforma Agraria, es necesaria para prender la lucha armada en todo el país, consolidar la victoria y asegurarla con bases sólidas. La vida se encargará de decir en esta como en tantas ocasiones anteriores: El 14 tenía razón.

**SIN REFORMA... (DE LA PAG.6)**  
rección política y militar, cediendo ante la fórmula que trata de imponer el imperialismo y la oligarquía derrotada, traicionando así al pueblo; o se sigue apoyando en las masas, hace suya con mas fuerza la consigna de "Todo con las masas" y dirige la profundización de este combate que libra el pueblo por la Soberanía Nacional y los derechos democráticos.

Y para profundizar la lucha, y seguir apoyandose en las masas, desplegar la lucha en todo el país, incorporar al campesinado dando como paso previo la promulgación de la ley de Reforma Agraria, organizar para la ocupación de las tierras de los latifundistas y establecer una sólida ligazón revolucionaria entre la ciudad y el campo para afincar la lucha patriótica contra el explotador yanqui que pisotea nuestra soberanía. Los campesinos son la abrumadora mayoría de la población dominicana y el sector mas explotado y pobre; sin ellos, sin su apoyo no llevamos adelante, no desarrollamos hasta el fin el actual combate. Y para ganar su apoyo, debemos comenzar la Reforma Agraria y ENTREGAR INMEDIATAMENTE LA TIERRA A LOS CAMPESINOS.

Con lo que estaríamos por verdaderos caminos de victoria, y al fin y al cabo, cumpliendo con la Constitución del 63. Porque una cosa es cierta:

**¡SIN REFORMA AGRARIA NO HAY REVOLUCION!**



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*Intercom*  
22/6/65



GUARD

(53/1/1)

RECEIVED IN  
ARCHIVE No 18  
22 JUN 1965  
AD 1015/250

BRITISH EMBASSY,  
SANTO DOMINGO.

17 June, 1965.

*My dear Bill,*

Following the heavy fighting which took place between the U.S. 82nd Airborne Division and the rebels in the city on 15 June, the Diplomatic Corps were asked at very short notice to attend a meeting with the O.A.S. Commission of three, headed by Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker, on the morning of 16 June. A report giving an account of events of the previous day was then read out to us.

2. The atmosphere at this meeting was somewhat infelicitous, perhaps for the reason that this was the first time since the Commission's arrival here that the Diplomatic Corps had been collectively noticed, perhaps on account of the rather strange procedure of scrambling us together, sitting us all down, and reading out a paper, or maybe it was because some Heads of Mission had been disturbed by the events of the 15th and felt that they had been invited to a whitewashing ceremony on behalf of something over which they had certain misgivings. I cannot say that I was very impressed, either by the statement, or by a clumsy handling of some testy questions asked by the Peruvian, Chilean and Panamanian Ambassadors afterwards.

3. The statement was a biased account of what had happened, placing the blame on Caamaño's forces in a way which, in a case where there is no evidence available at all as to who started the shooting, was a little too sweeping for taste. It was not much improved by the inclusion of a clause which praised Imbert for his restraint in standing apart from this affair when, in fact, one of his frigates came inshore during the morning and fired tracer shells into the aduana and set it on fire. I have reliable reports of Imbert troop movements through the corridor that morning (where they are not supposed to be at any time), coupled with American battalion radio instructions to permit Imbert troops to pass through American lines to a point north-east of the city, near the scene of heavy fighting later. My informant was Reston, of the Los Angeles Times, who told me that the U.S. battalion commander, over whose radio he heard these instructions, looked at him afterwards and said, "Well - you heard that, but don't ask me what's going on because I don't know". Lastly, Imbert's radio broadcasts throughout the day were declaring that the hour of deliverance from the communist horde had come, and that the Americans were now cleaning up the city at last.

4. The Americans, I think, have been worried about the possible backlash which their action in bringing heavy weapons into the built-up area might be causing; both Harry Shlaudeman and Bill Connett showed signs of uneasiness on this score on the morning of 16 June. I have several times warned our American friends about the type of resistance to be expected if they went into the city proper, not because I ever doubted that

/they

G. W. Harding, Esq.,  
American Department,  
Foreign Office,  
LONDON, S.W.1.

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- 2 -

they could take it if they were determined to do so, but because tough resistance would put regular troops into the situation of using weapons of highly destructive potential, such as the 106 mm. recoilless gun, in dealing with fire from the closely packed buildings there. This sort of thing always gets a bad press, and looks bad anyway in times of peace, particularly if you retire from the area later, which is what the 82nd Airborne Division did in Isabela la Católica.

5. My own theory for what it is worth is that the Americans were anticipating real trouble from the rebels on the celebration of the 14th of June, since they now seem convinced that ~~104~~ has completely taken over the movement. Having made this appreciation, it was then decided that, when trouble started, troops should go in and give a demonstration of overwhelming fire-power, which would quickly panic the rebels and allow the cleaning up of the city with little difficulty. Nothing happened on 14 June, but when trouble started on the 15th it was decided to put the plan for the 14th into action. As you know, despite an enormous amount of destruction in the city (El Conde, for example, which was untouched on 13 June, is now a complete mess), the rebels are still there. Santo Domingo does not seem to be a lucky place for our American friends.

6. The combined force here is called the O.A.S. Peace Force but they are not well organised to that end. One notable deficiency is the lack of properly equipped observers on both sides who can proceed immediately to any place where alleged breaches of the ceasefire are reported. Under this system it would then be possible to verify if firing was actually taking place and contact the observer on the other side by radio. This kind of practice is common, I think, to all international peace-keeping forces, but it is entirely lacking here, and that fact might have had a good deal to do with the excessive reaction of the 82nd Airborne Division on 15 June. The chances of trouble will remain high until something like this is adopted.

7. Bill Connett told me yesterday that the Bunker mission will be putting proposals to both sides to-morrow (18 June) in a fresh effort to find a political solution. I fear they will come up against the same trouble with Caamaño about the 1963 Constitution, which the Americans have now apparently decided is impossible. I doubt also that he will give the necessary safeguards about communists, which the Americans regard as indispensable. There is also the question of the army, which the Americans say must be strong to contain the communist threat. I asked Bill if he thought there was a better chance of stability in the army now than heretofore; all the crises we had during Donald Reid's régime were about trouble with the generals fighting amongst themselves, and it would not do to repeat this state of affairs. He seemed to think that something could be done about the chronic politicking of the army leaders. Personally, I doubt it. He also said he expected trouble from Imbert, who, he implied, would be required to stand down in these proposals. I am not optimistic about the chances of this initiative. I told him that it would be a good thing to remove Imbert as quickly as possible. I knew Imbert had a note already written out, but undated and unsigned, protesting against the invasion of his country by the Americans, and I imagined he would use this without hesitation if he

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/thought



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thought it to his advantage. Bill Connett was rather reflective about this, but then said that he did not doubt that Imbert would do such a thing. I went on speaking about Imbert, stressing that he was an extremely dangerous man to have much dealings with, remembering that he had tried to join the rebel movement in the first two or three days of the revolt, but had been rejected, and that he had maintained secret links with (104), P.S.P. and M.P.D. over the past three years. The fact that Imbert had provided weapons for (104) as late as six months ago was a fair indication of the deviousness of his mind, and the untrustworthiness of his nature. Bill Connett said he knew about the arms for (104), etc., and agreed that Imbert was a very undesirable character indeed. He hoped they could drop him in time.

8. I spoke frankly about my feelings for Imbert to Bill Connett at this time because there is little hope of a compromise solution here whilst Imbert, the sworn enemy of Balaguer, Bosch, Guzman, and most other elements that make up the bulk of political sentiment in this country, is sitting at a point of decision on one of the two sides.

9. I am copying this letter to Lord Caradon at the United Kingdom Mission to United Nations, New York, and to Sutherland at Washington.

*Yours ever*

*Stafford*

(S. F. Campbell)

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24 JUN 1965

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FROM SANTO DOMINGO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

AD1015/253

Cypher/OTP

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

Mr. Campbell

D. 04.05 24 June, 1965

No. 141

R. 04.05 24 June, 1965

23 June, 1965

IMMEDIATE

CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 141 of 23 June.  
Repeated for information to: Washington U.K. Mis. New York

GUARD

AD1015/246

My telegram No. 138.

I saw Aristy on 22 June. He seemed hopeful of an agreement provided radical gains of 1963 Constitution were recognized in institutional acts by which the provisional government would rule. Seeing that rebel movement was being asked to take an enormous risk the character of people in provisional government was a vital consideration and names would have to be vetted closely. This is point number one with rebels. He wanted cast-iron safeguards against return of any of generals and removal of about 35 officers from army. He repeated his statements about fight to death and burning down the city but I sense real desire to end deadlock now and weariness of siege.

2. I told him that fears of Communist threat were mainly preoccupying United States. Whether he agreed with their assumption of this threat was beside the point. The fear exists, attention must be paid to it and enough elbow room left in negotiation to make concessions. He replied that Communist party would be outlawed and Communist subversion dealt with by legal process. What more could America want. He was not going to deport people merely because someone called them Communists. I foresee much difficulty in agreement about <sup>his</sup> coup which I think is United States subject number one.

CONFIDENTIAL - GUARD

/3.

JUN 24 1965



CONFIDENTIAL - GUARDSanto Domingo telegram No. 141 to Foreign Office

-2-

3. Future of army which seems to be United States subject number 2 is being blandly side-stepped by Caamano. Rikhye told me this morning that Caamano proposes leaving this to provisional President. This tactic implies selection of a person wholly suitable to rebels and probably quite unacceptable to the Americans. Both points of view are understandable. Aristy certainly believes that 14 June will be allowed to be a legal party and evidenced great surprise at any contrary ideas.

4. I saw the United States Ambassador last night alone for about an hour. My impression is he cannot believe that either Aristy or Caamano is capable of approaching negotiation with honesty. The personal mistrust and dislike of these two goes very deep. He said that deliberate and transparent attempts at deceit about Communism in rebel organisation had caused failure of Bundy mission. This may be partly but not wholly true. He again said that 14 June were in control and blamed Caamano for all trouble on 15 June [gp. undec.] Bunker came. There is much mistrust and dislike here also but he is cooler and more pragmatic and I do not believe he wants a failure here. When I asked about a possible collapse of OAS proposals the United States Ambassador said that the whole country was weary of the deadlock and if it seemed that only rebels were preventing agreement an imposed solution might have to be considered.

5. On balance I think the proposals have a chance. The Americans seem less disposed to settle matters by force now, possibly because sentiments in your telegram No. 131 are general enough to cause reflection. My fear that Communists might have built their OAS proposals for obsolescence [sic] no longer seems justified. They must

/have anticipated the

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CONFIDENTIAL - GUARD

Sante Domingo telegram No. 141 to Foreign Office

-3-

have anticipated the points made by Aristy and decided how to deal with them. There is therefore room for modest optimism.

Foreign Office pass Washington No. 71, U.K.Mis. New York No. 33.

[Repeated as requested]

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P.U.S.  
Mr. Rennie  
Hd. of American Dept.

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FROM SANTO DOMINGO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

A

En Clair

FO/CRO/WH. DISTRIBUTION

Mr. Campbell

No. 143

25 June, 1965

D. 08.20 26 June, 1965

R. 08.25 26 June, 1965

PRIORITY

AD1015/245 AD1015/254

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 143 of 25 June,  
 Repeated for information to: Washington  
 U.K.Mis. New York

My telegram No. 137.

Both sides have now replied to proposals. Rebels agree to elections as proposed and ask for O.A.S. technical assistance. Following points are added by rebels with respect to Provisional Government:

- (a) Human Rights Commission to stay until after elections.
- (b) Armed forces to be completely under authority of civilian Provisional Government.
- (c) All military personnel to return to their units, irrespective of which side they fought for.
- (d) A Presidential Regime with President and Vice President. No junta, triumvirate or collegiate type Government.
- (e) No compromise of any kind of national sovereignty.
- (f) No disposal of public property.
- (g) Provisional President and Vice President to deposit a sworn inventory of their possessions on taking office.
- (h) O.A.S. military to leave one month after Provisional Government takes office.
- (i) Institutional Act, to incorporate all economic and social gains, human rights and liberties of 1963 Constitution. They will prepare a draft for approval by their Congress.
- (j) Constitutional Assembly to complete its work within three months of elected Government taking office.

Santo Domingo telegram No. 143 to Foreign Office

- 2 -

2. Imbert agrees to proposals, but says that as his Government is itself a Provisional Government there is no need to look elsewhere.

He adds:

- (a) Only those members of the armed forces not guilty of misconduct can return to their units.
- (b) Rebels' arms to be handed over to the arsenals under his control.
- (c) All persons considered to be Communist to be got out of the country by the O.A.S.
- (d) Constituent Assembly to be convened before elections.
- (e) Minimum period of nine months before elections.

Foreign Office pass Washington and U.K.Mis. New York as my telegrams Nos. 72 and 35.

[Repeated as requested]



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FROM SANTO DOMINGO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

AD1015/255.

Cypher/OTF

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Mr. Campbell

No. 144

25 June 1965

IMMEDIATE  
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D. untimed 26 June 1965

R. 0555 26 June 1965

AD1015/254.

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 144 of 25 June  
Repeated for information to: Washington U.K. Mission New York

GUARD.

My immediately preceding telegram.

Rebel reply seems well thought out. It amounts to full acceptance, in principle, of the Bunker Commission proposals. There will be very close bargaining over details later. Imbert's idea of prolonging the life of his junta hardly merits serious consideration and runs contrary to what is intended by the Bunker Mission. Imbert is being egged on by the United States Military Attachés, who are still as big a nuisance as ever.

2. Hector Garcia Godey called yesterday. He and the Santiago group of moderates anticipate difficulty in finding the right sort of men for the Provincial Government because of shortness of time in office and because the right men from P.R.D. and Balaguer's party will want to steer clear of the Provincial Government to concentrate on election prospects.

Foreign Office pass Washington No. 73, U.K. Mission New York No. 36.

[Repeated as requested]

ADVANCE COPIES:

- FO: Private Secretary
- P.U.S.
- Mr. Garvey
- Head of American Department
- Head of News Department
- Resident Clerk

28 JUN  
1965

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SECRET - GUARD

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FROM SANTO DOMINGO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTP

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

Mr. Campbell  
No. 147  
 27 June, 1965.

D. 2350 27 June, 1965.

R. 0020 28 June, 1965.

RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES No.39
28 JUN 1965

AD 1015/258

IMMEDIATE  
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Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 147 of 27 June.

Repeated for information to: Washington and UKMIS New York

GUARD

I spoke with Caamano and Aristy on 26 June. They said rising in San Francisco was first of many small scale operations to keep Imbert's troops hopping. San Francisco was chosen because Imbert had visited there and ordered execution of two young men. There would be another soon. As usual there is some truth and some eye-wash in this. The extent to which rising was planned from the capital is doubtful.

2. Replying to my questions they said that Guzman would be their choice as provisional President. They thought vice-presidency should go to a Balaguer man and named Garcia Godoy. One or two extremist commandos objected to O.A.S. negotiations, but they would have to accept decision of majority. There could be no argument about this. This minority is probably misrepresented and it will be interesting to see if Americans are right about complete control by this group which I have always doubted.

3. I hear Imbert wants fifteen million dollars per month from the Americans to keep his administration going. This rate of expenditure is greater than last year's national budget.

4. Washington telegram No. 1667 paragraph 2. — AD 1015/258  
 Flag A.

You can see from this how every opponent of Imbert is described by the United States Embassy here as Communist. This grossly slanted reporting has had worst possible consequences since beginning of this business. Time magazine of 25 June page 14 reports President Johnson as saying publicly that 1500 people were murdered and had their heads cut off. This is absolutely untrue. It illustrates frightening degree to which he is being misadvised from here.

Foreign Office please pass Washington 76 and UKMIS New York 39.

[Repeated as requested]

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 P.U.S.D.

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P.S. Head of American  
 P.U.S. Dept.  
 Mr. Rennie Head of I.R.D.

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FROM SANTO DOMINGO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTF

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Mr. Campbell

No. 149  
29 June 1965

D. 1935 29 June 1965  
R. 1939 29 June 1965  
RECEIVED IN  
ARCHIVES No. 39

30 JUN 1965  
AD1015/260

IMMEDIATE  
CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 149 of 29 June.  
Repeated for information to: UKMIS New York  
Washington

I have information from reliable source that a provisional government is now being drawn up on a basis of

- (a) President Julian Perez.
- (b) Vice President Garcia Godoy.
- (c) Tomas Pastoriza.
- (d) Alejandro Grullon.
- (e) Julio Postigo.

2. (a) Lawyer in his 50s, administrator of Banco Central. Not strongly bound to any political party, but tends to Balaguer. Thought to be honest and reasonably well regarded.

(b) and (c) you know.

(d) President of Banco popular. Former U.C.N. Son of landowner. Industrialist. Originally from Santiago.

(e) In Imbert Junta. Friend of Besch. Original P.R.D.

All of these are moderates. I understand that both sides agree.

3. Balaguer arrived here at 1 p.m. 28 June and has permission to stay for 72 hours. I do not connect his visit directly with the provisional Government negotiations. His mother is very ill here.

Foreign Office pass Washington 78 and UKMIS New York 41.

[Repeated as requested].

ADVANCE COPIES:  
Private Secretary  
P.U.S.  
Mr. Rennie  
Hd of American Dept.

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Order 78



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 ARCHIVES No. 10  
 5 JUL 1965
BRITISH EMBASSY,  
SANTO DOMINGO.

1 July, 1965.

My dear Dick

A9 1015/263

Now that negotiations are once more being tried we are enjoying a kind of breathing space, at least for a time. I am, therefore, going to try to outline a little of the background to events, as I see it.

2. Something went very wrong in the handling of this crisis at the beginning, and from that bad start, it seems to me, have stemmed all the difficulties we have had since. Thus after more than eight weeks, the efforts of Mr. J. Bartlow Martin, three different O.A.S. commissions, the presence of a U.N. observer team, and all the formidable talents of the Bundy mission, we are still, at the moment of writing, without a solution. I am able to fill in some of the background to events here, and I trust you will not mind if I go back to the beginning of the revolt to do so.

3. By 25 April, as you know, Donald Reid had been deposed, the coup d'état favouring Juan Bosch had apparently succeeded, and Rafael Molina Urefia was installed in the National Palace and was forming his government. If things had stopped there, Bosch would have been back in a day or so, and the normal cycle of a coup d'état here would have been completed in the customary few hours. General Wessin y Wessin's attack on the city changed all that, and turned the coup into a civil war. On 27 April the fortunes had been reversed and, in a very confused situation, Molina Urefia had resigned. I have already mentioned in despatch No. 13 "3" the dramatic re-organisation of the rebel cause at that time which turned the tables again. The result was a great strengthening of rebel resolve, coupled with a fall-off in the initiative by Wessin, until on 29 April he was finally brought to a complete halt.

4. It has not been too easy to find out exactly what happened at San Isidro on 27, 28 and 29 April and, as you can imagine, the rumours circulating here have been of grotesque proportions. One of the most persistent has been, and still is, that the arrival of the American troops on 30 April snatched victory from Wessin's grasp at the very moment when he was about to deliver the final assault which would bring the whole rebel movement crashing. You will recollect that, on the contrary, it seemed to me at the time that Wessin was a poor commander and had failed before the Americans arrived. That his offensive collapsed for some mysterious reason has been mentioned by several journalists since, and that he was effectively defeated by the rebels on the 28th is now accepted by responsible opinion.

5. The American Ambassador opened this subject with me some time ago by asking for my opinion of Wessin's performance as a field commander. I replied that I thought Wessin's original appreciation of his task was quite wrong. No great insight was

R. M. K. Slater, Esq., C.M.G.,  
 American Department,  
 Foreign Office,  
 LONDON, S.W.1.

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city was ~~needed~~ <sup>the</sup> needed to see the two dominating military factors; one, the key to the Duarte Bridge, and second, that the time factor was all important. The best course open to him was to move quickly and bash his way through by concentrating all his air and tank striking power on the bridge to the exclusion of all else. His material advantage in tanks and aeroplanes was very great and I did not doubt that he could have done it. We can always fight our colleagues' battles better after the event, of course, but I thought his failure to force the crossing against what amounted to scratch opposition, hurriedly brought together against him, was a lamentable performance by a professional officer.

6. The American Ambassador said that this was probably his worst blunder. It was, however, only one event in a long tale of irresolution and incompetence on part of the generals at San Isidro. Wessin, he said, had been completely demoralised when the rebels had destroyed the three tanks which had got past the bridge on 27 April. It appears that he had had no sleep for several days (Monty would not care for that), and when the American Service Attachés got to him at San Isidro to find out what was going on, they found him in a state approaching hysteria. He claimed that he had stopped the tank assault against the city because the rebels had so many Molotov cocktails, and that in these circumstances the narrow streets presented an impenetrable barrier. This remarkable statement is made more extraordinary when it is known that he still had about 25 other tanks ready for action. The performance of the other generals, said Mr. Bennett, was worse. The American Service Attachés found several of them actually weeping, there was a great deal of shouting and clutching of hair, and the whole group, said Mr. Bennett, was behaving like a crowd of demented monkeys. Only the news that the U.S. Forces were on their way in great strength was sufficient to restore them to reasonable calm. But, he added, they were useless then and have remained useless ever since.

7. In the light of this information it is interesting to speculate what would have happened later at San Isidro if the U.S. 82nd Airborne Division had not airlanded there on 29 and 30 April. Given the demoralised state of the Dominican military command as described by the American Ambassador, it is unlikely that a determined move by Caamaño's irregulars on San Isidro would have met with much resistance. It is no secret that the military commanders in the interior, the Chief of Staff of the Navy, and the Police had pledged their allegiance to Caamaño on 29 April. But the arrival of 82nd Airborne at San Isidro itself changed the whole situation immediately. Throughout the night of 29/30 April, I am told, Wessin was telephoning and radio-ing the news to all these commanders that the Americans had joined him at San Isidro as his allies. During that night the gates of the Fortaleza Ozama (headquarters of the elite Police), which had been opened to the rebels during the day, were closed. By the morning of the 30th a lightning switch of all these commanders to the Wessin cause had taken place, and the San Isidro radio was proclaiming that the Americans had come to join the forces of Wessin in the fight against the communists in the city.

8. Among the civilian population, the psychological effect of the American landing at San Isidro was immense. It was even greater when the inhabitants of the Security Zone in Santo Domingo saw on 1 May that U.S. Marine patrols were being accompanied by Wessin's

/Wessin's

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Wessin's troops, and any idea that this was an impartial intervention by the U.S. between two warring factions was totally dispelled. Caamaño and his rebels were the enemies; the "good guys" were the generals and their troops at San Isidro. The fact that a sizeable proportion of the metropolitan working class had finally exploded with rage and frustration, and that a deep-seated sociological and economic sickness had been the cause of it, was immediately forgotten. It was a fight to defeat a cunning and carefully elaborated communist plot to overthrow democracy, and the world's leading democracy had intervened just in time to save another Red Cuba. This notion was by no means confined to Dominicans on the island. Robin Stafford of the Daily Express, who got into Santo Domingo with the U.S. Marines, listened to the combat briefing of the troops on U.S.S. Boxer by their officers, and it was that Santo Domingo had been seized by thousands of armed communists and that the U.S. Marines were going in to put things straight.

9. If these ideas could be accepted, the landing of 82nd Airborne at San Isidro could be understood. If, however, impartiality had been one of the considerations of the U.S. in its decision to intervene here, San Isidro was not a good choice. Punta Caucedo, the civilian airport, was fully adequate to take the airlanding of the Division and to be divisional headquarters. Geographically it would have served the purpose perhaps better, because both warring factions would then have been contained between 82nd Airborne on the east and the U.S. Marine Corps on the west, and the subsequent take-over of the rest of the country by one faction could have been prevented. But the speed with which 82nd Airborne advance elements moved westward from San Isidro to the east bank of the Ozama leaves small room for doubt that a high-level decision had been taken that Caamaño must be contained in the city, and that what remained of the defeated troops at San Isidro under Wessin should be protected and preserved.

10. The deliberate re-equipment of the San Isidro military by the Americans followed. From the point of view of getting to grips with the rebels in a second round, Wessin's tank force was on the wrong (east) side of the river. To carry out any operation against the city, therefore, tanks would somehow have to be made available to him on the west side. As tanks figured largely in the fighting which began when Wessin broke the ceasefire on 15 May and attacked the northern part of the city, they must have become available at some point west of the Ozama. The information I have from a first-class source is that new tanks were, in fact, landed at Haina (which by then had become the American supply port) and were handed over to Wessin's troops from there. Trucks, ammunition and communication equipment were also supplied by the Americans between 5 and 12 May. On 13 May the rebel radio station was bombed by Wessin's planes, and we have still not yet had a satisfactory explanation as to how these aircraft were able to arm and take off from San Isidro without the Americans knowing about it. On 15 May the land operation was launched, and you will remember that U.S. officers accompanied the Wessin forces throughout the fighting for the announced purpose of "stopping them firing into our lines". That no such precautions were taken with the rebel troops was significant, and the impression made by this single incident was deplorable. I have learned since, by the way, that although Wessin began the operation, it had to be finished by

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another commander, owing to a repetition of his incompetence in handling it. At all events, by 22 May Imbert had secured the northern part of the city, and was loudly rejecting any extension of the 24-hour ceasefire which had by then been negotiated. At this time he was telling his friends that the American military was behind him "to a man". Mr. Stevenson's clear-cut statement about strict neutrality in the Security Council on 23 May, however, had an immediate effect at this time, and from then onwards open material support for the Imbert/Wessin faction largely stopped. I believe the presence of the U.N. team, under José Mayobre and Major-General Rikhye, was a decisive factor - perhaps the decisive factor - in bringing this about.

11. It is interesting to look back to what was happening on the political front at that time. Mr. McGeorge Bundy arrived here on 16 May. At the end of ten days he had come to the conclusion that, far from being controlled by communists, as had been repeatedly asserted by the U.S. Embassy here, Caamaño was "a man of real substance and, <sup>contrary</sup> to what had been believed, was in real charge". Imbert, in his opinion, was an "ambitious little gunman". If Caamaño, whom even the U.S. Embassy has never dared to classify as a communist, was a man of substance and in real charge of his movement, it is extraordinary that the Americans were equipping and encouraging an ambitious little gunman to bring about his destruction. What was thought of Mr. Bundy's opinion in Washington? He can hardly be described as an impressionable or naïve person, and some very considerable pressure must have been brought to bear to set aside his favourable opinion of Caamaño. Whatever did happen there, one thing is certain - after Mr. Bundy had left, Caamaño went on being Public Enemy No. 1 here; his movement came under fresh charges of being dominated by "extremists", and the build up of Imbert gathered strength.

12. In thinking of the personalities who had, in fact, qualified for American approval here, the eye roves over the records of the military leaders whom the U.S. troops had rescued by the landing at San Isidro. What, one may ask, is a country with the traditions of the U.S. doing helping such persons as Atila Luna, Belisario Peguero and Rib Santamaria? Wessin y Wessin may or may not be as corrupt as these three most certainly are but he is a product of Trujillo, chosen by the dictator to serve under Ramfis as the effective commander of a formidable force of aeroplanes and tanks, placed at San Isidro for the expresse purpose of crushing any attempt by the Dominican army against his dictatorship. In other words, he is a man that Trujillo could trust. His rôle in the destruction of the Bosch Government in September, 1963, is too well known to need repeating. If you have been brought up on the Rights of Man and the Declaration of Independence you would, I fancy, find some difficulty in finding common philosophic ground with Wessin. Lastly, the Chief of Staff of the Navy, Rivera Caminero, told Caamaño on 29 April that he and the Navy were coming in on his side. At that time he could not have been particularly worried about communists in the rebel ranks, but after the American landing on the following day he switched to the side of the "good guys" to fight against the communist plot. Cynicism, as I have said before, is one of the features of Dominican political life.

13. Continuing with the political front, I must once again mention the American Embassy and their original estimate of 12,000 hard core armed communists. This, within a few days, and after a

/shrill

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shrill outcry from the press here, had been brought down to 54 names on a list. We have heard no more of this woeful list, however, because it was mercifully buried almost as soon as it was born. Nevertheless, the ground on this question has continued to shift ever since, for we passed from the 54 names to Mr. McGeorge Bundy's vague minority, now also forgotten. The present position is that the word "communist" is hardly ever mentioned - "extremist" and "left elements" are the vogue words to-day - and it is now the 14th of June which has taken over the whole of Caamaño's movement. But this is exactly what the communists were supposed to have done in May. One has the sensation of having been here before, and I really fear that my friends in the U.S. Embassy have got themselves into such a frame of mind about this matter, that if the facts do not fit the circumstances, it is the facts which must be changed. You may like to have my opinion about the 14th of June and Caamaño, which is that certain 14th of June commandoes have caused him trouble, but of his hold over the movement there is no doubt at all.

14. Among this catalogue of contradictions I must include the behaviour of the U.S. Service Attachés. In this perhaps lies the true cause of much confusion here. These men, whom I have previously described as political primitives, seem to be something of a law unto themselves, and both the Naval and Air Attachés are personal friends of Imbert. (Heywood, the Naval Attaché, was duck-shooting with Imbert at the latter's finca when the revolt broke out.) Fishburn, the Air Attaché, on one occasion warned the Junior Attaché, Paul Rudd, to stop seeing the rebels because if he continued to do so he would be shot by Imbert after the latter had gone into the city, cleaned up the communists, and taken over the Government. When Rudd said that it seemed a pity to kill thousands of harmless persons in order to root out 54 communists, Fishburn replied that it was a pity but that it would have to be done. Both Attachés have stated openly that the only way to settle the Dominican problem was all-out assault and annihilation of the communist part of the city. I mention this as an illustration. The understandable temptation to dismiss this kind of rubbish as too impossible to be taken seriously must be resisted because these men were, and still are, the link between the Embassy and military executive action and, moreover, they had a large part in "filling in" the U.S. commanders about the situation as they arrived. I suspect that the material re-equipment of the San Isidro rump in early May was largely at their suggestion, and on their assessment of the fighting potential of Wessin's troops.

15. Their attitude towards their own State Department, as reported to me by a diplomatic friend who is close to Imbert, adds an additional twist. My friend, a Latin American who is liable to see communists everywhere (it was he who first told me that Mayobre had the Order of Lenin), was outlining to me the terrible mistakes made by the State Department in not giving the go-ahead to annihilate the Caamaño stronghold with the American army. I always listen to this kind of thing from him with patience, not only because he is basically a very kind and upright person, but because he often has interesting things to say of a factual nature about the various leading personalities here, all of whom are very well known to him. He told me that he was alone with Imbert at his house one night when the two Service Attachés mentioned called. The four men sat together talking about the situation for some time, when suddenly both the Attachés began to abuse the State Department in terms which my friend reported as being quite incredible for an American. He said he thought for a

Attachés-

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/moment



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- 6 -

moment that he was listening to two Latin Americans at their favourite hobby. Imbert also joined in the fray, and there seemed to be general agreement that "commies" had got hold of the State Department and were running it. This was after Mr. Stevenson's announcement. My friend's purpose in telling me this was to show to what a pass matters had come in the State Department, since he himself was only too convinced that the other three were right. To anyone else, of course, it indicates not only the relationship between Imbert and the U.S. Service Attachés, but suggests that American policy, in this country at least, could be a creature with two heads.

16. I hardly think you want this sort of thing in a despatch. My frank opinion is that the Americans have been in a complete mess here since this business began, and it has been very depressing, and even alarming at times, to see it. The Bunker mission will, I am sure, find some sort of solution, and then perhaps someone will get down to the real problem of the Dominican Republic, which is that Trujillo was killed four years ago, boys of 16 become 20 years old after four years, and that they are liable at that age to come out into the street and overthrow the government. They, and others, want something done about this society, and they have shown clearly enough that they are ready to fight to get it done in one way or another. What the Americans have to try to do is to get it done our way.

17. I am copying this letter to Lord Caradon in the United Kingdom Mission to United Nations, New York, and Sutherland in Washington.

*Yours ever*

*Stafford*

*878710* (S. F. Campbell)

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*Inter com. 86*  
*7.*



(53/1/1)

RECEIVED IN  
ARCHIVES No 18  
5 JUL 1965  
*A7 1015/248*

BRITISH EMBASSY,  
SANTO DOMINGO.  
30 June, 1965.

*Dear Sir,*

*A7 1015/248*

--- The attached came into my hand just as I was reading your telegram No. 143 about the line taken in the present circumstances by P.S.P., M.P.D. and 14th of June.

2. P.S.P., which is easily the most professional of the three, would not be so stupid as to oppose an agreement between Caamaño's group and the O.A.S., as long as there is a chance of it coming off. Their tradition has always been to infiltrate the party most likely to get power. Hence their infiltration of U.C.N. when it looked as if that party would win the elections in December, 1962. The unexpected P.R.D. victory caught them off balance then and I do not believe they had much success in getting into P.R.D. afterwards, but the chance of penetrating P.R.D. is better now than it ever was, as long as they keep a cool head and maintain an outwardly co-operative attitude.

3. The paragraph I have marked was, I imagine, written for the benefit of 14th of June. I have not had anything new about their attitude recently except that passed to you in the last bag. Aristy hinted to me a day or so ago that "some commandos" had been troublesome in an indefinite way, and inferred that they had been brought to heel. This, I think, would be 14th of June, whose extremists would like to fight it out in the good old romantic Fidel style.

*Yours ever*

*Stafford*  
(S. F. Campbell)

G. W. Harding, Esq.,  
American Department,  
Foreign Office,  
LONDON, S.W.1.

*07*  
*0111052*

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# *Respaldemos Unidos la Propuesta del Gobierno Constitucional*

¡Por la Soberanía Nacional!

¡Por las Libertades Públicas!

**D**URANTE más de dos meses, la clase obrera y todo el pueblo dominicano han luchado heroica y abnegadamente, al precio de millares de muertos y heridos, por el pleno restablecimiento de la voluntad popular desconocida por el golpe militar del 25 de septiembre de 1963.

Esa lucha revolucionaria armada echó abajo el triunvirato despótico, asestó golpes demoleedores al aparato militar represivo y, en el curso de ella, la oligarquía y sus representantes políticos, al actuar en abierta complicidad con el ocupante extranjero, se han hundido totalmente en el descrédito y en la ignominia de la traición nacional, al tiempo que se produce un importante y rápido crecimiento del prestigio y la influencia de las fuerzas patrióticas y revolucionarias.

Estos son importantes pasos de avance del movimiento democrático.



Pero la brutal intervención armada norteamericana en nuestro país ha creado una situación que impide que el pueblo pueda conseguir, en este momento, todos los objetivos iniciales del movimiento constitucionalista.

El poderío militar del imperialismo norteamericano evitó que la revolución se extendiera como una ola arrasadora a todo el país, salvó de la derrota total a la camarilla militar reaccionaria de San Isidro y cercó en la capital a las fuerzas armadas constitucionalistas. Pero no ha logrado sofocar los anhelos democráticos del pueblo, que abrumadoramente se ha manifestado por diversos medios en favor de sus ideales encarnados en el movimiento del 24 de abril; y ha provocado el repudio de todos los pueblos del mundo contra los intervencionistas.

El aplastamiento sangriento del sector constitucionalista de la capital, que aumentaría el odio popular contra los agresores extranjeros y sus aliados criollos, conduciría a la instauración de una dictadura militar que sólo podría ser sostenida por la presencia permanente de las tropas extranjeras, todo lo cual crearía una situación de constante crisis política y de inestabilidad gubernamental. Al mismo tiempo, tal aplastamiento y sus consecuencias, al recrudecer la ola de protestas en América Latina y en todo el mundo, multiplicarían las dificultades a que se enfrenta ya el imperialismo norteamericano a causa de su intervención en nuestra patria.

Estas circunstancias determinan que el gobierno norteamericano, por medio de la OEA, proponga una solución política negociada, ya que sólo al través de un acuerdo con los constitucionalistas puede lograrse hoy la formación de un gobierno relativamente estable.

Por su parte, el movimiento constitucionalista se ve obligado a negociar una solución política debido a que en la situación de cerco en que se encuentra no es posible obtener frente al poderío de los intervencionistas yanquis la victoria militar que había alcanzado ya sobre los generales de San Isidro.

El movimiento constitucionalista ha venido planteando desde hace 6 semanas las negociaciones sobre la base de la Constitución de 1963, pero el gobierno norteamericano ha rechazado reiterada y empecinadamente cualquier solución que mantuviera la vigencia de esa Constitución y que contemple el restablecimiento del orden institucional que el pueblo se dio el 20 de diciembre de 1962.

Es claro que únicamente el triunfo pleno de la revolución, detenido por la intervención de las tropas yanquis, hubiera permitido la vigencia de la Constitución de 1963 con todas sus consecuencias.

Mantener esa demanda como base para la solución de la crisis nacional significaría en la presente situación el rechá





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so total de la propuesta de la OEA y de las negociaciones, el enfrentamiento militar con el enemigo en las condiciones de ventajas que hemos señalado.

En todo ello, consideramos que la propuesta del gobierno constitucional responde a la realidad actual y recoge las aspiraciones del pueblo de una salida política basada en las libertades públicas y en la retirada a breve plazo de las tropas extranjeras, y cuya garantía será la vigilancia y la lucha permanentes de los dominicanos.

El pueblo apoya la posición asumida por el gobierno constitucional. Pero esto no significa, de ninguna manera, una renuncia a la lucha por los objetivos que la intervención imperialista ha frustrado temporalmente. Por el contrario, como subsisten las causas sociales y económicas que originaron la miseria, el pueblo proseguirá con renovado vigor la lucha por el triunfo inevitable de la revolución democrática, con el impulso y la valiosa experiencia que representan estos meses de combate unido del movimiento constitucionalista.

El pueblo no abandonará sus esfuerzos por conquistar la vigencia de la Constitución de 1963, demanda que sigue siendo justa, pero imposible de lograr en medio de la ocupación extranjera.

**D**E TODO lo anterior se desprende que la principal demanda de la hora, la consigna central que pasa a primer plano, es la retirada del territorio dominicano de todas las tropas extranjeras.

La permanencia de las tropas extranjeras es el obstáculo mayor para el desarrollo democrático en nuestro país, y por eso la solución que resulte de las negociaciones con la OEA tiene que ir acompañada de un plan concreto para la más rápida evacuación de esas tropas.

El imperialismo pretende prolongar al máximo la ocupación de nuestro suelo para frenar las luchas populares por la libertad, la independencia y el progreso de nuestra patria.

Frente a ese propósito debe alzarse la más amplia movilización de todos los dominicanos, unidos en el esfuerzo por establecer plenamente la soberanía nacional hoy pisoteada por el invasor yanqui.

**L**A UNIDAD alcanzada por el movimiento constitucionalista a todo lo largo de su lucha, debe ser mantenida y fortalecida durante las negociaciones, en apoyo a la propuesta del Gobierno Constitucional.

Esa unidad es imprescindible para lograr los mayores resultados favorables para el pueblo.

Por el contrario, debilitar hoy la unión de las fuerzas constitucionalistas no tendría otro resultado que fortalecer las posiciones del enemigo en las negociaciones.



*encima*

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Una incorrecta apreciación de la realidad puede llevar a mantener intransigentemente demandas imposibles de lograr en las presentes circunstancias. Cualquier intento de pasarle por encima a la realidad objetiva que vivimos, causaría grave daño a la unidad del movimiento.

No son nuestros deseos, nuestras aspiraciones, los que deben normar la actuación de los revolucionarios. Por el contrario, ésta tiene que basarse en la situación concreta y en la correlación de fuerzas en esta dramática coyuntura histórica de nuestro país.

En las negociaciones, determinadas por la realidad que afronta el movimiento constitucionalista, el pueblo dominicano aspira a una salida democrática, basada en el respeto a los derechos humanos y a la soberanía nacional.

Pero si el enemigo agrade nuevamente como lo hizo el pasado día 15 -acción aventurera que siempre es posible dada su naturaleza agresiva-, encontrará a los combatientes constitucionalistas firmes en sus trincheras, luchando hasta el último hombre en defensa de la libertad de nuestra patria.

Todo el pueblo unido en apoyo a la propuesta del gobierno constitucional!

Fuera de nuestro país las tropas extranjeras!

Viva la República Dominicana libre, soberana e independiente!

COMITE CENTRAL  
PARTIDO SOCIALISTA POPULAR

Santo Domingo,  
28 de junio de 1965.



SECRET

*Order soon 92*  
*5/7.*



RECEIVED IN  
ARCHIVES No. 18  
5 JUL 1965  
*AD 1015/265*

(53/1/1G)

BRITISH EMBASSY,  
SANTO DOMINGO.

1 July, 1965.

*Dear Paul,*

*1015/264*

Further to my letter 53/1/1 of 30 June,  
--- I now attach a copy of LJ4, which will give  
some indication of the 14th of June attitude  
before the latest O.A.S. proposals were made.  
From this I took the photocopy I sent you of  
the article "Los Cinco Puntos de las  
Negociaciones", but it seems to me that the  
whole document would be of interest.

2. I cannot yet find what the 14th of June's  
attitude is now that negotiations are at an  
advanced stage. As soon as I know it I will  
let you have it.

*Yours sincerely*

*Stafford*  
(S. F. Campbell)

G. W. Harding, Esq.,  
American Department,  
Foreign Office,  
LONDON, S.W.1.

SECRET





**DESPLEGAR LA LUCHA ARMADA  
POPULAR EN TODO EL PAIS  
CONTRA EL YANKI INVASOR**

14 DE JUNIO DE 1965

## Inicio de la Última Fase

## de la Liberación Nacional

Hoy, 14 de Junio de 1965, se cumple el sexto aniversario de la gloriosa expedición armada de CONSTANZA, MAIMÓN y ESTERO HONDO de 1959. El MOVIMIENTO REVOLUCIONARIO 14 DE JUNIO, hijo legítimo de ese glorioso esfuerzo y fiel continuador de sus tradiciones revolucionarias, saludable, junto a todo el pueblo, este día de unidad y lucha, hoy abiertamente anti-imperialista.

Combatientes de origen obrero y campesino, jóvenes estudiantes y profesionales; cubanos y venezolanos, puertorriqueños y nicaraguenses, todos unidos alrededor de un programa democrático y nacionalista y realizando la solidaridad internacional, se lanzaron desde la heroica Cuba Revolucionaria a combatir hasta la muerte la siniestra tiranía pro-yanqui de Rafael L. Trujillo que gobernaba nuestro país.

La lucha de los patriotas del 59 fue Nacional Liberadora y Democrática. Combatir la tiranía trujillista era combatir al imperialismo norteamericano que fue quien organizó, armó y protegió a la siniestra dictadura trujillista hasta su caída, al igual como hoy combatir a la junta Reconstructora de los asesinos de Imbert Barrera y Wessin, organizados, armados y protegidos por los yanquis, es combatir al imperialismo invasor.

Trujillo, el imperialismo yanqui y la Junta Reconstructora de los asesinos Imbert Barrera y Wessin son la antidemocracia, la represión y la explotación. El Programa de Junio del 59 y la Constitución del 63 son la democracia, la libertad y el progreso social.

La actual lucha armada por la Constitución del 63 y contra el invasor yanqui, y las luchas de Constanza, Maimón y Estero Hondo son una continuación de la otra, pasando, claro está, por las gloriosas guerrillas de Noviembre del 63 y otras jornadas populares que la han desarrollado hasta derrotar a la oligarquía criolla. Todas estas luchas componen un proceso: LA LIBERACION NACIONAL y tienen necesariamente el mismo blanco: EL IMPERIALISMO YANQUI, el más feroz enemigo de los pueblos y de la democracia.

Aunque las gloriosas jornadas de Constanza, Maimón y Estero Hondo fueron derrotadas, tuvieron una gran significación nacional: aceleraron la descomposición del régimen semifeudal y pro-yanqui de Trujillo e impulsaron las luchas del pueblo, despertando y dando conciencia revolucionaria a las masas explotadas. Además, su ejemplo de unidad combativa de las clases objetivamente interesadas en la Liberación Nacio-

nal: obrera, campesina, pequeña burguesa y burguesía nacional ha sido y es precedente orientador para las luchas sucesivas. Pero lo más importante fue que preparó la bancarrota ideológica, política y militar y el hundimiento actual paró la bancarrota ideológica, política y militar y el hundimiento actual de la oligarquía criolla.

Hoy, el 14 de Junio de 1965, nuestro pueblo está luchando ya de frente contra el imperialismo yanqui, obstáculo principal que se opone a la realización de los ideales por los cuales cayeron los Héroes de Constanza, Maimón y Estero Hondo y otros héroes como los guerrilleros de Manacías, La Berrenda, La Horma, El Limón y Enriquillo. Esto quiere decir que hemos entrado en la última fase de la lucha por la LIBERACION NACIONAL aunque aparezcan todavía los desbandados oligarcas criollos.

Está pendiente, naturalmente, la importante tarea de derrocar la dominación económica, política y militar del imperialismo yanqui en el país, organizar el poder revolucionario e iniciar el programa de la revolución.

Pero para cumplir esta tarea final, o sea, dar cima al proceso de Liberación Nacional iniciado el 14 de Junio de 1959, es preciso unir, organizar y levantar en lucha armada al pueblo a través de un frente único anti-imperialista que tenga como núcleo principal la alianza combativa obrero-campesina alrededor de la cual deben unirse las otras capas progresistas de la población.

Trabajar por la unidad de la clase obrera; trabajar por la organización y movilización de los campesinos; trabajar por la creación de la alianza obrero-campesina y desplegar la lucha armada actual en todo el país contra el imperialismo yanqui y su disfraz de OEA es cumplir el legado glorioso de los Héroes de Junio del 59, de Manolo y los Guerrilleros de Noviembre del 63, de Juan Miguel y cientos de combatientes democráticos caídos.

¡Despleguemos la lucha armada en todo el país contra el yanqui explotador, y forjemos la alianza obrero-campesina, sostén de la soberanía e independencia Nacionales! Por este camino: VENCEREMOS!

¡GLORIA A LOS HEROES DE JUNIO DEL 59, A MANOLO Y TODOS LOS PATRIOTAS CAIDOS!

¡QUISQUEYA... SI, YANQUIS... NO!



EL LUNES 14 DE JUNIO DE 1965

PAGINA 3



**Campo de Concentración en Sans Souci instalado por el Imperialismo Yanki para torturar y asesinar a los patriotas dominicanos-**

## Desechar Ilusiones

# LA NATURALEZA DEL IMPERIALISMO

A fines del siglo XIX y comienzos del XX, el capitalismo entró en su última etapa: el imperialismo.

La concentración de capitales trajo, necesariamente la integración de grandes consorcios, de vastos monopolios que se disputaban los mercados del mundo. El capital bancario se fusionó con el capital industrial, nació y se perfiló, la oligarquía financiera y los monopolios se erigieron en amos absolutos de la vida económica y política de los pueblos.

De la exportación de mercancías se pasaba a la exportación de capitales como rasgo principal. Y para exportar capitales había que adueñarse absolutamente de regiones del mundo, someter a sus pueblos, reprimirlos y penetrar los con la aparente legalidad que fabricaban las oligarquías feudales.

El imperialismo necesita de colonias, de semicolonias, de mercados, sobre todo, de ganancias, de super-ganancias; esta es su esencia: la explotación. El signo de los monopolios esta en las entrañas del capitalismo agonizante y

ello significa ansia voraz e incontenible en una espiral sin terminos, en busca de ganancias, de super-ganancias, como quiera que sea. Y en esta búsqueda de colonias, de pueblos, de mercados y de super-ganancias, los monopolios chocan y se disputan la penetración de sus capitales, el dominio de los territorios. Estas disputas por los reparos del mundo trajeron las guerras, la Primera y Segunda guerras Mundiales, disputas entre los grupos monopolistas anglo-frances-yanki y germano-italiano-japones, hechos que prueban en consecuencia, que el imperialismo es la fuente de las guerras y el atraso y el enemigo mas encarnizado de la paz mundial.

La esencia del imperialismo es la explotación, de donde se concluye que su política es la agresión y represión a los pueblos del mundo. Esta política criminal de piratería la lleva a cabo el imperialismo en todos los rincones del globo, en todos los continentes.

Por eso es que el imperialismo yanki -y hablamos del yanki por ser el principal

bastión de la reacción mundial y el que somete y explota al pueblo dominicano- intensifica su agresión en Vietnam del sur y al expandir la guerra al norte de Vietnam empuja al mundo al borde del abismo de una guerra atómica.

Las tropas yankis agreden despiadadamente al pueblo de Vietnam, al pueblo de Santo Domingo, mientras hablan de paz y de planes de desarrollo de alianza para el Progreso y otras farsas demagógicas. No sólo es el imperialismo yanki el que desata la guerra. Se habla tradicionalmente de la "exquisita cultura belga" mas el imperialismo belga mandó sus tropas a masacrar al pueblo del Congo y asesino al heroe Nacional Patricio Lumumba. La cultura belga no impidió, como no podía impedir la, esta matanza a todo un pueblo, porque la naturaleza imperialista esta por encima de los sentimientos humanitarios de su propio pueblo.

De Inglaterra, se habla como de una nación de hombres sensatos y comedidos, pero el imperialismo ingles manda sus "hombres sensatos y comedidos"

PASA A LA PAGINA 10



EL 1J4 - 14 DE JUNIO DE 1965

PÁGINA 4

## LA SITUACION INTERNACIONAL ES FAVORABLE PARA LA LUCHA

El pasado 24 de abril estalló una rebelión popular contra la dictadura pro-imperialista de Donald Reid Cabral.

El movimiento adquirió un extraordinario vigor cuando grupos de clases, soldados y oficiales entregó al pueblo armas para luchar.

Tras varios días de intensa propaganda difamatoria, los imperialistas norteamericanos comenzaron a desembarcar en nuestra patria a sus infantes de marina con el falso pretexto de "salvar vidas humanas y ayudar a crear condiciones pacíficas para el pueblo dominicano".

El propósito no era el de salvar vidas ni ayudar a crear condiciones pacíficas sino el de impedir que el pueblo derrotara a sus históricos y tradicionales enemigos de clase y recuperara las riquezas de su tierra. Esos y no otros son los objetivos del imperialismo al realizar su agresión armada contra nuestra patria.

Este hecho criminal y vandálico perpetrado contra nuestro pequeño país en la época de la liquidación definitiva del colonialismo, constituye una grave cuestión internacional que trajo sobre los imperialistas, la repulsa universal e hizo más crítica la paz mundial.

La lucha del pueblo dominicano se dirige pues, principalmente contra el imperialismo norteamericano, quien ha invadido militarmente nuestro territorio. Esta lucha es por tanto, una lucha de legítima defensa contra un enemigo que practica en la esfera internacional una política de agresión y de guerra.

En esta lucha el pueblo cuenta con el apoyo de todos los pueblos del mundo, de numerosos gobiernos y de organizaciones y personalidades de gran influencia.

Pese al desesperado intento del imperialismo de confundir a la opinión pública mundial crece incesantemente la solidaridad con la causa de los dominicanos. La lucha dominicana constituye un valioso aporte a la causa de todos los países es la resultante natural del histórico proceso que hoy vivimos y se traduce en una serie de hechos que nos dicen que los días del imperialismo están contados, aunque debemos desplegar una ardua lucha unitaria para acelerar su definitivo derrumbamiento.

En Argentina, las madres de los soldados han iniciado un movimiento masivo para impedir que sus hijos sean enviados a Santo Domingo; todos los partidos y organizaciones obreras, campesinas y estudiantiles más importantes han apoyado firmemente la actitud de esas mujeres logrando con ello destruir el intento de la oligarquía y los militares gorilas de enviar tropas a nuestro país.

En Colombia, el repudio a la intervención y la solidaridad con el pueblo dominicano no se ha demostrado a través de grandes manifestaciones populares. Pese a la represión desatada por el régimen títere del oligarca León Valencia, el pueblo colombiano no ha demostrado su solidaridad con el pueblo dominicano.

En Venezuela, la movilización popular ha impedido que el régimen de Raul Leoni fuera arrastrado a la complicidad con el imperialismo.

En Chile, Uruguay, México y Perú, se han llevado a efecto grandes concentraciones populares en respaldo a la causa dominicana.

Los voceros gubernamentales de esos países hermanos han manifestado el respeto de sus gobiernos a los principios de Autodeterminación y

de No Intervención.

La represión desatada por las dictaduras ultraderechistas de Brasil, Honduras, Guatemala y de otros regímenes títeres no han logrado impedir que las masas hagan demostraciones de solidaridad con nuestro pueblo y de condena a los imperialistas.

En Europa, la prensa en general coincide en afirmar que la intervención norteamericana contra nuestra patria es un acto sucio, injusto e ilegal y que tiende a aumentar la tensión internacional.

La intelectualidad de Europa occidental con Bertrand Russell y Jean Paul Sartre al frente acusan a la administración Johnson con lenguaje claro y terminante.

El gobierno Francés ha hecho duras críticas a la intervención llevando las relaciones franco-norteamericanas a un punto frágil.

Los pueblos y gobiernos de los países hermanos de África y Asia recién independizados, también se han pronunciado condenando enérgicamente la agresión yanqui contra nuestra patria. Las organizaciones obreras, campesinas y estudiantiles han condenado la ocupación militar yanqui y exigen la inmediata retirada de dichas tropas. En sus reuniones han manifestado su solidaridad con la lucha de nuestro pueblo.

En Argelia, la República Árabe Unida, en la República

PASA A LA PAGINA 14 -



Abrazo entre pueblos hermanos, Fidel y Enrique Jimenes Nova.



## DESPLIEGUEMOS LA LUCHA EN TODO EL PAIS

La lucha armada constitucionalista que se libra en la capital, corresponde a los actuales intereses políticos económicos y sociales de la abrumadora mayoría del pueblo dominicano (Obreros, Campesinos, estudiantes, empleados, profesionales, pequeños comerciantes y pequeños productores). Aun cuando la población del interior del país no está desarrollando su lucha armada, es de esperarse de un momento a otro su estallido popular armado, pues están dadas las condiciones. Los factores objetivos (crisis económica, desempleo y miseria), son más agudos en el interior del país que en la capital, y los factores subjetivos, Bosch y Constitución del 63, oposición armada a la junta y a la intervención yanqui, son de orden nacional y patriótico. La organización que hoy es débil, en el curso de la lucha se fortalecerá. La vanguardia la desarrollará. Debemos tener plena fe en las masas populares del interior; la lucha armada actual representa sus intereses e ideales. Todo el país apoya y quiere la lucha armada contra los reaccionarios de la Junta de Imbert Barrera y contra los yanquis, y por la Constitución de 1963 y el gobierno Constitucional.

La lucha armada de la capital que se ha desarrollado con éxito no puede por sí sola conquistar lo que quiere todo el pueblo: el cese de la brutal intervención yanqui, la Constitución de 1963 y el gobierno constitucional. Verdad es que ha obtenido importantes victorias populares, tales como la derrota de las fuerzas asesinas del CEFA, de

la tropa de choque de la policía (casco blanco), y la toma de la Fortaleza Ozama y los cuarteles de la policía. Pero aun así, esto no es suficiente para conquistar la victoria total.

Es necesario pues el despliegue de la lucha armada a todo el país. La lucha armada debe generalizarse, hacerse en escala nacional. La capital es el núcleo central, la base revolucionaria que permite, que crea condiciones para el inicio de la lucha armada en el interior. A su vez, la lucha armada que se inicie en el interior vigorizará y fortalecerá la lucha armada de la capital.

El levantamiento armado de una ciudad, de un campo, de una provincia del país, producirá el de una región y así se desencadenará una ola patriótica de levantamientos armados populares en todo el territorio nacional, hasta que al fin esté todo el pueblo en lucha armada contra el yanqui invasor. Este es el único camino para detener cualquier ilusión en la OEA y otros cabildos.

Ahora bien, ¿cómo levantaremos a todo el país en armas? ¿Qué trabajo debemos hacer! ¿Qué táctica adoptar!

Es importante promover la lucha de masas, las acciones de masas, la movilización de las masas del interior dirigidas a madurar la toma de las armas de los cuarteles militares del interior para defender la soberanía nacional ultrajada por la intervención militar yanqui y para defender la Constitución de 1963 y el gobierno constitucional.

Es necesario la presión po

pular sobre los cuarteles para conseguir y arrebatar las armas a los militares del interior indecisos en esta jornada patriótica. El pueblo debe mantenerse en las calles y activo con micromitines, reuniones, mítines amplios, asambleas, marchas, quema de gomas, etc., dependiendo de las condiciones concretas de cada localidad. Todo bajo la consigna de: ¡Armas para el pueblo! ¡Luchar por la Constitución de 1963 y el gobierno no constitucional y defender la soberanía nacional ultrajada por la intervención militar yanqui!

Es claro que la sola movilización y reclamo del pueblo no le proporcionará armas, la experiencia de la capital nos enseña que solo martillando con acciones armadas, seguido o conjuntamente con las movilizaciones de masas, sobre el sector militar que haya actuado o se muestra enemigo de la lucha patriótica, es como el pueblo consigue las armas. Naturalmente, las acciones armadas deben ser dirigidas contra los puntos más débiles del enemigo (puestos, pequeños cuarteles, etc.), donde debemos concentrar nuestra mayor potencia. Cortar el agua y la luz y privar de alimentos y comunicaciones a los cuarteles militares que repriman al pueblo.

Las primeras armas conseguidas deben destinarse a formar unidades de combate firmes, con el fin de ampliar los objetivos que puedan proporcionarles armas al pueblo.

También hay que trabajar para ganarse a los militares progresistas y sellar una alianza sólida con ellos. Tra

-PASA A LA PAGINA 14-





## SIN REFORMA AGRARIA NO HAY REVOLUCION

La sociedad dominicana es semicolonial y semifeudal.

La penetración del imperialismo yanqui en las fundamentales ramas de la economía dominicana nos coloca entre los países saqueados y dependientes de los Estados Unidos, por esto nuestro país es semifeudal, por la pervivencia del latifundio y otras formas de explotación sobre los campesinos que impiden el progreso social de nuestro pueblo.

El alto comercio importador y exportador -la burguesía intermediaria parasitaria-, y el latifundismo son las bases sociales de la penetración imperialista en nuestro país y los sostenedores del atraso de la represión antipopular.

La existencia del latifundismo semifeudal, con el injerto del latifundismo imperialista sobre la estructura económica de nuestra nación, revela a las claras que están aún por cumplir las tareas de la revolución democrática.

Se está de acuerdo en que en un pueblo subdesarrollado, con un campesino numeroso y sin tierras, los movimientos populares tienen el sello democrático-burgués, y lo llamamos Nacional Liberador para subrayar que se distingue de las viejas revoluciones democrático-burguesas, por el carácter que le imprime la clase obrera en la dirección política al dirigir el golpe principal de la revolución contra la explotación extranjera.

Necesaria e históricamente, la revolución dominicana ya

dirigida fundamentalmente contra el imperialismo y sus socios y el latifundismo; indispensable es entender, por tanto, que en la etapa que vivimos estos son los principales enemigos de la revolución dominicana. De ahí que debemos señalar que nuestra revolución no va dirigida principalmente contra el capital nacional, cuyo desarrollo y consiguiente papel en el seno de la sociedad han sido impedidos por el imperialismo y el latifundismo.

Todo esto nos hace ver que en las presentes condiciones históricas, la revolución dominicana es esencialmente agraria y anti-imperialista.

Si se combate la semifeudalidad se combate una de las bases de la penetración imperialista en la sociedad dominicana.

Proscribir el latifundio como lo hace la Constitución del 63, es realizar esa proscripción de manera real y práctica, es decir, entregar las tierras a los que las trabajan, conforme a un plan científico correspondiente al desarrollo conjunto de la economía nacional encontrará la oposición del imperialismo yanqui. Por su esencia explotadora y reaccionaria, el imperialismo no aceptará modificaciones ni reformas en las estructuras de sus semicolonias. El imperialismo se opondrá militarmente, como ya lo está haciendo con su intervención armada.

De ahí que, a la luz del proceso histórico dominicano, el Movimiento Revolucionario 14 de Junio plantee que el ú

nico camino para alcanzar la solución democrática que quiere el pueblo es desplegar la lucha armada de las masas campesinas en todo el país alrededor de la Reforma Agraria con la entrega de las tierras a los campesinos, y la inmediata desocupación de las tropas yanquis de nuestra patria.

Al enfatizar el papel del campesinado en la actual lucha, advertimos que la revolución independentista del 44 se frustró porque el campesinado, como masa fundamental de la población, no fue incorporada políticamente. Decimos que así ocurrió tras la guerra restauradora contra el colonialismo español, en la expedición gloriosa del 14 de Junio, el gobierno de Bosch y la insurrección de noviembre.

Y subrayamos con claridad meridiana: "Si no incorporamos al campesinado, el combate patriótico que entablamos se frustrará inevitablemente e históricamente".

No hay revolución sin Reforma Agraria. No puede haber democracia con latifundios y explotación extranjera.

Si no entregamos las tierras a los campesinos, destrozando la semifeudalidad, no estaremos haciendo revolución ni democracia, ni defendiendo con acierto la Soberanía Nacional.

Como históricamente la Revolución dominicana es agraria y antiimperialista, vemos que el movimiento constitucionalista tiene dos salidas a tomar: o capitula en la di

-PASA A LA PAGINA 11-



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PAGINA 7

## QUE ES LA REVOLUCION

La historia nos enseña que los pueblos han pasado por diferentes etapas históricas en el curso de su desarrollo político y social.

En el proceso de desarrollo de nuestro pueblo, desde la independencia hasta nuestros días, las masas explotadas han mantenido una lucha constante por cambiar sus condiciones de vida y las estructuras económicas y políticas de la sociedad dominicana. Más, esta lucha cuyo origen es la desigualdad social que existe en el seno de nuestra sociedad, por no tener una dirección esencialmente revolucionaria, no ha producido cam

bios fundamentales en las bases económicas y políticas de la sociedad. Para ello se hace necesario la Revolución.

La Revolución es la transformación de las estructuras económicas y políticas de la sociedad. Tal fenómeno social es solo posible en la medida en que las masas populares, conscientes de su papel histórico, luchan de manera abierta y decidida contra todo lo que se oponga al progreso y avance social del pueblo, y lo que es más fundamental, por la toma del poder político a través de su vanguardia combativa y revolucionaria.

Nuestro pueblo, que sólo ha



tenido gobiernos que representan los intereses de las clases explotadoras (oligarquía criolla y los monopolios extranjeros), marcha hoy a pasos de gigante por el camino de la revolución.

La revolución no significa

-PASA A LA PAGINA 12--

## EL SAQUEO DEL IMPERIALISMO YANKI EN NUESTRO PAIS Y SUS RESULTADOS

La República Dominicana, igual que los demás pueblos hermanos de América Latina, Asia y África no liberados es víctima desde hace años del saqueo y la explotación del imperialismo norteamericano y la oligarquía criolla.

Los monopolios imperialistas, mediante la exportación a nuestro país de capitales se apoderan de las principales fuentes de riquezas del pueblo. Como es natural, esto frena el desarrollo económico y social de nuestro pueblo.

Distintas regiones del país sufren el saqueo del imperialismo yanqui. El Sur se muere de hambre mientras la Alcoa arranca de sus entrañas cerca de un millón de toneladas de bauxita anualmente. El Este, ahogado por el desempleo y la miseria, mientras el Central Romana Corporation y el Furfural extraen de sus inmensos ca-

ñaverales más de \$8,000,000. (OCHO MILLONES DE DOLARES), de beneficios anuales. El Noroeste está sumido en el atraso mientras la Grenada Company amasa millones con los guineos de la región.

La Compañía de Telefonos se lleva millones de pesos de beneficios a cambio de un pésimo servicio al pueblo, y, para completar el cuadro, tenemos a los pulpos bancarios FIRST NATIONAL CITY BANK y CHASE MANHATTAN BANK controlando el capital circulante, y los ahorros del pueblo dominicano. Los imperialistas yanquis han saqueado al pueblo dominicano en poco menos de medio siglo la fantástica suma de \$1.500.000 (MIL QUINIENTOS MILLONES DE DOLARES)

Como resultado de esta explotación imperialista que nos han impuesto, las condiciones de vida de nuestro pueblo son verdaderamente alarmantes: medio millón de desem

pleados; el 75% de la población rural posee solamente el 0.2% de la tierra cultivable; aproximadamente solo un 30% de la población cuenta con agua potable y con luz eléctrica; solo hay 2,2 camas para cada mil habitantes; por cada 7500 habitantes solo un dentista, y así, todo un pavoroso cuadro de ignorancia, hambre e injusticia social.

Todo esto demuestra que el imperialismo yanqui es el principal explotador del pueblo dominicano y su más feroz enemigo. Cada día más dominicanos comprenden esta verdad. Por tanto se puede predecir que los días del imperialismo yanqui en nuestro país es tan contados, será echado por la lucha resuelta de nuestro pueblo.

FUERA EL IMPERIALISMO YANQUI  
EXPLORADOR DE NUESTRO PUEBLO  
QUISQUEYA...SI

YANQUIS...NO



# ABRIENDO CAMINOS HACIA

Con la llegada a nuestro país de los gloriosos combatientes de Constanza, Maimón y Estero Hondo, se galvaniza la lucha contra la dictadura pro-yanqui de Trujillo de todos los sectores del pueblo. El empuje revolucionario que daría al traste con el despotismo trujillista, comenzó a materializarse en el plano organizativo con una célebre reunión en Ojo de Agua, municipio de Salcedo, encabezada por nuestro recordado líder Manolo Tavarez. Posteriormente, en una reunión mucho más amplia efectuada en Mao, se formó el primer comité clandestino del Movimiento 14 de Junio. Era el año de 1959.

La prisión y las torturas bárbaras del trujillato no pudieron destruir al movimiento de vanguardia del pueblo dominicano.

El asesinato de centenares de nuestros compañeros solo sirvió para unificar aún más a todo el pueblo alrededor de la consigna de: destruir definitivamente la dictadura pro-yanqui de trujillo y su sistema.

Después de la caída del dictador, los revolucionarios, catorcitas, hemos continuado la lucha contra las bases sociales que hicieron posible a trujillo, contra los imperialistas que lo dejaron como su brazo de exterminio y explotación después de la ocupación militar de 1916.



## INVASION DEL 14 DE JUNIO DE 1959

Nuestra política con respecto a las elecciones de diciembre de 1962 fue incorrecta a pesar de que gracias a nuestras denuncias se incrementó enormemente en el pueblo la conciencia anti-imperialista y anti-oligárquica. El pueblo votó a pesar de nuestra consigna de abstención y eligió al profesor - Bosch presidente de la República. De esas mismas elecciones salió el Congreso Nacional que redactó la Constitución de Abril de 1963.

Los dos años transcurridos desde el 14 de Junio de 1963 hasta este 14 de Junio de 1965 están llenos de enorme enseñanzas para todo el pueblo. En este corto período en que hemos tenido que trabajar - pública y clandestinamente, en que hemos combinado la lucha armada con la no armada, nuestro partido ha dirigido la lucha del pueblo contra la

oligarquía.

Antes y después del golpe de estado del 25 de Septiembre propusimos correctamente a otros partidos y organizaciones democráticas la formación de un Frente antigolpista que aunara todo el poderío del pueblo para defender las conquistas democráticas de la Constitución de Abril de 1963, pero ese frente, no pudo hacerse realidad debido a la timidez de algunos sectores que tienen esperanzas de que el imperialismo cambie su naturaleza explotadora y no quieren disgustarlo.

Las guerrillas de Noviembre derrotadas militarmente, fueron el catalizador de las energías populares en un período en que circulaban confusión concepciones derrotistas. Su fallo fundamental



**Messón, Ejemplo De  
Barbarie Trujillista**

CARCEL DE TORTURAS "LA 40"



# LA REVOLUCION

"LA REVOLUCION NO ES UNA PALABRA, ES EL RESULTADO DEL TRABAJO CONSTANTE, DEL TRABAJO CONSCIENTE DE CADA UNO DE NOSOTROS".

Manolo Tavárez



HERMANAS MIRABAL  
NOVIEMBRE, 1960

haber invadido el campo (no tener bases sociales, la nointegración del campesino) trajo consigo la derrota militar y la muerte del comandante Manolo Tavarez y de otros muchos valiosos compañeros.

La derrota de la Insurrección de Noviembre era caldo favorable para la aparición de oportunistas de derecha con su conocido estréñillo: "nosotros lo habíamos previsto". En muchas ocasiones los derechistas no se quedaron zándose en su papel de profeta de la derrota sino que llegaban a lanzar, fuera de nuestro partido, calumnias de todo genero.

El año de 1964 se caracterizó por la gran combatividad de los obreros de todo el país y su clara posición dirigente del Movimiento Revolucionario Dominicano.

titucionalista armado que tuvo inicio el 24 de abril, y los intereses de las masas exigen desarrollar ese movimiento e impedir que el imperialismo y los reaccionarios lo conviertan en un simple contra-golpe. En diversos documentos públicos hemos llamado a la ampliación de la lucha en plano nacional, y a la integración de los campe-



INSURRECCION CONSTITUCIONALISTA DE NOVIEMBRE DE 1963

Manuel Tavarez J.

sinos, la fuerza fundamental de nuestra revolución, a la lucha por la tierra y contra los invasores extranjeros.

El 14 de Junio dirigio, junto a otras fuerzas revolucionarias la lucha de los trabajadores en ese combativo período. Con enorme experiencia y fuerza ha surgido el movimiento obrero dominicano de grandes jornadas como, la huelga del 2 de Mayo, la huelga de Santiago, la gran huelga del 2 de Diciembre de los obreros azucareros, la huelga de febrero de La Romana. En estos movimientos el trabajador dominicano desarrolló una lucha, no solo por conquistas económicas inmediatas, sino tambien contra el despotismo del triunvirato y por las libertades democráticas.

Junto a la evolución de la conciencia de clase de los trabajadores, en nuestro partido se ha intensificado el estudio de la teoría revolucionario y de nuestra situación concreta. Hemos trabajado en el estudio de toda nuestra labor como partido y comenzamos la sistematización de un documento de táctica y estrategia para la lucha del pueblo.

La línea de masas nos ha llevado a luchar en primera línea en el movimiento cons-



LUCHA POPULAR CONSTITUCIONALISTA.



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## LA NATURALEZA DEL....

(DE LA PAGINA 3)

a asesinar en el Africa y en Asia, presenta a los patriotas como vulgares chupadores de sangre y lleva al mundo al borde de una guerra mundial al ser rescatado el Canal de Suez por su verdadero dueño, el pueblo de la Republica Arabe Unida.

El imperialismo yanqui, por su parte, masacra en Panama a los patriotas que justamente reclaman la soberania de su pais sobre el Canal de Panama. Las tropas yanquis matan en Santo Domingo, los imperialistas impulsan la represión del gobierno venezolano contra los patriotas que luchan por la liberacion plena de su patria, en fin, las geroras imperialistas agreden a los pueblos en todo el mundo.

Como la naturaleza del imperialismo es la explotación y la política de agresión y guerra a los pueblos, por eso estan aquí en nuestra patria los mundialmente odiados "marines" y paracaidistas, cuya presencia recuerda a los dominicanos y a los patriotas del mundo entero la barbara y feroz invasion yanqui-belga en Stanleyville en noviembre pasado.

Siendo el imperialismo el enemigo de la paz y de los pueblos, nada puede hacer su poner que en Santo Domingo no lo sean así.

Ni el mas iluso se atreve ahora a decir que el imperialismo yanqui es amigo del pueblo dominicano y defensor de la democracia y la paz. Alguien dice que la intervencion militar yanqui obedece a una "política torpe" de la Administración Johnson o a las malas informaciones de la embajada norteamericana en este pais. Pero cada dia ese alguien "descubre" que la intervencion responde a la avaricia y agresividad del imperialismo y a sus voraces intereses. La naturaleza explotadora y criminal del imperialismo ha quedado definitivamente al desnudo.

El imperialismo yanqui es el principal enemigo de la nacion dominicana, como lo es de los pueblos de Asia, Africa y el resto del mundo. La penetración del imperialismo yanqui, apoyandose en el latifundismo y la burguesia intermediaria (alto comercio exportador e importador) nos mantiene como sociedad semicolonial y semifeudal. Al explotar a nuestro pueblo, el imperialismo yanqui impide la creacion historica independiente de nuestra nacion. Aquí nos toca subrayar una cuestion importante: el imperialismo yanqui es el enemigo principal de la nacion dominicana, pero no se entiende que esto se produce solamente porque sus tropas invadan nuestra patria. Las tropas yanquis pueden partir mañana del pais y los imperialistas yanquis continuaran siendo los principales enemigos del pueblo dominicano. ¿Por que? Sencillamente porque el imperialismo estrangula la economía del pais, saquea las principales riquezas, deforma nuestro desarrollo, prostituye nuestra cultura y promueve los regimenes mas represivos y antinacionales. Este es el guia del problema. Este el fondo de la cuestion a resolver: LA LIBERACION ECONOMICA Y POLITICA DE LA PATRIA.

A manera de conclusiones, podemos resumir así el presente trabajo:

1o. El imperialismo es la fuente de la guerra y la represion porque su naturaleza es la explotación de los pueblos y la política de agresion y guerra en el mundo.

El imperialismo yanqui es la principal fuerza de agresion y el mas feroz enemigo de los pueblos del mundo. Representa hoy la fuerza principal, que se opone al desarrollo historico independiente de nuestra nacion.

2o. Los pueblos oprimidos por el imperialismo no pueden coexistir con el imperialismo. Los pueblos oprimidos por el imperialismo tienen necesariamente que luchar contra el imperialismo.

El imperialismo oprime y

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explota a los pueblos, por lo que no puede haber paz con el imperialismo.

Por mas que cambie de grupos o camarillas gobernantes, el imperialismo no cambiara de naturaleza. Su política de agresion ha sido rechazada por todos los pueblos, pero el imperialismo no ha cambiado de política. No puede cambiar, porque la propia esencia de su sistema así lo determina.

Mucha gente del pais, que hace analisis de los hombres norteamericanos por encima de la naturaleza del imperialismo hablan por ejemplo de que si Kennedy hubiese sido el presidente norteamericano no estarían aquí las tropas yanquis. No puede haber mas ilusion en estas palabras.

Sólo cabria preguntarse: cuando Kennedy era presidente ¿no intensifico la guerra en el Vietnam, no se agredio a Cuba, etc?

3o. Como el agresivo imperialismo yanqui está armado hasta los dientes y es el principal bastión de la opresion colonial, sin la violencia revolucionaria es imposible extirpar su violencia contrarrevolucionaria.

El imperialismo yanqui intensifica la represion contra los movimientos de Liberación Nacional en Asia, Africa y America Latina. Ahora mismo impide el triunfo del movimiento constitucionalista, como impide la reunificación del pueblo vietnamita, ahora mismo exige a 30 millones de vietnamitas que se rindan incondicionalmente ante su cuchillo de carnicero, así como exige a los revolucionarios constitucionalistas que depongan las armas, destruyan los nuestros mismos la Constitución del 63 y aceptemos sus criminales y bandidos imposiciones de "gobiernos provisionales", "elecciones libres" y otras sandeces.

En fin, el imperialismo es la principal fuerza contrarrevolucionaria en el mundo.

¡Sólo con la lucha armada de masas es posible derrotar al perverso agresor yanqui!



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PAGINA 11

## LOS CINCO PUNTOS DE LAS NEGOCIACIONES

El pasado día 8, el presidente constitucional, ciudadano Francisco Caamaño Deñó, se dirigió al pueblo dominicano y al congreso nacional desde el teatro Leonor, de esta ciudad.

En su discurso el presidente Caamaño acusó al gobierno imperialista de los Estados Unidos por su política de agresión e intervención contra nuestro pueblo, así como a la organización de Estados Americanos y su Secretario General, Dr. Jose A. Mora, por seguir los dictados de sus amos de Washington, tratando de imponer soluciones contrarias a los intereses del pueblo dominicano.

El presidente Caamaño señaló la posibilidad de llevar el caso dominicano a otros organismos internacionales, se mostró partidario de sostener conversaciones con estos organismos y definió la posición que mantiene el gobierno constitucional sobre las negociaciones en los cinco puntos siguientes:

- 1.- Constitución del 63
- 2.- Vigencia de las Cámaras Legislativas
- 3.- Permanencia de los combatientes Constitucionales en las Fuerzas Armadas
- 4.- Formación de un gobierno con personalidades democráticas
- 5.- Salida inmediata de las tropas norteamericanas.

En otra parte de su discurso hizo un llamado a las ciudades del interior para que se levantaran en armas en defensa de la Constitución de 1963. Dijo Caamaño: " Los que hoy no pueden defenderla

con las armas, porque se lo están impidiendo por la fuerza, terminarán mañana por cojer las armas y vencer a sus enemigos". Dijo que los enemigos del pueblo no habían sido definitivamente derrotados "porque el gobierno de los Estados Unidos, violando todos los principios, abusando de su fuerza militar, invadió con sus tropas nuestro suelo y de tuvo momentaneamente el triunfo del movimiento constitucionalista".

Con estas palabras del presidente Caamaño se ha dado un rotundo mentís a las maniobras de los imperialistas yanquis que utilizaron la estratagema de "Proteger las vidas de sus nacionales" para intervenir descaradamente en nuestra patria, a la vez los imperialistas yanquis han puesto al desnudo su naturaleza agresora y se han mostrado abiertamente como son: Enemigos de los pueblos del mundo, La Paz y La Democracia.

La posición del 14 de Junio en la actual situación ha sido confirmada en la practica. Dijimos que la lucha armada era inevitable para consolidar la victoria popular. Otros pretendieron que conversando con el imperialismo se lograría el triunfo. Ahora nos dan la razón y se habla de incorporar a todo el país a la lucha armada. Dijimos que el imperialismo no estaba interesado en negociaciones sino al contrario: liquidar el roco constitucionalista, la justa rebelión del pueblo. Ahora se ve claro que es así.

Dijimos y reafirmamos que la movilización de las masas con la consigna de Desocupación Inmediata de las Tropas Yan-

quis y Reforma Agraria, es necesaria para prender la lucha armada en todo el país, consolidar la victoria y asegurarla con bases sólidas. La vida se encargara de decir en esta como en tantas ocasiones anteriores: El 14 tenía razón.

**SIN REFORMA... (DE LA PAG.6)** rección política y militar, cediendo ante la fórmula que trata de imponer el imperialismo y la oligarquía derrotada, traicionando así al pueblo; o se sigue apoyando en las masas, hace suya con mas fuerza la consigna de "Todo con las masas" y dirige la profundización de este combate que libra el pueblo por la Soberanía Nacional y los derechos democráticos.

Y para profundizar la lucha, y seguir apoyandose en las masas, desplegar la lucha en todo el país, incorporar al campesinado dando como paso previo la promulgación de la ley de Reforma Agraria, organizar para la ocupación de las tierras de los latifundistas y establecer una sólida ligazón revolucionaria entre la ciudad y el campo para afincar la lucha patriótica contra el explotador yanqui que pisotea nuestra soberanía. Los campesinos son la abrumadora mayoría de la población dominicana y el sector mas explotado y pobre; sin ellos, sin su apoyo no llevamos adelante, no desarrollamos hasta el fin el actual combate. Y para ganar su apoyo, debemos comenzar la Reforma Agraria y ENTREGAR INMEDIATAMENTE LA TIERRA A LOS CAMPESINOS.

Con lo que estaríamos por verdaderos caminos de victoria, y al fin y al cabo, cumpliendo con la Constitución del 63. Porque una cosa es cierta:

**¡SIN REFORMA AGRARIA NO HAY REVOLUCION!**



PAGINA 12

EL 134 - 14 DE JUNIO DE 1965

QUE ES LA REVOLUCION...  
(DE LA PAGINA 7)

destrucción, muerte, tragedia, etc., ni tampoco es revolución cualquier cambio político aunque sea efectuado por la violencia (contragolpe), que pretenda cambiar un grupo explotador por otro, como quieren hacer creer al pueblo los servidores del imperialismo para desviarlos de sus verdaderos objetivos revolucionarios. Tampoco es revolución el movimiento para reformar simplemente las viejas estructuras que sostienen el régimen de los explotadores, los remiendos al viejo régimen. No, al contrario, revolución es transformación total, radical, sustancial de lo viejo, de lo caduco; revolución es creación, vida, esperanza. La revolución es fuente inagotable de creación y de vida porque es entonces cuando las masas libres ya de las trabas que les cerraban el paso hacia el progreso, desarrollan como no lo habían hecho antes toda su capacidad creadora en las tareas de transformación de las viejas estructuras sociales y en la construcción de la nueva sociedad.

Es cuando los hombres con su trabajo creador le dan un nuevo sentido a la vida, pues se saben libres y dueños de su destino.

La revolución significa la desaparición del seno de la sociedad del reinado de la explotación, la miseria, la ignorancia y la liberación de las grandes mayorías populares. La revolución es una necesidad histórica que el pueblo dominicano está llamado a realizar. Nada ni nadie podrá detenerlo. Solo mediante ésta es posible sentar las premisas necesarias que harán a nuestra patria como la soñaron Duarte, Luperón, los mártires de Constanza, Maimón y Estero Hondo y Manolo: libre, soberana, independiente, próspera y feliz.

Hoy nuestro pueblo ha em-

prendido resueltamente el camino de la revolución y ya nada, ni el imperialismo yanqui podrá detenerlo.

¡Adelante, obreros y campesinos, estudiante y profe-

sionales, productores nacionales y pequeños comerciantes!

¡ADELANTE LA LUCHA ARMADA  
CONTRA EL EXPLOTADOR YANKI!

¡VENCEREMOS!

#### BREVE HISTORIA DE LA OLIGARQUIA

La traición a la patria de la oligarquía al aplaudir y apoyar la intervención militar yanqui en nuestro país no debe sorprender a nadie puesto que en su negra historia había repetido estas bochornosas actuaciones. Como ejemplo tenemos a Sánchez Ramírez nacido en Cotuí, quien en el 1808 peleó en contra de los franceses y no se intituló dominicano sino español. La ocupación haitiana, según Troncoso de la Concha en su estudio "La Ocupación de Santo Domingo por Haití", que antes de atravesar Boyer con sus tropas la frontera a mediados de enero del 1822, la bandera haitiana había sido enarbolada en los pueblos fronterizos, primero y algunos sitiados en el interior después. "Doy por sentado dice al autor- y comprobado, que en Santiago de los Caballeros hasta se llegó a formar una Junta Central Provisional de Gobierno, o cosa así, en oposición al Gobierno de Nuñez de Cáceres y que esta Junta estaba compuesta por las personas principales de Santiago". Son conocidas las actuaciones de Santana y Baez anexando el primero la República a España y el segundo pidió la anexión a E. U. Estos actos de vil traición a la Patria, no fueron cometidos por puro capricho sino con el propósito de buscar el apoyo de una potencia extranjera que la mantuviese en el poder a cambio de compartir la explotación del pueblo y conti-

nuar de ese modo saqueando las riquezas del país y su humana explotación de los campesinos y los trabajadores, porque a base de la explotación de los campesinos y de la clase trabajadora han amasado su fortuna. Es por esto que esa misma oligarquía se alía con el tirano trujillo, y lo ayuda a asesinar a los Héroes y Mártires de la gesta de Constanza, Maimón y Estero Hondo. Y es esa misma oligarquía la que asesina a los Héroes y Mártires de Las Manablas, La Berrenda, El Limón, La Horna y Enriquillo.

Ahora la misma oligarquía, ante el empuje de las masas populares por su liberación, aterrorizada y temblando de miedo aclama al amo yanqui para que violando todos los tratados internacionales, cayera sobre nuestra patria como buitres sobre su presa, violando nuestro sagrado derecho a la Autodeterminación y a la No Intervención. Pero esta vez los opresores y explotadores, igual que sus agentes, los traidores oligarcas de nuestra patria se han equivocado, porque hoy el pueblo se ha puesto en pie de lucha dispuesto a conquistar los ideales por los que han caído nuestros héroes y mártires. "Llegará el día en que las leyes viejas serán removidas y los privilegiados de la tierra verán con sus ojos que el sacrificio de los justos no ha sido en vano". ¡Este día ya no está lejano!



EL 14 DE JUNIO DE 1965

PAGINA 13

## LA OEA AL BASURERO

En 1889 nació en Washington la Organización de los Estados Americanos, OEA.

Esa organización de pantalla de los imperialistas norteamericanos que se encuentra de nuevo haciendo y deshaciendo en nuestro país a nombre de "las fuerzas hemisféricas" no tuvo en sus inicios un nombre tan pretencioso. En 1889, cuando los voraces capitales norteamericanos echaban las bases de la penetración económica en toda Latinoamérica no eran capaces de realizar los refinados juegos de palabras que ahora les conocemos. La OEA surgió en Washington ese año con el nombre de Oficina Comercial de las Repúblicas Americanas y años más tarde cambió de apelativo pero conservó su esencia de oficina comercial de los capitales norteamericanos para la explotación y la opresión de los pueblos latinoamericanos. Los barcos, italianos e ingleses que se estacionaban frente al placer de los estudios en Santo Domingo fueron sustituidos por los barcos norteamericanos que venían no solo a "cobrar las sumas debidas a sus nacionales sino también a echar las bases para su permanencia como poder explotador en nuestra tierra.

En el plano internacional los actos agresivos de los Estados Unidos necesitaban una institución de presión diplomática que cacareara con abundancia acerca de "la solidaridad, el panamericanismo, nuestras instituciones los tratados hemisféricos", etc, y otros lemas que solo han servido de hoja de parra

del imperialismo yanqui. Para engañar a nuestros pueblos las oligarquías vendepatria de toda Latinoamérica se han reunido más de diez veces con los Estados Unidos en lo que llaman "Conferencias Internacionales Americanas. Con el objeto de distraer al trabajador de Latinoamérica han creado organismos subsidiarios como el Consejo Interamericano Económico y Social y la Comisión Interamericana de los Derechos Humanos. La verdad es que día tras día la llamada Organización de los Estados Americanos se descubre más como instrumento de dominio económico y como gendarme sangriento que utiliza Estados Unidos contra los pueblos de Latinoamérica.

Con el Acta de Chapultepec y el tratado de Río de Janeiro, los enemigos de nuestros pueblos habían conseguido "legalizar" el supuesto derecho de los países de América a "responder con las armas al agresor" en caso que algún país de Latinoamérica "fuera agredido". Ahora, recorriendo el mismo camino, se ha formado a toda prisa otro sucio instrumento de fuerza, llamada Fuerza Multilateral de la OEA.

Esa Fuerza de la OEA, los marinos yanquis, que han violado la soberanía de nuestra nación tratarán de emplearla de ahora en adelante en cada país de Latinoamérica cuando las masas populares estén cerca de dar el golpe definitivo a los explotadores. Ese es el objetivo del imperialismo, pero los pueblos ya no lo tolerarán. Los pueblos se movilizan y se alzarán a la lucha.

Ya la OEA perdió su juego

porque el empuje de los trabajadores y campesinos latinoamericanos, apoyados por las capas medias de la población, está barriendo los traos viejos del continente. La OEA ya no es una pantalla, es la intervención descarada y esta muy carcomida y vieja. La OEA ya terminó y como trasto viejo irá al basurero.

**DESPLGUEMOS LA LUCHA....**

(DE DE LA PAGINA 5)

bajar en coordinación con esos militares que se hayan integrado al lado del pueblo hasta conquistar el triunfo patriótico y constitucionalista con la expulsión del invasor yanqui.

Debe ponerse atención en el abastecimiento de alimentos y las comunicaciones. Organizarse también la colecta de dinero y otros aportes que puede hacer el pueblo para mantener y llevar hasta el fin el combate patriótico y constitucionalista.

Los correos para comunicaciones regionales y sobre todo para contacto con la capital son muy importantes. No deben fallar.

Las ciudades o campos del país donde actualmente sea imposible desarrollar la lucha armada deben organizarse entonces colectas de dinero y comestibles para aprovisionar la capital o el lugar más cercano donde se esté desarrollando la lucha armada nacionalista y trabajar duro para crear las condiciones de lucha, pero con inteligencia y mucho cuidado para no caer en manos de los agentes represivos.

¡QUE SE PONGA EN PIE DE GUERRA TODO EL PAIS!

¡VIVA LA CONSTITUCION DEL 63!

¡VIVA LA REPUBLICA DOMINICANA!





PAGINA 14

EL 14 - 14 DE JUNIO 1965

## LA SITUACION INTERNACIONAL...

( DE LA PAGINA 4 )

de Mali y otros estados africanos han habido grandes manifestaciones de solidaridad con la lucha de nuestro pueblo.

En Asia, los pueblos que conocen bien las agresiones imperialistas, se han pronunciado firmemente en apoyo de nuestro pueblo y contra la intervención yanqui. En Jakarta, capital de Indonesia, se han realizado asambleas estudiantiles y obreras para condenar al imperialismo yanqui por su agresión a nuestra patria; así mismo, en el Japón, distintas organizaciones de masas de obreros, estudiantes y campesinas y personalidades independientes han condenado las agresivas acciones de los imperialistas yanquis contra nuestro país.

Los pueblos hermanos de los países socialistas y sus gobiernos se han pronunciado resueltamente contra la intervención yanqui en nuestro país y han ofrecido toda clase de ayuda a nuestro pueblo para rechazar al agresor yanqui.

El gobierno de la Unión Soviética junto a las organizaciones de los trabajadores, campesinos y jóvenes soviéticos han condenado la intervención militar yanqui y ofrecido su ayuda al pueblo dominicano.

El gobierno y pueblo chinos se pronunciaron contra la intervención yanqui. En declaración oficial del gobierno chino se dice que El gobierno y pueblo chinos condenan energicamente la bárbara intervención y agresión del gobierno norteamericano contra la República Dominicana y apoyan con firmeza la justa y patriótica lucha anti-yanqui del pueblo dominicano. Concluye la declaración del gobierno chino, "El hecho de que la Administración Johnson haya enviado apresuradamente tantos soldados a la República Dominicana, no demuestra en absoluto su po-

derío sino su debilidad. En su lucha patriótica y anti-norteamericana, los tres millones y más de dominicanos de ninguna manera están solos. Tienen ustedes el apoyo de los demás pueblos latinoamericanos. Los 650 millones de chinos los apoyan. Los pueblos de los demás países del campo socialista los apoyan. El heroico pueblo vietnamita está golpeando duro al imperialismo norteamericano. La nueva campaña de luchas revolucionarias anti-yanquis que se levanta en Asia constituye para ustedes un apoyo. Los pueblos arabes los apoyan mediante la lucha contra Israel, instrumento de agresión de los Estados Unidos. Los pueblos africanos los apoyan. Y los apoyan todos los pueblos del mundo que están luchando contra el imperialismo yanqui. El imperialismo norteamericano ya se encuentra bajo el múltiple asedio de los pueblos. Por mucho que forcejee, no podrá salvarse de su destino: la derrota final inevitable. ¡El pueblo dominicano y los demás pueblos vencerán!".

En la Cuba revolucionaria, el hermano pueblo cubano ha condenado la agresión yanqui y ha ofrecido su más decidido apoyo al pueblo dominicano. Por boca de su Primer Ministro, Comandante Fidel Castro, el pueblo cubano ha respaldado y estimulado la lucha heroica del pueblo dominicano.

Así también, se han manifestado todos los pueblos her-

manos y sus gobiernos de los demás países socialistas.

En el Consejo de Seguridad de las Naciones Unidas, la Unión Soviética y Cuba destruyeron uno por uno los falaces argumentos presentados por el hipócrita representante yanqui, mister Stevenson. En el máximo organismo internacional se ponen al desnudo todas las tramas y fechorías cometidas por los imperialistas. La OEA, pese al desesperado esfuerzo de Estados Unidos, queda totalmente desmascarada como lo que es: un instrumento político al servicio del imperialismo y, como diría el representante cubano, una celestina internacional.

Desde las protestas de las madres argentinas hasta los demoleedores argumentos del representante soviético Fedorenko, el mundo entero se solidariza con un pueblo pequeño que se defiende contra el más criminal agresor de la historia.

Al imperialismo le va siendo cada vez más difícil hallar cómplices en sus actos de guerra y rapiña.

El pueblo dominicano, que lucha actualmente con las armas en la defensa de su integridad territorial y de su soberanía nacional no se encuentra solo. Centenares de millones de habitantes de todo el mundo le prestan su apoyo. Por eso nuestra lucha, tendrá el triunfo. Los imperialistas yanquis serán irremediablemente derrotados.



ESTOS BILLETES FUERON IMPRESOS EL 15 DE MAYO POR LA JUNTA DESTRUCTORA DE IMBERT BARRERA. DADA SU ILEGALIDAD ALERTAMOS AL PUEBLO, QUE TIENE LA AMARGA EXPERIENCIA DE LAS PAPELETAS DE LILIS, PARA QUE NO SE DEJE ENGAÑAR.



# LA LUCHA ARMADA Y LA SITUACION ACTUAL

La historia muestra que todas las clases explotadoras se valen de la violencia para mantener su dominio. La burguesía monopolista que ha desarrollado el imperialismo, capitalismo en putrefacción, es sumamente agresiva y como clase explotadora que es, necesariamente, tiene que valer se de la violencia para mantener su dominación.

Además, innumerables hechos de la historia demuestran que las clases reaccionarias nunca ceden voluntariamente el poder y que son siempre las primeras en usar la violencia para reprimir el movimiento revolucionario de las masas y desencadenan la guerra civil poniendo así la lucha armada en el orden del día.

También, la historia nos enseña que aun cuando son desplazadas del poder las clases reaccionarias tratan de mil

maneras de restaurar su dominación, sobre todo a través de ataques armados sorpresivos contra el poder democrático.

Actualmente, en nuestro país han sido derrocadas del poder las clases más reaccionarias que determinó la intervención militar de su aliado el imperialismo yanqui, que a su vez desató un movimiento mundial que ha impuesto una precaria tregua en tanto se celebran "negociaciones" para resolver la crisis.

Esta situación y las negociaciones han hecho creer a mucha gente que la crisis se va a solucionar ya, pacíficamente. Nosotros creemos que esto es un error.

La vigencia de la Constitución del 63 y el pleno dominio del Gobierno Constitucional significan una gran victoria para el pueblo y una

seria derrota para el imperialismo yanqui y los reaccionarios que producirá un vigoroso impulso para la revolución dominicana. Esto es natural.

Ante esta realidad y siendo el imperialismo y los reaccionarios, agresivos y violentos, armados hasta los dientes, ¿qué hace pensar que el imperialismo y los reaccionarios cederán sus posiciones pacíficamente? ¿Acaso la presión internacional? Los casos del Congo y Viet-Nam nos dan la respuesta.

A la luz de la teoría revolucionaria y de la experiencia histórica, la solución de la crisis no será pacífica sino violenta. Nadie debe depositar ilusiones en las "negociaciones". La lucha armada será en definitiva la forma de solución. Preparémonos para ella.

Proyecto de Digitalización Academia Dominicana de la Historia

## INSTRUCCIONES PARA LA LUCHA REVOLUCIONARIA

**COMO HACER UNA COTER (MOLITORIO)**  
 (Una coter hecha de un bote de aceite de cocina con un plato de aluminio y un bote de aceite de cocina con un bote de gasolina.)

**PARA LARGARLA SE ENROLLA LA ANCHA Y SE AMARRA CONTRA EL CABLE.**  
 AL PONERSE EN LA BOTELLA SE ENROLLA EL CONTINERO Y SE PROBARA LA CARGA. NO SE ESTIRA QUE CON FUEGO.

**PARA DAR CANDELA.**  
 UN CIGARRO ENCENDIDO SE PONE EN CONTACTO CON LOS PUNTEROS DE UN CABLE. SE ENROLLA EL CIGARRO Y SE ENROLLA TODO SOBRE CUALQUIER MATERIAL DE FACIL COMBUSTION.

**EL CABLE LLAMO EN ESTE SABOTAJE DEBE SER DE ACERO, SIVERRILLO Y HIERRO TENIDO.**

**DE NOCHE SE COLOCA EN LOS PUNTEROS COMO EL CABLE EN UN BOTE DE ACEITE DE COCINA. AL PONERSE EN CONTACTO CON EL CABLE, SE ENROLLA CONTRA LOS PUNTEROS.**

**OBSTRUCCIONES**  
 (LAS OBSTRUCCIONES O DESARRIOLES CRUZADOS SOBRE EL CAMINO)  
 PIEDRAS GRANDES DISEMINADAS SOBRE EL CAMINO. NO, CUBIERTAS CON CENIZA VIVA. LAS RUEDAS SE FORTIFICAN CON UN CABLE DE VIENTO.

**TABLA CON CUATRO PUNOS DE AUTOMOVIL.**  
 AL PONERSE EN CONTACTO CON EL CABLE, SE ENROLLA SOBRE EL CABLE Y SE ENROLLA SOBRE EL CABLE.

**PARA SABOTEAR AUTOMOVILES.**  
 PANTALLAS TRONCABLES, GRANAS, ETC. ARRABADAS DURANTE LA NOCHE EN LAS CALLES Y CAMINOS DURANTE EL TRANSITO.

**NOTA:**  
 BARRILES DE CEMENTO, CABLES METALICOS LANZADOS SOBRE EL VEHICULO, ELECTRICOS PROVOCAN APAGONES DEL AUTOMOVIL.

## MOVIMIENTO DE LIBERACION DOMINICANA

DE LA UNION PATRIOTICA DOMINICANA Y DEMAS ORGANIZACIONES ASOCIADAS.

# Programa Minimo de la REVOLUCION DOMINICANA

El Movimiento de Liberación Dominicana se propone:

I.- En el aspecto político.

a) Derrocar por todos los medios a su alcance el régimen de opresión y sangre establecido en la República Dominicana por Rafael Leónidas Trujillo desde el año 1930.

b) Establecer un Gobierno Provisional Democrático revolucionario que en un período máximo de dos años ponga en marcha el programa de la Revolución y cree las condiciones necesarias para que el pueblo dominicano pueda ejercer libremente sus derechos políticos y sociales.

c) Convocar dentro de un término prudencial una Asamblea Constituyente, elegida por medio del sufragio universal, directo y secreto, encargada de laborar la nueva Constitución de la República, con sujeción a los principios que rigen la concepción de la organización democrática del Estado, e inspirada en los postulados de la justicia económica y social.

d) Derogar toda la legislación antidemocrática de la tiranía.

II.- En el aspecto social.

a) Implantar una amplia reforma agraria, que garantice al campesino la posesión de la tierra y le otorgue el derecho de propiedad correspondiente en la proporción que determine la ley, de acuerdo con el principio que establece la función social de la propiedad.

b) Reformar la "Ley de Tierras", y depurar todos los títulos definitivos otorgados por el Tribunal de Tierras que se obtuvieron por fraude o violencia.

c) Garantizar la libre organización de la clase obrera y campesina como medio de defensa de sus intereses y reconocer el derecho de huelga como instrumento de lucha del proletariado.

d) Iniciar una efectiva campaña de alfabetización y reformar integralmente la enseñanza, a fin de que la nueva escuela, desde la primaria hasta la universitaria, sea forjadora de una conciencia nacional avanzada y libre que contribuya a darle impulso a los recla-

mos y derechos del pueblo.

e) Establecer un amplio sistema de seguridad social que ampare a la niñez, la ancianidad y el desempleo y ofrezca los servicios imprescindibles para la protección de la salud y una vivienda adecuada.

III.- En el aspecto económico.

a) Impulsar la economía en sus múltiples aspectos fomentando el desarrollo del mercado interno y el poder adquisitivo de la masa popular.

b) Desarrollar y proteger la industria nacional, mediante las instituciones de crédito que organice el Gobierno Revolucionario y a través de las medidas legales que se dicten a ese fin.

c) Expropiar en favor del Estado todas las industrias y propiedades adquiridas por el tirano, su familia u otras personas al amparo de la tiranía, y reintegrar a sus legítimos dueños aquellas que hayan sido objeto de despojo.

d) Revisar todas las concesiones hechas por la tiranía en favor de capitales nacionales o extranjeros que sean lesivas al interés nacional.

e) Reformar el sistema tributario establecido por la tiranía, aboliendo los impuestos anti-populares e innecesarios para el sostenimiento del Estado.

f) Desarrollar una política económica tendiente a asegurar posibilidades de trabajo a toda la población laboral.

En el aspecto internacional.

a) Respaldar el ejercicio continental de la democracia representativa y el sistema de convivencia pacífica y de mutua ayuda, especialmente entre los países del Caribe y Centroamérica.

b) Fomentar las mejores relaciones con los demás pueblos, basados en la comprensión y el mutuo respeto que inspira la igualdad jurídica de los estados y la libre determinación de los pueblos.

Junio de 1959.-



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FROM SANTO DOMINGO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTP

FO/CRO/WH. DISTRIBUTION

Mr. Campbell

No. 153  
5 July, 1965

D. 2214 5 July, 1965  
R. 2214 5 July, 1965

RECEIVED IN  
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= 6 JUL 1965  
AD 1015/266

IMMEDIATE  
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Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 153 of 5 July.  
Repeated for information to Washington  
UKMIS New York

AD 1015/255

Conversations with Shlaudeman, Mayebre and Rikhye over the past few days indicate that negotiations have reached very close bargaining stage anticipated in my telegram No. 144. The Bunker mission saw Garcia Gedoy repeatedly over the past week and finally presented his name to the rebels as their preference for provisional President. The reply was that although they had nothing against him personally they prefer not to have him. They fear the influence of his very large upper class family and the return of Balaguer makes them wary of his connexion in that quarter. They put forward their choice of Guzman which was not acceptable to the Bunker mission. Several other names including de Moya the Minister of Labour in the Bosch Government have since been discussed. Garcia Gedoy is probably still in the running. The tenacity of the rebels clearly irritated Shlaudeman. The question of armed forces is proving very difficult. The Americans agree to the removal of Wessin and other officers, but wish to keep Caminere whom the rebels will not have at any price as his navy shelled the city.

anti-?  
-1248  
or -1250

2. Shlaudeman does not bother to disguise his opinion that Imbert is now finished and the operation of painless removal seems to be getting under way. His radio has gone over to an OAS line and is protesting against United States interference suggestive of my letter 53/1/1 17 June, paragraph 7. One of his Ministers Zeller Cece dined on Saturday with a friend, who asked him if the Americans were tying his hands. He replied that if only his hands were tied he could kick with his feet, but the Americans had him swathed like a mummy. He said he had left a letter with the French Ambassador for immediate transmission to de Gaulle if the Junta was "betrayed". He hinted that the contents would be sensational.

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Santo Domingo telegram No. 153 to Foreign Office

- 2 -

3. My telegram No. 146. The town of Ramon Santana erupted on 2 July when the police station was assaulted and taken by rebel commandos. Three police were killed and several injured. The rebels retired immediately. Yesterday I had information of considerable disturbances in San Pedro, but no details.

Foreign Office pass Washington 80, UKMIS New York 42.

[Repeated as requested]

ADVANCE COPIES:

Private Secretary

P.U.S.

Mr. Rennie

Head of American Department

Head of News Department

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3



*Slate*  
*5/7*

GUARD

(53/1/1)

BRITISH EMBASSY,  
SANTO DOMINGO.

30 June, 1965.

*My dear Dick,*

I was told to-day that Imbert is proving to be really very obstinate at the last moment and now will agree to nothing in the negotiations. As far as the Caamaño side is concerned, I gather there is not much difficulty, and the draft of the Institutional Act has been agreed between the Bunker mission and the "Constitutionalistas". But Tony has apparently backed into his querencia (are you keen on the bulls?) and refuses to give up being President.

2. The economic hold the Americans have over him is now total, and provided they are not worried about the mud-slinging that would follow, there should be little difficulty in dislodging him. But the U.S. Embassy here is, I regret to say, divided on that issue of Tony. The Attachés have always backed him and undoubtedly have given him to understand that he is the Pentagon's darling. I fancy that Bunker will have something sharp to say about this if the success of his mission is threatened by such considerations.

3. We may now expect Imbert to produce that protest against the American seizure of his country which I have already mentioned. Viriato Fiallo, whose name after these two months seems to belong to another century, delivered himself of a patriotic protest against the American invasion last night on the radio. This is the first word uttered publicly by Viriato. In its way it is an indication of the way things are going in the negotiations.

4. There is every chance that this will reach you well after a settlement is announced. My latest tip is that to-morrow is the day. We have learned not to be too optimistic here, and the removal of Tony, Wessin and the others may prove difficult.

5. I am copying this letter to Lord Caradon at the United Kingdom Mission to United Nations, New York, and to Sutherland at Washington.

*Yours ever,*

*Stafford*  
(S. F. Campbell)

R. M. K. Slater, Esq., C.M.G.,  
American Department,  
Foreign Office,  
LONDON, S.W.1.

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(53/1/1)



BRITISH EMBASSY,  
 SANTO DOMINGO.

30 June, 1965.

My dear Dick,

AD 1015/260

With reference to paragraph 3 of my telegram No. 149 of 29 June, you will remember that there was talk of Balaguer coming here before the coup d'état in view of his mother's illness. I understand that when her condition took a graver turn recently, the Imbert junta authorities stated that they were willing for Balaguer to return provided he signed a document limiting his stay to 72 hours, and exonerating them from all responsibility for his safety. There were other stipulations relating to political activity but I cannot say exactly what they were.

2. As you know, Balaguer arrived on 28 June. I gather that Imbert has now given up any pretence at making conditions about his stay. He told Bernard Diederich of New York Times this morning that Balaguer could stay as long as he liked, and it is my <sup>own</sup> impression that we shall have him at least for a few weeks. His house is surrounded by a smallish crowd all the time but there has been little evidence of excessive excitement.

3. Judging from Balaguer's past record, he will not be so foolish as to involve himself in the present negotiations for a provisional government, outside giving his assent to the various personalities from his party taking part in it.

4. I am copying this letter to the Chanceries at the U.K. Mission to United Nations, New York, and Washington.

Yours ever

Stafford

(S. F. Campbell)

R. M. K. Slater, Esq., C.M.G.,  
 American Department,  
 Foreign Office,  
 LONDON, S.W.1.

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RECEIVED IN  
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FROM SANTO DOMINGO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTP F.O./C.R.O./WH DISTRIBUTION

Mr. Campbell

No. 15A D. 00.22 7 July, 1965  
 6 July, 1965 R. 00.25 7 July, 1965

IMMEDIATE  
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Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 15A of 6 July.  
 Repeated for information to: Washington UKMis New York.

Good progress in negotiations was achieved yesterday and this morning in spite of a sudden increase in tension between Imbert and Caamano military forces which is now under control. Garcia Godoy is now acceptable to the whole of the rebel leadership with the exception of Aristy and Cury. Beseh has agreed to Garcia Godoy and is telephoning Aristy and Cury to urge their cooperation. On formation of provisional government the entire Imbert junta will resign. Garcia Godoy's insistence on a reorganization of the military now, which will obviate any suggestion of control from that quarter, is agreed by the Bunker commission. The removal of Wessin is accepted but Caminero will stay for the time being although he offers to take other employment if no place can be found for him in reorganized armed forces. Caamano has agreed to go on unemployed list and intends to resign in time for the elections. Beseh has agreed to his candidature for the Presidency. The Bunker commission has arranged to see rebel leadership daily until a settlement is reached and is hopeful of an agreement this week.

2. Donald Reid is reported due in London shortly for interviews with B.M.C.

Foreign Office pass Washington No. 81, UKMis New York No. 43.  
 [Repeated as requested].

ADVANCE COPIES:  
F.O.  
 Private Secretary 1965  
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 Mr. Rennie  
 Head of American Dept.  
 Head of News Dept.

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FROM SANTO DOMINGO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTP

FO/CRO/WH DISTRIBUTION

Mr. Campbell

No. 155

8 July 1965

D.0150 9 July 1965

R.0155 9 July 1965

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- 9 JUL 1965  
HD/1015/272

IMMEDIATE

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Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 155 of 8 July 1965

Repeated for information to: Washington

UKMIS New York

I hear that at a decisive and dramatic vote taken this morning of rebel leaders Garcia Godey as President and Eduardo Read Barreras as Vice President were accepted. A provisional government should follow immediately. Aristy and Cury and [GP. undec.] who were against were out-voted by solid P.R.D. block in favour. I understand P.R.D. threatened to withdraw from the movement if a provisional government in this form were not accepted and this was the deciding factor. I await confirmation.

Foreign Office pass Washington 83 UKMIS New York 44.

[Repeated as requested]

ADVANCE COPIES

P.S.

P.U.S.

Mr. Rennie

Hd. American Dept.

Hd. News Dept.

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FROM SANTO DOMINGO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTP

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

Mr. Campbell

No. 159  
16 July 1965

D. 0145 17 July 1965  
R. 0145 17 July 1965

RECEIVED IN  
ARCHIVES No.39  
19 JUL 1965  
AD 1015/273

IMMEDIATE

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AD 225/79

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 159 of 16 July  
Repeated for information to: Washington

UKMIS New York  
Port au Prince

UKMIS New York telegram No. 1681 (not to all addressees).

We are curious but not very alarmed by Imbert radio broadcasts today warning all non combatants to leave the rebel area as attack is imminent. This is the first time since mid June. Imbert radio is also broadcasting repeatedly alert calls to Haiti proclaiming that groups of Communist Haitian exiles are crossing the border from Dominica. My Haitian exiled contact states this to be quite false. The motive may be to show that the whole island is under a Communist threat. The person behind this is probably Charles Millery an informer employed by the United States Embassy here who denounced Haitian guerillas last year as Communists. We must expect the mice to play when Bunker is away.

Foreign Office pass Washington 85 UKMIS New York 46.

/Repeated as requested/

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*Emile Jh  
19/1/65*

BRITISH EMBASSY,  
SANTO DOMINGO.

(53/1/1)



16 July, 1965.

*Dear Sir,*

When Rikhye was in San Juan over the weekend he took the opportunity of calling on Juan Bosch, of whom he had naturally heard a great deal, but never seen.

2. He found Bosch in a very pessimistic frame of mind about the future of the Dominican Republic. He said that the stifling of the libertarian revolt by the United States had finished all chances for an orderly and peaceful development of the country towards democracy; he saw a long period of unrest and sporadic violence for the future, in which the communists would probably become more and more prominent. He said the United States had now decided that Joaquín Balaguer had to win the forthcoming elections, and every kind of support, above and below board, would eventually be given him to do so. Balaguer, however, would eventually create a similar type of opposition among the young to that which had swept Donald Reid from the scene, and the result would be further chaos. The United States would be acting contrary to its interests in this, but he had now given up wondering why it consistently did this in the Dominican Republic.

3. He said that in the circumstances there was nothing to do but support the nomination of Hector Garcia Godoy for the provisional presidency, and he had advised the constitutionalists to stop arguing, swallow their pride and do so. His bitterness towards the United States was very evident. He was considering leaving Puerto Rico and going to live in Antigua. Regarding his own political career, he inferred that the time had come to leave the scene for good.

4. Later, Rikhye saw Benitez, who seemed most disturbed to hear of Bosch's intention to retire. He told Rikhye that he was going to see Bosch without delay, talk the whole matter over, and attempt to dissuade him.

*Yours sincerely*  
*S. F. Campbell*  
(S. F. Campbell)

R. M. K. Slater, Esq., C.M.G.,  
American Department,  
Foreign Office,  
LONDON, S.W.1.


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Mr. H. [unclear] 19/6  
[unclear] 19/7

(53/1/1)

BRITISH EMBASSY,  
SANTO DOMINGO.

14 July, 1965.

My dear Sir,

I saw Caamaño yesterday morning and had about an hour's talk with him. He seemed reasonably content with the progress made in negotiations, and said that he thought a settlement could be reached fairly quickly. I mentioned Imbert's demands about deporting communists, etc., and he said that he had never had anything to do with Imbert, and his extravagances were something that the Americans would have to put up with because, after all, they had brought him into existence. He was very bitter about the Americans. He said again that the "Constitutionalistas" had won the victory in the field against Wessin's troops, but the United States had done everything possible since to reverse that. The tactics used by Imbert in the north were those he remembered receiving instruction in when, as a member of the regular forces, he attended an amphibious warfare course in the United States, and claimed that the Americans had supervised the operation throughout. I tend to agree about the supervision, but I doubt that he could identify the tactics used from his course in the way claimed. He also claimed that the renovation and supply of equipment to Imbert for this fighting was, in any case, the only thing that had made it possible. He said that the U.S. attack on 15 June was based on two companies forward with one in reserve, and he talked for some time about tactical aspects of this fighting. He claimed that many more Americans were killed in this affair than they were ready to admit, because he had pushed his troops forward when the Americans started to advance and caught the first wave by surprise. He added that the Americans used 150 mm. medium artillery with proximation fuses, producing air burst in the city.

2. He said that the report of the O.A.S. Commission on Human Rights would point the guilt not only at Caminero and Imbert, but at the Americans themselves. I said that I thought this was hardly just and not too sensible. Putting the United States in the dock was not only difficult to justify from the ascertainable facts, but had policy, seeing that this could only cause them to harden their attitude towards his movement at this time. It would certainly alienate whatever favourable feelings Ambassador Bunker had towards his movement. Caamaño did not seem to think that Ambassador Bunker had any favourable feelings towards the rebel movement anyway, but that he thought Bunker a practical man who was prepared to face the facts. I do not think he means to press this charge against the Americans.

3. I enclose a copy of the Institutional Act which so irritated Ambassador Bunker by its length. Whilst agreeing with his objection to the size of it, it does in some measure illustrate the existence of some useful thinking power on the Caamaño side. In this they are ahead of the Imbert faction, who are really lost when it comes to matters of this kind. You will note that it is personally signed by both Caamaño and Aristy, "as a special mark of respect to England".

4. I am copying this letter, without enclosure, to Lord Caradon at the United Kingdom Mission to United Nations, New York, and to Whitehead at Washington.

*Yours truly*  
[Signature]  
(S. F. Campbell)

R. M. K. Slater, Esq., C.M.G.,  
American Department,  
FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.

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


*Mr. H. A. ...*  
*...*  
*...*  
*...*

BRITISH EMBASSY,  
 SANTO DOMINGO.

GUARD

(53/1/1)



13 July, 1965.

Dear Sir,

During John Killick's visit we had a talk with Hector Garcia Godoy a few hours after agreement had been reached by all sides on his appointment as Provisional President, with Eduardo Read Barreras as Vice-President. We found him relaxed, and the conversation, it seemed to me, showed that he was thinking clearly and logically about the daunting problems which would face him as President.

2. He said that Eduardo Read Barreras had originally only consented to be a member of the Provisional Government, and the proposal that he should take the Vice-Presidency was a surprise to him - thus there had been some delay while he considered it. It had been agreed that the final word about the rest of the Cabinet must rest with Hector as it had to be his team; the idea of a ready-made Cabinet could only make for difficulty in circumstances which were difficult enough already. In answer to my question, he said that had he been asked to lead the country for such a short time in more normal conditions, he would have refused, but the present catastrophic state of the Republic called for some self-sacrifice by someone. I believe he is quite sincere in this; we all have our fingers crossed that the self-wounding instincts of the Dominicans can be held at bay, at least for a while, to give him and his colleagues a fair chance. We can never be sure of this.

3. Regarding the length of stay of the O.A.S. Peace-Keeping force, he said this had still to be negotiated. This explosive issue should be settled before the Provisional Government got down to work. He thought the force might withdraw from the city to some area nearby, where its physical presence would not be so obvious and oppressive, and the removal of all the various road-blocks, barriers and examination points would have a good psychological effect, at least for a time. He certainly seemed to think that practical considerations needed this force readily available in some way or another, and he made it fairly plain to us that he would want this. As the removal of the O.A.S. force has been demanded by both the Imbert and Caamaño factions, I foresee Hector Garcia Godoy having difficulty here. He did say, however, that Caamaño seemed ready to extend the period from one month to two months after the nomination of the Provisional Government; Imbert, he thought, would not continue to insist on the immediate departure of the force after the announcement of the Provisional Government, as he had previously done.

4. The question of the future of the Armed Forces was easily the most difficult of all. He had previously told me that there could be no question of the Army having even a shadow of its former political power, and their complete subordination to the authority of the civil government had been one of his essential conditions to taking the office. He said now that he hoped the Dominican Army could be incorporated into the O.A.S. force here

R. M. K. Slater, Esq., C.M.G.,  
 American Department,  
 Foreign Office,  
 LONDON, S.W.1.

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temporarily. He was going to arrange a meeting between the leaders of those elements of the Services on the rebel side, and the San Isidro group, as a start to negotiation for a rationalisation of the Armed Forces. Wessin, he said, had agreed to go. Who should stay is the most difficult of the country's immediate problems. He was clearly concerned about the Pentagon's intentions in this field, and the rôle of the U.S. Military Attachés here obviously worried him. He told us that two days before, Lieut. Colonel Heywood, the U.S. Naval Attaché, whose influence on the affairs of this country over the past 2½ months has, in my estimation, been disastrous, drew him on one side and told him that his first charge as President would be the declaration of the Papal Nuncio as persona non grata. Hector was extremely upset about this crudity; it would be impossible for him to run his Government with any hope of success if he was to be subjected to this type of irresponsibility. He thought that the period of life of the Provisional Government should be nine months, six months of which should be devoted to basic restoration to normality, and the last three months to the election campaign.

5. Since talking to Hector, however, the air has been filled with rumours that Eduardo Read Barreras had changed his mind and refused the vice-presidential appointment. There may be something in this. On a more cheerful note, I saw Caamaño and Aristy this morning and they said that Read Barreras had telephoned from Rome that he intended to return immediately to discuss matters with Garcia Godoy and other interested persons. This, thought Caamaño, indicated that Read Barreras would accept the appointment.

6. On 11 July we had a long interview with Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker. He began by speaking rather bitterly about Mayobre, saying that he was excessively partisan in favour of the rebels. You know my opinion that Mayobre's stand on several occasions in these past weeks has done good. There is no doubt about where his sympathies lie, but equally, there is not much doubt that the rebels are cordially hated by the entire U.S. Mission, the U.S. Service Attachés and General Alvim, and if partisanship is to be discussed, some of the actions of the U.S. forces here would hardly bear examination. I did not say <sup>that</sup>, of course, but I think Mayobre has been a balancing factor here, and positive in effect. Ambassador Bunker confirmed that agreement had been reached about Hector Garcia Godoy and Eduardo Read Barreras, and said that he hoped that this agreement could be put into action soon. He did, however, stress that a long, weary road of negotiations still lay before them over four matters. These are: the military, the communists, the Institutional Act, and the length of stay of the O.A.S. Peace-Keeping force.

7. With regard to the first, he said that the departure of Wessin provided no problem since he had agreed to go, and nobody particularly wanted him to stay. The other Service chiefs, however, were laying down very difficult conditions which, one gathered, added up to a continued existence of the Armed Forces on present lines with present chiefs in control. This, said Ambassador Bunker, was not really practical. He added that the Armed Services chiefs were probably in for a shock when the results of the O.A.S. Human Rights Commission became common knowledge. As you know from my telegram No. 156 of 10 July,

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the conclusions of this Commission will point damagingly towards the Imbert faction's complicity in these crimes. I gather that Caminero, whose retention is being strongly pressed by the Americans at the present time, will be especially implicated. On the other hand, the rebels were being unreasonable in demanding the carte blanche dismissal of all persons in responsible positions on the other side.

8. Ambassador Bunker said the question of the communists promised to be very difficult. The Imbert faction's demands for wholesale deportation of persons suspected as communists was scarcely practical, because this was hardly a measure to which U.S. public approval could be given. Apart from that, Donald Reid told him that deporting communists was one of the least wise of his acts; they immediately took themselves to places abroad to receive further instruction and support, and returned to this country clandestinely whenever they chose. This, of course, is true. Fidelio Despradel, for example, who was deported during the Reid régime, returned to the Dominican Republic last October and stayed here in secret ever since. My impression was that Hector Garcia Godoy would not countenance deportation.

9. Dealing with the Institutional Act, he remarked with some irritation that the rebels had taken the opportunity of producing a full-scale printed constitution for the Institutional Act, consisting of 157 articles. This was not at all what was intended or acceptable. He was not going to allow one side to secure terms so favourable to themselves that the election would be anticipated. This is fair enough, of course, but at the same time the rebels are taking a risk in lowering their guard during the life of the Provisional Government, and the need for constitutional safeguards in a matter which concerns life or death for them is understandable. Both sides' proposals for the Institutional Act were now being considered by a committee of jurists from the two factions, which included Cuello and, somewhat to my dismay, that renowned obstructionist, Julio Peynado. I last saw him, by the way, in my house on 29 April. He was on the run, and in fear of his life, had taken shelter in the house of my neighbour, the manager of the First National City Bank. He left early the following morning after telling my neighbour that he could not remain in the house of an American now that the U.S. Marines had landed. Such is the fibre of too many members of the Dominican upper class.

10. On the length of stay of the O.A.S. Peace-Keeping force, Ambassador Bunker did not consider it practical to think in terms of an early withdrawal, and said that he thought it should be here until the result of the elections. He agreed that the Dominican forces could be put into it, but getting agreement for this was going to be extremely difficult. He wound up by saying that the Dominican situation was the most difficult and complex in all his experience, which included the New Guinea affair with Soekarno, and the Yemen. He said there was a long way to go, and all the progress made at present could easily fall to ruins. The country as a whole was sick of the business and longed for normality, but the lack of guts and basic patriotism on part of the governing class was a most distressing feature to him, and he spoke contemptuously of them, saying that Hector Garcia Godoy was one of the few Dominicans prepared to accept the proposal that one should sometimes suffer for one's country.

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11. He remarked that Imbert told him that he could clean up the city in four hours. I said that we had heard that one before, and that it was really not a very sensible statement. You will remember that with considerable help from the U.S. he took seven days to advance 3,000 yards against 800 irregulars last June. Ciudad Nueva, of course, would be a very different matter. Here, at least 5,000 irregulars would come into action, using previously prepared obstacles covered by heavy fire potential. On the basis of his advance in the north he would, I fear, get bogged down in Ciudad Nueva for more than a month. Frankly, I estimate that he would be defeated. I have been round the area to-day (which is probably more than Imbert has) and my opinion remains that this is just as tough a nut to crack as ever it was. The morale of the battalion commanders I spoke to seemed good.

12. Despite Hector Garcia Godoy's assurance that his and Eduardo Read Barreras's nomination was acceptable to both sides, and although Ambassador Bunker assured us that these nominations were supported by Imbert, the latter's radio last night continued to denounce Garcia Godoy as a communist. Not only did this transmitter insist on the deportation of all communists from the country, but required the dismissal of all officers and men who had joined the rebel side from the Armed Forces. The "cleaning-up" of the city was the first pre-requisite to any discussion of the Institutional Act. This truculence is at variance, it seems, with agreements made in private.

13. I am copying this letter to Lord Caradon at the United Kingdom Mission to United Nations, New York, and to Whitehead at Washington.

*Yours ever*

*Stafford*

(S. F. Campbell)

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RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES No 18 21 JUL 1965 AD1015/278
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BRITISH EMBASSY,  
WASHINGTON, D.C.,  
19 July, 1965.

Dear Dick,

The trouble with the twenty-four hour expert is that he knows no shame and writes about it all at great length as though his views and impressions meant anything. I propose to be no exception; partly in order to do something to demonstrate that my visit at your suggestion to Santo Domingo from 9-12 July was a working visit. Indeed perhaps a record of some of the things said to me by people I met have a certain value, and I enclose a summary. I commend to you particularly what Garcia Godoy and Bunker had to say. The Israeli Ambassador is pretty suspect on matters of fact, but is perhaps of interest as the independent judgement of a shrewd and intelligent man. I hope Stafford Campbell will not hesitate to comment on the records and on the rest of this letter.

2. My main purpose was, as you know, to give him a glimpse of the outside world and to demonstrate to him that you and we had by no means forgotten him. I think he appreciated this, and I hope he found my visit worth while. I certainly found it both valuable and enjoyable and am most grateful to him both for much hospitality and for arranging an excellent programme which his impressive range of contacts and friends made possible. I found his cheerfulness and sangfroid after, and still with, so much unpleasantness and frustration quite admirable.

3. I hope you will not mind if I set down some rather sweeping impressions and conclusions which are admittedly very subjective. But perhaps the detached view of a complete outsider has a certain interest.

4. The situation in the Dominican Republic is not, I suppose, hopeless. But it contains so many built-in elements of instability for the foreseeable future that it must be regarded as in large measure intractable and curable only by the passage of time and further bitter and probably bloody experience. I do not know whether Dominican politics make the Dominicans what they are or vice versa. However it may be, the widespread hatred of the armed forces and police; the personal rivalries, ambitions and jealousies of the politicians of all factions; the general tendency to violence; and the marked social and economic disparities which exist all combine to make the task

/of

R. M. K. Slater, Esq., C.M.G.,  
American Department,  
Foreign Office, S.W.1.

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of any Government which is out to do a good job for the country indescribably difficult. It is true that there is a certain feeling of the need for peace and stability, but the will to work together to bring it about barely exists and will not last. I think I am not doing violence to Stafford Campbell's views if I say that he has no illusions about the demerits of both sides in this affair. His basic argument has been that Caamano and his people are a force to be reckoned with and must be taken into account in a settlement. The O.A.S. Mission is now doing this.

5. If anybody can do the job ahead, Garcia Godoy can, but he cannot do it single-handed and he will not get the support he should even from those who may agree to join his Government, let alone from the leaders and factions outside it. For him to undertake the job at all is a great personal sacrifice and hazard. He will be blamed for every unpopular but necessary measure and get no credit for any achievement. He will be lucky if he can satisfy any of the people some of the time.

6. The most immediate dangers and threats, even if the political negotiations succeed, will be these (in no particular order of importance). Continued or renewed revolutionary activity on the part of those elements of Caamano's group which are opposing a settlement seems inevitable. The 12,000 weapons distributed among them during the coup will certainly in sufficient measure be retained and re-used by them. The armed forces, even as reorganised by Garcia Godoy, will seek to use their strength to influence political developments. Their backs have not been and cannot conceivably be decisively broken. Their activity and influence can be spontaneous, but will vary in intensity in direct proportion to the extent to which the dissident left-wing extremists are active in Santo Domingo or the country as a whole. They cannot be effectively controlled by the President on the basis of a paper Institutional Act or Constitution. They are unlikely to reject the amnesty, and many old scores remain to be settled by both sides. These are the major spectres, and there are still all the difficulties and problems arising from the secular characteristics of Dominican life and politics which I have outlined.

7. In this situation, the President and his Government can only succeed if they have non-Dominican sanctions at their disposal on the spot, whether political, economic or military. This means an O.A.S. political presence, an effective Alliance for Progress programme, and, most important of all, an O.A.S. military force. All of these at least up to the time of the elections if not beyond. Of course elections held under a "foreign military occupation" will be an easy target for every sort of hostile propaganda, but if these sanctions are not maintained, I would

/bet

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bet a lot of money that elections in every reasonable sense of the term will never be held. The provisional Government will be overthrown and there will be either prolonged civil war, a new military dictatorship, or a Left-wing extremist take over. Garcia Godoy will of course wish to minimise the foreign pressure, especially military, to the greatest possible extent (e.g. by moving the O.A.S. force outside Santo Domingo) and will be anxious to get rid of it as soon as he safely can. It may be politically essential for him to do so before an election.

8. In point of fact, I feel sure that the Americans have no intention whatever of allowing these sanctions to disappear until they deem it safe, and are willing to finance their maintenance indefinitely. They will disregard any amount of outside pressure in order to do so, up to and including a veto in the Security Council. If they lose O.A.S. support and co-operation, they will go it alone. A good yardstick of what the Dominican Republic means to them is the fact that, according to Kennedy Crockett, they are financing the present O.A.S. political economic and military effort to the tune of some \$40 million a month and are prepared to spend a great deal more. If they miscalculate their withdrawal, and the situation turns sour again, they will not hesitate to go back in.

9. They will not allow the United Nations to become involved to any greater extent than at present, and would be happy to do without even that. If the United Nations were to press for a greater degree of control, whether from New York or on the spot, there would be the real risk of a showdown between the United Nations and the United States., with all the sweeping and fundamental consequences which would ensue for the former's whole future. There could be similar consequences for bilateral relations between the United States and individual countries which might support any United Nations attempt to become deeply involved or usurp the O.A.S. role (or the United States role, if the O.A.S. fell down on the job, as well it might).

10. Looking at the thing from the United Nations point of view, I cannot imagine a more unrewarding, stultifying or indeed dangerous affair for it to become directly involved in. Even if it could mount an effort as effective and costly as the United States, whether through the O.A.S. or directly, is prepared to do and is doing, it could never even begin to cope with the Dominican parties and factions, armed to the teeth as they are, nor with the intractable nature of Dominican politics for lack of clear and effective political guidance and control. This would be a Congo multiplied ten times, and however unsuccessful the O.A.S./United States effort may turn out to be the United Nations could not fail to do worse.

11. I probably have no right to make these latter observations, and I must emphasise how purely personal they are. This is however not a matter of generalising from the particular, but of identifying what seem to me fundamentals.

/12.

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AD 105/263

12. To turn to more legitimate comment, I of course read with great interest Stafford Campbell's letter of 1 July to you. On paragraphs 4-6 of this, I would only add Kennedy Crockett's remark (so illustrative of the internal situation) that Wessin needed throughout to bear in mind that the moment he committed himself across the Duarte bridge, there was every likelihood that his fellow Generale would bite him from behind. Paragraphs 8-9 seem to me pretty well-justified, and indeed it was remarkable to see to what extent the G.N.R. still enjoys advantages over Caamano in terms of freedom of movement and so on. Their communiqués, for instance, were posted up in the Embajador Hotel, where Caamano's people do not get a look in. So far as I could judge, G.N.R. people controlled immigration and customs at the civil airport (and a nasty-looking lot they were, too). On paragraph 11, I simply cannot really explain why the Bundy mission had no immediate apparent effect. It is interesting though that when on his return Bundy announced his intentions of holding a press conference, this was vetoed by the President as soon as he heard of it. I can only speculate that the President decided that, despite having seen Bundy's reports, whatever shortcomings the American Embassy might have had, he would not afford to repudiate his own statements of the beginning of May nor publicly turn Ambassador Bennett into a scapegoat. No doubt the Senate hearings now going on will also prove to be something of a whitewashing operation. I hope to get transcripts and let you have comments on them in due course. On paragraph 13, Kennedy Crockett here assures me that the figure of 12,000 Communists was never even heard, let alone used as a working assumption, in Washington, and that military intelligence material was throughout classed as fourth-rate. He thought there might have been some confusion with the numbers of arms distributed (see the Israeli Ambassador's calculation of the number of Communists!) Finally, on paragraph 16, I agree in so far as the American Embassy in Santo Domingo are concerned, but not really as regards the Americans in Washington or the Administration as a whole. I think they were misled at first by reporting from Santo Domingo, but must fairly soon have become leery of it, or the Bundy mission, which was an unbelievably high-powered affair, would not have been sent down. I think they have known the basic truths since then, and indeed Bunker seems to be operating on the right lines. An American intervention would have been inevitable in such a situation under almost any conceivable American Administration, though it could have been handled very differently in terms of tactics. It was undoubtedly justified in terms of protection of United States lives and property, and I have through all this affair had at the back of my mind the lively recollection that in the course of some joint discussion of Jordan contingency planning two years ago they had in mind just such an operation as a means to much broader ends. I do not recollect that this horrified us at that time. The Americans would agree with Stafford Campbell about the great need for social reform, but not that the preservation of Caamano is an essential part of the operation.

/13.

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- 5 -

13. I can only conclude by apologising for writing at such length and placing it on record that a posting to Santo Domingo would come very low indeed on my post preference form.

14. I am copying this letter to Stafford Campbell in Santo Domingo and Anthony Acland in New York.

*Yours ever*

*John Killick*

(J. E. Killick)

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FROM SANTO DOMINGO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTP

FO/CRO/WH.DISTRIBUTION

Mr. Campbell

No. 161  
21 July, 1965

D. 1959 21 July, 1965

R. 2000 21 July, 1965

RECEIVED IN
ARCHIVES No.39
22 JUL 1965
AD1015/279

IMMEDIATE  
CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 161 of 21 July.

Repeated for information to: Washington  
UKMis New York

Reference Cury's telegram of 20 July to the Venezuelan Government about violation of the cease fire.

I spoke to Mayebre about 22 rounds of 81 millimetre mortar fire which struck the rebel zone on 20 July. He told me that the United Nations have evidence of 2 eye witnesses who separately saw a mortar fired from the Imbert controlled zone north of the city at the time concerned. Witnesses stated that an Imbert tank stationed in a school playground moved away shortly after midnight. A jeep containing a mortar and detachment later took its place, set up mortar, fired and withdrew. The tank then returned to its original position. This is the fifth occasion of the kind but previously eye witnesses have refused to come forward in fear of reprisals. The aim appears to be to cause the rebels to open fire on O.A.S. troops in retaliation, but Caamane's orders to hold fire on this and previous occasions has been obeyed.

2. Mayebre said that Bunker entered a strong protest with the Imbert authorities on the 20 July. If Cury were not so free with his telegrams and used more temperate language in them the undoubted justice of his complaint would have better effect. As to the Imbert faction, added United States disenchantment will probably be the product of this latest blunder.

Foreign Office pass Washington 86, UKMis New York 47.

[Repeated as requested.]

ADVANCE COPIES:

P.S.  
P.U.S.  
Mr. Rennie

Hd. of American Dept.<sup>23</sup>  
Hd. of News Dept.<sup>12</sup>

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6	6

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1965



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RECEIVED  
CONFIDENTIAL22 JUBRITISH EMBASSY,  
WASHINGTON, D.C.

AD 1015/280 19 July, 1965.

Dear Dick,

By a strange coincidence I found, on my return from Santo Domingo, that Reid Cabral was scheduled to speak to the National Press Club here a few days later. So of course I went to listen to him, and enclose a transcript of his remarks. I found it pretty superficial stuff, but it was good enough for the bulk of his audience, which was a full house by Press Club standards and gave him a good reception.


2. Having heard Stafford Campbell's stories of Reid's activities in the field of getting cars into the country duty-free for resale through his business, I cannot say I was wrung with compassion on hearing what he said about reform of the customs service and the prevention of contraband!

3. Obviously, some of the members of the American press who have been carrying the torch against the Administration on the Dominican Republic were present and Reid made a pretty poor fist of answering their questions (submitted anonymously and in writing).

4. In reply to questions, Reid described the Republic's most crying need as education. He said he had not requested the U.S. intervention. He denied having fallen out with Wessin. Having referred to the outright Communist character of the coup and publicly disagreed with President Johnson's description of its nature, he was caught on his own hook and asked why he had allowed so many Communists to remain loose; he could only cite his deportation of 34. He failed dismally to document the allegation that Bosch had facilitated Communist inroads. He asserted that 10,000 more people would have been killed if the Americans had not intervened when they did. When asked to identify by name the Communists with Caamaño he could only say tamely that it was difficult to give names--these people did not show their faces. There were "some Cubans, one Chinese, and one Algerian"! He was sure there would be a bloodbath if the O.A.S. withdraw.

5. Altogether, it was a poor performance.

6. I am copying this letter and enclosure to Stafford Campbell.

Yours ever,  
  
 (J.E. Killick).

R.M.K. Slater, Esq. C.M.G.,  
 American Department,  
 Foreign Office,  
 London, S.W.1.

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- 3 AUG 1965

AD1015/262

(53/1/10)

BRITISH EMBASSY,  
SANTO DOMINGO.

19 July, 1965.

*inter p. 1*  
*2/3*

*My dear Buel,*

AD1015/276

In my hurried letter of 15 July enclosing a press cutting of the M.P.D. statement which, I consider, is about as good a summary of M.P.D.'s thinking as it is possible to get at the present time, I meant to draw your attention to the fact that it was signed by Cayetano Rodriguez del Prado. Your telegram No. 98 of 24 May referred to a B.B.C. monitoring of an Imbert broadcast on 20 May which claimed that Cayetano Rodriguez had been killed with Fernandez Dominguez on 19 May. You commented that if Cayetano had been killed it was surprising that the fact had not been more publicised.

AD1015/196

2. I had intended to reply to this in the following bag but, in the pressure of events at the time, I fear I overlooked it. It was widely announced that Cayetano Rodriguez had been killed but I was not at all sure that this was true. My information was that he was not in the city on 19 May, having gone into the interior. Moreover, his name did not figure in the list of killed given to me by Aristy shortly afterwards. I, therefore, omitted his name. As he was one of the names passed to you in my telegram No. 46 of 5 May I would certainly have told you if I thought that report was reliable.

AD1015/91/G

3. Cayetano Rodriguez del Prado is, I gather, now the effective leader of the M.P.D., and is very active in Ciudad Nueva at the present time. My information is that Román was the only communist killed in this affray; Capozzi was not a communist but an Italian soldier of fortune, and a friend of Rivière, the former French Legionnaire anti-Gaullist. The latter was also listed as a communist by the Americans but I fear he was nothing of the kind. He had been obliged to flee France on the collapse of the O.A.S. (French) movement against de Gaulle. For your information, Rivière was also killed later on 15 July, when the Americans attacked the city in strength.

*Your ever*  
*S. F. Campbell*

G. W. Harding, Esq.,  
American Department,  
Foreign Office,  
LONDON, S.W.1.


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& copy to Chancery, London.*

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
BRITISH EMBASSY,  
SANTO DOMINGO.

24 July, 1965.

*My dear Sir,*

In conversation with Victor Cabral on 21 July he hinted rather pointedly to me that Ramfis Trujillo was giving money to the rebel side. He may have said something similar to you in London (I gather you had dinner together recently). As we all know, his wife is Ramfis's cousin, and the clan occasionally forgathers to discuss matters. He also told me that Ramfis financed the return of Fidelio Despradel and others when they came back here last year. The explosive collusion between the extreme left and the extreme right here always adds an extra dimension to things, e.g. Tony Imbert's contacts with 14th of June and P.S.P. Reid, I believe, occasionally flirted with 14th of June also.

Victor is going to Miami this weekend to join his wife, who is staying at the Trujillo house there. He has invited me to go along. I would love to do so, of course, but cannot take my hand off the wheel at the moment. He is possibly coming to London soon for a few days for a purpose which he has not disclosed. (Perhaps, like the Dominican First Secretary in Rio in Ramfis's time, he has instructions to shoot his Ambassador!)

*Yours ever*
  
 (S. R. C. C. C. C.)

G. W. Harding, Esq.,  
American Department,  
Foreign Office,  
LONDON, S.W.1.

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*Emery* ~~126~~



(53/1/1)

- 3 AUG 1965  
AD1015/284

BRITISH EMBASSY,  
SANTO DOMINGO.

28 July, 1965.

*My dear Sir,*

Eduardo Read Barreras, who returned from Rome recently to discuss his possible candidature for the Vice-Presidency under Hector Garcia Godoy, has finally announced that he will not accept this appointment. There have been rumours over the past week to the effect that he would probably refuse, but my hopes rose last Saturday when he called at the house of the New York Times' correspondent here and told him that he was going to accept. However, he changed his mind later it seems, and now another name has got to be thought up. This I hope will not cause too much delay.

2. I am copying this letter to Lord Caradon at the U.K. Mission to United Nations, New York, and to Sutherland at Washington.

*Yours ever*  
*Stafford*  
(S. F. Campbell)

R. M. K. Slater, Esq., C.M.G.,  
American Department,  
Foreign Office,  
LONDON, S.W.1.

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GUARD

(53/1/1)

BRITISH EMBASSY,  
SANTO DOMINGO.

- 3 AUG 1965

AD1015/285 29 July, 1965.

My dear Dick,

As expected, the major difficulty in coming to a final agreement on the Provisional Government is about the future of the military. I saw Hector Garcia Godoy on 28 July at his brother-in-law's house, just after he had come from a meeting with Caamaño and his military advisers. Up to the present the rebels have been insisting on the wholesale dismissal of the prominent military personalities in the Imbert faction, but Garcia Godoy told me that he had at last persuaded them to move from this inflexible and intemperate position. They were now ready to retain some of the persons to whom they had originally objected, but they still insist that this cannot include Rivera Caminero. I know Hector is anxious to keep Commodore Jimenez, now Head of the Navy in the Imbert faction, who was at one time Naval Attaché in London, and is married to a British woman. About three weeks ago, I spoke to Aristy about Jimenez when he was talking about personalities anathema to the rebels, and he told me that they had no particular objection to Jimenez, although he had obeyed the orders of Rivera Caminero which led to the naval shelling of the city.

2. Garcia Godoy told me that Caamaño had wanted ten officers from each side to sit round a table to discuss the future of the Armed Forces, but Rivera Caminero had refused. When I asked him why, Hector said that it was probably because Rivera Caminero saw some danger of an under-the-table rapprochement, from which he could be excluded, in such a meeting. I am told from various sources that the Junta is having trouble with its military, and the number of officers stated to have been arrested and imprisoned recently is really very large. I cannot confirm this. Rivera Caminero, for his part, wanted a meeting between himself and Caamaño alone. This, bearing in mind the tone of rebel propaganda about Caminero, connecting him consistently with the atrocities, is hardly practical. Hector Garcia Godoy has now obtained Caamaño's agreement to a meeting between a group of middle-piece officers from both sides to break the ice, and when he left me it was to go to Rivera Caminero's house to obtain his agreement to this.

3. Garcia Godoy's main preoccupation at the moment, however, is the Pentagon's representatives' intentions here. He said that he has the full co-operation of the Ad Hoc Committee headed by Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker, but the Service Attachés of the U.S. Embassy, and in particular Lieut. Colonel Heywood, the Naval Attaché, are, according to him, acting in such a way as to block all progress in connection with the military question. This officer is insisting, and has continued to insist for more than a month, that Rivera Caminero shall retain his office as Minister of Defence in the Provisional Government. Garcia Godoy had spoken to Harry Shlaudeman about what he thought was exceptional interference of the U.S. Service Attachés in the negotiations, but had gained the impression that, although Shlaudeman agreed with him, the State Department

/was

R. M. K. Slater, Esq., C.M.G.,  
American Department,  
Foreign Office,  
LONDON, S.W.1.

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was not willing to take any corrective action. As you know, I have ceased to be surprised at most things that happen here; I was taken aback, however, to learn from Hector that the meetings between himself and the Imbert military to decide the future of the Armed Forces have been held in Heywood's private house, with Heywood and the other U.S. Service Attachés taking an active part in the conversations. This clumsy nonsense, said Hector, was so at variance with the principle that the Dominicans should appear to be settling their own affairs, and so potentially damaging to his own position, that he had had to tell Heywood that he had no intention of attending further meetings on Dominican national matters in his house. He thinks, as I do, that it would profit everyone if Heywood and his colleagues were moved from here, and he told Shlaudeman that if the United States did not take them away, he would be obliged as President to make it plain that they were not welcome. Shlaudeman said that he would privately applaud this, but one gathers that he will not, or cannot, do much more.

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4. We then discussed the withdrawal of Eduardo Read Barreras from the Vice-Presidential candidature, which I reported in my letter of 28 July. Ambassador Bunker is said to have described this as a clear case of "chickening out". Hector said that Read Barreras had in the past shown himself to be reluctant to face up to real difficulties and, unfortunately, he had been got at by Bonnolly and his group, who had been working steadily upon this weakness to get him to refuse. Bonnolly, it seems, is now beginning to have ambitions for the Provisional Presidency for himself, and is intriguing, without much success, among the Imbert army officers for support. It seems extraordinary that Bonnolly and his friends cannot recognise the significance of the rising and civil war, and that there is no hope for his kind in the foreseeable future. The last news I had of Bonnolly, incidentally, was early in May when he had gone to his house near Santiago with Tapia and some others. Fighting broke out around his property between the Police and rebels, whereupon he and the rest of the party fled to Puerto Plata. His next-door neighbour, a Dutchman, told the head of Shell that within three minutes of their departure his house was totally sacked, even to the extent of digging out the tiles on the veranda.

5. Regarding the Vice-Presidency, Garcia Godoy said that he thought the solution would be to settle for a Government with least possible delay without that office being filled, and later to elect a Vice-President from the Council of Ministers. It was the rebels who had insisted upon this office, on the grounds that if anything happened to Garcia Godoy their vulnerability would become sharply apparent.

6. Good progress has been made over the matter of the Institutional Act, and the 151 articles which the rebels produced have now been whittled down to about 50. However, Imbert (probably egged on by Heywood) is beginning to object that this Institutional Act was not at all in the spirit of the O.A.S. proposals, and thus the prospect of even more delay looms up if his objections are taken seriously. Imbert clearly thinks that delay plays into his hands. Last week a delegation of seven men came from the Cibao to the American Embassy and presented a formal demand for Imbert to be made President of the country, claiming that majority opinion desired this. Hector told me that the Ad Hoc Committee, and Ambassador Bunker

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in particular, were most annoyed at this little charade. Bunker knows perfectly well that Imbert's popularity in the Country is nil; this, in fact, is what all the negotiations have been about, because if Imbert could have claimed any real popularity the Americans would have <sup>made</sup> claimed him ~~as a~~ Provisional President without hesitation. One of the reasons they have had to treat with the rebels is because Imbert, the alternative, was political poison. He said that the Ad Hoc Committee's patience with Imbert was now wearing very thin and Bunker, who cordially loathes the rebels, has had just about as much as he is going to stand from Imbert too. He is tired of the negotiations and increasingly irritated by the Imbert delaying tactics which appear whenever it looks as if an agreement is possible. One of the more deplorable but typically Dominican features of the present scene is the total failure on part of responsible and educated people to consult and act together to see what they can do for their country and themselves. However, I am glad to hear that the Santiago newspaper "La Información", which has not been published since the beginning of the revolt, is coming out in the next few days with a special edition which will be devoted entirely to an expression of the views of prominent personalities about what should be done. The editorial is to be written in four parts by Herrera of "Listin Diario"; Moreno Morillo, editor of "Ahora, a weekly review; possibly German Ornes of "El Caribe"; and the editor of "La Información". I gather it will show overwhelming acceptance of the O.A.S. proposals, as they now stand, for a Provisional Government under Hector Garcia Godoy, by the various organisations of businessmen in Santo Domingo, and in Santiago, and the professional associations and trade unions. It may do some good. In the meantime, we wait and wait.

7. I am copying this letter to Lord Caradon at the U.K. Mission to United Nations, New York, and to Sutherland at Washington.

*Yours ever*

*S. F. Campbell*

(S. F. Campbell)

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FROM SANTO DOMINGO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTP

RECEIVED IN  
ARCHIVES No 39  
- 9 AUG 1965  
FD 1015/287

FO/CRO/WH  
DISTRIBUTION

Mr. Campbell  
No. 167  
7 August, 1965.

D. 1800 7 August, 1965.  
R. 1810 7 August, 1965.

PRIORITY  
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Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 167 of 7 August  
Repeated for information to: Washington  
UKMIS New York

The past week has recorded some increased United States pressure on Imbert and anti O.A.S. tone of his radio has sharply risen. Pay for his armed forces is withheld by the O.A.S. and a considerable redeployment of United States units to positions facing his troops has taken place. There are suggestions of division between the Junta and its armed forces but there is some way to go yet before this becomes significant. The O.A.S. negotiations with rebels continue with apparent success. It is thought that the Pentagon insistence on Caminero for Minister of Defence is lessening. [? Grp. omitted] have handed to O.A.S. a photostat copy of a document which shows that Caminero placed a large sum in his New York account in mid-June. Garcia Godoy is still fully in the running and a provisional Government is hoped for this month. The economic situation in the country as a whole seems less serious than originally thought. Whilst business in the capital is at bankrupt level, sugar exports were maintained from provincial ports and agriculture in the interior has been little affected.

Foreign Office pass Washington 87, UKMIS New York 48.

[Repeated as requested.]

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1965

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SECRET - GUARD  
FROM SANTO DOMINGO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTP

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

Mr. Campbell

No. 169  
15 August 1965

D. 0306 ~~16 August 1965~~  
R. 0319 ~~16 August 1965~~

RECEIVED IN  
ARCHIVES No. 39

16 AUG 1965

IMMEDIATESECRET

AD1015/289

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 169 of 15 August.  
Repeated for information to: Washington UKMIS New York

GUARD

I lunched with Bunker on 14 August; also present were the Nuncio and French, German and Italian Ambassadors. Bunker was very sensitive about the act of reconciliation and plainly surprised and upset by the rebel reception of it. He blamed all the present trouble on the rebels and said that it was clear the Communists were controlling Caamano. He asserted that the rebels had no right to insist on the dismissal of Wessin, Caminero and others before the Provisional Government took office. These were not objective or balanced views, and unlike him. He reluctantly agreed with me that Imbert's acceptance was really worthless; also that Imbert was not politically viable. He later agreed that Imbert's delaying tactics had wasted an enormous amount of time. There were many contradictions in his views. I am satisfied that the act had no ulterior motive and was made in good faith but it demonstrates that America fails to comprehend the mentality of the Caamano group. These people have made great sacrifices for whatever it is they are fighting for and the act was unwise and badly conceived from that standpoint.

2. I saw Garcia Godoy alone today and was much heartened on hearing that matters had improved since I saw Bunker. Caamano told him that he would yield over dismissing the generals, saying that his movement would trust Garcia Godoy to do what is best for the country. Garcia Godoy has accepted this hot potato. He tells me that nothing will stop him from dismissing the generals immediately. He then saw Caminero who volunteered to resign in the first month of the Provisional Government and asked to be sent to Washington. Garcia Godoy says that his word is probably worthless but he knows that Caminero has deposited more

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CONFIDENTIAL



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RECEIVED IN  
AUG 18 1965  
AD1015/290

BRITISH EMBASSY,  
SANTO DOMINGO.

11 August, 1965.

*Dear Bill,*

The resignation of Julio Postigo from the Imbert junta was announced yesterday. This, I fancy, is the first outward sign of the impending break-up of the "Government of Reconstruction" formed under Tony Imbert in early May.

2. Julio Postigo was always a fish out of water in the junta. A bookish man with basically liberal ideas, he was known to be unhappy there, and the fact that his son joined the rebels during his tenure in the "Government of National Reconstruction" was hardly calculated to further domestic felicity. I believe Postigo has been wanting to resign for some weeks but has been persuaded to hold his hand. His seat on the junta has been taken by Ing. Leonte Bernard Vásquez, whom I do not know. In any case, if the signs I detect mean what I think, it is a paper transaction: the junta cannot have much longer to live.

*What: a provisional  
govt. soon?*

3. I am copying this letter to Acland at the United Kingdom Mission to the U.N., New York, and to Whitehead at Washington.

*Yours  
Stafford*

(S. F. Campbell)

G. W. Harding, Esq.,  
American Department,  
Foreign Office,  
LONDON, S.W.1.

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SECRET - GUARDFROM SANTO DOMINGO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTP

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

Mr. Campbell

No. 171  
17 August, 1965.D: Untimed.  
R: 0017 18 August, 1965.IMMEDIATE  
SECRETRECEIVED IN  
ARCHIVES  
18 AUG 1965Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 171

AD 1015/291/G

of 17 AugustRepeated for information to Washington  
UKMis New YorkGUARD.

Over weekend I heard two tape recordings taken here between 25 April and 29 April, which were obtained by monitoring radio frequencies used by San Isidro and Wessin-controlled out-station during the fighting. Five more tapes exist and I understand that the whole seven amount to a substantial record of signal traffic between Wessin's headquarters, the Air Force, the Navy, and the United States Service Attaché.

2. I am reliably informed that one of these, which I have not yet heard, records a conversation between Heywood the United States Naval Attaché and Caminero on the morning of 27 April prior to the naval bombardment of the city. I am assured that this tape records Carinero's insistence on opening fire with his ships on Santo Domingo and Heywood's voice asking Caminero to hold fire until 11 a.m., in view of the possibility of a conference. Later, Heywood is said tacitly to agree that fire should be opened, but warning Caminero to avoid hitting the port of Haina and the Hotel Embajador. Haina was later used as an entry port for United States forces and United States civilians were being evacuated from the hotel.

3. The reason I could not hear this tape myself is that it was away being copied. It is not impossible that a copy will find its way to the United States. I am taking earliest opportunity of hearing this tape myself, but

/thought

SECRET - GUARD

SECRET - GUARD

Santo Domingo telegram No. 171 to Foreign Office

- 2 -

thought it prudent to warn you right away that it is reliably said to exist in the form described.

Foreign Office pass Washington No. 90 and UKMis New York No. 51.

[Repeated as requested]

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P.U.S.D.

ADVANCE COPIES

Private Secretary  
P.U.S.  
Mr. Rennie  
Head of American Department  
Head of P.U.S.D.

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SECRET - GUARD

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FROM SANTO DOMINGO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

RECEIVED IN  
ARCHIVES No.37  
23 AUG 1965  
AD1015/292

A<sup>9</sup>

Cypher/OTP

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

Mr. Campbell

No. 175

20 August 1965

D. 2331 20 August 1965

R. 0210 21 August 1965

IMMEDIATE

CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 175 of 20 August  
Repeated for information to:

Washington, U.K. Mission New York  
Caracas.

GUARD

Garcia Godey told me today that Shlaudeman had called on him to discuss a telegram received from Washington. It appears that President Leoni of Venezuela had been approached by "a mutual friend of Garcia Godey and President Leoni" asking Leoni to use his influence in Washington to stress the need to remove Dominican Generals without delay. President Leoni had consequently called on the United States Ambassador in Caracas and asked him to [pgp omitted] his views to the White House strongly supporting the removal of the Generals and stressing that this matter had been needlessly holding up a settlement for too long. The Washington telegram asked for an account of the current difficulty over this point. Shlaudeman wanted to know who the mutual friend was.

2. Garcia Godey said that he did not knew and that the news was a surprise. However if Shlaudeman wanted to do the right thing he should say that there was no reason why these men should not be removed forthwith. After some discussion Shlaudeman said that they would probably arrange for the removal of Wessin and De Les Santes (Air Force) at the same time.

Garcia Godey said that this move of Leoni's was separate from and additional to that mentioned at paragraph 4 of my telegram No. 169 (not to all).

3. Tempers cooled down here appreciably on postponement of the Security Council meeting scheduled for 18 August and some progress is being made.

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Academia Dominicana de la Historia

CONFIDENTIAL - GUARD

Santa Domingo telegram No. 175 to Foreign Office

- 2 -

Foreign Office pass Washington No. 92, U.K. Mission New York  
No. 53, Caracas No. 9.

[Repeated as requested]

DISTRIBUTED TO:

American Dept.  
U.N. Dept.  
Northern Dept.  
I.P. Dept.  
I.R. Dept.  
News Dept.

ADVANCE COPIES TO:

Private Secretary  
Mr. Rennie  
Hd American Dept.  
Hd News Dept.  
Hd I.P. Dept.  
Resident Clerk

CONFIDENTIAL - GUARD

77777





BRITISH EMBASSY,

WASHINGTON

19 August, 1965.

RECEIVED 23/8  
ARCHIVES  
26 AUG 1965  
AD 1015/293/G

10225/65.

SECRET

Dear Sir,

AD 1013/5/G

I am sorry not to have sent you an earlier reply to your letter (AD 1015/278) of 2 August about the Dominican Republic. The reasons for this are set out in a separate letter which I have sent to Jack Rennie about other aspects of a talk I had with Jack Vaughn on 17 August. As you know, since Iain Sutherland's departure we have been a little hard put to it to cover Latin America very fully but I hope that with Robin Johnstone's arrival we shall now be able to pursue the Office of Caribbean Affairs more energetically. In any event, however, as you know, we do not have a very high opinion of them and I confess that I was glad to learn from Vaughn that Ken Crockett, the present Director of the Office, will shortly be leaving. I hope his successor will be both more forthcoming and more effective.

2. At all events, I felt it essential to await the opportunity of a talk with Vaughn before replying to you.

AD 1015/278

3. I told him, with all due diffidence, briefly of such conclusions as I had drawn from my visit as set out in my letter to you on 19 July and then did my best to draw him out on the particular points which you raise in your letter.

AD 1024/16

4. As regards your second paragraph, although I did not ask Vaughn about this in terms, he had I felt already made it clear enough to what lengths the Americans remain prepared to go in the Caribbean by his categoric assertion in relation to Haiti (~~our telegram No. 137 Saving~~) that they would not hesitate to intervene again to "protect American lives and property" if necessary. I am afraid in short that I would be dishonest if I were in any way to modify the impression I have left with you that the Americans remain determined to pursue their present policies, which they judge to be vital to them, in the strictest sense of the word, in terms of their national security. It is true that no catastrophic new development seems at present likely in Santo Domingo, but I feel sure the Americans privately attach importance to the deterrent effect elsewhere of continued toughness. Of course they are uncomfortable about the damage which has already been done to the fabric of O.A.S. but seem to have hope of building on the wreckage (see our telegram No. 137 Saving). They are certainly conscious of the fact that they would have been much wiser to have made an effort to consult with their other friends and allies and carry them along with them, and we must hope that they will do better in this regard in future. It is not my impression that they really attach much importance to the U.N. angle and they would indeed dispute that what they have done has in any way made a serious inroad on the authority of the U.N. I will not go into this in greater detail here; their attitude is based on more than just the legal niceties of the situation although they

R.M.K. Slater, Esq., C.M.G.,  
FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.

SECRET

23 VIII /would...  
Mr Harding

SECRET

-2-

would no doubt have preferred it if they could have gone into the Dominican Republic at the invitation of some more or less legitimate authority. They would certainly argue that far more damage has been done to the U.Ns. by the failure of the organisation to insist on the strict application of Article 19; and as a corollary they would no doubt argue further that, given the Article 19 situation, reference of the Dominican Republic crisis to the U.N. would have led only to a disastrous loss of time with no effective result.

4. I agree with you that the situation as regards the U.N. is at the moment satisfactory enough and seems likely to remain so, so long as the Security Council does not seek to expand the extent of U.N. involvement. It was a relief to see in this connexion that the Caamano faction seem unlikely to press for a further meeting of the Council at present (UKMIS New York telegram No.1892).

5. I should incidentally be grateful for some further enlightenment on just how far we really are firmly and always committed to ascertaining the primacy of the U.N. over regional organisations. Leaving aside situations like Berlin, in which great power confrontations are involved and in which we seem as a general rule to agree that the U.N. is powerless, there are surely other situations in which we as a matter of policy think it right for a regional organisation to take action and for the U.N. to do nothing. I am thinking particularly at the moment of the problem of the Southern Sudan where we seem to have no alternative to hoping that the O.A.U. will take some initiative. And we have surely long wished that the O.A.U. would look after the Congo. *Above all, what about Malaysia/Singapore?*

6. As regards your paragraph 3, I mentioned to Vaughn the 1962 elections and enquired about his ideas on the continued presence of the I.A.P.F. right up to the time of the forthcoming elections. As I had expected, he argued that the situation now was totally different from 1962. As you yourself say, tempers are running higher now, and there is a much greater availability of arms and a much greater likelihood of their being used. Furthermore, Vaughn felt that the I.A.P.F. was the only ultimate sanction available to the President for keeping the military, whoever their leaders may continue to be, under adequate control. Whatever the Institutional Act might say about the President's powers over the military, this would be meaningless unless some such sanction were available. Vaughn said that although the I.A.P.F. would be scaled down and he hoped positioned less obtrusively than in Santo Domingo itself, it would certainly have to stay on, and the disadvantage of its becoming a target of attack and opposition would have to be accepted.

7. It is difficult to comment from here at long range on the actual negotiations going on about exactly which officers might

/stay on..

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AB 228/103

assessing?



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-3-

AD 1015/289

stay on in the armed forces. Things in Santo Domingo seem to change from day to day. Stafford Campbell's telegrams Nos. 168 and 169 were disturbing in this respect but Vaughn's attitude was more reassuring. He said that he had a good impression of only one officer, Jimenez, who he thought ought to be retained. He seemed to have no wish to fight for the retention of any others in particular. As regards Wessin, the D.I.A. Daily Intelligence Bulletin of 13 August said without comment that Wessin had stated that he would retire to the U.S. as soon as a settlement was reached. Caminero was said to wish to become Military Attaché in Washington again.

8. Ever since my visit to Santo Domingo I have myself been disturbed about the role of the American Service Attachés. You will recollect that Garcia Godoy raised this of his own volition when I called on him down there. In view of subsequent developments and in particular of the fact that Godoy has now laid his cards on the table with Bunker about this I felt it would do no harm, if (of course without referring to what had passed between Godoy and Bunker) I quoted quite bluntly to Vaughn what Godoy had said to me. I emphasised that I was doing so with all due diffidence and Vaughn's reaction was not at all hostile. Naturally it was not to be expected that he would accept that the Service Attachés were behaving in a dangerous and irresponsible manner, but he left me with the clear impression that he was fully aware of the problem. He made no attempt to speak up in their defence and confined himself only to offering excuses for them to the effect that in the discharge of their military duties they naturally formed opinions of personalities and established relations with them on the basis of military criteria which were not politically realistic. He volunteered nothing about Garcia Godoy's approach to Bunker nor about Munoz Marin's activities.

9. I raised with Vaughn the question of getting under way some form of "accion civica militar" to which you referred in your paragraph 4. His response was immediate and positive. He said not only that action of this sort was indeed essential and a matter of high priority but that the necessary plans were all drawn up and funds were available. There was every intention of getting on with practical implementation at the earliest possible moment.

AD 1071/27

10. Since, as you will see from my separate letter to Jack Rennie, the situation in the Dominican Republic was not the main object of my call on Vaughn, I was not able to have any lengthy or detailed discussion of it with him. I am afraid I was not able to go into the question of the timing of elections or the current position about the "Act of Reconciliation" on which you will meanwhile have had our telegram No. 2057. In any case, the situation as regards current negotiations in Santo Domingo changes so rapidly that it is not easy to give you any blow by blow account of State Department thinking.

11. In general, however, I would think we ought on the whole to remain reassured by the fundamental common sense which has

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/always..



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AD1015/259

AD1071/31

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1280

always been demonstrated in the past by Bunker in other mediatory roles, and not be put out by flashes of irritation such as that reported in Santo Domingo telegrams Nos.169 and 173. To judge from your telegram No.2748, you would agree that he has some cause for vexation. We should perhaps also discount to some extent the line taken by him on occasions such as the lunch reported by Stafford Campbell. It may well be that Bunker was speaking as he did with tactical considerations in mind in order through indirect channels to bring some pressure to bear towards reaching agreement after so much delay. To judge from the opening sentence of Santo Domingo telegram No.173 his tactics were beginning to work until Cury put his spoke in the wheel! Here in Washington we do not find any dangerous degree of bias or unreasonableness. Our telegram No.2057 illustrates what I mean and Vaughn himself is as you know very far from being a dangerous fire-eater. The trouble is rather that he is not a forceful character and is totally overshadowed by Tom Mann. I do not wish to underestimate his ability, and perhaps in small and unobtrusive ways he achieves something. He has been, and will continue to be, away a good deal. I do not doubt that Bunker gets his guidance ultimately from the White House. And there probably is some substance to the claim that Vaughn has made to me in the past that Bunker is not just a U.S. agent, but really has to take O.A.S. views and pressures into account.

12. One final point. In paragraph 12 of my letter of 19 July I referred to hearings in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the Dominican crisis. Little has since appeared in the press about them, and they seem to have been quietly wound up. They were held in executive (i.e. closed) session, and no record has been made publicly available. I asked Vaughn whether they would be published, and he at once put them in the same category as the hearings held at the time of President Truman's dismissal of General MacArthur - they would not be published for ten or fifteen years!

13. However, I gather from well-informed journalists that the Committee concentrated heavily on the fundamental question whether and to what extent the coup at the outset was under Communist control. The Administration officials who testified were quite unable to convince at least half the Committee on this score and it therefore had to wind up the hearings completely divided. No doubt this is the real reason why the record will not be published! I also understand that Ambassador Bennett made a pretty poor showing and was unable to cope with questions on why he had slammed the door in the early stages on any possible negotiation or discussion with Caamano. I am now much more sure that <sup>my</sup> speculative interpretation of what happened after the Bundy mission must be correct.

14. I am copying this letter to Ted Youde in UKMIS New York and Stafford Campbell in Santo Domingo.

Yours ever  
*(J.E. Killick)*  
 (J.E. Killick)

(para 12 of letter of 19/7)

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SECRET



*Quaker 22  
+ copy without envelope to chg. 4/4.*

(53/1/1G)

BRITISH EMBASSY,  
SANTO DOMINGO.

RECEIVED IN  
- 1 SEP 1965  
AD 1015/295

18 August, 1965.

*My dear Bill,*

I attach the latest issue of "El Popular", the Restauración issue of 16 August. You will note that P.S.P. have now changed their name to Partido Comunista Dominicano (P.C.D.). Seeking for news of developments on the extreme left, in a recent conversation with Hector Garcia Godoy I asked for his opinion on the present state of LJ4 (the long negotiations about his potential Presidency have involved him in a good deal of contact with LJ4's leadership, as well as the rank and file). I prefaced my enquiry by saying that it was my impression that LJ4 had become much stronger in numbers since the revolt.

2. He thought that they had found a good number of new recruits. However, he said, with great assurance, that LJ4 was rapidly approaching the final stage of a total split between the extreme left wing, whose orientation towards a militant Communist philosophy has been a marked feature of recent months, and the nationalist wing, which has become increasingly disenchanted and hostile towards that faction. He said that LJ4 was, to all intents and purposes, now composed of two separate parties, and the end of the crisis here would probably see them divided for good.

3. The state of the extreme left here does not, in fact, give much promise for the United Front which they all declare to be the corner-stone of policy. The quarrel between M.P.D. and P.C.D., as you can see from page 13 of the attached, grows ever more shrill and abusive. The present circumstances are such as to command an outward unity in the face of a common enemy, but even that kind of window dressing is getting difficult to manage. With the end of the present crisis and return to something resembling normality, it seems likely that the ideological battle between them will come into the open, and that, of course, cannot help weakening the collective effectiveness of the extreme left. The Social Christians' pre-revolt split over the Pact of Rio Piedras (see my letter 53/1/8 of 15 March) has also apparently reached full separation point at the present time.

4. By contrast, the P.R.D. element in the city seems to be holding solidly together. P.R.D., according to Garcia Godoy, is also backed by Balaguer's Partido Reformista youth movement. As you know, it is my impression that P.R.D. is comfortably dominant in the rebel movement. The success they had in forcing the extremist elements to accept Garcia Godoy, much against their will (by threatening to leave the movement if the democratic majority did not prevail), is fair evidence of this, and there have been other events in the rebel area to indicate that P.R.D. is able to enforce a moderate policy over the extremists at the present time.

G. W. Harding, Esq.,  
American Department,  
Foreign Office,  
LONDON, S.W.1.

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5. This does not, of course, dispose of the possibility of a terrorist organisation emerging here later. As in Venezuela, this could conceivably be mounted by a minority group. The future is a dangerous one but it does not seem, at the moment, to derive from a dominance by the extreme left of the rebel movement as a whole. I will, naturally, write to you later about the possibility of terrorist minority groups when I can see the picture more clearly.

6. I am copying this letter, with enclosure, to Stephen Clissold in Research Department.

*Yusev*

*Stafford*

(S. F. Campbell)

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Enter. 39  
31/8

(53/1/1G)

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- 1 SEP 1965  
AD 1015/295 (A)

BRITISH EMBASSY,  
SANTO DOMINGO.

24 August, 1965.

*Dear Paol,*

*AD 1015/295*

Further to my letter 53/1/1G of 18 August, I now enclose another of M.P.D.'s contributions to the dialectic war with P.C.D. It is impossible to be sure, but the indications of serious disunity on the extreme left seem to be multiplying daily. The most striking feature of the two Communist parties here, it seems to me, is their immaturity. In their anxiety to position themselves correctly in the world Communist crisis, they allow their opportunities here to slip away.

2. In contrast, Antonio Guzman of P.R.D. has once again demonstrated the strength of the P.R.D. majority in the rebel movement last weekend. The division of opinion over acceptance of an amended Acta de Reconciliación has been coming to a head during the last week. Guzman, using his previous tactics of threatening to withdraw the entire P.R.D. presence from the movement if the will of the democratic majority did not prevail, successfully isolated both Jottin Gury and Hector Aristy, who are strongly against an agreement with the U.S. on the basis of the Act.

3. I am copying this letter, with enclosure, to Stephen Clissold in Research Department.

*Guzman*

*S. F. Campbell*

(S. F. Campbell)

G. W. Harding, Esq.,  
American Department,  
Foreign Office,  
LONDON, S.W.1.

SECRET



CONFIDENTIAL - GUARD  
FROM SANTO DOMINGO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

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Mr. Campbell

No. 181  
1 September 1965

RECEIVED IN  
ARC  
- 2 SEP 1965  
AD 1015/297

D. Untimed  
R. 1650 1 September 1965

IMMEDIATE  
CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 181 of 1 September.  
Repeated for information to: Washington UKMIS New York

GUARD

Yesterday at the Rebel Government Headquarters Caamano and his entire Cabinet signed act of reconciliation and [? gp omitted] act. The Ad Hoc Commission also signed. The disappearance of Imbert Government has removed the authority with whom Caamano was supposed to be reconciling. Attempts are now being made to get the armed forces to sign in his place.

92

2. I hear from Garcia Godey that he hopes for formation of Government on 2 September and at the latest 3 September.

3. My telegram No. 175, paragraph 2. I understand that the two Generals will be shipped out today but this, as ever, is fraught with uncertainty.

4. Last Sunday mortar fire incident was the last straw for Bunker. The one most unwise move made by United States here was the creation of Imbert puppet Government in early May. This mistake has greatly increased the Dominican death toll, added much bitterness and division, and lengthened the war. As an American tool Imbert was always a bad choice. He ends as an embarrassment.

Foreign Office pass to Washington 96 and UKMIS New York 58.

[Repeated as requested].

ADVANCE COPIES:  
Private Secretary  
Sir B. Burrows  
Mr. Rennie  
Head of American Dept.  
Resident Clerk

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CONFIDENTIAL - GUARD

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FROM SANTO DOMINGO TO FOREIGN OFFICE


En clair

FO/CRO/WH/DISTRIBUTION

Mr. Campbell

No. 188

3 September 1965

IMMEDIATE

D.0020 4 September 1965

R.0030 4 September 1965

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 188 of  
3 September

Repeated for information to: Washington

UKMIS New York

At a ceremony at National Palace at 4.30 p.m. to-day Dr. Hector Garcia Godoy was named President of Dominican Republic. In a short speech, he spoke of the causes of the sufferings of country as abuse of power, military interference in politics and dishonesty in national life. He dedicated himself and his Government to the abolition of these evils insofar as the shortness of his term will allow and to the institution of reforms to ensure the apolitical nature of the armed services, the observation of human rights, the repair of the economy and the holding of truly democratic elections at the end of his term. After the National Anthem, the revolutionary hymn of the rebel movement was played with great vigour by an army band.

Foreign Office pass Washington and UKMIS New York as my telegrams Nos. 100 and 62.

[Repeated as requested]

ADVANCE COPIES:

Mr. King  
Head American Dept.  
Head News Dept.  
Resident Clerk

MMMM

CONFIDENTIALFROM SANTO DOMINGO TO FOREIGN OFFICEA  
RECEIVED IN  
ARCHIVES No. 39

Cypher/OTP

FO/CRO/WH DISTRIBUTION P 1965

Mr. Campbell

D. 0725 6 September, 1965 AD 1015/300

No. 19A

R. 0730 6 September, 1965

5 September, 1965

IMMEDIATECONFIDENTIALAddressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 19A of 5 September  
Repeated for information to: Washington

U.K. Mission New York

Yesterday the President issued decree number 2 which in effect abolishes Wessin's command. This morning, accompanied by Bunker, he went to San Isidro to speak to Wessin and the three Chiefs of Staff. He outlined to them his intention to make the armed forces apolitical and asked for their cooperation. Later he had a private talk with Wessin and invited him to accept the terms of his command as in the nation's interest. Wessin replied

- (a) His honour was involved;
- (b) The country would fall into the hands of the Communists;
- (c) Many patriots were imploring him to stay.

(these patriots are undoubtedly Bonnelly, Severo ~~Silva~~ and the troublesome priest, Marcial Silva).

The President made it clear that his decision was final and asked Wessin to think it over.

2. This afternoon at 1600 San Isidro Radio broadcast an announcement that the armed forces, foreseeing a Communist plot, could not support the President. It declared that this was a joint decision by Wessin and three Chiefs. Much alarm followed.

3. The President telephoned Jimenez, Chief of Naval Staff, who knew nothing about the declaration. Jimenez later telephoned that the other two chiefs also were not party to the San Isidro declaration.

4. My understanding is that having recognized yesterday the United States is not prepared to put up with a coup d'état quite so quickly. The President is quite unruffled. Wessin's pocket Getterammerung, which I have always felt to be on the cards, is possible. The United States Service Attachés have lately taken

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CONFIDENTIAL

Santo Domingo telegram No.194 to Foreign Office

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to stressing how strong the armed forces are now but my own opinion is that they are in a complete mess.

Foreign Office pass Washington 194, U.K.Mission New York 64.

[Repeated as requested]

ADVANCE COPIES:

F.O.

Private Secretary  
Sir B.Burrows  
Mr.Rennie  
Head of American Department  
Head of News Department

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FROM SANTO DOMINGO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTP

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- 6 SEP 1965  
AD 1015/301

Mr. Campbell  
No. 186  
2 September, 1965.

D. 0308 3 September, 1965.  
R. 0308 3 September, 1965.

CONFIDENTIAL

*AD 1015/195*  
*AD 1015/302*

Addressed to Kingston telegram No. 20 of 2 September  
Repeated for information to:- Foreign Office

Your telegram No. 547 to C.R.O.

My remarks about Imbert at paragraph 21 of my despatch Number 138 outlines Junta's mortal weakness which was lacking political appeal to all classes. He was never a viable alternative and his collapse was a question of time. Having acquired some military strength he succeeded in taking on the rôle of a puppet who pulled his own strings for a while but as soon as America really turned away from him he was finished. The Junta fell apart only a few hours after President Johnson dropped his hint in the Johnson City speech. The Rebels knew his weakness and would never recognize his existence. They calculated that if they held out long enough America would talk to them seriously, and as it happens they were right. It has speeded up the whole process of a settlement which is now a matter of hours.

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**CONFIDENTIAL****FROM SANTO DOMINGO TO FOREIGN OFFICE**

Cypher/OTP

**FO/CRO/WH DISTRIBUTION**

70  
 RECEIVED  
 AUG 31 1965  
 SEP 8 1965  
 AD 1015/303

Mr. Campbell  
 No. 193  
 4 September, 1965

D. 0527 8 September, 1965  
 R. 0527 8 September, 1965

**IMMEDIATE**  
**CONFIDENTIAL**

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 193 of 4 September  
 Repeated for information to: Washington and UKMIS New York

A sudden raising of temperature has been caused by action of San Isidro army group which today sent a force of soldiers to airport to prevent persons they do not approve of entering the country. The radio is also giving details of various oppressive acts by the army personnel in that part of the city formerly under Imbert. The rebels have ordered an alert status and called on the President to demonstrate his disapproval of these acts and a tense situation is building up. As far as I know Wessin is still at San Isidro giving orders. He did not of course sign the act of reconciliation and doubtless refused to consider himself bound by clause requiring Army to return to its barracks.

Foreign Office please pass Washington 103 and UKMIS New York 63.

[Repeated as requested]

[Note by Communications Dept. This is a missing telegram repeated at our request]

**ADVANCE COPIES TO:**

P.S.  
 Sir B. Burrows  
 Mr. Rennie  
 Head of American Dept.  
 Head of News Dept.

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**CONFIDENTIAL**

CONFIDENTIAL

FROM SANTO DOMINGO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

RECEIVED 72  
ARCHIVES  
10 SEP 1965

AD1015/304/G

Cypher/OTP

Mr. Campbell

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

No.199

D. Untimed 9 September, 1965

9 September, 1965

R. 2105 9 September, 1965

IMMEDIATE  
CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No.199 of 9 September  
Repeated for information to: Washington  
U.K.Mission New York

A contact saw Wessin this morning, who asserted that he had been offered 50,000 dollars by United States to leave the country, and had refused. My contact thinks he is speaking the truth. Wessin also declared that in concert with these supporting him and notwithstanding opposition by United States, he is prepared for war, and will shortly begin his attacks on Santo Domingo to remove provisional Government. Paragraph 2 of my despatch [gp.undec.] sums up my views about this man's medical condition, and I think it not unlikely that he will try to do what he says.

? 13s  
AD1015/195

Foreign Office pass Washington 107, U.K.Mission New York 67.

ADVANCE COPIES:

- Private Secretary
- Sir B.Burrows
- Mr.Rennie
- Head of American Dept.,
- Head of P.U.S.Department

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CONFIDENTIAL

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FROM SANTO DOMINGO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

En Clair

RECEIVED IN  
FO/CRO/WH 54-39  
DISTRIBUTION EP 1965

AD 1015/305

Mr. Campbell  
No. 200  
9 September, 1965.

D. 0740 10 September, 1965.  
R. 0743 10 September, 1965.

IMMEDIATE

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 200 of 9 September  
Repeated for information to:- Washington  
UKMIS New York  
Miami

In a radio address to National Provisional [? word omitted] President announced retirement of Wessin from armed forces and his departure from country this evening to take up post of Consul-General at Miami. He left from San Isidro for an unknown destination by United States aircraft at 2005.

Foreign Office pass Washington and UKMIS New York 108 and 68.

[Repeated as requested.]

ADVANCE COPIES:-  
Private Secretary  
Sir B. Burrows  
Mr. Rennie  
Head of American Dept.  
Head of News Dept.

10 SEP  
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AD 1015/306

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NOT FOR CIRCULATION.**DOMINICAN REPUBLIC**

13 September, 1965

Section 1

**THE REVOLT IN RETROSPECT***Mr. Campbell to Mr. Stewart. (Received 13 September)***SUMMARY**

1. Following signature of an Act of Reconciliation, Dr. Héctor García Godoy was proclaimed Provisional President, and the civil war officially ended. Relief at peace must be tempered by the magnitude of his task, for the state of the economy and the war and crisis have left great problems. Much time was wasted as the United States seemed to fail to grasp the essence of the Dominican problem. The creation of the Imbert junta was a mistake, and their insistence that Caamaño should negotiate with him failed. Among the many missions to come from the United States and the O.A.S., Mr. MacGeorge Bundy's seemed most promising, but it also failed. (Paragraphs 1-8.)

2. American hostility to the rebels was reasonably understandable, but strong political and social causes for the revolt were not difficult to see. Both the Ambassador's and his military advisers' policies were embarrassed by the violence of the revolt. This, as well as great pressures on the Chargé d'Affaires, caused them to conclude that a Communist plot was in danger of overtaking the country. However, it is possible that the *coup d'état* sparked off a rampage by the urban-industrial bottom-dog. (Paragraphs 9-22.)

3. The decision to land Marines to restore order was right, but the landing of 18,000 troops to rescue the military junta was a great mistake. Opportunities of contacting the rebels were neglected, and this caused the Embassy to misjudge their strength and led them into traps. Eventually, the Embassy was supplanted as the negotiating body by missions coming in from outside. By mid-June all attempts at negotiation had failed, tension rose, and an American attack in the city brought about bitter fighting and much destruction. At this stage the Dominican affair seemed completely out of hand. (Paragraphs 23-28.)

4. The Imbert junta wielded oppressive rule. A team of O.A.S. criminologists investigated alleged atrocities and found evidence gravely implicating that faction, causing embarrassment for the United States in the Security Council. After the *Ad Hoc Commission* presented its proposals on the 18th of June, six weeks' desperately hard bargaining in an atmosphere of suspicion followed, which was only dispelled by the skill of Ambassador Bunker. As it became appreciated that the rebel cause had merit, support for the Imbert junta was gradually withdrawn. A mortar bomb attack aimed at provocation was pinned on the Imbert faction in humiliating circumstances, and this, coupled with a speech by President Johnson, gave clear warning for the junta to quit, and they resigned on the 30th of August, and Dr. Héctor García Godoy was proclaimed President on the 3rd of September. His Government was recognised by the United States on the 4th September. (Paragraphs 29-36.)

5. The notion of keeping Communists down by maintaining a large Dominican Army is questionable and risky. The Dominican crisis was fundamentally about honest government and not necessarily about Communism. The American Mission made disappointing showing in the crisis. Brigadier-General Wessin has refused to recognise the Presidency of Dr. García Godoy and is still holding out at San Isidro. (Paragraphs 37-38.)

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(No. 14 S. Confidential  
and Guard)

*Santo Domingo,*  
*9 September, 1965.*

Sir,

I have the honour to refer to my despatch No. 13 S of the 18th of May which described the events arising from the revolt of the 24th of April in Santo Domingo, and the ensuing civil war. It is now my duty to report that the first step towards a return to normality in this afflicted country was taken on the 3rd of September, 1965, when Dr. Héctor García Godoy was nominated Provisional President of the Dominican Republic as a result of an agreement between the rebels, representatives of the Dominican Armed Forces, and the *Ad Hoc* Commission of the Organisation of American States. The mandate of the Provisional Government, now in the process of being formed by Dr. García Godoy, is the restoration of peace, the rehabilitation of the economy, and the preparation of the country for free and democratic elections in nine months' time. Thus practical results have at last yielded to the long and tortuous negotiations which began on the 18th of June, when the *Ad Hoc* Commission, appointed by the Tenth Meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers of the American States, and led by Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker, first presented their proposals.

2. Amid the understandable feelings of heartfelt relief by the inhabitants of this divided city at a move towards normal life after four months of revolt, civil war and occupation, it would be prudent to recognise the magnitude of the task facing Dr. García Godoy and his colleagues. These men come to power in circumstances of a sombre kind. The ungovernable passions that swept away the Triumvirate régime in a few hours last April, and shattered the Dominican military establishment, have subsided for the time being, but the driving force behind them—an acute polarisation of the Dominican political Right and Left—has been greatly intensified by months of conflict, in which hatreds have sharpened, and divisions have widened. The restoration of the capital's mercantile and business life, stagnant since the 24th of April, and the rescue of the economy as a whole, will call for almost superhuman effort and judgment from the Provisional Government, even granted the most generous help from the United States. But the leadership of a country which now bears the traumatic scars of atrocities com-

mitted by Dominicans against their own countrymen, a death roll reckoned in thousands, foreign occupation, and a precarious and consequently, at times, brutal rule over the provincial towns by an imposed and unpopular junta, will be a greater task. Many of the worst excesses of the civil war could have been avoided if so much time had not been lost: it is sad to record my impression that, from the beginning of this affair, the United States failed to grasp the real nature of the Dominican revolt, and because of this, the history of the past four weary months has been marked by repeated delays and missed opportunities of arriving at an arrangement, not greatly different, one thinks, from that being hailed now with such relief.

3. At the beginning of May, the Dominican crisis—which up to that time had been entirely violent in outward character—was rapidly changing to become almost wholly a political problem, basically tractable to a political solution. The United States took immediate action to bring this affair under control by political means, and a series of missions headed by persons of well-known ability and experience in the field of international negotiation arrived here from Washington to that end. By mid-June, however, nothing had been achieved; the situation, in fact, had greatly worsened, and the chances of a settlement seemed further off than ever. The unreasonable and intransigent attitudes shown by the contending Dominican factions was partly responsible, for the idea of making any kind of concession in negotiation is altogether foreign to the Dominican mind. That difficulty, however, was predictable. What was quite unexpected was that this crisis could bring to the Dominican Republic such persons of international stature from the United States Administration as Mr. Thomas G. Mann, Mr. MacGeorge Bundy, Mr. Jack Hood Vaughn and Mr. Cyrus Vance, and that after a stay varying between four and ten days, these eminent persons would have to depart without a solution being brought any nearer at all. Mr. John Bartlow Martin, formerly United States Ambassador to the Dominican Republic during the Government of Professor Juan Bosch, came here at the end of April as a special envoy of President Johnson: he left about a week later, apparently—to judge from the article he subsequently wrote for an American magazine—in despair. A five-man mission, appointed by the Tenth Meeting of Foreign Ministers of the

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American States, led by Ambassador Colombo of Argentina, arrived in Santo Domingo on the 2nd of May, but broke up soon after coming into contact with the Dominican problem on the ground, and was succeeded, for a while, by a one-man mission in the person of Dr. José Mora, Secretary-General of the Organisation of American States. I fancy this distinguished Latin American statesman would have been hard put to it to say what, precisely, he had been able to achieve by the 15th of June, bearing in mind that on that date major units of the United States 82nd Airborne Division were fighting a set-piece battle with high performance weapons, against the rebels in the streets of the old city, to the accompaniment of considerable loss of life and destruction of property. This fighting, it is worth noting, was happening some six weeks after it had first become clear to many observers that the Dominican affair had gone well beyond the stage where military action could solve it. The United States, it seemed, was unable to get at the heart of the problem in the Dominican Republic: by mid-June the Dominican crisis had fallen into a state of confusion and complication almost defying description, and each new attempt to grapple with it had only seemed to make matters worse. Out of control and set for disaster, the Dominican affair was behaving like a runaway car headed for the cliffs: one after another the desperate passengers leapt into the driver's seat, seized the steering wheel and jammed on the brakes, but to no avail—the car careered onward, and the growl of the sea on the rocks below grew louder and louder.

4. In my view, the steady worsening of the situation between April and mid-June was due to a faulty appreciation by the Americans of the dominant factors. In my despatch of the 18th of May I was at some pains to emphasise the military and political importance of the rebel movement, led by Colonel Francisco Caamaño Deño, and, at that time, I gave it as my opinion that the strength of this movement in both these spheres presented the United States with its major problem in the Dominican Republic. The failure of the various initiatives mounted by the United States and the O.A.S. up to mid-June was partly because the United States would not, or could not, recognise this fact. This was curious because it was certainly not hard to see. On the 2nd of May, the basically sound state of rebel morale, discipline and organisation, as it

seemed to me, was mentioned in my telegram of that date, and this was later followed by other estimates to the effect that the rebels were not going to fade away, and were preparing for a long siege. On the 7th of May, however, in a desperate shuffling of some rather greasy cards, the Americans set up a puppet junta, under Brigadier-General Antonio Imbert Barrera, in opposition to the rebels. Only a bad under-estimation of rebel strength, I think, could have persuaded them to do this, because the American Embassy must have been only too well aware that Brigadier-General Imbert had no political support whatever in the country. My reading of this move was that they thought the rebel cause so lacking in cohesion and military capability, that the creation of a rival strong-man junta would quickly spell its dissolution. Events have since shown that this was a grave miscalculation, because, not only did the rebel movement survive two separate large-scale military attacks in May and June respectively, but their leadership has since shown exceptional intelligence and adroitness in the hard political bargaining that has followed. Added to this, the junta of Brigadier-General Imbert soon took on a life of its own as well, and in such a way as to cause annoyance and embarrassment to the United States here, which in setting him up had hardly bargained for a puppet who pulled his own strings.

5. Under-estimation of the real significance and staying power of the rebel faction, coupled with the hasty and ill-advised creation of the Imbert junta, has been an important cause of delay in the Dominican affair. Failure of essential communication has been another. The American formula for settling the crisis did not, up to mid-June, include talking directly to, or having any real political contact with, the rebels, despite the fact that the rebel movement was really what the crisis was all about. Instead, the creation of the Imbert junta by the Americans on the 7th of May was quickly followed by an insistence on their part that "both sides" should get together and talk out their difficulties. In the rebel view, however, the Imbert junta represented the factor of zero in the equation: their battle, up to the time that the United States 82nd Airborne Division had landed at San Isidro on the 29th of April, had been against the Right-wing rump of the Dominican Armed Forces, led by Brigadier-General Wessin y Wessin, and, in their opinion, they had won that battle. Certainly the situation at

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San Isidro, as seen by the first incoming American officers there, and later described to me by the United States Ambassador, Mr. William Tapley Bennett, Jr., tend to confirm the rebels' claim to have won a victory. Wessin, it seems, was in despair at the failure of his last tank attack on the city on the 28th of April, some of the other generals were actually weeping, and, in the United States Ambassador's own words, "the whole group was behaving like a crowd of demented monkeys"

6. Thus, there is something to be said for the rebel argument that having on the 29th of April rescued a demoralised and discredited Wessin—whose deficiencies as a field commander had mention in my previous despatch—and having placed their troops between Wessin and the rebels in such a way as to preserve the former and contain the latter, the Americans had, for all practical purposes, taken sides in the Dominican civil war before the Imbert junta ever came into existence. Dr. Héctor Aristy, Minister of the Presidency in the rebel "Government", later described this to me in terms of a boxing match between two flyweights: one of the contestants, he said, had knocked out his opponent in the second round, but as he was pulling off his gloves, he was amazed to see a heavyweight clambering through the ropes to continue the fight. Extending this analogy, the two contestants in the ring from that moment forward—according to the rebels—were themselves and the Americans, and as long as the Americans stayed there, the business of the rebels could really be with no one else. Imbert was not, in fact, a contestant, and talking to him could serve Caamaño no real purpose; he refused to talk to him then, and has continued to refuse ever since. All through May and half-way through June, therefore, the various initiatives to end the Dominican crisis were coming to naught through total lack of contact between the principals: the Americans refused to talk to the rebels except through Imbert, whilst the rebels would have nothing to do with him.

7. Outside this sphere, a good deal was going on. Between the 16th and the 25th of May the Bundy mission had carried out a most exhaustive survey of native opinion about the Dominican crisis, but this, unfortunately, did not include making direct contact with Caamaño. Mr. MacGeorge Bundy's aim, which was to form a Provisional Government composed

of persons owing allegiance to neither extremes of Right or Left, quickly became apparent, but it was also abundantly clear that the setting up of such a Government would be hardly practical without some agreement with the militant movement at the heart of the Dominican crisis. It was therefore, disturbing to learn that Mr. Bundy was preparing to leave, and in fact had called his final Press conference, without seeing the rebel leader.

8. At this time, the American Embassy had almost recovered from the hard hammering it had had from the international Press about the Communist issue, which I mentioned in my previous despatch. The extravagant assertions that there were thousands of Communists in the rebel zone had been dropped, and the hurriedly produced C.I.A. list of 58 Communists in the rebel movement—afterwards amended to 53 when it was discovered that some persons named on the list as active Communists were dead, and some names had been duplicated—had been forgotten. Indeed, the word "Communist" went out of vogue for some time, its place being taken by "extremists" and "leftist elements". From early May, however, when Caamaño refused to talk to Imbert, the United States Embassy was giving it out that he was not a free agent, that he was not in control of his movement, that he, personally, was under the domination of a Communist group who watched over him by night and day—in some versions, at the point of a gun—and that the reason he would not talk to Imbert was that he could not, because his Communist masters would not let him. This, I imagine, was a product of the American Embassy's refusal to have anything to do with the man and his movement, because five minutes' conversation face-to-face with Caamaño was enough, as far as I was concerned, to show that this fanciful idea had little connection with the true state of affairs inside the rebel command. I was, therefore, pleased to learn that after his final Press conference, Mr. Bundy had a four-hour secret talk with Caamaño in a deserted building in the no-man's-land between the American and rebel lines. After this meeting, Mr. Bundy gave it as his opinion that, contrary to what had been said, Caamaño was a man of real substance and fully in charge of his movement. The fact that he coupled these observations with some unflattering remarks about Imbert did no disservice to the truth, but it must have

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caused a certain amount of heartburn in the American Embassy, whose recently adopted protégé Imbert was. The point worth noting here, however, was the speed at which matters moved towards agreement once an authoritative American voice talked direct to the rebels. An agreement was probably available at this time, and it is a pity that we do not know for certain why Mr. Bundy's plans for a middle-of-the-road Government somehow got quite lost in Washington. Yet his mission was not a total loss, for the third reorganisation of the O.A.S. presence here included, at last, an American in the shape of Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker, who has since talked for the United States to the rebels face-to-face. By now, however, much time had been lost, and a series of events had occurred greatly to envenom and complicate the Dominican affair.

9. The road taken by United States policy in the Dominican Republic during this crisis has been much influenced by the quality of judgment exercised by a small number of men who found themselves in the cruel position of having to make a fateful decision at desperately short notice. In attempting to write a coherent account of the confused and tragic story of the Dominican revolt and civil war, some examination of these men, their personalities, and the predicament they were in, is unavoidable. The situation before and immediately after the crisis broke must also be considered, because I think it true to say that the officers' revolt of the 24th of April need never have led to the civil war, had these men thought differently. What follows, therefore, is a second journey over some of the ground already covered in my previous despatch, but this time, in looking at the picture, the reasons for certain decisions leading to the events take emphasis over the events themselves.

10. At first sight, the hostile posture of the American Embassy towards the rebel movement is fairly understandable. The dangerous proximity of the Dominican Republic to Cuba, and the evident truth that Communists had made common cause with the rebels in the fighting between the 24th of April and the 1st of May, does much to explain American nervousness about this affair, and their initial reaction to it. The atmosphere in the American Embassy at times reached levels of excitement bordering on hysteria, and in these circumstances errors of judgment can be expected. From the very start of the revolt, at which moment

the American Ambassador was away in the United States, and 13 of his 16 military advisers were absent at a conference in Panama, our American colleagues have been dogged by a certain amount of bad luck. It is also a fact that Santo Domingo went mad for 48 hours on the 28th and 29th of April, and that the elaborate structure of civilised law, and the obedience it normally commands, dwindled to the point where the safety of a man's family and property might depend solely on his personal resolution and skill with a gun. It was not clear to anyone, myself included, who, precisely, had taken over the leadership of the rebel cause on the 27th of April, and it is a fact that some members of the Bosch party, which had started the revolt, were saying on that date that the Communists were in charge. Bands of armed looters, sometimes numbering hundreds, were cruising the city on the 28th and the 29th of April, and the hunting down and killing of police in the streets had reached the stage when common humanity required that I should disguise the policeman on duty outside my house in my clothes, and hide him. Later, at the Embassy, the policeman there had to be locked in my office when an armed band hammered on the Embassy door in the middle of the night. This chaotic state of affairs was the background to which the American Head of Mission had to make his decisions, one of which—rightly taken in my opinion—was that the United States Marine Corps should land in the city of Santo Domingo to restore order.

11. Conditions in the city being what they were, it is not surprising that the reaction of some private citizens to the rebels was one of fear and horror; their lives and property had suddenly fallen under a kind of formless terror, and the rebels, apparently, were the cause. This fairly describes the American Ambassador's feelings towards the rebels also, then and since, and although it by no means wholly accounts for the American handling of the Dominican affair afterwards, it certainly was a contributory factor. Referring to events in the city at a meeting of the Diplomatic Corps at the Nunciatura on the 29th of April, he spoke of the rebels with indignation and revulsion, and in relating the plight of the injured and dying in the hospitals, which by that time had reached the stage of having no water, power or light, his voice faltered and tears came to his eyes.

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Mr. Bennett is a sincere and kind man, and his evident humanitarian feelings about the sufferings of ordinary people at that time did him much credit.

12. However, anyone whose business it is to analyse the causes of political events was more or less bound to recognise that the present state of things was a product of what had gone before. In my previous despatch I attempted to outline the extent to which cynicism and moral rot had been spreading unchecked into almost every branch of Dominican public life. The political and economic consequences of the *coup d'état* of 1963 had proved disastrous, and for more than a year the country had been staggering from one financial crisis to another. Repeated political convulsions had seized the Presidential Palace, whilst, behind the scenes, the generals fought amongst themselves like tigers for control of the channels along which flowed the vast sums allocated to the armed forces. Unemployment had reached an estimated level of 50 per cent. Between September 1963 and April 1965 therefore, the dragon's teeth had been well and truly sown in the political field: the revolt surely was the harvest.

13. The American Ambassador was aware that the existing political situation in the Dominican Republic could not last much longer. In a letter dated the 22nd of April I described the tension here by saying that if anyone accidentally dropped a glass, there would be a rush for the door. At about the same time, the American Ambassador wrote to Washington: "We are almost on the ropes in the Dominican Republic". The timing of the revolt caught us both off guard—the rebels too, it so happens, because the *coup d'état* was planned for June, and only an unexpected twist on the morning of the 24th of April set the revolt in motion on that day. But changes were obviously coming, and Mr. Bennett has since said that he thought his visit to the United States that week-end would be the last he could safely manage before matters entered the danger stage. The *coup* itself could hardly have been a surprise: the explosion that swept everything away before it, however, certainly was.

14. This event, which vaporised the Triumvirate Government into nothing in the space of a few hours, must have called into question the wisdom of his whole policy of support for that régime. Since his arrival in Santo Domingo about a year before, some US\$100 million had been pumped into the Dominican economy for

various aid and monetary support purposes, and on a *per capita* basis of about US\$28, the Triumvirate régime was enjoying a level of support far exceeding the average for Latin America as a whole. It seems unlikely that this would have been forthcoming if the American Ambassador had not decided, very early on, that the régime was secure enough against the very kind of calamity that had befallen it. The chief Triumvir, Reid, knew how to make the appropriate incantations about anti-Communism, and appeared to be a very "sound" man on that indispensable score. The fact that he was a front for a junta of generals was no disadvantage in the eyes of the Pentagon's representatives here either, who, in their policy of keeping the Dominican Armed Forces materially strong under the leadership of "safe" generals, hardly seemed to notice that those same forces had been taking on some of the characteristics of an army of occupation in their own country. I cannot say, of course, what the Pentagon itself thought about the Dominican Republic, but its representatives certainly saw a strong Dominican army as the best defence against Communism. I will not attempt to discuss the flaws in this basically superficial hypothesis: this is how the United States Service Attachés thought before the revolt, and it is how they still think at the present time. Therefore, as Reid's Government lurched from one crisis to another, the armed forces, in the view of the Pentagon's representatives, became more and more the only rock on which to secure their policy of keeping the Communists down by force. As Reid's fortunes fell, the importance of the generals rose, until Reid's desperate predicament rendered his continued leadership of the Government desirable, but not essential; his place could be taken by another without much disturbance, so long as the newcomer was also ready to act as a front for the real power in the land, which was the generals.

15. For the American Ambassador, too, this kind of change need not have meant that his judgment had been at fault in backing the Triumvirate régime, for the all-powerful Dominican Armed Forces would still be there, and there was no reason to think that his policy with Reid could not be continued with a successor. By April, in the face of Reid's universal unpopularity, and the dizzy rocking of the political boat, it is quite likely that the American Ambassador had regretfully resigned himself to a palace revolution removing



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him, and one of the reasons for his visit to Washington could well have been to brief the State Department on the background to this forthcoming event.

16. Instead of the expected game of musical chairs in the palace, however, the stunned capital suddenly saw an enraged people rise in their furious thousands to sweep the Triumvirate utterly out of existence, and far from being a source of ultimate strength, the armed forces were revealed to be hopelessly split by disaffection and indiscipline. If my interpretation of American Embassy thinking here is correct, we may imagine their feelings. On one hand, the Embassy's political forecasters seemed to have been out of touch, even unaware, of a numerous and ferocious opposition which was capable of coming out into the streets and overturning the Government; if this were so, many questions remained to be answered, and some of them would be about the soundness of judgment that had backed the Triumvirate with such generous aid. On the other hand, the dyke erected by the Pentagon against the Communists had sundered. Hence, from the very beginning, even if the rebels could have been positively identified as genuine democrats, absolutely above suspicion, what they had done must have been the cause of dismay and embarrassment to the American Mission here. But Communists were already known to be fighting on the rebel side; with the dyke broken, therefore, the question was how fast the Red tide was pouring in over the breach.

17. It will be remembered that at this moment the American Ambassador was away in the United States, and the predicament of the Acting Head of Mission, Mr. William Connett, Jr., needs understanding. Events in the city were careering away at breakneck speed, and in such a way that the course they might finally take could hardly be foreseen. The conference at Panama had removed all the senior military advisers except the Naval Attaché, Lieutenant-Colonel Heywood, United States Marine Corps, and that officer was in the country for the week-end at a pigeon-shooting party. The position of the United States Naval Attaché in the Dominican Republic has traditionally been one of extraordinary power and influence, and I have mentioned Lieutenant-Colonel Heywood's ideas about the containment of Communism, with those of the other

Service Attachés, in a previous paragraph: the fact that his host on the 24th of April was his close friend, Brigadier-General Antonio Imbert Barrera, is also worth recording in the light of subsequent events. At decision-making level, therefore, there were only two officers of the United States Embassy in the country on the 24th, the 25th and the 26th of April, and in the interpretation of what was happening in the city, and of the forces behind it, the opinion of one, the Naval Attaché, can be fairly easily divined. Lieutenant-Colonel Heywood never had any doubt, nor has he now, that the violence of the revolt stemmed from Communist inspiration and organisation, and the need to crush the rebels so as to prevent the Dominican Republic becoming a Communist State is, in his opinion, a self-evident truth, which only stupid or mischievous persons would deny.

18. Aside from whatever Mr. Connett may have been thinking, the force of his colleague's convictions about the Communist threat at this time must have carried great weight. Time was flying, and the pressure on Mr. Connett was mounting hourly. Apart from the frightening things that were really happening, lurid accounts were also reaching him, such as that 1,500 people had been lined up by the rebels in the main square of the city, machine-gunned and afterwards decapitated. This, like many other stories of the same kind, was not true, but it is possible that it fitted into Mr. Connett's preconceived ideas about how Communists behave. There is another important point which must have consideration: because the nature of Communism is secretive and conspiratorial, a Communist plot did offer some explanation of how a militant movement, thousands strong, could exist without the American Embassy knowing anything about it. It even made the collapse of discipline in the Dominican Army somehow understandable. Reckoning up the various factors, therefore, the case for saying that the revolt looked very much like a Communist insurrection was reasonably impressive.

19. There were, perhaps, other explanations. In my despatch of the 18th of May I said it would be profitable to arrange for an independent analysis into the background of the Dominican revolt because strong social reasons, apart from political causes, might lie behind it, and

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this had implication for other parts of Latin America where similar conditions exist. Briefly, these conditions amount to a large city of 400,000 people, vast numbers of whom have been sucked into the metropolis from the countryside to follow a slum existence. These multitudes, cut off from their religious and cultural roots, face a future which, unlike the corresponding urbanisation processes in the advanced countries, offers no hope whatever of compensating economic improvement: indeed, over the past year their position has worsened greatly. These people are now becoming aware of their condition. In other parts of the world the rock-bottom layer is a minority: in Santo Domingo, however, it is a majority. This is rather as if the situation in Los Angeles, which has erupted into violence since the Frankenstein monster arose in the Dominican Republic, were reversed. There, 4 per cent of the city suddenly rioted whilst the remaining 96 per cent rubbed their eyes in amazement. Here, it was as if the young males belonging to the 96 per cent went bang, whilst the 4 per cent at the top shuddered in horror. The men who started the revolt on the 24th of April, politicians and soldiers alike, were just as amazed as the Americans, and everyone else here, by the violence and lawlessness it released in the city. Something new in the way of social protest had obviously hit Santo Domingo, and it is important, to my mind, to resist generalising over this too much in terms of political ideologies, however neatly the latter may fit the bill. The American journalist, Mr. Walter Lippmann, writing about the Santo Domingo revolt in May, warned against what he called the all-purpose myth in connection with this crisis. His argument is that the American people are in danger of falling under the spell of a mythology about revolutionary disorders all over the world, that they are forgetting that these disorders are basically indigenous to countries where the social order is breaking down, and that they are not originally, not essentially conspiracies master-minded from the centres of Communist power.

20. In the Dominican Republic the social order has been breaking down since the assassination of Trujillo. It is not unlikely that the anarchic rampage of April was a climax to that process, and the outbreak of the revolt a means of releasing a long built-up head of steam. I think it probable that the worst of the violence in the city

was done by people moved by something quite unconnected with politics. It did not last long: unlike the fighters on the bridge and the sniper bands, whose political convictions have been strong enough to keep them in a position of defiance against a Great Power for more than four months, the looters and hell-raisers vanished when the American Marines landed, and the suppression of rioting and looting was never a task for the American troops in the city. The proposition that most of the violence was not politically inspired but socially generated is another, and I think, a more credible explanation of how the American Embassy's political forecasters found themselves quite unaware of a numerous and ferocious opposition: it was probably not a political opposition at all, but an outburst of fury from people who had been, and still are, becoming increasingly aware that the future offers them nothing. It was this that prompted my suggestion of an independent enquiry into the background to the Dominican revolt, because Santo Domingo is almost certainly not going to be the last place in Latin America where this kind of thing happens.

21. Anyone having contact with Mr. Connett at the time, however, could see that he, like the Naval Attaché, viewed the Santo Domingo revolt as a Communist bid to turn the Dominican Republic into a second Red Cuba. By the time that Mr. Bennett had returned on the 27th of April, the process of crushing this revolt by using that portion of the armed forces still having a cohesive existence under Brigadier-General Wessin, had already had the approval of the American Embassy, and was under way. This began the civil war. The news that this was a Communist insurrection had apparently reached Washington and was already travelling downwards, because the briefing given to the United States Marines by their company commanders on U.S.S. *Boxer* prior to the landing on the 29th of April was that the city had been seized by an army of Communists, and the marines were going in to put that right. The unnatural collusion between the United States and a corrupt and hated junta of generals, whose ideas openly opposed every principle on which the American Constitution stands, had begun, and the United States 82nd Airborne Division was about to land at San Isidro to prop up the tottering junta there, and encircle the rebels in the city.

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22. There is no doubt in my mind now that both Mr. Bennett and Mr. Connett were wrong about the Communist threat at that time, but the background of chaos and baffling uncertainty to which they had to make their decisions has to be remembered. The cruel dilemma and crushing responsibility of the American Head of Mission in those early days has to be seen, above all, in the light of his Government's and his nation's feelings about Castro's Cuba, and the appalling risks they could be running on that score. Nothing less than an immediate decision would suffice, and this was at a time when many factors available to us now were hidden. If my thoughts on the Dominican eruption are valid, it was a double crisis in which two elements had come together at the same moment—the first, a popular political *coup d'état*; the second, a scream of frustrated rage from the urban-industrial bottom-dog, who had long wanted to smash something, anything, and now had his chance. Mr. Bennett's decision to bring the United States Marines into the city to restore order was correct. One only has to imagine what Los Angeles would have been like if the police and national guard had vanished, to see what could have happened here, had he decided otherwise. Given the circumstances, we need not wonder why these two men made a mistake about the Communist threat; it is enough to be honest, and ask oneself the question—had I been the American Head of Mission, what would have been my decision in the circumstances?

23. Their judgment immediately afterwards, however, is an entirely different matter. The decision had brought 23,000 United States troops into this country and only about 5,000 of them came into the city with the task of restoring order. The remaining 18,000 came into San Isidro, where Wessin had his headquarters. The psychological effect of this was immense, because it portrayed the United States standing shoulder to shoulder with the military junta who had, by that token, become the "good guys" in this affair. The "bad guys" were therefore the rebels, who, flanked by the United States Marine Corps on the west, and besieged by the 82nd Airborne Division on the east, had been stalemated in their almost completed *coup* to seize power.

24. The situation at that time was quickly taking up the lines that it has basically kept

over the succeeding four months, and, by the first week in May, fighting had died down to sporadic level. With the Dominican crisis more or less stabilised in the military sense, the next logical move, it seemed to me, was for the Americans to take a closer look at the rebel movement to find out what, in fact, its aims really were. After all, the hypothesis that this was a Communist revolution was only a hypothesis and no more, and the pause in the fighting offered a chance of verifying evidence of a rather circumstantial kind. But, as I have said, the American Embassy refused to have anything to do with the rebels, and not only were the political officers of the Mission embargoed from making contact with the rebel movement but it quickly became clear to me that even the information about conditions in the rebel zone, and the ideas of the leaders, which, as a friendly observer I was able to pass to them from daily contact with Caamaño, were unwelcome. This was an unprofessional attitude which, it seemed to me, could only lead them down a road littered with traps. It caused them to misjudge and under-estimate the rebels' ability to endure the siege which followed, and it was an important factor in the lengthening of the crisis to four months. The creation of the Imbert junta was another trap. Moreover, not having any real contact with the rebel side, they found themselves in a rather ridiculous position with the international Press. The journalists, who were seeing Caamaño frequently and were thus able to hear what he had to say, became increasingly restless over the Embassy's sweeping assertions that the revolt was a Communist insurrection, and demanded some tangible evidence: the list of Communists, later produced, was greeted with much derision, the journalists making great play afterwards over the landing of 23,000 American soldiers in this country to deal with 53 Communists. But far and away the worst product of the Embassy's miscalculations was the re-equipping and reorganisation by the Americans of the Right-wing remnant of the armed forces of San Isidro. This allowed the deliberate breaking of the ceasefire by Wessin on the 13th of May, and a seven-day land battle in the north of the city followed, with many casualties and much renewed suffering for the civilian population. If the idea behind this was to bring about a collapse of the rebel movement it failed, because Caamaño was still in position when that operation was

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over: if, on the other hand, it was done to give Imbert a portion of the city, and thereby improve his bargaining position—thus forcing Caamaño to negotiate with him—it failed also, because Caamaño continued to ignore Imbert. Ironically, what it did was to improve Imbert's bargaining position with the Americans, and from this time forward he became an increasing nuisance and embarrassment until they finally turned their face away from him for good.

25. Having reviewed some of the human factors behind the events reported in my last despatch, I can now resume the narrative of the Dominican crisis as it developed from mid-May. Mr. MacGeorge Bundy and the other high officials of the United States Administration arrived here on the 16th of May, one day after the resumption of the land fighting, and it became clear that, from that time, the Embassy's functions in the field of negotiation had been supplanted. I have already mentioned the significant difference between Mr. Bundy's views of the rebel movement and those held by Mr. Bennett. As soon as it became clear, however, that nothing would come of the Bundy proposals to form a Government which could partially represent rebel aspirations, the Embassy's allegations that the whole rebel movement was dominated by extreme Left elements were again being heard. With the Embassy virtually out of the running as negotiators, and the Bundy mission finished and gone from the country, a dangerous situation began to build up in the vacuum. Throughout the last week of May and the first 14 days of June, in the total absence of any new American initiative, the crisis deepened.

26. Among the extreme Right-wing Dominicans, who had clearly learned nothing from experience, the cult of "Operación Limpieza"—which was nothing more nor less than an all-out military attack on the city regardless of casualties—gained excited approval. To this group Lieutenant-Colonel Heywood appeared as a towering figure, and his openly repeated statements that "the bunch of commies" in the town had to be "cleaned up" by assault were greeted with enthusiasm. The city, I should explain, contained many women and children, as well as rebel combatants, and the appalling loss of life that such an action would certainly entail among these people was hardly considered beside the mystique that the slogan "limpieza" had acquired. The rebel reply, in this rapidly worsening

situation, was a declaration to fight to the death—"They can have the ashes", said Caamaño, at an interview I had with him then, "but they will never get this city". Events a few days later suggested that this was not an entirely idle threat.

27. Because of its significance to the 14th of June party (the most numerous of the rebel Left-wing groups), the date of the 14th of June was thought to be a particularly dangerous anniversary in the circumstances. The Inter-American Peace Force, created as a result of a resolution by the Council of Foreign Ministers of the American States on the 6th of May, now consisted of some 10,000 American troops, a battalion of Brazilian marines, and a scattering of soldiers from Paraguay and Honduras. In a situation of rising tension the commander of this force took the normal precaution of raising the state of readiness of his units as the 14th of June approached, but this date passed without incident. On the afternoon of the 15th of June, however, after an exchange of fire between the rebels and the Inter-American Peace Force, the United States 82nd Airborne Division, supported by the fire of heavy weapons, advanced from their lines into the Santa Barbara district, and began thrusting towards the centre of the city. Fierce and stubborn house-to-house fighting followed. From Sans Souci, on the east side of the Ozama River, American troops opened a devastating fire with recoilless artillery on the city docks, which they quickly reduced to ruins and left blazing. The main street of the city, El Conde, came under shelling from American artillery, and several hits were registered on the building where Caamaño had his headquarters. The Imbert radio immediately issued a stream of announcements claiming that "Operación Limpieza" had begun and that the elimination of the "Communists" would be a matter of hours. Fighting broke out along the entire line between the Inter-American Peace Force and the rebels, and the civilian casualty list rose, among which, on this day, was the sad death of the two-year-old child of our Embassy head messenger, killed by a grenade in the fighting at Calle Caracas. At around midnight, with the American troops in possession of the Santa Barbara area and the power station, but with the rebel movement still intact and putting up a fanatical resistance, the fighting stopped, and Caamaño telephoned me from his now battered headquarters to claim that his



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troops had frustrated an American attempt to seize the city by force.

28. I have not been able to discover the real reasons behind the American attack on this day. The conduct of the operation was such as to suggest previous preparation, but planning for contingency is normal in any well commanded military force. I am certain that the American commander had no intention whatever of starting "Operación Limpieza". The most likely explanation, I think, is that an opportunity presented itself for a display of overwhelming strength which, in the light of the stubborn American under-estimation of rebel resistance, was thought capable of bringing about the immediate collapse of the Caamaño-led movement. The demonstrations expected for the 14th of June had not materialised, but on the 15th the preparations made to meet that contingency were still on an active footing, and an exchange of fire between the rebels and the Inter-American Peace Force on that day sent the whole machinery into action. Thus, after more than six weeks, the Dominican affair was finally quite out of hand. The political initiatives that had successively brought Mr. John Bartlow Martin, the O.A.S. five-man mission, Dr. José Mora, Mr. Bundy, Mr. Vaughn, Mr. Vance and Mr. Mann, to this tortured island, were a dead letter. Nothing, frankly, was going right for our American friends, and their troubles were by no means confined to the rebels.

29. Early in May, through the O.A.S., the United States offered financial support for the Administration of both the Imbert and rebel factions, as a measure to limit the hardship of State employees. This was immediately rejected by the rebels on the grounds that the O.A.S. had no right to be in the country in the first place, and that being so, they certainly had no business paying the salaries of the servants of the Dominican State. These high-minded sentiments cloaked a good deal of common sense, since once in fee to the Americans, they could always be subjected to the pressures of economic denial, which later had to be brought on Imbert. There was, moreover, a large content of unpaid volunteers in the rebel movement. For Imbert, however, pay for his troops was essential, if he was to maintain physical control over the provincial towns; he accepted and was consequently much better able to exert his authority over the interior, and the newly conquered northern suburbs

of the city in the face of much indifference and, at times, hatred from the civilian population. Because his hold was precarious, the smallest sign of disaffection provoked savage reprisals, especially in the towns of San Pedro de Macoris, San Francisco de Macoris, and Santiago. About 2,000 political prisoners were swept into the notorious penitentiary of La Victoria, near Santo Domingo, and arbitrary arrests were frequent throughout the country. Conditions in the interior were made known to me by certain priests, who visited me from time to time in connection with a small number of arrested persons having British connection. Although, after releasing two of these people as a consequence of my intervention, the Imbert authorities refused to respond to all contacts in connection with the rest, I think it possible that the continued annoyances caused to the Imbert officials by the Embassy's repeated enquiries about their welfare gave these people some measure of protection, and they were all released unharmed during August. For the vast majority of Dominican political prisoners, however, no such recourse was available. After a time, rumours began to circulate which raised fears for their safety.

30. Towards the end of May I had reliable information that some political prisoners at La Victoria were being taken out into the country by night to the State grazing lands at Villa Mella, where they were being shot by firing squads. On the same day I was informed of this, the German Ambassador was riding her horse over the fields in the area and came across two human bodies which appeared to have been partly devoured by animals. Dr. José Mayobre and Major-General Rikhye, of the United Nations presence here, took this matter up immediately and pursued it without flagging until the O.A.S. Human Rights Commission was formed under Dr. Bianchi, and came here to carry out its investigations. The evidence produced by the team of O.A.S. criminologists dealt with the examination of some 20 bodies at Villa Mella, and its conclusions gravely implicated the Imbert junta, which, incidentally, had been foolish enough to try to obstruct the work of the Commission, and interfere with witnesses. Few persons here doubt that the bodies discovered represent only a portion of the people murdered in this way: bodies had been seen floating in the river, and there was no way of knowing what had happened in other parts of the country. The brutal murder of a Canadian priest by the

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police at Monte Plata is unlikely to have brought about the investigation and outcry it did, had he not been both a priest and a foreigner. It was clear that the United Nations and O.A.S. reports on the discoveries at Villa Mella would make disturbing reading in those institutions, and that they could hardly fail to add to the American burden of controversy over the Dominican Republic, already heavy enough.

31. On the 16th of June, therefore, with the streets of the capital strewn with rubble, and the docks still burning as a result of an unsatisfactory American military operation, the rebels still breathing a fanatical defiance in the city, and with the Imbert junta creating embarrassing difficulties in the United Nations Security Council on the issue of Human Rights, the Dominican scene must have presented a melancholy aspect to American eyes. Viewed from the British Embassy here, the unfolding of this tragedy of errors was painful to watch. There is no doubt whatever that the real aspirations of the United States in this country deserved, and still deserve, our profound sympathy. But persistent bad judgment had continued to frustrate their good intentions here, and the possibility that we were almost at the point of no return in the Dominican Republic was a gloomy one indeed.

32. It was at this low point, however, that the policy of the United States towards the Dominican crisis seems to have begun to change direction. The *Ad Hoc* Commission appointed by the O.A.S. on the 2nd of June, composed of Ambassador Ilmar Penna Marinho of Brazil, and Ambassador Ramón de Clairmont Dueñas of El Salvador, and led by Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker of the United States, had arrived here on the 6th of June. Very slowly and deliberately this body carried out a careful survey of the ground without attempting to re-open negotiations, and it was still at the stage of careful reconnaissance when the fighting broke out on the 15th of June. On the 18th of June, probably realising that there was not much more time to lose, the *Ad Hoc* Commission presented to both the rebel and Imbert factions its proposals for an ending to the crisis. For six weeks after this, the Commission had to contend with a rebel negotiating committee that fought for advantage at every stage with a good deal of intelligence, allied to that particular brand of maddening persistence which Dominicans can bring to negotiation. The United States was at last talking to the rebel

movement through Ambassador Bunker, but the proceedings were now hag-ridden by the events of the previous six weeks. The American intervention, the landing at San Isidro which had frustrated their *coup*, the preservation of Wessin, the setting-up of Imbert, and the American material help given to him in his attack on the north of the city, the fighting of the 15th of June, and other incidents, had by now created a state of mind among the rebel leaders in which every American move was treated with obsessive suspicion and caution. But rebel losses in the fighting had been considerable, both in quantity and quality, and the desire to negotiate was there, provided that negotiation would be with the United States. The gradual restoration of confidence in American sincerity had to be the first achievement of Ambassador Bunker, the uphill nature of which task can be measured by the fact that, while the talks were proceeding, the rebels were filling the head offices of the foreign banks in the city with enough dynamite to blow the entire district to Kingdom come, and thousands upon thousands of molotov cocktails were accumulated in buildings in other parts of the town to ensure that, if they were crushed, nothing worth keeping would be left of Santo Domingo. These reckless tactics told on everyone's nerves, the rebels included, I have no doubt, and it is no wonder that Caamaño took the precaution of closing all bars and restaurants in the rebel zone at 5 p.m., from mid-June onwards.

33. The patience and remarkable perception of Ambassador Bunker and his profound experience in negotiation has since guided matters to the present outcome. He told me recently that the Dominican affair was the most complicated and frustrating diplomatic experience he had ever known, far worse, in fact, than any negotiation he has had with Sukarno, or in India, or the Yemen. All his qualities have certainly been needed here. Any move towards a settlement with the rebels was countered by difficulties created by the Imbert faction, at one moment claiming to be the legal Government of the country, at another offering to stand down immediately the Communist threat had been "dealt with". An unfortunate choice as Commander of the Inter-American Peace Force did not make Ambassador Bunker's problems any lighter; this Brazilian officer, General Hugo Panasco Alvim, displayed a prickly kind of bravado and military bluster



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from the start, and fell into the habit of quarrelling with his American deputy, his own Ambassador, the United Nations team, and the *Ad Hoc* Commission itself. Moderation has always been a scarce commodity in the Dominican Republic: at this time, in an atmosphere overloaded with prejudice, suspicion and excitement, President Johnson's selection of Ambassador Bunker was an inspired choice, decisive, in my opinion, in the final outcome achieved. As the weeks of negotiation dragged on, it became evident that the *Ad Hoc* Commission had grasped the realities of the Dominican crisis. By July it could be seen that they were working on the assumption that the rebel movement represented a viable force of political opinion in the Dominican Republic, and that, in the interests of the country as a whole, this opinion merited recognition in the Government that was to follow.

34. Once this fact was appreciated, it was a logical step to extract the United States from its awkward predicament with the Imbert junta, but this, of course, could not be done overnight. Ambassador Bunker's methods with Imbert, whose mortal political weakness in the country he well understood, followed a tactic of gradualness. Outwardly, he seemed to be taking Imbert seriously as a political alternative, but, one by one, he stealthily removed his American props until even Imbert himself suddenly woke up to the fact that the roof was about to fall in. At the end of July the financing of his administration was cut off completely, and from that moment he was doomed. Presidential ambition in this country, however, is a disease not lightly shaken off. At this time he was constantly in the company of Lieutenant-Colonel Heywood, whose passionate belief in the need for an all-out assault on the city had not abated in the least. I cannot say what they discussed together at their frequent meetings, of course, but it is not impossible that Imbert was hoping that his friend's views represented the Pentagon's views, and that if he could only hold on long enough the United States would swing back to its original ideas about the Communist menace in the city. By bringing in a law which allowed him to collect the tax on motor vehicles for the half-year, he was able to scrape together enough revenue to pay part of his army and police force, and by these means he kept going until half-way through the month. But by the third week in August, Imbert was really at the end of his rope,

and it was then, apparently through that extraordinary process of circular thinking which so often governs Dominican actions, he decided on a last desperate throw.

35. During July and part of August the rebel area had several times come under a mysterious mortar bombardment at night, indiscriminately aimed into the city, and the deaths of several civilians had been the result. The United Nations military team here under Major-General Rikhye, which immediately investigated these incidents, found convincing evidence that the mortars had been fired from certain positions in the Imbert-held part of the city. The Imbert junta denied all connection with the firings, and insisted that the extremist elements, over which they claimed Caamaño now had no control, were responsible, and repeated their previous assertions that the rebel movement was rapidly breaking up under the strains of its own contradictions. Major-General Rikhye thereupon suggested to the O.A.S. that a mortar-tracking radar be brought in by the Inter-American Peace Force so that the origin of future incidents could be detected without delay. On the 29th of August at about 10 p.m. an intense mortar bombardment suddenly fell in front of the lines manned by the Latin American Brigade of the Inter-American Peace Force, which faced the rebels on the west of the city. The Latin Americans not unnaturally concluded that the rebels in front of them were responsible, and poured unrestricted fire into the rebel lines. A battle followed resulting in four killed and several wounded. The mortar radar, however, had immediately fixed the origin of the mortar firings as being in seven locations, all in the Imbert area. Ambassador Bunker, after striding calmly through a hail of fire into the headquarters of the Inter-American Peace Force, telephoned the Imbert junta from there, and made known in no uncertain fashion his and his Government's feelings. Caught red-handed, the Imbert faction could hardly deny their responsibility for this reckless attempt at provocation. Worse, from their point of view, the significance of a speech, given by President Johnson at Johnson City, in which a plain hint was given of the forthcoming end of the Imbert junta, was sinking in. Imbert and his colleagues in the junta resigned on the 30th of August. On the 31st of August, the rebel negotiating committee, and Imbert's military, which had effectively withdrawn itself from the junta as soon as its fall

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looked likely, both separately signed an Act of Reconciliation, which formally declared an end to the Dominican civil war, and which acknowledged an Institutional Act as the constitutional instrument by which the Provisional Government will rule for the next nine months. The civil war was over. Dr. Héctor García Godoy was proclaimed Provisional President of the Dominican Republic on the 3rd of September at the National Palace, and the United States recognised his Government on the 4th.

36. As far as I have been able to discover, the one practical result of Mr. John Bartlow Martin's visit here at the end of April as President Johnson's envoy, was the formation of the Imbert junta. He did this in consultation with Mr. Bennett, who, in answer to my questions on the subject, told me that Imbert, among all the Dominican generals, had been the only one capable of "doing anything", meaning, I assumed, that he was the only available opposition to the rebels. The junta was always irrelevant; after the 24th of April juntas had to go out of fashion in this country, at least for a while, and the Imbert experiment was, so to speak, built for obsolescence; a fair comment on the American decision to create the Imbert junta is, I think, that the midwife officiating at the birth eventually smothered the child. Its *raison d'être* was the American Mission's view at the time that Communists were in complete control of the rebel movement, and the danger of the Dominican Republic becoming a Communist-run State was imminent. This being so, any measure—even the formation of a strong-man junta with no relevance whatever to the political mood of the country—was justified, as long as it could be used as a vehicle on which to rebuild the power of the Dominican Armed Forces as a bulwark against Communism. I have already mentioned my sympathy for the American Ambassador's position at the time he had to decide, but he subsequently showed a distressing inflexibility of mind towards new evidence, which I think should have caused him to amend his views. The Communists in the rebel movement are a problem, but I do not think they are the kind of problem that can be solved by the existence of an army which behaves as the Dominican Army has behaved in the past three years. The dominant centre of the

rebel cause at the present time is, in my estimation, social-democratic in outlook, and the proper aim of the United States should be to get behind this force, and encourage it by all means possible. The driving of a wedge between this moderate group—which successfully forced through the decision to negotiate with the *Ad Hoc* Commission—and the extremists who were against negotiation, is a policy entailing risks, but it is less risky, I think, than trying to build dykes with armies and unpopular juntas. The Dominican crisis was not essentially, not originally about Communism; it was a crisis about honest government, and a social system that is breaking up.

37. I would be doing less than my duty if I did not say that what I have seen of the American Foreign Service in action in this crisis has been disappointing. The political section of their Embassy here failed to take the pulse of the patient properly and it never seemed to understand what was wrong with him. The Embassy ended up by being placed outside the main stream of events, and a virtual spectator to the work being done by the O.A.S. *Ad Hoc* Commission. Moreover, the extent to which the United States Service Attachés have been able to influence political decisions is, I think, one of the most dangerous features of the system. Places like the Dominican Republic are full of complex social and political problems: if these problems are treated by applying a kind of coppers-and-robbers rule about Communism, as these officers have done, they are liable to turn into international incidents, to the disadvantage of the United States and the embarrassment of her allies.

38. The story of the Dominican revolt and civil war began with a group of army officers rebelling against the Government at the Camp of 16 de Agosto. It is to end, it seems, at another camp, San Isidro, where a different group of officers are now rebelling against the authority of the new President, Dr. Héctor García Godoy. As the various characters fall out of the narrative of this crisis, one—Brigadier-General Wessin y Wessin—remains, still at San Isidro, where he has been since the first day of the revolt. This officer, whom I described last May as having descended to the level of a destructive nuisance, is sustained by a fanatical belief that he alone can save the Dominican Republic from



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Communism, and he has made it clear that Dr. Héctor García Godoy does not measure up to his standards as a President in that regard. The President, who has no illusions whatever about his position *vis-à-vis* this extraordinary man, abolished Wessin's command on the first day of his presidency. The whole Dominican nation, therefore, is watching with bated breath the development of the inevitable clash between the general who destroyed the Government of Professor Juan Bosch, and manipulated the Triumvirate as he chose, and the relatively unknown diplomatist who is now the Head of State. Four months ago, American troops were landing in their thousands at San Isidro to rescue Wessin after his disastrous failure in the field. Now the wheel of fortune has turned full circle: five days ago

the United States Government recognised the Government of Dr. García Godoy, and the American paratroopers, who had been facing the city for the past four months, are now looking over their shoulders towards San Isidro. The last word on the Dominican crisis has yet to be written.

39. I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Representatives at Washington, United Kingdom Mission to United Nations, New York, Port-au-Prince, Kingston, Caracas and Havana, and to the Resident Naval Officer in Nassau.

I have, &c.

S. F. CAMPBELL,  
*Chargé d'Affaires.*

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CONFIDENTIAL & PERSONALDESPATCHED IN  
DEPARTMENT

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W. 1.

(AD 1015/306)

16 September, 1965.

As today's confidential bag will be the last to reach you while you are still in charge at Santo Domingo, I should like to take the opportunity of thanking you for the admirable job which you have done for us over the past five months. The well-informed and pithy telegraphic reports which you have sent us over this period have been read with close attention not only in the Office but also, as far as I can gather, throughout Whitehall and I have heard golden opinions of them on all sides.

2. I have not yet had time to give your despatch No. 14S the careful re-reading which it deserves; and we shall probably have some comments to offer on it when it has gone the rounds in the Office. Although the despatch is, as you have said yourself, rather on the long side, I think you were right to give full play in it to American misunderstandings and mistakes as seen from your post. It was, after all, American involvement in the Dominican Republic which brought the crisis to the forefront of the international stage; and we must clearly make an effort to understand their motives if we are to be able to bring any useful influence to bear on them should a Dominican-type situation blow up in another Latin American country - which heaven forbid!

(R. M. K. Slater)

S. F. Campbell, Esq., O.B.E.,  
SANTO DOMINGO.CONFIDENTIAL & PERSONAL

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*PW*  
*Dr*  
*4/19*

BRITISH EMBASSY,  
SANTO DOMINGO.

27 SEP 1965

AD 1015/306 ✓

23 September, 1965.

Dear Dick,

Very many thanks indeed for your letter AD.1015/306 of 16 September, which came at the perfect psychological moment - in fact, as the Ambassador arrived. You can imagine what it means to know that you have been pleased at the way things were handled here - for my part it was a wonderful opportunity that fell straight into my lap. I was very lucky. Although physically a long way from the American Dept., I never had any sense of isolation because, from the start, the rapport established by yourself and Bill at the Office with me here was very plain. This meant everything. Especially important, when the going was rather rough, was the care you clearly took not to overload this tiny Embassy, and I have the liveliest gratitude to you for your restraint at that time.

Again many thanks indeed for writing.

*Yours ever,*  
*Stafford*  
(S. F. Campbell)

R. M. K. Slater, Esq., C.M.G.  
American Department,  
Foreign Office,  
LONDON, S.W.1.

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American Dept 123  
for info. Vol 20/10

DESPATCHED IN  
DEPARTMENT

AD1015/306.

? per. file.

19 October, 1965.

I have just been reading a long but extremely interesting despatch from Campbell, our Chargé d'Affaires in the Dominican Republic, entitled "The Revolt in Retrospect". Particularly in paragraphs 19 and 20 he sets out his thinking on the causes which led to the revolt and suggests that these causes are not confined to the Dominican Republic. We are now engaged in looking at other Latin American countries to see how far the situation in any of them resembles, or is likely to resemble, that in the Dominican Republic.

It occurred to me that a similar survey in Jamaica and in Trinidad might be of value. Doubtless you are well aware of any potentially dangerous situation which may be likely to arise in these places, but, if you have not already  
read/

Cledwyn Hughes, Esq., M.P.,  
Commonwealth Relations Office,  
Downing Street,  
S.W.1.

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read it, I suggest you take a look at least  
at these two paragraphs in Campbell's despatch.

(Walston)

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inter.  
13/9.

BRITISH EMBASSY,

(39/2/2)

RECEIVED IN  
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SANTO DOMINGO.

14 SEP 1965 9 September, 1965.

AD 1015/307

Dear Sir,

--- I attach a curriculum vitae for the new Provisional President. Héctor Garcia Godoy is a friend of mine, as you know, and I think he is a most fortunate choice for the Presidency, particularly in view of the immediate problem provided by Wessin.

2. During the long-drawn-out negotiations, Héctor has grown in stature in a remarkable way, and he has quite won Bunker and the Americans over. He is absolutely unflappable, and very determined about sticking out for what he thinks is right. These, of course, are the right qualities for the present difficulties with Wessin, and, barring one of those lightning switches in American policy which occur when the Pentagon takes over from the State Dept., or vice versa, the end can really only go one way.

3. I am sorry my despatch is so long, but there is going to be a fair amount of controversy about this affair in the future - four books are already on the stocks - and I thought the view from the Embassy here, and all the view, ought to go on the record.

Yours etc.

Stafford

(S. F. Campbell)

G. W. Harding, Esq.,  
American Department,  
Foreign Office,  
LONDON, S.W.1.

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Dr. Héctor Garcia Godoy Cáceres

Member of a prominent Dominican family and a descendant of several past Presidents and members of the Dominican Diplomatic Service.

Born in Moca on 11 June, 1921. Educated in Moca and Santiago. In 1936 he entered Central High School, Washington, and later attended the Colegio Ponceño de Varones, Puerto Rico. He studied at the Faculty of Law at the University of Santo Domingo.

Entered the Diplomatic Service as Second Secretary, and was posted to San José; he was later promoted to First Secretary, and was Chargé d'Affaires in Managua. In 1948 he returned to Santo Domingo as Head of the Consular Department in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

He then left the Diplomatic Service and was appointed Secretary of the Board of Directors of the Banco de Reservas. In 1954 he was made Superintendent-General of Banks, and a year later Vice-Governor of the Central Bank of the Dominican Republic.

In 1956 he returned to the Diplomatic Service as Minister-Counsellor in London and Permanent Delegate for the International Sugar Council. In 1958 he was appointed Ambassador to Belgium. Served between 1959 and 1963 as Ambassador to the Court of St. James. In 1963 he was appointed Foreign Minister to President Juan Bosch, which post he held at the time of the coup d'état of 25 September, 1965. Since then he has been Vice-President of the Compañía Anonima Tabacalera.

daughter of a former Ambassador to London.  
In 1944 he married Matilda Pastoriza Espaillet, There are two children.

Dr. Garcia Godoy speaks English, Spanish and French with equal ease and fluency. He is charming and cultivated person, and a man of strong principles.

BRITISH EMBASSY,  
SANTO DOMINGO.

9 September, 1965.





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Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 212 of 25 September.  
Repeated for information to : Washington.

My immediately preceding telegram (not to Washington).

An unconfirmed but reliable source reports that convoy of cars conveying Bosch from the airport was stopped near San Isidro by troops formerly under Wessin's command. Firing was opened and some casualties are reported. At kilometre 9 on Cibao road troops opened fire on truck loads of civilians coming into the city to greet Bosch, of whom several are reported killed. The troops are said to have opened fire on civilians at Haina resulting in several wounded.

2. Bosch addressed a mass meeting (about 25,000) in the city this morning.

Foreign Office please pass Washington lll.

[Repeated as requested]

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Este libro, que contiene documentos originales tomados del Archivo Nacional del Reino Unido, revela cómo los diplomáticos británicos veían, asumían y reportaban los acontecimientos que se desarrollaron en la República Dominicana entre abril y septiembre de 1965: la revolución, la guerra civil y la intervención militar extranjera que le siguió. Esta es, a vuelo de pájaro, la historia contada por Stafford Campbell como encargado de negocios. Y fue tal la naturaleza de los acontecimientos de 1965 en la República Dominicana, que los diplomáticos británicos en Washington, Nueva York y, por supuesto, en Londres se vieron profundamente involucrados. Sus enfoques, preocupaciones y análisis se pueden encontrar en esta obra.

La belleza de un trabajo como este, que ofrece al lector los documentos originales en una forma inédita, es que él o ella pueden derivar su propia evaluación. Esta colección de documentos ofrece una visión al interior de los principales actores dominicanos y de muchos actores extranjeros que también se vieron involucrados.

Los documentos hablan por sí mismos. Espero que puedan disfrutar del análisis sincero y del estilo de esta pequeña muestra de los reportes diplomáticos británicos clásicos, de interés para el lector dominicano, puesto que se refieren a acontecimientos que ocurrieron en Santo Domingo, hace ya medio siglo.

Espero que muchos dominicanos puedan leer este libro, y particularmente espero que el mismo encuentre el camino hacia los anaqueles de muchos con quienes he disfrutado discutiendo de historia dominicana durante mi placentero e inolvidable período como embajador de su Majestad en Santo Domingo.

**STEVEN FISHER**

**Embajador de su Majestad en  
Santo Domingo (2009-2015)**





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